C. 9 - On Small, Great, Same, Other, Like, Unlike, Station, Session, Motion, Equality

On Small, Great, Same, Other, Like, Unlike, Station, Session, Motion, Equality

Lectio 1

On Great and Small; According to What Ratio They Are Said of God

C. IX, § 1. 357. Yet because both great and small have been attributed to the cause of all things, and same and other and like and unlike and status and motion, come, let us contemplate also whatever are manifest to us of these signs in which God is named.

358. Therefore in the eloquences God is praised as great indeed and in greatness; and in the subtle breeze, manifesting the divine smallness; and same, when the eloquences say: yet you yourself are the same (Ps 102:27); and other, when by the same eloquences he is composed as many figures and many forms; and like, as the substantifier of like things and of likeness; and unlike all things, as that there is nothing like him; and standing and immobile and sitting unto the ages; and moved, as walking to all things; and whatever other namings of God equivalent to these are praised by the eloquences.

§2. 359. Therefore God is named great indeed according to his greatness which itself he hands on to all things eternally great;

360. and super-poured and super-extended beyond every greatness, containing every place, surpassing every number, crossing over every infinity;

361. and according to his super-full and magnificent and his fontal gifts, inasmuch as these, participated by all things according to the effusion of the infinite gift, are not lessened at all and have the same super-fullness and are not lessened by participation, but even super-flow more.

362. This greatness is infinite and without quantity and without number; and this excess is according to the absolute and infinitely super-extended effusion of the received greatness.

§3. 363. Yet the small, that is, the subtle, is said in that which exceeds every weight and distance and goes through all things without prohibition. And indeed the small is the cause of all things: for you shall never find the form of the small not participated.

364. And therefore in God small must be received as going to all things and through all things without impediment and operating and reaching even unto the division of soul and body and of joints and marrows and intentions of the heart (Heb 4:12), yet more of universal existing things: for there is not a creature hidden in his sight (Heb 4:13).

365. This small is without quantity and without number and incomprehensible, not prevailing to be held, without term without definition and comprehensive of all things, yet itself incomprehensible.

797. After Denys has determined about the divine names that are received according to the processions of perfections befitting things absolutely, as are good, being, beautiful, life, wisdom, and virtue, here he determines about the names of God that are received according to the processions in which there is imported a habitude to another: as about great and small, which import excess and defect according to quantity; about same and different, which import fittingness and difference according to substance; and about like and unlike, which import fittingness and difference according to quality; and about station and motion, because the ratio of station indeed consists in this: that something has itself now like before; and further about equality, which imports fittingness according to quantity and is a middle between great and small.

798. Therefore it is divided into three parts:

in the first, he shows what his intention is about;

in the second, he shows that each of the aforementioned is said of God, at therefore in the eloquences God is praised;

in the third, he shows according to what ratio they are said of God, at therefore God is named great indeed.

799. Therefore he says, first, that, because to God who is the cause of all things there is attributed both great and small and the other aforementioned things, it is necessary to consider about these signs by which God is named, whatever can be manifest to us.

800. Then when he says, therefore in the eloquences God is praised, he shows that the things set forth are said of God: for God is praised in Sacred Scripture as great and existing in greatness, according to Psalm 144:3: great is the Lord and exceedingly praiseworthy and of his greatness there is no end.

And because subtlety is a certain smallness, small also is attributed to God in Scripture, as it is said in 1 Kings 19:12–13 that he has appeared in the whistling of a delicate breeze, which delicacy indeed or subtlety manifests the divine smallness.

Also sometimes in Scripture God is called the same, according to Psalm 101:28: yet you yourself are the same.

Otherness also is attributed to him, inasmuch as diverse figures and diverse species of things are compared to him in the Sacred Scriptures, as that sometimes he is designated in the figure or species of a man or a lamb or a lion or a stone.

Yet he is called like in the Scriptures, inasmuch as he makes certain like things and is the cause of likeness itself, according to Genesis 1:26: let us make man unto our image and likeness.

God also is called unlike all things, where Scripture says that nothing is like him, according to Psalm 85:8: who is like to you among the gods, O Lord?

God also is described in the Scriptures as standing, according to Amos 7:7: behold God standing upon the side wall.

And he is described as immobile, according to Malachi 3:6: I am the Lord and I do not change. And sitting unto the ages, according to Isaiah 9:7: henceforth he shall sit upon the throne of David and even unto sempiternity.

And he is also described as moved, as walking or proceeding to all things, according to Genesis 3:8: since he had heard the voice of the Lord God taking a walk in paradise; and in Wisdom 7:24 it is said that wisdom is more mobile than all mobile things. Yet it touches everywhere on account of its mobility. And many other things, equivalent to these, are said of God in the Scriptures.

801. Then when he says, therefore God is named great indeed, he shows according to what ratio the aforementioned things are said of God;

and first, of great and small;

second, of same and other, at yet the same is supersubstantially eternal;

third, of like and unlike, at yet if someone indeed should call God like;

fourth, of station and session and motion, at yet what do we say also;

fifth, of equality, at yet if anyone, in the eloquences.

802. About the first,

first he determines about great;

second, about small, at yet the small, that is, the subtle.

803. About the first, he does three things:

first, he attributes great to God according to the ratio of causality;

second, through the ratio of a certain likeness, at and super-poured and super-extended;

third, according to unlikeness, at this greatness is infinite and without quantity.

