C. 13 - On Perfect and One

On Perfect and One

Lectio 1

There Are Expounded the Names That Pertain To the End of Providence: And First It Is Determined About Perfect

C. XIII, § 1. 435. So much also concerning those. Yet to what is left, if it seems, let us go by a most brief speech: for theology predicates of the cause of all things both all things and all things simultaneously, and praises this as perfect (Matt 5:48) and as one (1 Tim 2:5).

436. Therefore it is perfect indeed, not only as per se perfect and according to itself from itself uniformly segregated and whole through most perfect whole, but also as super-perfect according to the excess of all things,

437. and indeed terminating every infinity, yet extended above every term and grasped or comprehended by none,

438. but extending itself to all things simultaneously and above all things by unfailing admissions and by interminable operations. Yet it is called perfect again both as unincreasable and always perfect and as not diminishable, as prepossessing all things in itself and super-flowing according to one unceasing and same and super-full and undiminishable lavishing, according to which it perfects all perfect things and fills them with its proper perfection.

957. After Denys has expounded the divine names that pertain to the ratio of providence, here he expounds the divine names that pertain to the end of providence; for the end of providence is that each thing should attain its proper perfection and further that all things should be led back into one end, and for this reason there is said here, On Perfect and One, as is clear from the title.

958. Yet this chapter is divided into three parts:

in the first, he says what the intention is about;

in the second, he pursues it, at therefore it is perfect indeed;

in the third, he offers an epilogue for the things that have been said in the whole book, at gathering these intelligible significations.

959. Therefore he says, first, that it suffices to have said so many things about what has been set forth; yet it seems that there is left that we should cross over to what is most brief in speech; because the Holy Scripture not only predicates all things of God, who is the cause of all things, but also predicates all things of him simultaneously. Yet there are found many things in any one creature, but not simultaneously: either because they come together in it, nevertheless not at the same time, as a body is white and black, but not simultaneously; or because they come together in it, not according to the same part, as if some body should be white according to one part and black according to another, it has many things indeed, but not simultaneously.

But God has all things in himself neither successively according to time nor dividedly according to parts, but simultaneously; and for this reason, because thus he has all things simultaneously, he is praised as perfect and as one: for what has many things, not simultaneously but successively, is imperfect because it is mutable: yet motion is the act of the imperfect; yet what has many things, not simultaneously but dividedly, according to its parts, is composed and not truly one.

And therefore, by a most brief speech, all things that have been said above of God, are comprehended in the name of perfect and one.

960. Then when he says, therefore it is perfect indeed, he pursues the proposition;

and first, he determines about perfect;

second, about one, at yet one, because it is all things unitively.

961. About the first, he does two things:

first, he shows how perfect is attributed to God;

second, what is of the ratio of the perfect according as it is attributed to God, at and indeed terminating every infinity.

962. About the first, he posits the modes of the divine perfection through difference to those things that are called perfect in creatures:

for, first, some things are said to be perfect in creatures not per se, but through something extrinsic coming upon them, as air through light received from the sun and man through grace which he has from God; but God is called perfect, as per se perfect.

Second, something is called perfect per se indeed, because it is through its proper natural form, but not according to itself, because it is not its own form, but is composed from form and matter, as if we should call a stone perfect or whatever material thing: for nothing of this sort has that it should be perfect according to its whole self, but according to something of itself.

Third, something is found perfect according to itself, because it is a certain subsisting form, as whatever immaterial substance, nevertheless it is not perfect from itself, because it does not have being from itself, but from another; and for this reason to exclude this he attributes to God: per se perfect and according to itself from itself segregated, namely from all other things; and he posits in place of perfect: segregated from others, because each thing, according as it is holy and has perfection, is segregated from others.

Fourth, it must be considered concerning the perfection of whatever creature that, since whatever creature is in some way composed and in whatever composite thing there is something more perfect than another, no creature is wholly most perfect according to its whole self, but according to something of itself; as the most perfect in man is the soul and in the soul the intellect. And to remove this from God, he says that God is a most perfect whole.

And not only according to the aforementioned modes is being perfect attributed to God, but also he is called perfect as super-perfect, inasmuch as he exceeds the perfection of all things.

