C. 7 - On Wisdom, Mind, Reason, Truth, and Faith

On Wisdom, Mind, Reason, Truth, and Faith

Lectio 1

How Wisdom Is Received in God

C. VII. §1. 297. Yet come, if you will, let us praise the good and eternal life both as wise and as per se wisdom; yet more as substantifying of every wisdom and above every wisdom and as super-existing prudence.

298. For not only is God super-full with wisdom and of his prudence there is no number (Ps 147:5), but he is super-gathered above every reason and mind and wisdom.

299. And supernaturally intending this, the truly divine man, the common sun of us and of our leader, says that what is stupid for God is most wise for men (1 Cor 1:25);

300. Not only because every human deliberation is a certain error, judged against the stable and remaining intellect of divine and most perfect things, but because it is the custom for the theologians to say those things that are of privation in God by a contrary passion. Thus also the eloquences call the most clear light invisible (Col 1:15, 1 Tim 1:17, Heb 11:27); and the very laudable and very nameable, ineffable and unnameable; and the one present to all things and found from all things, incomprehensible and uninvestigable. In this way therefore now also the divine Apostle is said to praise the stupidity of God, which appears in those things as beyond reason and unfitting, driving upwards unto the truth ineffable and before every reason.

301. But, which I have said in other works, receiving those things that are above us according to our propriety and fastened to reason co-nourished by the senses and comparing divine things to our own, we are deceived, pursuing the divine and ineffable reason according to the apparent.

302. Yet it is necessary to see that our mind indeed has virtue for understanding through which it inspects intelligible things, yet unition exceeding the nature of mind through which it is joined to those things that are above it. According to this therefore it is necessary to understand divine things, not according to ourselves, but our whole selves established outside ourselves and wholly deified.

303. For it is better to be of God and not of ourselves. For such divine things shall be given to those made with God.

695. After Denys has determined about being and life, here he determines about wisdom and those things pertaining to knowledge that are joined to wisdom; and about this, he does three things:

first, he determines about wisdom and mind;

second, about reason, at yet God is praised as reason;

third, about truth and faith, at this reason is the simple and existing truth.

696. About the first, he does two things:

first, he shows how wisdom is received in God;

second, he manifests what he had said, at for not only is God super-full.

697. Yet it must be considered that prior things always are preserved in posterior things. Yet the good, according to what has been said before, as regards causality is prior to being, because the good extends its causality even to non-beings; yet being extends itself to more things than life and life than wisdom, because there are certain things that do not live, and certain things live that do not know. And this Denys subtly insinuates: for he names the divine life good, because according to intellect it presupposes goodness; whereas he names it eternal, because it presupposes immutable being. But because no wisdom is lacking to this life, he praises it from wisdom, and this in three ways:

first of all, because the divine life is wise; and so that you might not understand that it is wise participatively, he adds that it is per se wisdom, for just as God is his own life, so also his own wisdom.

Second, that the divine life is the cause producing every wisdom in being.

Whereas third, because the divine life is above every wisdom, which pertains to speculation; and above every prudence, which pertains to action.

698. Then when he says, for not only is God super-full, he manifests the three aforementioned things; and about this, he does three things:

first, he manifests that the divine wisdom is above every wisdom;

second, that it is the cause of every wisdom, at therefore praising exceedingly this irrational;

third, he manifests how God is wise by knowing other things, at yet thus God himself who is super-wise wisdom.

699. About the first, he does two things:

first, he shows the excess of the divine wisdom;

second, he shows how we ought to have ourselves to the exceeding divine wisdom itself, at but, which I have said in other works.

700. About the first, he does three things:

first he proposes what he intends, namely that God not only is called superabundantly full of every wisdom, and that he has infinite prudence, but also he is said to be made firm above everything that seems to pertain to knowledge, namely above reason and above mind, that is, intellect, and above wisdom that is the perfection of the intellect;

second, at and intending this supernaturally, he proves the excess of divine wisdom through authority, and he says that Paul, understanding an excess of the divine wisdom of this sort in a supernatural way, who was a divine man from participation of the divine wisdom and was the sun, that is, the illuminator for magisterium, both of Denys and of his leader, that is, Hierotheus who was his master, says in 1 Corinthians 1:25: what is **stupid for God, is most wise for men;

third, at not only because every human deliberation, he expounds on the authority introduced.

701. Where it must be considered that a twofold mode is found in the Scriptures for signifying the excellence of divine things.

For because those things that pertain to privation and defect are attributed to created things according to comparison to the divine excellence, just as if we should say that every justice of man is uncleanness in comparison to the justice of God; and likewise we can say that every human deliberation and knowledge is reputed to be a certain error in comparison to the stability and permanence of the divine and perfect knowledge, which it names plurally on account of knowing plurality.

