C. 5 - On Existing, In Which Also On Exemplars

On Existing, In Which Also On Exemplars

Lectio 1

Certain Things Having Been Set Forth Necessary for the Proposed Intention, He Pursues the Causality of the First Being

C. V, § 1. 257. Yet it must be crossed over now to the truly existing theological praising of the truly existing God. Yet only we shall remember that the intention of the speech is not to manifest the supersubstantial substance, according as it is supersubstantial, for this is ineffable and unknown and perfectly not manifestable and exceeding unition itself, but to praise the substantified procession of the thearchic substance of the principate to all existing things. For the naming of God of the good, manifesting all the processions of the cause of all things, is extended both to existing things and to non-existing things and is above existing things; yet that of life is extended to all living things and is above living things; whereas that of wisdom is extended to all intellectual and rational and sensible things and is above them all. Therefore this speech desires to praise those namings of God manifestive of providence, for it does not promise to narrate the per se substantial goodness and deity, and the substance and life and wisdom of the per se substantial divinity that is above all goodness and deity and substance and life and wisdom super-gathered in hidden places, as the eloquences say; but it praises the goodness manifested and the exceedingly beneficent providence and the cause of all good things, and existing and life and wisdom, which makes substance and vivifies and is wisdom the giver the cause for those things that participate substance and life and reason and sense.

258. Yet it does not say that the good is one thing and existing another and life or wisdom another, nor that there are many causes and other deities productive of other things, exceeding and subject, but that of one there are all the good processions and namings of God praised by us; and that this indeed is perfectly manifestive of the providence of the one God, yet certain ones of the more universal of the same and of the more particular.

§3. 259. And indeed, someone should say: why, with existing exceeding life and life wisdom, living things indeed existing things, yet sensible things living things, yet reasonable them and minds excel reasonable things, and why are they about God and why do they approach more to him? And indeed, it is necessary that those that participate greater gifts from God both should be better and should excel the rest.

260. But if someone were to suppose that those things indeed that are intellectual are not subsisting and not living, well indeed would the speech have itself; yet if the divine minds both are above the rest of existing things and live above the rest of living things and understand and know above sense and reason and more than all existing things desire the beautiful and the good and participate it, those more are around the good abundantly participating this and possessing more and greater gifts from it, as also reasonable things excel sensible things, possessing more than them by an abundance of reason, and certain ones by sense and others by life. And this is, as I reckon, true: that those more participating the one and the God of infinite gift, of the image are nearer to him and more divine than the derelict.

§4. 261. Yet because also concerning those things we have said, come, let us praise the good as truly existing (Ex 3:14) and substantifying of the whole of existing things,

262. Which of the whole of being according to supersubstantial virtue is the substantifier cause and causer of the existing, of mind, of person, of substance, of nature; the principle and measure of the ages and what makes time to be and the aevum of existing things, the time of those things that are made, being for things existing in whatever mode, generation for things generated in whatever mode. From the existing both the aevum and substance and the existing and time and generation and things to be generated and those things that are in existing things and that, in whatever mode, inhere in them and stand under them.

263. For God is not existing in a certain mode, but simply and uncircumscribedly, who receives and pre-receives the whole of being in himself; on account of which also he is called King of the Ages (1 Tim 1:17), as in himself and around himself, with the being of all things for existing things both substantifying and existing.

264. And he neither was nor shall be nor was made nor is begotten nor shall be begotten; yet more nor is he, but he is being for existing things; and not only existing things, but the being itself of existing things is from the existing before the ages: for he is the aevum of aevums, who is before the ages (Gen 21:33, Rom 16:26).

§ 5. 265. Therefore resuming we say that for all existing things and ages there is being from the preexisting, and every aevum and time indeed is from him. Yet of every age and time and everything existing in whatever mode, the preexisting is the principle and cause, and all things participate him, and he recedes from none of existing things, and he is before all things, and all things consist in him (Col 1:17); and simply, if something is in whatever mode, it is and is understood and is preserved in the preexisting;

266. And before his other participations, being is proposed, and being itself according to itself is older than that which is to be per se life and that which is to be per se wisdom and that which is to be per se divine likeness; and whatever other participating existing things, before all those participate being; yet more, all those things which existing things participate according to themselves, participate being itself according to itself, and nothing is existing, of which being itself is not the substance and aevum. Therefore fittingly is God praised as existing more principally than by all the others, from the worthier of his other gifts.

267. For prepossessing and super-possessing pre-being and super-being, from that which is, I say, he made being itself according to itself to preexist, and through being itself he made everything existing in whatever mode to subsist. And indeed, all the principles of existing things participate being and are and are principles, and are first, afterwards they are principles; and, if you wish to call the principle of living things as living per se life; and of like things as like per se likeness; and of united things as united per se unition; and of ordered things as ordered per se ordination; and of whatever other things participate this or this or both or many, you shall find that this or this or both or many participated things, per se participations, are first those participating things and existing first by being itself, afterwards existing as the principles of this or this, and that both existing things and participated things participate being. Yet if these are by the participation of being, much more indeed those that participate them first. Per se goodness proposing, therefore, the first gift of per se being, is praised by the more worthy first participation.

268. And there is, from this and in this, being itself and the principles of existing things and all existing things and what are contained by being in whatever mode; and this incomprehensibly and jointly and singularly.

269. For in unity every number uniformly preexists, and unity has every number singularly in itself; and every number is united indeed in unity, yet inasmuch as it proceeds from unity, so much is it discerned and driven in multitude.

270. And in the center all lines of a circle according to one unition coexist and the sign has all lines in itself uniformly united both to one another and to the one principle from which they proceed; and in this center indeed they are united perfectly, yet little distant from it, they also are discerned little; yet more distant they also are discerned more; and simply, inasmuch as they are nearer to the center, so much also are they united to this and to one another; and inasmuch as they proceed from it, so much are they discerned from one another.

§ 7. 271. But also in the whole nature of the whole of things, all the rationes of each nature are gathered according to one unconfused unition.

272. And in the soul uniformly the virtues of all the particulars of the whole body providingly.

273. Therefore nothing is unfitting, ascending from obscure images to the cause of all things, to contemplate with super-mundane eyes, all things in the cause of all things and things contrary to one another uniformly and unitedly.