963. Then when he says, and indeed terminating every infinity, he shows what is of the ratio of the perfect, according as God is called perfect;

and first, he excludes certain things from God that are of the perfection of a creature;

second, he shows what things are of the ratio of the divine perfection, at but extending itself to all things.

964. Yet three things must be considered in the perfection of a creature that are excluded from God:

the first of which is that the perfect is opposed to the infinite, because, as is said in the third book of the Physics, the infinite is that of which for those receiving quantity there is always something beyond to receive; yet the perfect and whole is that beyond which there is nothing. (Aristotle, Physics, 3.6, 207a7–8; cf. Aquinas, Commentary on Physics, lect. 11, n. 2ff.) And therefore the perfect creature is opposed to the infinite, but God by his perfection terminates every infinity because whatever infinity, compared to the divine perfection, is finite and terminated; for example, if there were a body infinite according to quantity, it would be terminated according to genus and species, which termination indeed it would obtain from the participation of the divine perfection.

Second, it must be considered that whatever creature is called perfect from the fact that it arrives unto the term of its nature and unto the due term of its quantity; yet God is called perfect, not as though having a term, but as extended, as he says, above every term, because every termination is derived from him.

Third, it must be considered that whatever creature is called perfect from the fact that it is contained by certain fixed limits; yet God is called perfect such that nevertheless he is grasped or comprehended by none.

965. Then when he says, but extending itself to all things, he posits four things that are of the ratio of the divine perfection:

for, first, it must be considered that something is called imperfect whose virtue does not extend itself to fulfilling all its proper works; as it would be of an imperfect king if his virtue were not to extend itself to governing all his subjects, and for this reason, through the opposite, he says of God that he extends itself to all things not indeed successively, such that by reaching one he would desert another, but simultaneously; nor through a certain adequation to things, as the potency of man, but existing above all things. Yet he extends himself to all things by unfailing admissions, inasmuch as he unfailingly communicates to things his goods, and by interminable operations, inasmuch as he operates interminably in all things.

966. Second, something is called imperfect because it tends to perfection, as a boy, while he is in the state of growing; or because it recedes from perfection, as an old man, while he is in the state of diminishing; or even because it does not have perfection always immanent, as all mutable things are called imperfect; and for this reason, through the opposite, he says of God that God is called perfect as unincreasable and always perfect and as not diminishable.

967. Third, it is called imperfect because there is lacking to it something of those things that it ought to have, as a man would be called imperfect if he were not to have a hand or a foot or science or virtue; yet what has all things that it ought to have according to its nature is called perfect not simply, but according to its nature. Yet God is called simply perfect, because he prepossesses all things simply in itself, as effects preexist in a cause, as has been said above many times.

968. Fourth, something is called imperfect that cannot make something like itself; yet each thing is perfect when it can make something like itself, as is said in the fourth book of the Meteorologies, and for this reason he says of God that God is called perfect, inasmuch as he pours his perfection from above upon all creatures, and this not according to diverse lavishings, on the part of God himself the lavisher, but according to one: which lavishing indeed does not fail, but is unceasing and remaining the same. (Aristotle, Meteorology, 4.3, 380a13–15; cf. Aquinas, Commentary on Meteorology, lect. 4, n. 1. Cfr. On the Soul, 2.4, 415a26–29; cf. Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle's On the Soul, lect. 7, n. 314.) Nor again is it diminished, but when he gives affluently to all things, as is said in James 1:5, his lavishing is super-full, as what never can be lessened through the abundance of its effusion, according to which lavishing he perfects all perfect things, inasmuch as he fills them with a likeness of his proper perfection.

Lectio 2

He Shows the Causality of One In Common

§2. 439. Yet one, because it is all things unitively according to the excess of one’s unity and one is the cause of all things inegressibly,

440. for nothing of existing things is not participating one;

441. but just as every number participates unity, and the binary and the denary are called one and the half one and the third and the tenth one, so all things and the part of all things participate one, and through what is one, all things are existing.