702. In another way, it is the custom in divine Scripture that those things that it says privatively are attributed to God on account of his excess; just as if God who is most clear light is called invisible; and who is laudable and nameable by all things is called ineffable and unnameable; and who is present to all things is called incomprehensible as though he should be absent to all things; and who can be found from all things is called not investigable: and the whole of this on account of his excess. And therefore, the Apostle also praises stupidity in God on account of that which appears in the wisdom of God, beyond our reason, and which seems unfitting to us, while we cannot comprehend the wisdom of God; and through this he elevates us unto the divine truth, which is ineffable to us and which exceeds our every reason.

703. Then when he says, but, which I have said in other works, he says how we ought to have ourselves to the excellence of the divine wisdom; and about this, he does three things:

704. First, he shows how we are deceived in the contemplation of the divine wisdom; and he says that, as he has said in his other books, while we wish to receive divine things that are above us according to our mode; and while we lean on our reason which is co-nourished by the senses from the beginning, namely gathering truth from sensible things; and while we wish to compare divine things to our own, namely those that are known to us, by this also we are deceived, wishing to scrutinize the reason divine and ineffable to us, according to what is apparent to us through reason and through sense.

705. Second, at yet it is necessary to see, he shows how to avoid this deception; and he says that it is necessary to consider that our mind has two ways to know intelligible things: first, that it has natural virtue, that is, intelligence, through which it can inspect intelligible things proportionate to itself; whereas second, it has a certain unition to divine things through grace, which exceeds the nature of our mind, through which unition men are joined through faith or whatever knowledge to those things that are above the natural virtue of the mind. Therefore it is necessary that we should understand divine things according to this unition of grace, as though not by drawing divine things to those that are according to us, but rather establishing our whole selves outside ourselves into God, such that through the aforementioned unition we might be totally deified.

706. And because someone could say that this would be harmful to us, if we should desert our own selves, for this reason, third, he excludes this, at for it is better to be of God, and he says that, since God is better than us, it is better for us that we should be of God through the unition of grace that that we should be of our own selves, that is, leaning on our natural things. For thus, with us made with God, that is, when we will have been united to God, divine gifts will be present to us that we cannot perceive, if neglecting the unition of God, we should adhere to our own selves.

Lectio 2

That the Divine Wisdom is the Cause of Every Wisdom

304. Therefore praising exceedingly this irrational and out-of-its-mind and stupid wisdom, we say that it is the cause of every mind and reason and of every wisdom and prudence, and this is every counsel and from this is all knowledge and prudence, and in this are hidden all the treasures of wisdom and of knowledge (Col 2:3). For according to the consequence of the things already said above, the super-wise and all-wise cause is the substantifier of per se wisdom itself and of the whole and of the particular;

§2. 305. From this the intelligible and intellectual virtues of angelic minds have simple and blessed and good intellects;

306. Not gathering divine knowledge in divisible things or from divisible things or senses or diffuse speeches, nor driven from some common things to those simultaneously. Yet existing as cleansed from all material multitude, intellectually and immaterially uniformly they understand the intelligibles of divine things;

307. And there is for those intellectual virtue and operation cleansed and immaculate, resplendent with purity and conspicacious of divine intellects by simplicity and immateriality and heavenly unition figured to the divine super-wise both mind and reason, as is possible.

308. On account of the divine wisdom also souls have the rational, diffusively indeed and by a circle going around the truth of existing things, and failing of the unitive minds by the divisible and the most lavish of variety. Yet by the convolution of many things to one also considered worthy of the equal angels, inasmuch as is proper and possible for souls.

309. But also someone should not sin from intention, saying that those senses are the resonance of wisdom.

310. And indeed even the mind of demons, according as it is mind, is from this; yet inasmuch as the mind is of depraved reason, neither knowing how nor willing to obtain that which it desires, it is necessary to call this more properly a fall from wisdom.

311. According to which indeed it has been said that the divine wisdom is the principle and cause and substantifier and perfection and guard and end, of every wisdom itself and of every mind and of reason and of every sense.

312. Yet thus God himself who is super-wise wisdom and mind and reason and knower is praised.

707. After Denys has shown the excess of the divine wisdom, here he shows its causality;

and first, in general;

second, in particular, at from this the intelligible and intellectual virtues.