274. For he is the principle of existing things from which are both being itself and all things existing in whatever mode: every principle, every end, every life, every immortality, every wisdom, every order, every harmony, every virtue, every protection, every gathering, every distribution, every intellect, every speech, every sense, every habit, every station, every motion, every unition, every concretion, every friendship, every concordance, every discretion, every definition, and whatever other things, existing through being, figure all existing things.

606. After Denys has treated the good in chapter 4, here in chapter 5 he determines about being; about which he determines first after the good, because the good in a certain way extends itself to more things, as the Platonists said: for even what is not existing actually, which is being in potency, from the very fact that it has an order to the good, has the ratio of the good; but it participates the causality of being when it is made a being actually. And because certain men posited that things are made in act according to some example of some preexisting form, for this reason in the chapter about being, he determines also about the examples unto which beings are, as is clear from the title.

607. Yet this chapter is divided into two parts:

in the first, he sets forth certain things that are necessary for the proposed intention;

in the second, he pursues the causality of the first being, at yet because also concerning those things.

608. About the first, he does three things:

first, he manifests his intention;

second, he excludes an error, at yet it does not say that the good;

third, he responds to a certain objection, at and indeed, someone should say.

609. Therefore he says, first, that from the consideration of the good it must be crossed over now to the true praise of God according as he is named by the holy theologians as truly existing. But it is necessary to know before this that there is not in the present speech the intention that the very supersubstantial substance of God, according as he exists supersubstantially in his own self, should be manifested, that is, in order that the essence of God should be known, for this cannot be explicated by speech nor grasped by our knowledge: for whatever our intellect apprehends is less than the essence of God, and whatever our tongue speaks is less than the divine being, nor can the divine essence be manifested perfectly to each created intellect such that it should comprehend it; but it exceeds the unition itself of the intellects of the blessed, who see the essence of God through the unition of their intellects to the very essence of God: for although they see this very what-God-is, nevertheless the perfection of vision is not as great as is the perfection of divine being itself and as is the perfection of the vision by which God sees himself.

610. Therefore it is not of the present intention that the very essence of God should be manifested, through which all things are substantified, according as it is in itself, but that there should be praised the procession of being from the divine principle into all existing things. For by whatever divine name, there is manifested some procession of some perfection from God into existing things, and according as it is said of God it is above all beings. Just as the name of the good manifests all the processions of the universal essence of things and extends itself both to existing things and to non-existing things, inasmuch as non-existing things have something of the good, as they are in potency to being.

Whereas the name of being designates the procession of being from God into all beings, and according as it is said of God it is above all existing things.

Whereas the name of life is extended to all living things, and according as it is said of God it is above all living things.

Whereas the name of wisdom signifies the procession which is extended to all intellectual and rational and sensible things, because even sense itself, inasmuch as it is a certain knowledge, is a participation of the divine wisdom, although nevertheless the divine wisdom is above them all.

611. Therefore this speech tends to this: that it should expound the names of God according as they are manifestive of divine providence, through which perfections are attributed to things. For this speech does not promise that it should narrate the very supersubstantial goodness and substance and life and wisdom of God, according as he exists supersubstantially in himself above all things that are found in creatures; whence concerning the wisdom of God it is said in Job 28:21 that it is hidden from the eyes of all living things. Therefore the intention of the present speech is to praise God by the name of the good, according as he is the cause of all good things; and by the name of existing, according as he makes every substance; and by the name of life, according as he vivifies all things; and by the name of wisdom, according as he gives wisdom.

612. Then when he says, yet it does not say that the good, he excludes an error of certain Platonists who reduced universal effects to more intelligible causes. And because they saw that the effect of the good is the most universal, they said that its cause is the good itself which pours out goodness into all things, and under it they placed another cause that gives life and thus concerning the others, and they called principles of this sort gods.

613. Therefore Denys himself excludes this, saying that the present speech does not say that the good itself is one principle and existing itself another and life another and wisdom another. Nor does the present speech say that there are many causes and diverse deities productive of diverse things, of which certain are exceeding and certain inferior, according to all processions of perfections in creatures. And all the names that are expounded here, the present speech says are of one principle, and there is some name that manifests the whole providence of God, universally, namely the name of the good; whereas certain names manifest divine providence as regards some determinate effects either more universal or more particular, as being, living, and wise, and things of this sort.

614. Then when he says, and indeed, someone should say, he solves a certain objection;

and first, he poses it, which is thus: since being itself exceeds life and life exceeds wisdom, whence is it that living things excel existing things and sentient things living things and reasonable things sentient things, and minds, that is, angelic intellects, reasonable creatures, that is, men, and more are about God and as though more assimilated to him and more approach him according to dignity of nature, although nevertheless it is necessary that those that participate greater gifts from God should be better and should excel others that participate lesser gifts?

615. Second, at but if someone were to suppose, he solves the objection set forth; and he says that the speech of the aforementioned objection would have itself rightly, if someone were to suppose that those things that are intellectual are not existing or are not living; for then just as being excels life and life wisdom, so existing things would excel living things and living things wise things. But the divine minds of the angels do not lack being, nay rather they have it more excellently above other existing created things and have life above other living things and understand and know above the knowledge of the sense of animals and of human reason; and as regards the order to the good, above all existing things they desire the beautiful and the good; and not only do they desire more, as though more perfectly ordered to it, but they participate it more, having more perfect goodness actually.

616. For in these two modes, the good is found in creatures: either according to actual participation of the good or according to order to the good, as it has been said above in chapter 4 that the good extends itself even to non-being actually. Whence reasonably the angelic substances more are around the divine good through a certain approaching to it, as though more abundantly participating this divine good, as though possessing more and greater goods from it than others: more indeed, because they have intelligence that many do not have; whereas greater, because the being itself and living that other things have are possessed more perfectly by the angels.

617. And likewise also rational things, namely men, excel sensible things, that is, brute animals, because they exceed them in reason that they possess before them; and certain ones, as brute animals, excel others, as plants, in the sensible; and others, namely plants, excel the rest of inanimate bodies in life. And universally this truth can be said: that those things that more participate the one itself, which is God, and the God of infinite gift who is giving affluently to all, as is had in James 1:5, are nearer to God and more similar to him than the derelict, that is, those that are exceeded.

618. Yet because also concerning those things. Having set forth certain things that were necessary for the present intention, here Denys proceeds to expound the name of being, according as it is said of God. And because, as he has said already, it is not of his intention to manifest the ineffable essence of God according as it is in itself, but according as the name of being, said of God, manifests the procession of being from God into creatures; for this reason, first, he shows the universal procession of being into all things; second, he shows that from the divine being there flow out also singulars in particular, at and from the same cause of all things.