442. And that one which is the cause of all things is not the one of many, but before every one and multitude and determining every one and multitude. For neither is there multitude not participating one, but those things that are many in parts are one in whole; and that are many in accidents are one in subject; and that are many in number or virtues are one in species; and that are many in species are one in genus; and that are many in processions are one in principle; and there is nothing of existing things that according to something does not participate the one which, in that which is singular according to all things, co-receives all things and all wholes and opposites and singularly;

443. and without one indeed there shall not be multitude; whereas without multitude there shall be one; just as also unity before every number and multiplied.

444. And if someone should suppose all things united to all things, all things shall be one in the whole.

§3. 445. And otherwise also this must be known because, according to the preconceived species of each, those things that are united are said to be united,

446. and one is elemental of all things; and if you should remove one, neither totality nor part nor anything else of existing things shall be: for one uniformly pre-receives and circum-receives all things in itself.

969. After Denys has determined about perfect, here he determines about one;

and first, he shows the causality of one in common;

second, how one is attributed to God, at and therefore theology praises the whole thearchy.

970. About the first, he does two things:

first, he proposes what he intends;

second, he proves the proposition, at for nothing of existing things.

971. Therefore he says, first, that one is attributed to God for two reasons:

first of all, because he is all things unitively according to the excess of his singular unity, as it has been said above many times that effects are in a cause not as many, but as one according to the one virtue of the cause, as if we were to say that all lines progressing from a center are one in it.

Second, one is attributed to God because one, considered according to its intention, is the cause of all things inegressibly: for thus from one there are caused diverse things, by which nevertheless one is not led out from its unity.

972. Then when he says, for nothing of existing things, he manifests the proposition by five arguments, the first of which is thus: that which any things participate is the cause of those participating, as whiteness is the cause of white things; but there is nothing of existing things that does not participate one; therefore one is the cause of all existing things.

973. Yet he proves the minor at but just as every number participates unity,

and first, he proves the proposition;

second, he excludes an objection, at and that one which is the cause.

974. Yet that all things participate one, he proves through that concerning which it seems less, namely through number, which in a certain way is opposed to one, as the divided to the undivided: for every number participates one, whether number should be received according to itself, as is signified when there is said binary or ternary, or number should be received according as it denominates some part, as when we say half or third or tenth.

And he proves this through the fact that one, in both ways, is predicated of number: for we call binary or ternary or denary one; and again we call half or third or tenth. Therefore just as number participates one, so all wholes and the parts of all participate one. And thus it follows that through what is one, all existing things have being, as things participating through the participated.

975. Then when he says, and that one which is the cause, he excludes an objection: for someone could object that one is not the cause of all things, whether of the multitude or of number, because it is a certain part of the multitude. But he responds that the one which is the cause of all things is not that one which is a part of many, because that one is partial and participated; but is before every multitude, not only by the order of time and of nature, but also by the order of cause, because it determines every participable one and every multitude, through the mode by which a participating thing is determined to form through what it participates: for there is no multitude that does not participate one, because all many things are one according to something: just as those things that are many in parts are one in whole; and those that are many in accidents, as white and musical, are one in subject; and those that are many in number are one in species, as many individuals, as Socrates and Plato, are one in the species of man; yet he adds, virtues, because in one individual of the same species there are many virtues, following upon one and the same species, or because there are diverse virtues in diverse individuals according as they are disposed in diverse ways to the acts of the species: for there is not the same power or virtue of all men for understanding; and those that are many in species are one in genus, as man and dog differ indeed in species, yet come together in the one genus of animal; and further those that are many in processions come together in one principle, as being and living and understanding and things of this sort are diverse processions proceeding from the one principle which is God, as is clear from the things set forth.

976. And thus it is made manifest that, although all things in whatever way are many, nevertheless they come together in some one: for nothing is in beings that does not participate this one according to something; which indeed according to its ratio is singular according to all things, that is, undivided in itself. For many individuals that are one in genus, are many divided things according to species; and likewise, everything that is in something is in it through the mode of that in which it is, as all effects are in a principle. Yet all participated things operate unto that which they participate, as unto a principle. Whence it remains that one, inasmuch as it is singular, participated in all things, singularly, that is, indivisibly, co-receives in itself, as in one principle, all existing things, and all wholes, as universal genera, and opposites, as are the differences by which a whole genus is divided.

