Prooemium

For the understanding of the books of blessed Denys, it must be considered that those things that are contained in the Sacred Scriptures concerning God divide artfully into four parts.

For in a certain book, which is not had among us, which is entitled On the Divine Hypotyposes, that is, characters, he treats those things concerning God that pertain to the unity of the divine essence and the distinction of persons. Of which unity and distinction a sufficient likeness is not found in created things, but this mystery exceeds every faculty of natural reason.

Whereas those things that are said of God in the Scriptures, of which a likeness is found in creatures, have themselves in two ways. For a likeness of this sort in certain things is considered according to something that is derived from God into creatures. Just as from the first good are all good things and from the first life are all living things and thus concerning other similar things. And such things Denys treats thoroughly in the book On the Divine Names, which we have before our hands.

Whereas in certain things a likeness is considered according to something transferred from creatures to God. Just as God is called a lion, a stone, the sun, or something of this sort; for thus God is named symbolically or metaphorically. And concerning things of this sort Denys treats in a certain book of his that he entitled On the Symbolic Theology.

But because every likeness of a creature to God is failing and this very what-God-is itself exceeds everything that is found in creatures, whatever in creatures is known by us is removed from God, according as it is in creatures. And thus, after everything that our intellect, led by the hand from creatures, can conceive about God, this very what-God-is itself remains hidden and unknown. For not only is God not a stone or the sun, as they are apprehended by sense, but neither is he such life or essence as can be conceived by our intellect. And thus this very what-God-is itself, since it exceeds everything that is apprehended by us, remains unknown to us. Yet concerning removals of this sort, by which God remains unknown to us and hidden from us, he made another book, which he entitled On the Mystical, that is, the hidden, Theology.

Yet it must be considered that blessed Denys in all his books used an obscure style, a dark pen. Which indeed he did not from inexperience, but from industry, in order to hide the sacred and divine dogmas from the derision of the infidels.

Difficulty also happens in the aforesaid books, from many causes.

First of all, because generally he uses the style and mode of speaking that the Platonists use, to which modern men are unaccustomed. For the Platonists, wishing to reduce composed or material things to simple and abstract principles, posited separated species of things, saying that there is man beyond matter, and likewise horse, and thus concerning the other species of natural things. They said, therefore, that this sensible singular man is not the very what-man-is itself, but is called man by participation of that separated man. Whence in this sensible man there is found something that does not pertain to the species of humanity, such as individual matter and other things of this sort. But in separated man there is nothing but what pertains to the species of humanity. Whence he named separated man per se man, because he has nothing but what belongs to humanity; and principally man, inasmuch as humanity is derived to sensible men from separated man, through the mode of participation. Thus also it can be said that separated man is above men and that separated man is the humanity of all sensible men, inasmuch as human nature applies purely to separated man, and is derived from him to sensible men.

Nor by an abstraction of this sort did the Platonists consider only about the ultimate species of natural things, but also about the most common things, which are the good, one, and being.

For they posited a first one that is the very essence of goodness and of unity and of being, which we call God, and that all other things are called good or one or beings through derivation from that first. Whence they named that first the good itself or per se good or principal good or supergood or also the goodness of all good things or even goodness or essence and substance, by that mode in which it is expounded concerning separated man.

This ratio of the Platonists, therefore, does not accord with the faith nor with the truth, as regards what it contains concerning separated natural species. But as regards what they said concerning the first principle of things, their opinion is most true and consonant with the Christian faith.

Whence Denys names God at times goodness itself or supergood or principal good or the goodness of every good thing. And similarly he names him superlife, supersubstance, and the very thearchic deity, that is, principal deity, because even in certain creatures there is received the name of deity according to a certain participation.

Yet the second difficulty happens in his sayings, because generally he uses efficacious arguments to show a proposition, and many times he implies them with few words or even one word.

Third, because many times he uses a certain multiplication of words that, although it may seem superfluous, nevertheless for those diligently considering is found to contain a great profundity of knowledge.