619. About the first, he does two things:

first, he shows that all existing things universally are from God;

second, he shows that all things are in him, at and there is from this and in this.

620. About the first, he does two things:

first, he shows that there is divine universal causality in respect of all existing things;

second, he shows that from being itself, God properly is named more, at and before his other participations.

621. About the first, he does three things:

first, he shows what his intention is concerning;

second, he pursues the proposition, at which of the whole of being;

third, he offers an epilogue, at therefore resuming we say.

622. Therefore he says, first: because it has been said concerning what has been set forth, the knowledge of which was necessary beforehand for the present intention, we ought to praise the good itself, which is God, as truly existing in himself and as making the substance of all existing things.

623. Then when he says, which of the whole of being, he pursues the proposition, and about this he does three things:

first, he shows that God is the cause of all things that pertain to being;

second, that all things befit him in a certain way, at for God is not existing in a certain mode;

third, that all things are removed from him, at and he neither was nor shall be.

624. Therefore he says, first, that the good itself which is God, according to his supereminent virtue, is the substantifier cause of all substances, and creator of all existing things, namely because he does not produce substances from anything preexisting, but every existing thing comes forth simply from his virtue.

625. Then, he enumerates those things that seem to pertain to being: and first, he posits two universals: namely the existing and mind, that is, intellect. For mind is comprehensive of the whole of being. But because mind, that is, intellect, is not made intelligent actually except through the participation of an intelligible thing that is itself existing, the Platonists posited that the existing itself, which they posited as separated, is above the first created intellect, as the intelligible is before the intelligent and the participated before the participating. And on account of this, Denys said here that God is the creator cause of the existing itself and of mind itself.

626. Then, he posits those things that pertain specially to the substances themselves of existing things; in which three things can be considered:

one of which is the singular itself, which in itself embraces principles and universals and individuals as Socrates or Plato; and as regards this, he says, person.

Whereas the second is species or genus, as man or animal, in which there are comprehended universal principles in act, yet singulars in potency: for man is said of him who has humanity, without the precision of individual principles; and as regards this he says, substance.

Whereas the third is the essence of genus or species, as the ratio of the species is signified by the name of humanity (in which indeed only the principles are comprehended by the name): for none of the individual principles pertains to the ratio of humanity, unless it signifies precisely the fact that man is man. Yet none of the individual principles is of this sort; whence in the name of humanity, no individual principle is included either actually or potentially; and as regards this he says, nature.

627. Yet to the ratio of being there pertains first of all the substance of a thing, about which it already has been said, whereas second the measure itself of the duration of things; and as regards this he adds that God is the principle and measure of the ages. Yet the measure of the duration of each thing is called an age. Whence the time that one generation of men can last or that the memory of human deeds commonly is accustomed to last is called one age; whence by certain men the space of one thousand years is called an age. Yet it is manifest that the measure of the duration of each thing is prefigured by God, and for this reason he says that the principle in whatever genus is the measure of those things that are in that genus, as the unit of numbers and tone in melodies. Therefore the divine being itself is the measure of all ages, not indeed equal, but exceeding.

And consequently he expounds in particular how it is the principle of the ages. For some existing things have duration in two ways: for the being of certain things is subject to change; and the duration of these is measured by time, and as regards this he says, and what makes time to be. Whereas the being of certain things is not subject to change, and the duration of these is measured by the aevum; and as regards this he says, and he makes the aevum of existing things. For just as time has itself to motion, so the aevum has itself to being itself; and for this reason he adds that God causally is the time of those things that are made and he is being causally for all things existing in whatever mode; in which he excludes the opinion of the Platonists who posited that both time and being itself subsist as though separated under God.

628. Third, to the ratio of being there pertains generation which is change unto being; and for this reason he adds that God is the generation causally for all things generated in whatever mode, because he grants generation to all things, as is said in Isaiah 66:9.

And thus it is clear that from the first existing itself, which is God, there is caused both the aevum that is the measure of being; and substance which is per se existing; and everything existing in whatever mode; and again, from God there is caused that there is the measure of motion and generation itself and what is generated, and not only are existing things themselves caused by God, but even whatever are in existing things, as parts and natural properties and those things that in whatever mode either inhere in them, as accidents, or stand under them, as substances.

629. Then when he says, for God is not existing in a certain mode, he shows that all things befit God, in a certain way. For the evidence of which it must be considered that every form, received in anything, is limited and bounded according to the capacity of the receiver; whence, this white body does not have the whole of whiteness according to the whole ability of whiteness. But if there were separated whiteness, nothing would be lacking to it which pertains to the virtue of whiteness. Yet all other things, as has been said above, have received and participated being, and for this reason they do not have being according to the whole virtue of being, but God alone, who is subsisting being itself, has being according to the whole virtue of being; and this is what he says: that for this reason God can be the cause of being for all things, because he is not existing in a certain mode, that is, according to any finite and limited mode, but universally and infinitely he receives in himself the whole of being and pre-receives it, because in him it preexists as in a cause and from him it is derived to other things. And for this reason he is called in 1 Timothy 1:17: King of the Ages, because in himself he has the whole of being and every substance and all existing things, and again just as around him, inasmuch as they are derived from him.

630. Then when he says, and he neither was nor shall be, he shows that all things are removed from him, as regards that mode in which they befit creatures; and he says that he was not, as though something of his being should have lapsed in the past; nor shall be, as though something of his being should be expected in the future; and this because he was not made, yet only the being of those things that happen to be made is varied through past and future; nor also does it happen to him that he should be generated in the present or in the future unto the mode of temporal generation; and what is more, nor is he, namely according as present time is signified, because his being is not measured by time, but he is being for existing things, not indeed such that God himself should be the formal being of existing things, but he uses that mode of speaking that the Platonists used who said that there was a separated being of existing things, inasmuch as composite things are participated through the participation of abstract things. And that this must be understood causally is apparent through the fact that he adds that not only existing things are from God, but also the being itself of existing things is from God, who is before the ages; and he is said to be before the ages because he is the aevum of aevums, that is, the measure of all dimensions.