977. Then when he says, and without one indeed, he posits the second argument, which is thus: that from which the consequence of being is not converted is naturally prior and in a certain way a principle. But one is of this sort because without one there is not found any multitude, but there is found something one without every multitude. Therefore one is prior to every multitude and its principle. A sign of which is apparent in numbers, because unity is before every number, however it should be multiplied.

978. Then when he says, and if someone should suppose, he posits the third argument, which proceeds from a certain supposition, namely that all things are united to all things. For only those who do not posit one first principle of all things deny this, as those who say that good and evil are two first principles and that evils are not coordinated with goods. But since it has been manifested from what has been said above that there is one principle of all things which is the good, it is necessary that all things should be coordinated and united to all things. Yet whatever things are united to one another have themselves as parts of one whole that is established through their unition. And therefore, if all things are united to all things, it is necessary that all things should come together in one whole; and thus all things shall participate one, as parts participate the form of the whole. Therefore there shall be one, the principle of all things.

979. Then when he says, and otherwise also this must be known, he posits the fourth argument proceeding from the same supposition: for those things that are united to one another not only come together in one form of the whole, but also are said to be united according to some one preconceived species, as parts of a house that are united in one form of a house, preconceived by the builder. And therefore, if all things are united to all things, not only do they come together in one form of the whole, but they also come together in the fact that all things are united according to one form, preconceived by him who is the author of the universe of things. For the unity itself of the universe proceeds from the unity of the divine mind, as the form of a house that is in matter comes forth from the form of the house that is in the mind of the builder.

980. Then when he says, and one is elemental of all things, he posits the fifth argument: that one is elemental of all things. Yet an element is that from which something first is composed and is in it and is not divided according to form. Yet it is manifest that, in every composite, there is some multitude of composing things; yet one is the element of every multitude, since one is indivisible and one is in a multitude, as that from which the multitude is first composed. Therefore it remains that one is as the elementary principle of all elemental things.

981. Therefore it is clear from what has been set forth that one has the ratio of a principle in five ways:

in one way, as the participated of things participating;

in another way, as the universal from which the consequence of being is not converted.

And these two ways proceed according to the opinion of Plato.

In a third way, as its formation and formal principle, from which the whole is composed;

in a fourth way, as the form preconceived by the builder is the principle of those things that produce an effect;

in a fifth way, as an element is a principle.

And thus, having proven in many ways that one is the principle of all things, as though concluding, he adds that if one should be removed neither whole nor part nor anything of existing things shall remain; because one pre-receives all things in itself, as the principle of all things.

Lectio 3

How One Is Attributed to God

447. And therefore theology praises the whole thearchy as the cause of all things by the naming of one: one God the Father and one Lord Jesus Christ and one and the same Spirit (1 Cor 8:6), on account of the exceeding simplicity of the whole divine unity, in which all things singularly are gathered and super-united and preexist supersubstantially.

448. On account of which also all things justly are remitted to this and replaced, from which and out of which and through which and in which and to which all things are and are coordinated and remain and are contained and are fulfilled and are converted.

449. And you shall not find anything of existing things that is not in one, according as every deity supersubstantially is named, and thus this which is both is perfected and is preserved.

450. And it is also necessary that, from many things converted to one by the virtue of the divine unity, we should praise the whole and one deity unitively, the one as cause of all things, which is before every one and multitude and part and whole and definition and infinity and term and interminability; which defines all existing things and being itself and is the cause of all things and of all wholes and simultaneously and before all things and above all things and singularly; and above this existing one and it terminates this existing one.

451. Because the existing one which is in existing things is numerable; yet number participates essence; yet the supersubstantial one terminates both the existing one and every number and it is the principle and cause and number and order of one and number and every existing thing.