708. Therefore first he recollects the excess of the divine wisdom, saying that the divine wisdom is praised excellently as irrational, inasmuch as it exceeds reason; and as out of its mind, inasmuch as it exceeds mind or intellect; and as stupid, inasmuch as it exceeds the habit of the mind, namely wisdom; and he joins the causality of the divine wisdom, positing three conditions of this cause:

first of all its causality, saying that the divine wisdom is a cause through some participation of its likeness, of powers both practical and speculative, namely of mind, that is, intellect; and of reason, which is of practical and speculative understandings and habits; of wisdom, which is a contemplative habit of the mind; and of prudence, which is right reason in things to be done.

The second condition of this cause is that effects are said from it: for this is every counsel and nevertheless from this is all knowledge and prudence.

The third condition of this cause is that effects exist in it: for in this wisdom of God, which is Christ, are hidden all the treasures of wisdom and of knowledge, as the Apostle says in Colossians 2:3. And the third condition of this sort is the cause of the second: for God is named from his effects for this reason: because effects preexist supereminently in him. Whence as regards the abundance of wisdom and knowledge in God, he uses the name of treasures; whereas as regards the eminence of the divine knowledge, as it exceeds our intellect, he attributes hiddenness to treasure of this sort.

And indeed he manifests this universal causality of the divine wisdom through the likeness of the things set forth, namely of goodness; of essence; and of life; and he says, as is said in the aforementioned, consequently also here it must be said that God, who is the supereminently and abundantly wise cause, as having every wisdom, is the cause giving even to per se wisdom itself, as this is understood as a formal something, whether it should be understood in the universal or in particular, as he introduces the wisdom of this or of that.

709. Then when he says, from this the intelligible and intellectual virtues, he shows the causality of the divine wisdom in particular with respect to singulars;

and first, as regards the angels;

second, as regards the rational soul, at on account of the divine wisdom;

third, as regards the senses, at but also someone should not sin;

fourth, as regards the demons, not inasmuch as there is the depravation of knowledge, but inasmuch as is from their nature, in which there is a certain knowing science.

710. About the first, he does three things:

first, he posits the procession of angelic knowledge from God, and he says that from the divine wisdom virtues of angelic minds, which are intelligible inasmuch as they are immaterial and are intellectual inasmuch as they can understand, according to a certain participation of the divine likeness, have indeed simple intellects, according to the propriety of their nature; and blessed, according to unition to God; and good, according to the propriety of their science, to direct speech to God.

711. Second, at not gathering divine knowledge in divisible things, he manifests the simplicity of the angelic intellect through the removal of those things that introduce composition in our intellect. Yet it must be considered that in us there is a twofold composition of intellect: one indeed which pertains to the finding of truth, whereas the other which pertains to judgment; by finding, indeed, we proceed as though gathering from many to one, whether many be said for diverse sensible things through the experience of which we receive universal knowledge, or many be said for the diverse signs from which we arrive by reasoning to such a truth. Yet not only do we proceed by many and divisible things of this sort to one intelligible truth when we first acquire science, but also already having science, in those many and divisible things through a certain application we consider what we hold in universal knowledge.

Whereas in judgment, we proceed from some common principle to the aforementioned many and divisible things or particulars and signs of its effect.

Yet excluding both of those from the angels, he says that the intellects of angels do not gather, as we do, divine knowledge, considering in divisible diverse things what they already know or acquiring science from divisible things of this sort: divisible things I say or senses, as regards sensible things, or diffuse speeches, that is, reasons, as another translation has; (John Duns Scotus.) for logos in Greek signifies reason and speech; and there is said diffuse reason, on account of the procession from one to another. For also the aforementioned intellectual virtues, similarly as in us, are driven from some common thing to those many and divided things, but since they are pure from all matter, through which they differ from senses and sensible things, and multitude, through which they differ from diffuse reasons, they understand the intelligibles of divine things not sensibly nor rationally, but intellectually; but and immaterially unto the difference of sense and uniformly unto the difference of reason.

712. Third, at and there is for those intellectual virtue, he assigns the cause of so excellent a knowledge in the angels:

and first of all on the part of their nature; and he says that for those angels there is virtue and intellectual operation resplendent with purity cleansed and immaculate: cleansed indeed through the removal of interior uncleanness; immaculate through the removal of exterior staining; and this purity arrives in them from two sources:

first of all from a certain natural simplicity and immateriality, and this befits these angelic intellects, which he calls divine, on account of their nearness and likeness to God; and from this simplicity and immateriality they are returned conspicacious, that is, understanding acutely.

Second also purity is resplendent in them from a heavenly gift given to them through which they are united to God; through which gift indeed, according to their ability, they tend to the divine, that is, to this very what-God-is itself, to the divine mind and reason, which exceeds every wisdom.

Therefore there is in them purity of intellect and splendor, both from their simplicity, and from the gift of divine grace.