631. Then when he says, therefore resuming we say, he gathers those things that have been said, and he says by resuming that all existing things and the measures of being have being from the preexisting; and every aevum and time, which are durations, are from him and he is the effective principle and final cause of every age and time and of whatever thing existing in whatever mode; and again all things participate him, as the first exemplar form; and not only is he the cause as regards the becoming of things, but also as regards the whole of being and duration, which he manifests when he says, and he recedes from none of existing things; for with the builder receding, the house remains, because he is the cause of the house as regards becoming and not as regards being, but if God were to recede from his effect, the effect would not remain, because he is the cause of being itself. And because a cause surpasses its effects, he is before all things and all things consist in him (Col. 1:17), as effects preexist virtually in a cause; and universally, whatever is in whatever mode, preexists in the first being, namely God, both as regards the being that it has in the intellect and as regards the conservation of its being.

632. Then when he says, and before his other participations, he shows that being, said of God, signifies the procession of existing things from God; and he shows that this name being, or He Who Is, is said most fittingly of God. Yet he shows this by two arguments, the second of which begins at for prepossessing and super-possessing.

633. The first argument is thus: if any cause should be named from its effect, it is named most fittingly from the principal and most worthy of its effects. Yet being itself among the other effects of God is more principal and worthy. Therefore God, who cannot be named by us except through his effects, most fittingly is named by the name of being. Therefore this is what he says: that being itself has been proposed to creatures for participating before the other participations of God. For whatever perfection a creature should have, it is made through this in the participation of God, who as it were is proposed and offered to all for participating; but first he is participated as regards being itself, before whatever other perfection: and per se being itself is older, that is, first and more worthy, than that which is to be* per se life and that which is to be per se wisdom and that which is to be per se *divine likeness.

634. Yet here it occurs to be considered, that here there is said per se being or per se life and things of this sort.

For the evidence of which it must be known that the Platonists, whom Denys imitates much in this work, before all things participating composition, posited separated per se existing things, which are participated by composite things; as before singular men who participate humanity, they composed separated man existing without matter, by the participation of which singular men are said. And likewise they said that, before those composite living things, there was a certain separated life, by the participation of which all living things live, which they called per se life; and likewise per se wisdom and per se being. Yet they posited these separated principles diverse from one another from the first principle that they named per se good and per se one.

Yet Denys consents to them in something and dissents in something; he consents indeed with them in the fact that he posits life existing per se separated and likewise wisdom and being and other things of this sort; yet he dissents from them in the fact that he does not say that these separated principles are diverse, but one principle which is God, as has been said above.

Therefore when there is said per se life, according to the thought of Denys, this can be understood in two ways: in one way, according as the per se imports discretion or real separation, and thus per se life is God himself. In another way, according as it imports discretion or separation only according to reason, and thus per se life is what is in living things, which is not distinguished from living things according to the thing, but according to reason only. And there is the same ratio concerning per se wisdom and thus concerning the others; and he posits that exposition below in chapter 6.

Yet here he receives per se life for the life that is in living things: for he is speaking here about participations, yet life existing per se is not a participation.

635. Yet that per se being is first and more worthy than per se life and per se wisdom, he shows in two ways: first of all, through the fact that whatever things participate other participations first participate being itself: for first something is understood as being before one, living, or wise.

Second, that being itself is compared to life, and other things of this sort, as participated to participating: for even life itself is a certain being, and thus being is prior and simpler than life and other things of this sort, and is compared to them as their act. And for this reason he says that not only do those things that participate other participations first participate being itself, but, what is more, all things that are named per se, as per se life, per se wisdom, and others of this sort, which existing things participate, participate per se being itself: because nothing is existing of which per se being itself is not the substance and aevum, that is, the form participated for subsisting and enduring. Whence since life is a certain existing thing, life also participates being itself.

Therefore from this he concludes the principle proposition, namely that God fittingly, more principally before all other names, is praised as existing, as though from the worthier of his gifts. And that he is praised thus more principally is clear in Exodus 3:14, where it is said, He Who Is has sent me to you.

636. Then when he says, for prepossessing and super-possessing, he posits a second argument which is thus: if another cause should be named from its effect, it is necessary that it should be named more principally from the first effect through which it made them all; yet being is of this sort; therefore God is named more principally through being itself. Therefore this is what he says: that God himself prepossesses and super-possesses pre-being and super-being.

637. Therefore here it must be considered that one thing can be preferred to another in two ways, namely: as regards the fact that it is had and as regards the mode of having, as one man who has greater knowledge than another is preferred to him as regards the quantity of what is had. But an angel is preferred to a man in wisdom, not only as regards the quantity of wisdom, but also as regards the mode of having, because the man has rationally, whereas the angel intellectually, and thus it exceeds in both ways, namely both as regards what it has and as regards the mode of having.

638. Yet as regards what it has, it exceeds in two ways, namely: according to order, because it has being first, and on account of this he says, pre-being, and as regards dignity, because it has being more excellently, and on account of this he says, super-being. And likewise as regards the mode of having, there can be understood the ratio of order and dignity, and for this reason he says, prepossessing and super-possessing. And therefore God, having being more eminently from himself, through a certain likeness among his other effects, first made what is to be, that is, being itself according to itself, and through being itself he made all things whatever are to subsist: for through this each thing is caused by God: through its being from God, and not only do other existing caused things participate being, but also those principles of existing things participate being, inasmuch as they are and are principles. And first being according to itself applies to them and afterwards that they should be principles of other things.

639. For if someone should wish to say, according to the opinion of the Platonists, that per se life, that is, a certain separated life under God, is the principle of living things, inasmuch as they are living, and of like things, per se likeness, and likewise concerning all other participating things, whatever things participate this or that or both or many, you shall always find that things of this sort, although they be participated by others, nevertheless themselves also participate being itself, and first they are understood as participating being, before that they should be principles of other things, through the fact that they are participated by other things. Yet this also can be understood according as per se life is understood as the life itself which is in living things, which is the formal principle for living things, and likewise concerning the others. Therefore if these that are principles of other things are not except through the participation of being, much more are not those that participate them except through the participation of being itself. And thus it is clear that God causes all things through being itself. From which he concludes the principle intention, and he says that God, who is per se goodness and first proposing, that is, granting, to created things this gift that is per se being, is praised by this name, which is as it were from the more worthy and first of his participations.

640. and there is from this and in this. After Denys has shown that all existing things universally are from God, here he intends to show that all things universally are in him; and about this he does two things:

first, he proposes what he intends;

second, he manifests the proposition, at for in unity every number uniformly preexists.