452. On account of which the deity praised as Unity and Trinity, which is above all things, is neither the unity nor the trinity that is known by us or by a certain other of existing things; but so that we might truly praise its super-one and generation-of-God, we name the super-namable naming of Trinity and Unity of God and super-essential above all things. Yet no monad or trinity nor number nor unity or fecundity nor anything else of existing things or known to anything, educes what is existing above all things and reason and mind, what is hidden of the super-deity above all things supersubstantially super-existing; nor is there a name of this nor a speech, but segregated in inaccessible ways. And neither do we bear this name of goodness as harmonizing with this, but by desire of understanding and saying something of that ineffable nature, we sanctify the most worthy, the first of names for this. And in this we shall harmonize indeed also with the theologians, yet we shall fail of the truth of things. On account of which also they pre-honored the ascent through negations, as rousing the soul from those things that are connatural to it, and proceeding through all the divine intellects, by which that is segregated which is above every name and every reason and every thought. Yet in the last of all things joining to this, inasmuch as it is possible for us to be joined to this.

982. After Denys has shown that one is the principle of all things according to its proper ratio, here he shows how one is attributed to God; and it is divided into two parts:

in the first, he shows how one is attributed to God;

in the second, he shows the difference between this one and every other one, at and it is also necessary.

983. About the first, he does two things:

first, he assigns the reason why one is attributed to God;

second, he also manifests the reason assigned, at on account of which also all things.

984. Yet it must be considered that above he had said three things of one, namely: that it is the cause of all things; that it is singular or simple and undivided; and that it pre-receives all things in itself. Whence attributing unity to God through these three things, he concludes from the things set forth that Sacred Scripture praises the whole thearchy, that is, the principal deity of the whole Trinity, as the cause of all things, in the fact that it names it one: for the Apostle says, in 1 Corinthians 8:6, one God the Father . . . and one Lord Jesus Christ; and in 1 Corinthians 12:11: one and the same Spirit works all these things. And thus he attributes unity to each on account of the excellent divine simplicity. In which simple unity indeed all things are aggregated, as in a cause, and supereminently united singularly, that is, indivisibly, and all things preexist in it, not through their proper mode, but through the mode of God himself, namely supersubstantially.

985. Then when he says, on account of which also all things, he manifests the ratio posited of the causality of the divine unity;

and first, through the authority of Scripture;

second, through the experience of human reason, at and you shall not find anything.

986. Therefore he says, first, that God is praised as one in Sacred Scripture, as the cause of all things and as prepossessing all things in himself, on account of this: justly, that is, rationally, all things are remitted, that is, reduced, to this deity, as effects to their cause from which they proceed. Yet he adds, and replaced, as regards the fact that effects preexist in a cause; for the Apostle says, in Romans 11:36, out of which all things, through which all things, in which all things; to which three Denys adds two, namely: from which and to which, which also are not far from the tradition of Scripture.

To which five habitudes, he posits five things corresponding, so that it might be understood that all things are from God as from a principle that pours being into all things; yet out of God all things are ordered, inasmuch as in himself the order of things is taken from the ratio itself of the divine goodness; through God all things remain, as through a conserving cause; in God all things are contained, as effects in a cause; and to God all things are converted, as to an end, and all things are fulfilled, that is, perfected: for the ultimate perfection of a thing is from the fact that it attains its proper end.

987. Then when he says, and you shall not find anything, he manifests the same through the experience of human reason, and he says that, if anyone diligently were to consider, he cannot find anything that does not have being and perfection and health, that is, conservation, through one, according as the deity of the Trinity supersubstantially is named one.

988. Then when he says, and it is also necessary, he shows the difference between one according as it is said of God, and all other things to which one is attributed; and about this, he does three things:

first, he posits the order of this one to others;

second, he assigns the ratio of this order, at because the existing one;

third, he concludes the difference, at on account of which the deity.

989. Therefore he says, first, that it is necessary that we should praise the whole and one deity of the Trinity unitively, that is, according to the ratio of one, such that we are converted from many creatures that participate one, to that which is truly one, namely God; and this conversion is made in us by the virtue of the divine unity: for while we consider that the divine unity is more virtuous than every unity, forsaking all things, we are converted to it.