713. Then when he says, on account of the divine wisdom, he shows how the rationality of souls is derived from the divine wisdom; and he says that on account of the divine wisdom also human souls have that they should be rational.

And to expound according to what they are called rational souls, he adds that they go around the truth of existing things, diffusively and by a circle. For the truth of existing things radically consists in the apprehension of the quiddity of things, which quiddity rational souls cannot apprehend at once through itself, but they diffuse themselves through properties and effects that stand around the essence of the thing, while from properties and effects they find causes and from causes they judge concerning effects. And because the angelic minds inspect the truth according to a united and simple consideration, souls fail of them inasmuch as, through the division and multitude of various things, they are diffused unto the knowledge of truth.

But nevertheless, in this very fact that they can roll many things together in one, just as from many effects and properties they arrive at knowing the essence of a thing, to this degree souls are held worthy that men should have intellects in a certain way equal to the angels, namely according to the propriety and possibility of souls: for the investigation of reason is terminated at the simple understanding of truth, just as it begins from the simple understanding of truth that is considered in first principles; and for this reason, in the procession of reason there is a certain convolution as a circle, while reason, beginning from one, proceeding through many, is terminated at one.

714. Then when he says, but also someone should not sin, he posits that even sensitive knowledge is derived from the divine wisdom; and he says that someone will not sin, as though diverting from the intention proposed according to which we intend to assign the procession of the divine wisdom, if he should have said that even those senses are a certain resonance of the divine wisdom. For the lowest of whatever procession is named resonance unto the likeness of that which cannot be sensed from sound on account of distance: for just as the ultimate of life is in plants, so the lowest of knowledge is in sense. For the divine wisdom is above all knowledge: the first effect of which is the knowledge of the angelic intellect, the whole of which consists in uniformity; the second effect is the knowledge of reason, which rolls many things together into one; yet the third effect is sensitive knowledge, which is diffused around many things, but does not prevail to know uniformity.

715. Then when he says, and indeed even the mind of demons, he shows that even the knowledge of demons is derived from the divine wisdom; and he posits the knowledge of demons last, because it is depraved knowledge, although, according to the order of nature, it is higher than the knowledge of reason and of sense; and he says that the mind of demons, as much as it retains of the nature and virtue of mind, proceeds from the divine wisdom; but inasmuch as it has knowledge depraved through an evil will, while the highest good, which it naturally desires, it neither knows how nor wills to obtain by that mode in which it is necessary, in this it rather falls from the divine wisdom; which fall indeed they do not have from God, but from free will.

716. Yet last he recapitulates what he had said; and he says that it has been said that the divine wisdom is the principle from which the whole emanation of knowledge begins, and the cause pouring it forth, and the substantifier, inasmuch as it makes wisdom to be in each thing; and the perfection, inasmuch as it leads knowledge unto the perfect; and the guard, that is, conservation; and the end, because in this all knowledge is terminated: that God should be known. Therefore the divine wisdom is both principle and cause of wisdom itself according to itself received in common; and of every mind, that is, intellect, as regards the angels; and of every reason, as regards men; and of every sense, as regards animals.

Lectio 3

How God Knows Through the Divine Wisdom

313. For how shall he understand anything of intelligible things, not having intellectual operations? Or how shall he know sensible things, gathered above every sense? And indeed the eloquences say that he knows all things and that nothing escapes the divine knowledge.

314. But, what I have said many times, it is fitting to understand divine things as befits God: for without mind and not sensible, according to excess, not according to defect, it must be ordered in God; just as we impose the irrational upon him who is above reason; and imperfection upon him who is super-perfect and pre-perfect; and impalpable and invisible darkness upon the light inaccessible according to the excess of visible light.

315. Wherefore the divine mind contains all things, by knowledge segregated from all things, according to the cause of all things, pre-receiving the science of all things in itself. Before the angels were made, knowing and producing the angels and all other things, within and from the principle itself, so that I might speak thus, knowing and driving unto substance.

316. And this I reckon the eloquence hands on, when it says, he who knows all things before they are made (Dan 13:42). For the divine mind knows not by learning existing things from existing things, but from itself and in itself according to cause it prepossesses and pre-receives the science and knowledge and substance of all things, not according to vision by sending itself to singulars, but according to one continence of cause, knowing and containing all things; just as also light according to cause through its own self pre-receives the vision of darkness, not seeing darkness from elsewhere than from light.

317. Therefore the divine wisdom knowing itself knows all things, immaterially, material things; and indivisibly, divisible things; and many things unitively, in this one knowing and producing all things. For if according to one cause God has handed on being to all existing things, according to the same cause he shall know all things, just as from him are existing things which also preexisted in him; and not from existing things shall he assume the knowledge of those, but he shall be the lavisher of the knowledge of those to singulars themselves and of other things to other things.