641. Therefore he says, first, that not only from this goodness of God, but also in this is per se being itself, which is the participation of God, and all principles of existing things and all existing things, both substances and accidents, and all in whatever mode are contained under being, as imperfect beings, as being in potency and motion and other things of this sort. And lest anyone were to believe that these are in God in the same mode as in themselves, consequently he excludes this. For in themselves all things caused are finite, yet in God they are infinite, because in God they are the divine essence itself; and for this reason he says, and this incomprehensibly. Again, in themselves they have opposition and diversity, yet in God they are joined together simultaneously; and for this reason he says, and jointly. Again, in themselves they have multitude, yet in God they are one; and for this reason he adds, and singularly, that is, unitedly.

642. Then when he says, for in unity every number uniformly preexists, he proves the proposition;

and first, through examples;

second, through reason, at for he is the principle of existing things.

643. About the first, he does two things:

first, he proposes examples;

second, he argues through example, at therefore nothing is unfitting.

644. About the first, he proposes four examples:

the first of which is concerning unity and number; and he says that number uniformly preexists in unity, because unity virtually is every number, as Boethius says in the Arithmetic. (Boethius, On Arithmetic, bk. 1, c. 7.) Yet he says, uniformly, because everything that is in another is in it through the mode of that in which it is; whence number in unity is existing in it through the mode of unity, and this is what he says: uniformly. Again he says, unity has in itself every number, because all the properties of all numbers in some way are found in unity: for whether I should receive numbers squared or cubed or whatever other figures of numbers, in whatever disposition of numbers, unity is found first. And again, it must be considered that every number in unity itself is one, but as much more as it recedes from unity, so much more is it distinguished and led away into multitude.

645. He posits a second example concerning a center, and he says that in the center all lines that are led out to the circumference exist simultaneously as in a common principle; and that sign, that is, the point that is called the center, has in itself uniformly all lines conjoined both to one another and to the principle from which they proceed, because just as from one they are produced into multitude, so their multitude is terminated at the center, as at a term.

And it must be considered that the lines that in this center are united perfectly, receding little from the center, are little distant from each other; and this simply must be said: that inasmuch as they are nearer to the center, so much more are they united both to this center and to one another; whereas as much more as they are distant from the center, so much more also are they distant from one another, just as also it is concerning number that, as much more as it recedes from unity, so much more is it multiplied.

646. He posits a third example concerning universal nature, which, according to Plato, is some separated substance; whereas according to Aristotle, is some virtue of the first natural body. Yet in whichever mode universal nature should be received, it is manifest that in the universal nature of all natural things there are united the rationes of whatever particular nature, not through the mode of confusion, as stones are united in a heap, but through the mode of a certain unition: just as if we should say that the rationes of generable things virtually consist in the sun and all the rationes of members virtually exist in the seed.

647. He posits a fourth example concerning the soul, which is the cause of the body both as efficient and as form and as end, as is said in the second book of the De Anima; (Aristotle, On the Soul, 2.4, 415b7–28; cf. Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle's On the Soul, lect. 7, nn. 318–323.) and thus in the soul, as in a common cause, there preexist all the virtues of the parts of an animal, by which it is provided for the whole body. For all the virtues are rooted in the soul as in a common root.

648. Therefore from these examples, he concludes further that, from the things set forth as from certain obscure likenesses, that is, failing of the divine representation, we can ascend to the universal cause of all things through the likeness of particular causes, so that thus, by transcending all mundane things with the eyes of the mind, we might contemplate all things to be simply in God, who is the cause of all things, and that those things that are contrary to one another, as they are in their natures, preexist simply and unitedly in God. For what is the proportion of a particular cause to its effects, the same is the proportion of the universal cause to all things.

649. Then when he says, for he is the principle of existing things, he proves the same through reason, through which the abovesaid proof is confirmed. For all the many things that are from one principle preexist unitedly in the first principle. And therefore it is clear that all things are unitedly in God, since he is the principle of all things.

650. Yet in this causality of God, first he posits those things that pertain to being itself; and he says that there is from God the being itself of things and all things existing, in whatever mode they are. Yet there pertains to being both the principle of being and the end, because they are found in all existing things; and for this reason he says that from him is every principle and every end.

Second, he posits those things that pertain to life; and he says that there is from God every life and immortality, which is the unfailingness of life.

Third, he posits those things that pertain to wisdom; and he says that there is from God every wisdom. And because it belongs to the wise man to order, he adds, and every order and every harmony, which is the fittingness of order.

Fourth, he posits those things that pertain to virtue; and he says that from God there is every virtue. Yet it pertains to virtue that someone should be preserved from harms, and as regards this he says, every protection; and that someone should be made firm in those things that befit him, and as regards this he says, every gathering; and that someone should pour forth those things that he has, and as regards this he says, every distribution.

Fifth, he posits those things that pertain specially to knowledge; whence he says, every intellect as regards the angels; every speech, that is, reason, as regards men; every sense as regards animals; every habit by which the cognitive or appetitive reason is perfected.

Sixth, he posits those things that pertain to bodily things; and he says, every station, that is, rest; and every motion.

Seventh, he posits those things that pertain to one; and he says, every unition, universally; every concretion, as regards the union of bodies; every friendship, as regards the union of affections; every concordance, as regards the union of conceptions and opinions.

Last, he posits those things that pertain to multitude; and he says, every discretion, that is, distinction; and every definition, that is, the determination of each thing: for each thing is determined in itself through the fact that it is distinct from others. And not only are those from God, but whatever other things pertain to being by which beings are informed.

Lectio 2

That God Is the Cause of All Particular Beings According as They Are in Their Proper Natures

§ 8. 275. And from the same cause of all things are the both intelligible and intellectual substances of the deiform angels and of souls and of every nature of the world and in whatever mode things said to be in others or to be according to thought.

276. And indeed, the most holy and most advanced virtues existing and gathered as in vestibules of the supersubstantial Trinity, from this and in this have both being and being deiformly; and after those, subjectly and extremely as to the angels, yet as to us super-mundanely.

277. And souls and all other existing things according to the same ratio have both being and wellbeing and are and are well from the preexisting being and having wellbeing; and in this are both existing things and well-existing things; and from this beginning and in this guarded and unto this terminated.

278. And indeed he distributes certain dignities of being to superior substances that the eloquences even call eternal; yet being itself is not in any way forsaken by all existing things.

279. Yet being itself also is from the preexisting and being is of this and this is not being and being is in this and this is not in that which is being and being has this and this does not have being and this is the aevum of being and principle and measure existing before substance and before what exists and before the aevum and the substantifier of all things and principle and middle and end.