And because he had said that it is necessary to praise the one deity unitively, he expounds what this imports, adding, namely the cause of all things. For causality is of the ratio of one, as has been said above, and likewise also priority, whence he adds, one, which is before every created one and before every multitude and before every part and whole, concerning which it has been said above that they participate one; and again it is before every definition and opposed infinity and opposed term unto interminability: for end and term seem to pertain to the ratio of one. For each thing, inasmuch as it is finite and terminated, according to this has unity in act. But the one that is God is before every end and term and their opposites and is the cause of the termination of all things, and not only of existing things, but even of being itself. For created being itself is not finite if it should be compared to creatures, because it extends itself to all things; nevertheless if it should be compared to uncreated being, it is found deficient and from the preconception of the divine mind, having the determination of its proper ratio.

990. And the divine one itself is the cause of all things, and not only of particular beings, but also of all wholes, that is, of universal beings, and is simultaneously with all things and before all things, namely because by its eternity it contains the durations of all things and exceeds them; and it is above all things by the sublimity of its nature and singularly by its loftiness existing as separated from all things; and since it is the supersubstantial one, it is above every existing one, that is, above the created one, which is found in existing created things; and it terminates this existing one, that is, gives the termination of its proper ratio to the created one, which is not super-existing, but existing, as though contained within the genus of existing things.

991. Then when he says, because the existing one, he assigns the ratio of the order set forth, namely why the one that is God is before this created one and before all other things; and he says that this is for this reason: because the existing one, which is in the genus of creatures, is numerable, that is, a certain part of number: for everything that is one in creatures is co-numbered with another with which it comes together either in species or in genus or in some order; but number participates essence, since it is a certain species of being; whence, consequently, the one that is in created things participates essence.

But the supersubstantial one, which is God, is not co-numbered with another nor does it participate essence, but it gives the termination of proper ratio both to the created one and to number, and it is the principle and cause and number and order of the created one and of number and universally of every being: yet it is said to be the principle of every being, as it is before all things; yet the cause, according as all things proceed from it; yet number, according as it is the measure of all things, establishing the proper mode for each; yet it is the order of all things, according as it orders all things by its wisdom.

992. Then when he says, on account of which the deity, he concludes from the things set forth the difference between the one that is attributed to God and the one that is in creatures; and he says that, because the one that is God is above every created one and above every number, for this reason, when in the deity which is above all things there is praised Unity and Trinity, this must not be received such as that unity or trinity that is known by us or by whatever of existing things, according to natural knowledge; because not even the angels themselves through their natural endowments could attain to knowing the divine Unity and Trinity, as it is in itself. But nevertheless through grace not only the angels but even we will be able to attain to seeing the essence of the one eternal God, but not to comprehending.

And although this Unity and Trinity of God is not such as is known by us, nevertheless we name God, who exists super-essentially above all existing things and who is above everything that is named, by the name of the divine Unity and Trinity, so that through these two names we might praise its super-unity, that is, the excellence of his unity that is above every one; and so that we might truly praise his generation-of-God, that is, so that in the name of Trinity there might be insinuated for us divine procession as the Son is generated from the Father and the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son: for the Trinity of persons is not distinguished except through relations of origin, by which there is designated the procession of one person from another.

993. And although we intend to praise in God his super-one and generation-of-God by the name of Unity and Trinity, this must be retained: that no monad, that is, unity, or trinity nor universally whatever number or whatever unity or whatever fecundity nor whatever else that naturally is known by whatever of created beings, educes, that is, manifests, and perfectly expresses what is hidden of the super-excelling deity, which supersubstantially super-exists over all things. Which hidden indeed I say not on account of defect, but because he exists above both every human reason and every angelic mind. And because by voice there are expressed those things that are grasped by reason or by mind, for this reason he adds that, of that hidden thing that is above mind and reason, there can be neither simple name nor composite speech, expressing this as it is in itself, but it is segregated in inaccessible ways. And he speaks unto the likeness of sensible things, in which there are things hidden to men, which are placed outside the ways through which men pass. Thus also the essence of the deity is hidden, because it is beyond all ways that created reason or mind can think.