318. Therefore God does not have proper knowledge of his own self, yet another common knowledge comprehending all existing things: for the very cause of all things knowing itself is empty somewhere, if it should not know those things that are from it and of which it is the cause.

319. Therefore God knows existing things thus, not by knowledge that is of existing things, but that is of his own self: for the eloquences say that even the angels know those things that are on earth, not according to senses, thus knowing sensible existing things indeed but according to the proper virtue and nature of deiform mind.

717. After Denys has manifested the eminence and causality of the divine wisdom, here he shows how God knows through the divine wisdom; and about this, he does two things:

first, he shows how God knows;

second, how he is known, at thereafter, it is necessary to inquire.

718. About the first, he does three things:

first, he raises a doubt;

second, he solves it, at but, what I have said many times;

third, from the solution posited, he infers certain conclusions, at therefore the divine wisdom knowing itself.

719. Therefore he says, first, that, although God is above all wisdom, nevertheless he is praised in Scripture as mind and as reason and as knower. For there is a doubt: how could he understand intelligible things, since he does not have intellectual operations; and how could he know sensible things, since he does not have sense, but is above every sense; since nevertheless the sacred eloquences hand on that he knows all things and that nothing escapes the divine knowledge, according to Hebrews 4:13: all things are bare and opened to his eyes, and there is not any creature invisible in his sight.

720. Then when he says, but, what I have said many times, he solves the proposed doubt; and about this, he does three things:

first, he shows how sense and intellect are removed from God;

second, how knowledge befits him, at wherefore the divine mind contains all things;

third, he proves this through authority, at and this I reckon the eloquence hands on.

721. Therefore he says, first, that, as has been said many times, it is fitting that divine things should be understood as befits God. For what is said: that God is without intellect and without sense, must not be received according to defect, as though God should be inferior to those things that have sense or intellect, but it ought to be received according to excess, namely because he exceeds all intelligible things. Thus also we attribute to him the irrational, inasmuch as he is above reason; and we attribute to him imperfection, inasmuch as he is perfect above all things and before all things; and we attribute to him that he is impalpable and invisible darkness, inasmuch as he is light inaccessible, exceeding every light that can be seen by us either through sense or through intellect.

722. Then when he says, wherefore the divine mind contains all things, he concludes from the things set forth that the divine mind contains all things by knowing through knowledge separated from all things, namely because his knowledge is above the knowledge of intellect and above the knowledge of sense, inasmuch as he knows all things through the first cause of all things itself, having in himself all science first, before all things have being; just as he had notice of the angels before the angels were made and even before, within his own disposition he produced the angels and all other things, before they were in their proper natures, as though knowing all things, so that I might speak thus, from the primordial principle of things itself; and through his science, he leads all things to this: that they subsist.

723. Then when he says, and this I reckon the eloquence hands on, he proves what he had said through the authority of Scripture; and he says that it is signified in Sacred Scripture when it is said that God knows all things before they are made (Wis. 8:8); and there can be received Sirach 23:29, where it is said: for the Lord God, before they were created, recognized all things. And he expounds this, saying that what he says: that the divine mind knows all things, is not through this: that it acquires the science of things from things, but from itself and in itself it prepossesses, through the mode of cause, the science and knowledge and substance of all things. And he says, substance, because, as has been said above in the chapter on being, in the divine being itself there preexists every being: for through his essence he could not know all things otherwise, unless all things were in him causally. And because he knows all things through his essence, it follows that he knows all things and contains them by knowing, not through the fact that he sends himself separately to singulars by dividing, as we apply our intellect separately to diverse things, but through one continence of cause, namely because by knowing one cause containing all things he knows all things; just as also light, if it were knowing, would know darkness through its very self, not receiving the knowledge of darkness from elsewhere than from itself. Yet God is compared to creatures as light to darkness, on account of the deficiency of creatures from the divine light.

724. Then when he says, therefore the divine wisdom knowing itself, he infers three conclusions from the things set forth. For it is manifest that all knowledge is according to the mode of that by which something is known, as every operation is according to the mode of the form by which someone operates. Since therefore the divine wisdom knows all things through the fact that it knows itself, as has been said, yet this is immaterial and indivisible and one, it follows that it knows material things immaterially and divisible things indivisibly and many things unitively, namely inasmuch as it knows and produces all things through one thing which is its essence. For if effects can be known through the cause, it follows that if he hands on being to all things according to one cause which is his essence, that also according to the same cause he knows all things, as those that proceeded from him which also preexisted in God himself, before they were in their proper natures. And thus it is manifest that God does not assume the knowledge of things from those things themselves, but rather he gives to those knowing that they can know themselves and that other things can be known by other things.