280. And on account of this, from the eloquences, he who truly preexists according to the intention of all existing things is multiplied and properly is praised as what was in him and is and shall be and has been made and is made and shall be made: for as it befits God for intelligent things, all those signify that he is according to every intention supersubstantially and is the cause of existing things everywhere. For he is not this indeed, yet is not this; nor is he somewhere indeed, yet is not somewhere; but he is all things, as the cause of all things, and every principle is in him, the cause of the whole of things comprehending and prepossessing all terminations of all things and he is above all things, as supersubstantially super-existing before all things; on account of which also all things both simultaneously are predicated of him and he is nothing of all things: of every figure, of every form, without form, without beauty; pre-receiving in himself incomprehensibly and excellently principles and middles and ends of existing things and being for all things, according to one and super-united cause, super-pouring out by shining immaculately.

281. For if our sun, the substances and qualities of sensible things and indeed many and different existing things, nevertheless this, existing as one and uniformly, light by shining and super-pouring, renews and nourishes and guards and perfects and discerns and unites and makes to flourish again and makes to be germinable and increases and changes and gathers and from plants makes to go forth and moves upwards and vivifies all things, and each of the whole of things according to its propriety by one and the same sun participates and the one sun pre-receives uniformly in itself the causes of many participating things, much more in the cause of all things must it be conceded that the exemplars both of this and of all existing things preexist according to one supersubstantial unition, because it produces substances also according to an excess from substance.

651. After Denys has shown that God is the universal cause of the being of all things, here he shows that he is the cause of all particular beings, according as they are in their proper natures; and it is divided into three parts:

in the first, he shows the proposition;

in the second, he determines about exemplars, at yet we say that exemplars are the substantifying rationes;

in the third, he offers an epilogue for the things that have been said above, at therefore all existing things must be attributed to him.

652. About the first, he does three things:

first, he shows that the proper natures of things are from God;

second, he infers a corollary from the things said, at and on account of this, from the eloquences;

third, he manifests through an example, at for if our sun.

653. About the first, he does two things:

first, he posits that all grades of beings are from God;

second, that even common being itself is from God, at And indeed he distributes certain dignities.

654. About the first, he does three things:

first, he distinguishes the grades of beings, saying that they are from God;

second, he adds the grades of the supreme beings, at and indeed, the most holy and most advanced virtues;

third, he distinguishes the grades of inferior beings, at and souls and all other existing things.

655. Therefore he says, first, that from the universal cause of all things, which is God, are the substances of the angels like God, which are intelligible, inasmuch as they are immaterial, and are intellectual, inasmuch as they have the virtue of understanding themselves and other things, and this is the first grade of substances, which are neither bodies nor united to bodies.

The second grade is of substances that are not bodies, but are united to bodies; and as regards this he says, and of souls.

The third grade is of bodily substances; and as regards this he says, and of every nature of the world.

In the fourth grade of beings are accidents, which are in nine genera.

The fifth grade is of those things that are not in the nature of things, but only in thought, which are called beings of reason, as genus, species, opinion, and things of this sort; and as regards these two grades he says that they are from God in whatever mode any things are said to be in others, as accidents, or to be according to thought, as beings of reason.

656. Then when he says, and indeed, the most holy and most advanced virtues, he distinguishes the grades of the supreme beings, that is, of the angels, which are distinguished into three parts. Therefore as regards the angels of the supreme hierarchy, he says that from this universal cause of all things and also in this the virtues of the supreme angelic hierarchy have both being and conformity to God, which are most holy on account of perfect union to God, and most advanced on account of the height by which they excel other things, and are gathered as though in vestibules of the supersubstantial divine Trinity: for it is the opinion of Denys, as is clear in the eighth chapter of the Angelic Hierarchy, that the angels of the supreme hierarchy are not sent to exterior things, and thus established in the hiddenness of most high divine contemplation they are said always to assist, unto the likeness of ministers who dwell always with the king, keeping watch in his houses. (Dionysius, The Angelic Hierarchy, c. 8, n. 4.)

Whereas as regards the angels of the second hierarchy, he says that the virtues of the middle angelic hierarchy, which are subjected to the aforementioned virtues, subjectly, that is, in an inferior mode, have being from God.

Whereas as regards the angels of the lowest hierarchy, the angelic virtues have being from God extremely, that is, in the lowest mode.

But extreme and lowest are said in angels through comparison to superiors, but through comparison to us, they are super-mundane, and they participate the goodness of God above the mode of mundane things.

657. Then when he says, and souls and all other existing things, he distinguishes certain grades in inferior things, namely in souls and in bodily substances; and this in two ways:

first, according to the order that is between being and wellbeing; and this is what he says: that souls and all other existing things, below souls, have being and wellbeing and are denominated existing things and well-existing things, inasmuch as they have being and wellbeing from the first being, and inasmuch as both beings and well-beings are in the first being; and this according to the same ratio according to which these are said of the angels.

Second, he shows the grade in them as regards the progress of being: for things of this sort begin to be from this first being, as from a first principle; and in this first being they are guarded, that is, conserved, as in a first principle which is the cause not only making, but also conserving in being, and unto this first being all things are terminated as unto a last end. Yet grades of this sort are attributed to inferior substances inasmuch as they are subject to change, through which they begin to be and are made better, according to the procession from being to wellbeing.

658. Then when he says, and indeed he distributes certain dignities, he shows that God is the cause of common being itself; and about this, he does two things:

first, he shows that being itself is common to all things;

second, he shows how common being itself has itself to God, at yet being itself also is from the preexisting.

659. Therefore he says, first, that God distributes to superior substances certain more noble proprieties of being, through which superior substances are called eternal, as though always existing, according to that line of the Psalmist: arise, eternal gates (23:7). Yet they are called eternal because, as regards something, they participate eternity: because they were not always, but because, from when they were, they never cease to be. And although dignities of being of this sort befit superior substances only, nevertheless this very thing that is being is not forsaken by all existing things, because nothing can be called existing unless it has being.

660. Then when he says, yet being itself also is from the preexisting, he shows how being has itself to God; and he says that common being itself is from the first being, which is God, and from this it follows that common being has itself otherwise to God than to other existing things, as regards three things:

first of all, as regards the fact that other existing things depend upon common being, yet God does not, but rather common being depends upon God; and this is what he says: that common being itself is of God himself as depending upon him, and God himself is not of being, that is, of common being itself, as depending upon it.