994. Yet it must be considered that the Platonists posited that God is highest indeed above being and above life and above intellect, nevertheless not above the good itself that they posited as the first principle. But to exclude this, Denys adds that neither do we bear this name of goodness to the divine predication, as harmonizing with this, as though this name should respond to it through a certain comparison. But because it is desirable for us that we should understand and say something however small of that ineffable nature of God, we consecrate to God, first and principally, the most worthy name, which is good.

995. And in this indeed we harmonize with the theologians, that is, with the apostles and prophets, who produced the Sacred Scriptures, who also attribute this name to God, but we fail much of the truth of things: for it is manifest that this name good, since it is imposed by us, does not signify except what we grasp with our mind; whence, since God is above our mind, he super-exceeds this name.

And because the theologians considered that every name imposed by us fails of God, for this reason, among all the modes by which we can ascend through the intellect into God, they gave preference to that which this through negations, through which we ascend into God in a certain order.

996. For first our soul is as though roused and rises from material things, which are connatural to our soul; for example, when we understand God not to be anything sensible or material or bodily; and thus our soul by denying proceeds through all the divine intellects, that is, through all the orders of angels, by which God is segregated, who is above every name and reason and thought.

Yet at last our soul is joined to God by ascending through negations, in the last of all things, that is, in the supreme ends of the more universal and more excellent creatures. And indeed the joining of the soul to God is made inasmuch as it is possible for us now to be joined to God: for our intellect is not joined to God in the present so that it should see his essence; but so that it should know of God what he is not. Whence this joining of us to God, which is possible for us in this life, is perfected when we arrive at this: that we know that he is above the most excellent creatures.

Lectio 4

He Offers an Epilogue for the Things That Have Been Said in This Book

§4. 453. Gathering these intelligible significations of God, as is possible, we have opened up, failing not only of their diligence—for this truly even the angels should say—nor of the praise of them by the angels, for among us the mightiest theologians have less than the lowest of those, nor of the praise of those philosophizing about them or the ones accompanying those, but even of those coordinated with us extremely and subjectly.

454. Wherefore if indeed the things said have rightly, and as according to us we truly have touched upon the opening up of the namings of God by deliberation, this thing must be referred to the cause of all good things which first gives saying, afterwards saying well. And if anything equally important has been passed over, it is necessary that we should hear that too according to the same reasons and the same rules.

455. Yet if those things have themselves either not rightly or imperfectly, and we have erred from the truth either totally or particularly, let it be of your kindness to direct one not voluntarily ignorant, and to hand on reasons to one needing to learn, and to help one not having sufficient virtue, and to heal one unwillingly sick. And these indeed through yourself, yet finding others through others, yet receiving all things from the good, and to transfer to us.

456. Yet let you not be reluctant doing good to a friend: for you see that we have held back to ourselves none of the thearchic speeches handed on to us, but running upwards we have handed them on and shall hand them on both to you and to other holy men, as indeed both we are sufficient to say and to whom it is said to hear, according to nothing doing injury to the tradition, unless perhaps we should be infirm for their understanding or exposition.

457. But let these things indeed so be both had and said as shall be friendly to God. And let that indeed be an end for the intelligible namings of God, according to us; yet we shall cross over to the symbolic theology, with God as our guide.

997. After Denys has expounded the divine names in this book, here he offers an epilogue for the things that have been said in this book;

and first, he recapitulates the things that have been said;

second, he connects himself to the following book, at but let these things indeed.

998. About the first, he does three things:

first, he shows how he has expounded the divine names;

second, he induces the reader to render thanks to God concerning things said well, at wherefore if indeed the things said.

third, he asks to be corrected and directed, if there are any things that he did not say well, at yet if those things have themselves.

999. Therefore he says, first, that in this book he has opened up, that is, expounded, according to his ability, the intelligible significations of the divine names, by gathering and reducing them into one work. Yet he says intelligible for the difference from those that are said of God symbolically or metaphorically, the significations of which are sensible.