725. He infers the second conclusion at therefore God does not have proper knowledge. For if God by knowing himself knows all things, it follows that there is not one knowledge in him by which he knows himself and another by which commonly he comprehends all things. For if it were such that by knowing himself he did not know all things, it would follow that his causality would be empty somewhere, namely such that there would be some things not caused by him. Therefore just as it is impossible that anything should not be caused by God, so it is impossible that anything should not be known by God.

726. He infers the third conclusion at therefore God knows existing things thus. For if the mode of knowledge follows the principle of knowledge, from which God does not receive the knowledge of things from things, it follows that he knows existing things not through the knowledge that is unto the mode of existing things, but through the knowledge that is unto the mode of his own self; which Scripture also says of the angels: that they know those things that are on earth, nevertheless not that they know sensible things through senses, but through their proper virtue and the nature of their mind, as they are assimilated to God who knows all things through his essence, not only universals, but also singulars. For the virtue of a superior nature is greater and can know more through one, which the inferior knows through many. Therefore God, and even the angels through assimilation to God, knows through mind not only universals, but also singulars; although man knows universals by intellect, whereas singulars by sense.

Lectio 4

How God Is Known

§3. 320. Thereafter, it is necessary to inquire how we know God neither intelligible nor sensible nor anything existing of universally existing things.

321. Therefore can it possibly be true to say that we know God, not from his nature? For this is unknown and exceeding every reason and mind; but from the order of the whole of all things, as proposed from him, having both certain images and assimilations of his divine exemplars, we ascend to that which is above all things by way and order according to virtue, in the removal of all things and by excess and in the cause of all things;

322. on account of which God is known both in all things and without all things; and God is known through knowledge and through ignorance; and there is of him intellect and speech and science and touch and sense and opinion and fantasy and name and all other things; and neither is he understood nor said nor named; and he is not anything of existing things, nor in any of existing things is he known, and he is all things in all things and nothing in any, and he is known in all things and from none of any.

323. For also we say this rightly of God and he is praised by the universe of existing things according to the proportion of all things whose cause he is; and again the most divine knowledge of God is that which is known through ignorance, according to unition above mind, when mind, receding from all other things, afterwards also dismissing itself, is united to the super-resplendent rays; thence also there illuminated by the inscrutable depth of wisdom;

324. and indeed from all things, which I have said, this must be known. For this is, according to the eloquence, what is the cause effective of all things and always concording all things, the cause both of the indissoluble concordance of all things and of their order, and always joining the ends of the first things to the principles of the second things, and beautifully operating one conspiration and harmony of all things.

727. After Denys has shown how God knows, here he shows how he is known; and about this, he does three things:

first, he raises a doubt;

second, he solves it, at therefore can it possibly be true;

third, he infers a conclusion from the things said, at on account of which God is known.

728. Therefore he says, first, that, since it has been said that God knows all things through his essence which is above intellect and sense and above all existing things, it remains to be asked how we can know God, since he is not intelligible, but above intelligible things; nor sensible, but above sensible things; nor is he anything from the number of existing things, but above all existing things: yet all our knowledge is through intellect and sense, nor do we know except existing things.

729. Then when he says, therefore can it possibly be true, he solves the proposed doubt; and because the question is thus, he infers the solution under interrogation. This therefore is the solution: that we know God, not through his nature, as though seeing his essence: for his essence is unknown to a creature and exceeds not only sense, but also every human reason and even every angelic mind, as regards the natural virtue of reason and mind; whence it cannot come to anyone otherwise, unless from a gift of grace. Therefore we do not know God, seeing his essence, but we know him from the order of the whole universe. For the universe of creatures itself is proposed to us by God in order that through it we might know God, inasmuch as the ordered universe has certain imperfect images and assimilations of divine things which are compared to them as exemplary principles to images.

And therefore from the order of the universe, just as by a certain way and order, we ascend through intellect according to our virtue to God, who is above all things; and this in three ways:

first of all and principally in the removal of all things, namely inasmuch as nothing of these things that we see in the order of creatures do we reckon God or befitting God;

whereas secondarily through excess: for we do not remove from God the perfections of creatures such as life, wisdom, and things of this sort, on account of a defect of God, but on account of the fact that he exceeds every perfection of a creature, therefore we remove wisdom from him, because he exceeds every wisdom;

third, according to the causality of all things, while we consider that whatever is in creatures proceeds from God as from a cause. And therefore our knowledge has itself in a mode contrary to the knowledge of God: for God indeed knows creatures through his nature, yet we know God through creatures.