Second, as regards the fact that all existing things are contained under common being itself, yet God is not, but rather common being is contained under his virtue, because the divine virtue is extended more than created being itself; and this is what he says: that common being is in God himself as the contained in the containing and not conversely is God himself in that which is being.

Third, as regards the fact that all other existing things participate that which is being, yet God does not, but rather created being itself is a certain participation of God and a likeness of him; and this is what he says: that common being has this, namely God, as participating his likeness, yet God himself does not have being, as though participating being itself. And from this it is clear that God himself is the aevum of created being itself and its duration (this is the ratio of duration) and is also its principle and measure; nevertheless such that he is existing before every substance and before every being and before every aevum, and not only is he before by duration and order, but also by causality, because he is the substantifier of all things, as the cause of subsisting for all things, is the principle of being for all things, and the middle, according as the duration and procession of all things is from him, and he is also the end to which all things tend.

661. Then when he says, and on account of this, from the eloquences, he infers a conclusion from the things said; and he says that, on account of this: that God is the principle of all things, in Sacred Scripture God himself who truly preexists all things is praised in many ways according to every ratio of existing things. For there is said of him what was and is and shall be, through which there is understood what has been made, that is, the past; and what is made, that is, the present; and what shall be made, that is, the future.

Which indeed must not be understood as though the divine being should be subject to time, but through this there is signified, for those who can understand divine things, that it is befits according to God, that every being, according to whatever ratio of being, supersubstantially exists in him, who is the cause of all existing things: for his being is not finite through any nature determined to genus or species, so that it should be able to be said that he is this and is not that, as are even spiritual determinate substances; nor also through place, so that it should be able to be said that he is here and is not there, as happens in bodies, but he is all things as the cause of all things, that is, he prepossesses every being in himself, and in him there are comprehended and prepossessed the principles of all beings and ends; nevertheless not in the same mode as in things themselves, but he is above all things, supereminently existing before all things.

And because in him, in a certain way, are all things, as though comprehending all things in himself, simultaneously all things are predicated of him and simultaneously all things are removed from him, because he is nothing of all things, but above all things; as it is said that he is of every figure, inasmuch as all preexist in him, and nevertheless he is without figure, because he does not have that he should be figured unto the mode of things; and by the same ratio he is of every beauty and nevertheless without beauty, namely inasmuch as he pre-receives in himself incomprehensibly and excellently principles, middles, and ends, not according to any corruption, but from the fact that he, according to one unity, pours being into all things, by super-shining upon them without stain of himself: for altering he is not altered, as happens in bodies.

662. Then when he says, for if our sun, he manifests what he had said through a sensible example; and he says that our sensible sun, existing as one and uniformly, light by infusing all things, all sensible things both as regards substances and as regards qualities, it renews, by generating other things anew when certain things have corrupted, as is apparent in plants and in vines stricken by frost; and nourishes all living things; and guards, that is, conserves all things universally, both living and non-living; and perfects, that is, leads to life and due perfection; and discerns, that is, distinguishes the diversity of sensible things; and unites, by establishing one from many; and makes plants in the winter dried up through cold to flourish again, even enclosed under covers, and makes them to seed, and by its virtue plants and animals are generated; and changes those things that are changed in the nature of things; and gathers, that is, makes each thing firmly to be and to thrive in its place or even in its principles; again, from plants it makes to go forth fruits and seeds and other plants; and moves food upwards from the root of the plants to their heights; and vivifies all things that live; and each of all natural bodies, according to its propriety, participates the virtue of one and the same sun.

From which it is clear that one and the same sun in itself causally pre-receives uniformly, that is, according to its virtue, those things that are participated by diverse things: for effects would not participate a cause, unless the cause were to prepossess in itself causally those things that are effects.

Yet the proportion of a particular cause to its particular effects is the same as that of a universal cause to its effects; nay rather, a universal cause influences its effects more than a particular cause. If therefore in the sun according to its one virtue there preexist uniformly all its effects, much more in God, who is the cause both of this sun and of all existing things, must it be conceded that the exemplar rationes of all beings preexist according to a supersubstantial unity, namely which altogether exceeds the unities of substances. For thus all things preexist in God, as he is productive of all things; yet he produces all substances according to a virtue that exceeds all substances; whence it follows that all things preexist in God, according to a virtue substantially one.

Lectio 3

On Exemplars

–282. Yet we say that exemplars are the substantifying rationes of existing things in God, and singularly preexisting, which theology calls predefinitions and divine and good wills, pre-determinative of existing things and effective, according to which substantial essence has predefined and produced all things (Rom 8:29–30, 1 Cor 2:7, Eph 1:5).

§ 9. 283. Yet if the philosopher Clement proves that also to anything the more principal among existing things are called exemplars, that speech proceeds indeed not through proper and perfect and simple names. Yet even those conceding that this is said rightly must remember theology, saying that I shall not demonstrate to you those so that you might go after them, but so that through the proportional knowledge of them we might be driven upwards, as we can, to the cause of all things (Wis 13:5, Rom 1:20) .

284. Therefore all existing things must be attributed to him according to one segregated unition of all things; because beginning from the essence of substantifying procession and goodness and going through all things and fulfilling all things from essence itself and exulting in all existing things, he indeed prepossesses all things in himself according to one excess of simplicity, refuting every duplicity; yet he contains all things in the same mode, according to his super-simplifying infinity, and he is participated singularly by all things, in which way also voice existing as one and the same is participated by many hearers as one. Therefore he is the principle of all existing things and the end that preexists: principle indeed as cause; yet end as that for the sake of which and the term of all things and the infinity of every infinity and the end, exceedingly, as of opposites. For in one, as has been said many times, he both prepossesses all existing things and makes them to subsist, present to all things and everywhere and according to one and the same and according to every same and proceeding to all things and remaining in himself and standing and moved and neither standing nor moved nor having principle or middle or end nor in any of existing things nor existing as anything of existing things; and neither does anything of eternally existing things or of temporally subsisting things totally befit him, but from time and the aevum and those things that are in the aevum and all those that are in time he is segregated. On account of which also the aevum itself and existing things and the measures of existing things and things measured are through him and from him.

663. After Denys has shown that God is the cause of all beings according to their proper natures, here he determines about the exemplars of things according to which whatever things seem to be produced in their proper natures; and about this, he does two things:

for first he shows what the exemplars of things are;

second, he excludes an error, at yet if the philosopher Clement.