1000. And lest anyone should understand that he is presuming that he had expounded the significations of the divine names sufficiently, to exclude this he adds that not only in expounding the aforementioned significations has he failed of their diligence, that is, from a perfect exposition of them, according as the thing requires, because neither could the angels do this, since they do not comprehend the divine goodness and the divine being and the diving living and other things of this sort, concerning which it has been said; nor does he say only that he had failed of praising the aforementioned significations as they are praised by the angels, because the most excellent theologians who are among us fail in the least things of the angels, as it is said in Matthew 11:11 that he who is least in the kingdom of heaven is greater than John the Baptist; nor even does he say only that he had failed of praising the aforementioned significations as the theologians philosophizing about divine things, namely the prophets and apostles or even their comrades who produced the canonical Scriptures, as Luke and Mark, but he asserts that he had spoken deficiently and in the end through comparison to others who were of his own grade and order.

1001. Then when he says, wherefore if indeed the things said, he concludes that, from the fact that he knows that he is failing thus in divine things, if those things have themselves rightly that have been said, and if, according to deliberation proportionate to himself, he truly has touched upon the exposition of the divine names, this must be referred with the action of graces to God who is the cause of all good things, who indeed first gives to us the virtue of speaking and afterwards gives to us that we should use this virtue well, by saying something well.

1002. And nevertheless if anything has been passed over that is equally important as those that have been said, it is necessary to understand this one according to the same reasons and rules according to which the aforementioned have been expounded. And he says this because perhaps some name said of God in the Scriptures has not been expounded, which nevertheless is equally important as any of those set forth. Or, if any mode of expounding has been passed over in any of the names said, it can be understood from the exposition of the other names.

1003. Then when he says, yet if those things have themselves, he asks to be corrected about the things not said well;

and first, he posits the petition;

second, he assigns the reason for the petition, at yet let you not be reluctant.

1004. Therefore he says, first, that if those things that have been said by him in the exposition of the divine names have themselves either not rightly or imperfectly, and if he has erred from the truth either in whole or in part, he asks of Timothy that from his kindness he should direct him; because if he has erred anywhere, this was not from voluntary ignorance, and for this reason he wishes to be directed: for if any men are ignorant voluntarily, they refuse to be directed. Therefore this is the first condition on his part wherefore he asks that he should be directed: because he has not been voluntarily ignorant.

The second condition is because, according to his reckoning, he needs to learn, and for this reason there must be handed on to him the reasons by which he can learn: yet it seems superfluous to hand on discipline to him who does not reckon that he needs discipline.

The third condition is because he must be helped who does not reckon that he has sufficient virtue.

The fourth condition is because the cure of health must be imparted to him who is unwillingly sick.

1005. Yet he shows how he should be able to direct him, adding that he can hand on certain things to him, for his direction, which Timothy knows through himself; yet certain things that he can find by receiving from others, let him receive: for it is certain that they are received from the good which is God, and things received from God in whatever way, he asks to be transferred to himself.

1006. Then when he says, yet let you not be reluctant, he assigns the reason for the petition posited;

and first of all, on the part of friendship, because a man ought not be reluctant to do good to a friend. Yet the greatest beneficence is imparted to someone, if he should be led back from error to truth.

Second, he assigns the reason on the part of his example, namely because he has kept back to himself, that is, has retained greedily to himself, none of the holy speeches handed on to him, but by running upwards unto the imitation of God, those things that have been handed on to him, he already has handed on and in the future intends to hand on, both to Timothy and to other holy men, according as he is sufficient to say and others are sufficient to hear. And in this, in none does he do injury to the tradition of divine things, to which injury is done while things handed on either are retained greedily or are scattered inconsiderately.

Yet he intends thus to hand on to others those things that have been handed on to him, unless perhaps in some things he is not mighty to understand or to expound to others.

1007. Then when he says, but let these things indeed, he connects himself to the following book. And because he had said certain things pertaining to the future, namely that he shall hand on to others those things that have been handed on to him, for this reason he says that these things so should be had and said as is friendly to God, that is, as is pleasing to God, according to James 4:15: so that you might say for this: if the Lord should will.

And in this there is made an end of the exposition of the intelligible divine names, as regards this.

But he intends to cross beyond with God as his guide to the symbolic theology, namely in which he expounds the names that are said of God symbolically; for example: that he is called a lion, a stone, fire, and other things of this sort; which book indeed is not had among us.