730. Then when he says, on account of which God is known, he infers a conclusion from the things said; and about this, he does three things:

first, he infers a conclusion;

second, he shows how the conclusion follows from the premises, at for also we say this rightly;

third, he manifests a certain thing that he had presupposed, at and indeed from all things.

731. Therefore he says, first, that, because we ascend from creatures to God and in the removal of all things and by excess and in the cause of all things, therefore God is known in all things, as in effects, and without all things, as removed from all things and exceeding all things; and on account of this also God is known through our knowledge, because whatever falls in our knowledge, we receive as adduced by him; and again he is known through our ignorance, namely inasmuch as to know this very what-God-is, because we know that we do not know of God what he is.

And what he had said in general knowledge, he explicates through parts, adding that of God himself there is intellect and speech or better reason, as another translation has, and science which is the conjunction of intellect and reason; and as regards sensitive knowledge he adds, and touch, which is the sense common to all animals; and he adds what is common, when he adds, and sense; and he adds concerning those things that import deficient knowledge, when he says, and opinion, which fails of science; and fantasy, which fails of the certitude of sense. And he adds those things that pertain to the manifestation of knowledge, and he says, and name, which is a sign of intellect; and whatever other things pertain to knowledge or signification. And contrarily, neither is he understood, nor sensed nor said or named.

And how he is each of all those things, he manifests, adding, For God is not anything of existing things, but above all existing things, and for this reason, since existing things are known through intellect and the other aforementioned things, God is known by none of the aforementioned things through the knowledge of any of existing things. Again, God is all things in all things causally, although nevertheless he is nothing of those things that are in things essentially: and for this reason, whatever existing in things is known either by intellect or by sense or by whatever of the aforementioned modes, in all those things known in a certain way God is known, as cause, although nevertheless from none is he known as he is.

732. Then when he says, for also we say this rightly, he shows how the conclusion introduced follows from the premises; and he says that we say this rightly of God according as he is known and not known: for from all beings he is known and praised according as they have proportion to him, as whose cause he is. Yet again the other knowledge of God is the most perfect, namely through removal, by which we know God through ignorance, through a certain unition to divine things above the nature of mind, namely when our mind, receding from all other things and afterwards even dismissing itself, is united to the super-resplendent rays of the deity, namely inasmuch as it knows God to be not only above all things that are below it, but also above it and above all things that can be comprehended by it. And knowing God thus, in such a state of knowledge, it is illuminated by the very profundity of the divine wisdom, which we cannot scrutinize. That we also understand that God is above all things not only that are, but also that we can apprehend, comes forth to us from the incomprehensible profundity of the divine wisdom.

733. Then when he says, and indeed from all things, he manifests a certain thing that he had said, namely that God is known from all things; and he says that this is because the divine wisdom itself is the effective cause of all things, inasmuch as it produces things in being, and not only does it give being to things, but also being with order in things, inasmuch as things unite themselves to one another into the order to the ultimate end; and further, it is the indissoluble cause of this concordance and of this order, which always remain, however things may be changed. Yet he adds the mode of this order, because it always joins the ends of the first things, that is, the lowest of the supreme things, to the principles of the second things, that is, to the supreme of the lowest things, unto the mode in which it unites the supreme of bodily creation, namely the human body, to the lowest of intellectual nature, namely the rational soul; and it is similar to see in other things; and thus it operates the beauty of the universe through one conspiration, that is, concordance, and harmony, that is, due order and proportion, of all things.

Lectio 5

On Those Things that Are Joined to Wisdom, or On Reason, On Truth, and On Faith

§4. 325. Yet God is praised as reason (Wis 18:15) by the holy eloquences not only because he is the lavisher of reason and of mind and of wisdom, but because he pre-receives the causes of all things uniformly in himself, and because he goes through all things, reaching, as the eloquences say, even unto the end of all things (Wis 7:24); and before this, because the divine reason is simplified above every simplicity and is absolute from all things above all things according to the supersubstantial.

326. This reason is the simple and existing truth of the existing, around which just as cleansed and not erroneous knowledge of the whole of things, is divine faith which is the remaining gathering of believers, which gathers them in the truth and the truth in them, by unchangeable identity, for believers having the simple knowledge of truth.

327. For just as knowledge is unitive of those who know, yet ignorance is always the cause of change and of division for the ignorant, from himself; according to the holy speech, nothing shall move the believer in truth from the cause that is according to true faith, in which he shall have immobile and unchangeable permanence of identity.