664. About the first, it must be considered that the Platonists, positing that God is the cause of the whole of being, because they believed that the same thing could not be the cause of many things according to their proprieties in which they differ, but only according to what is common to all, posited certain second causes through which things are determined to their proper natures and which commonly receive being from God, and they called these causes the exemplars of things, as they called a certain separate man the exemplar of man, which would be the cause of humanity for all singular men; and likewise concerning other things. But Denys, just as he had said that God is the cause of the whole of common being, so had said that he is the cause of the propriety of each thing, whence it followed that in God himself were the exemplars of all beings.

665. Which indeed it is necessary should be understood in this way: for God, although he is one in his essence, nevertheless by understanding his unity and virtue, knows whatever exists in him virtually. And therefore he knows that diverse things can proceed from him; therefore things of this sort that he knows can go forth from himself are called understood rationes. Yet not all rationes of this sort can be called exemplars: for an exemplar is that unto the imitation of which another is made; yet not all things that God knows can go forth from himself, does he will to produce in the nature of things; therefore only those rationes understood by God can be called exemplars, unto whose imitation he wills to produce things in being, as an artist produces artefacts unto the imitation of the forms of art that he conceives by his mind, which also can be called exemplars of artificial things.

666. Therefore this is what he says: that we say that exemplars are not any things outside of God, but certain understood rationes of existing things in the divine intellect itself, which are factive of substances, and preexist in God singularly, that is, unitedly and not according to any diversity; and Sacred Scripture calls rationes of this sort predefinitions or predestinations, according to Romans 8:30: whom he has predestined, these he also has called, and he calls them also divine and good wills, according to Psalm 110:2: great are the works of the Lord, exquisite in all his wills. Which predefinitions and wills indeed are distinctive of beings and effective of them, because also according to rationes of this sort, the supersubstantial essence of God has predetermined and produced all things.

667. Then when he says, yet if the philosopher Clement, he excludes the contrary error of those positing that the exemplars of things are certain separated supreme beings, and he imputes this error to a certain philosopher Clement; and he says that if that philosopher approves that as regards anything those things that are more principal in existing things are called the exemplars of inferior things, his argument does not proceed through proper and perfect and simple names: for an exemplar is that according to which something else is made so that thus it might imitate the exemplar; yet things are not made unto this: that they should imitate some superior beings, but unto this: that there should be fulfilled in them what the divine wisdom has ordained; whence whatever principles of things are not properly the exemplars of things. Likewise also they are not perfect exemplars, since they also need other exemplars. They also are not simple, because they are simultaneously exemplars and exemplated.

668. But if it also should be conceded that this rightly can be said: that superior things are the exemplars of inferior things inasmuch as inferior things imitate superior things according as they can, nevertheless there must be remembered the judgment of Sacred Scripture that says, I shall not show to you those, namely superior beings, so that you might go after them, but so that by knowing those we might be elevated according to our proportion, as we can, to knowing the cause of all things.

And therefore it can be conceded that they are exemplars, not indeed so that we might finally be conformed to them, but so that through the consideration of them we might tend to God, to whom we ought to be conformed. Yet that judgment of Sacred Scripture is taken from what is said in Deuteronomy 4:19: lest perhaps (it says), with eyes raised to heaven, you should see the sun and the moon and all the stars of heaven and, deceived by error, should adore them.

669. Then when he says, therefore all existing things must be attributed to him, he offers an epilogue for the things that have been said above, showing how God has universal habitude for all things. Therefore he concludes first from the things set forth that all things must be attributed to him, not indeed according to any composition, but according to a simple unity. And this because God himself begins to communicate his perfection to other things from the very procession of being through which things are substantified and from the very procession of goodness; for these are found first among the things that proceed from God into creatures: being and the good; for life and wisdom are posterior to these, and a procession of being and of goodness of this sort goes through all beings, because all things are beings and good; not all things are living or wise; and thus all things are fulfilled from the participation of being itself, and thus in all existing things he exults through a certain existence.

Therefore because the divine essence so lavishes being upon all things, he prepossesses all things in himself, not indeed according to any composition, but according to a most simple unity, refuting every plurality. And therefore the first universal habitude is that the divine essence prepossesses all things in itself.

670. The second is that it contains and conserves all things in being according to its simple infinite unity.

671. The third universal habitude is that existing as singular and one it is participated by all things, as also voice, existing as one and the same, is participated by many hearers: for voice is one according to principle, whereas manifold according to diffusion.

672. Yet from these things he concludes a fourth universal habitude, namely that the divine essence is the principle and end of all existing things, not indeed that it should be generated through existing things, as health is generated through medicine, but as him who preexists existing things: the principle indeed of all things, as the cause factive of things; whereas the end as that for the sake of which all things are made; and he is also the term of all things: for the termination of whatever motion is unto the divine essence and from its infinity there is derived every infinity and every end as from an exceeding cause that produces opposites; because to neither is it appropriated as limited to one of them.

The reason why he can be the cause of all things is this: because he prepossesses all existing things in his unity; and because from the fact that he has each thing and causes something unto his likeness, it follows that he who has all things in himself makes all things to subsist, present to all things and everywhere, not according to diverse parts of himself, but according to one and the same and according to the same he is all things, inasmuch as in his simple essence all things virtually preexist; and likewise according to the same he proceeds to all things causatively and nevertheless he remains in himself, existing as immutable in causing, and he is standing inasmuch as he is not changed and moved inasmuch as he diffuses his likeness to other things.

673. And all those things that we affirm of God can also be denied of him, because they do not so befit him as they are found in created things and as they are understood and signified by us.

Whence, although it has been well said that he is the principle and end of all things, nevertheless he has neither principle nor middle nor end.

And although it has been said that he is present to all things and everywhere, nevertheless he is not in any of existing things in that mode in which one created thing is said to be in another.

And although it has been said that he is every existing thing, nevertheless he is not anything existing from the number of existing creatures.

And universally anything from the number of creatures or of eternally existing things, that is, above time, or also of temporally subsisting things, does not befit him, but he is separated through a certain eminence both from time which measures motion and mutable things and from the aevum that measures being itself and those things that exist immutably; and he is also separated from those things that are in the aevum and time through a certain eminence. And for this reason the aevum itself and those things that are and whatever other measures of beings and those things that are measured by measures of this sort, are through him, because they have the likeness of him as of a first exemplar, and from him as from a first active principle.