328. For he who is united to the truth knows well how well he has it; although many reproach him as suffering ecstasy. Indeed he hides those from error, as is fitting, through true faith suffering ecstasy united to truth. For he knows himself, not according as they say, mad, but freed from unstable and variable partition, around the most lavish variety of error, through the simple and always according to the same and in the same way having the truth.

329. And therefore the princes and leaders of our wisdom are put to death for the truth all the day, testifying, as is fitting, by every word and work and the true knowledge of God unitive of Christians that this is both more divine and simpler than all; yet rather, that this is the only true and one and simple knowledge of God.

734. After Denys has determined about wisdom, here he determines about those things that are joined to wisdom;

and first, about reason;

second, about truth and faith, at this reason is the simple and existing truth.

735. Therefore he says, first, that God is praised in Sacred Scripture as reason, which especially can be received from the Sacred Scriptures in that God is called Word, according to John 1:1: and the Word was God. For logos in Greek, as Augustine says, signifies both reason and word. (Augustine, Eighty-Three Questions, q. 63.)

Yet from the name of reason, four things are understood:

first of all it is said to be a certain knowing virtue; and thus God is called reason causally, inasmuch as he is the lavisher of all knowledge, namely of reason and of mind and of wisdom and of all things of this sort.

In another way, it is posited for the cause, as when it is said, by what reason have you done this? (Gen. 3:13) That is, by what cause? And God is called reason thus, not only because he is the cause of all things, but also because he pre-receives all second causes in himself, nevertheless not through the mode of composition, but through the mode of uniformity and simplicity.

In a third way, computation also is called reason, as is had in Matthew 18:23, that he began to pose a reason with his servants. And thus God is called reason, because he is the highest disposition of things that goes through all things, reaching, as is said in Wisdom 8:1, from end even unto end of all things, disposing all things strongly and sweetly.

In a fourth way, anything simple abstracted from many is called reason, as the reason of man is said for what is abstracted from singulars through consideration, pertaining to the nature of men. And as regards this he says that, above all of these, God is reason more properly, because the divine reason is simpler above every simplicity and is absolute, that is, separated or abstracted from all things, inasmuch as according to its supersubstantiality it is above all things.

736. Then when he says, this reason is the simple and existing truth, he treats of truth and faith;

and first, he proposes what he intends;

second, he manifests the proposition, at for just as knowledge is unitive.

737. Therefore he says, first, that, just as some faith is caused from human reason, so also that divine reason is a certain simple truth of the whole of being; around which reason or truth, just as pure and not erroneous knowledge of all things, faith consists: which divine faith indeed is a certain permanent gathering of believers, namely inasmuch as it places them firmly in the truth and the truth in them, as believers have a simple knowledge of truth without doubt and investigation, according to a certain unchangeable identity, namely because in the same way and unchangeably, they remain in the truth. And on account of this firmness of faith, the Apostle called faith substance (Heb. 11:1), as though a certain foundation and gathering.

738. Then when he says, for just as knowledge is unitive, he proves the aforementioned firmness of faith, in three ways:

first of all, through the ratio of knowledge: because knowledge is mutually unitive of those who know, not only from the fact that all knowing the truth are united in one knowledge of the truth, but also because he who knows the truth remains always in the same way in one and the same truth; whereas ignorance, on the contrary, is the cause that the ignorant should be changed from himself, opining that in this way, such that he is divided from others, because different of ignorant men opine different things; and for this reason, according to the speech of Sacred Scripture, nothing can remove from the true faith him who believes in the truth of divine faith, inasmuch as he has impermutable permanence: for the Apostle says in Romans 8:28, I am certain that neither death nor life nor anything else can separate me from the love of God.

739. Second, at for he who is united to the truth, he proves the same from the judgment of believers. For he who is united to the truth through faith knows well how well it is for him, by adhering thus to the truth of faith; although many blame him as suffering ecstasy, that is, as foolish and alienated from himself; for he hides those blaming from their error, because without doubt through true faith he is suffering the ecstasy of truth, as though placed outside of sense and joined to supernatural truth, because believing he knows of himself that he is not mad, as they say, but he has been freed through simple truth and always having himself in the same way, lest he should be borne about through the unstable and variable winds of diverse errors.

740. Third, at and therefore the princes and leaders, he proves the same by the example of the apostles, who are the princes and leaders of Christian wisdom and are put to death for the truth all the day, contesting, as is fitting, not only by word, but also by work and through true knowledge of God which is unitive of Christians, because the very knowledge of God in which Christians are united is simpler and more divine than whatever knowledge of God that is had by men in this world; nay rather, so that we might speak more truly, this alone is true and one and simple knowledge of God. For whatever other knowledge of God is discordant with the common knowledge of Christians, which is named the Catholic faith, must be called error rather than knowledge of God.