804. Therefore he says, first, that God is called great, according as he hands on his greatness, which essentially befits him eternally, to all great things, just as also he is called wise, inasmuch as he hands on wisdom to all wise things. Or it can be read otherwise that God hands on his greatness to all things that are eternally great, that is, from the beginning of creation even unto sempiternity.

805. Then when he says, and super-poured and super-extended, he attributes great to him according to a certain ratio of likeness:

and first, as regards his substance;

second, as regards his effects, at and according to his super-full and magnificent and his fontal gifts.

806. Yet it is manifest that great is attributed to creatures according to the ratio of excess: for those things are called great that are found to exceed other things. Yet excess in created things is considered in many ways:

in one way, according to the dimension of length, width, and depth; and according to this, something is called great with respect to another inasmuch as it super-exceeds its quantity; and thus God is called great simply, inasmuch as his greatness is super-poured and super-extended beyond every greatness; and super-poured is said unto the likeness of wet things, as air and water; whereas super-extended unto the likeness of dry and solid bodies.

In another way, excess is considered in created things according to place, and thus a place is said to be greater which is containing more. Whence also God is called great simply, inasmuch as he contains every place.

Third, excess is found in things according to number, and thus also God is called great simply, inasmuch as he surpasses every number, because every number proceeds from the divine wisdom distinguishing things, in whose power it is to produce the many differences of things. Yet it seems that among things the maximum infinite is that which exceeds all things. But, as there is found in created things, nothing is called infinite that is not finite according to something, namely according to species. Whence God, who is infinite in all ways, exceeds every infinity.

807. Then when he says, and according to his super-full and magnificent and his fontal gifts, he attributes great to God according to the ratio of excess, which is considered on the part of effects. Yet three things must be considered in his effects:

first of all, that the effusion of an effect proceeds from the fullness of the cause, as what is not full of heat cannot pour out heat. We speak according to the likeness of a vase, which unless it is full of water cannot pour out water.

Second, because if there should be more fullness, there is made a great effusion.

Third, that as much as an effusion is before, so much before is what is poured out received in that into which the liquid is poured out, unless an infusion of earth should be received from it first.

And these three things must be considered in the effects of God:

for first, on the part of God there is found a superabundant fullness of goodness;

second, from this abundant fullness there follows that he does more;

third, from the fact that he is the primordial cause there follows that his gifts are fontal, that is, primordial: for whatever is received from whatever cause presupposes what is received from God.

And therefore, according to his super-full, as regards the first; and magnificent, as regards the second; and his fontal gifts, as regards the third; inasmuch as these gifts are participated by all things, according to the effusion of the gift that is infinite on the part of the giver, gifts of this sort are not lessened at all, but always have the same superabundant fullness and never are lessened, however much they are participated; nay rather, as much more as they are participated, so much more do they flow from above: because, as much more as something receives from the divine gifts, so much more is it rendered apt for receiving; and on the part of the one pouring in, which from the influence of infinite virtue cannot be lessened.

808. Then when he says, this greatness is infinite and without quantity, he expounds the divine greatness, through distance to other greatnesses; and he says that the divine greatness is infinite, because if befits no created greatness; and it is also without quantity, because it is not in the genus of quantity, but the greatness of God is his being; and it is without number, that is, without measure: for number has the first ratio of measure, since through it even continuous quantities are measured; or what he says: without quantity, is referred to continuous quantity; yet what he says: without number, is referred to discrete quantity. And thus through the divine greatness there is considered the excess of the divine causality, according as it pours out universally and superabundantly its infinite greatness, which is not received by creatures in its infinity, but according to their capacity they receive it in a finite mode.

809. Then when he says, yet the small, that is, the subtle, he shows how small is said in God; and about this, he does three things:

first, he posits the rationes of small;

second, he attributes them to God, at and therefore in God small must be received;

third, he shows the difference of this small to other smalls, at this small is without quantity.

810. About the first, it must be considered that subtlety is a certain smallness, whether subtlety is received as it is a certain quality, according as subtle bodies are called rare as they have little of quantity under these same dimensions; or subtlety is received as it is a certain difference about quantity: for just as long and short have themselves to a line, whereas wide and narrow to a surface, so subtle and gross to the depth of a body. Whence subtlety signifies a certain smallness.

Therefore he posits three properties of the small or subtle:

the first of which is that it exceeds every weight and every distance; and he says, weight, according as what is rare is called subtle: for such is found maximally light; whereas he says, distance, according as subtle is opposed to gross, in which there is such great distance: namely great depth; whereas in subtle, small. Yet that excess, by which small and subtle exceed every weight and every distance, is not considered according to the greatness of quantity which is opposed to smallness, but as unity exceeds number, because it measures it and is not measured by it.

He posits the second property of the small: that it goes through all things without prohibition: for it is of the ratio of subtlety that it should be penetrative.

He posits the third property of the small: that the small is the cause of all things; and he introduces as proof of this that nothing is found which does not participate the form of the small: for the small is found in great things, but the great is not found in small things; yet the participated seems to be the cause of the participating, whence also in all genera principles are small in quantity, but great in virtue.

811. Then when he says, and therefore in God small must be received, he assigns the aforementioned rationes of small to God, especially the second; and he says that small is received in God, inasmuch as it goes to all things without impediment, by filling them both with its effects and with its presence, because he is in all things and again operates through all things, as through proper instruments. And to prove this he introduces the authority of the Apostle in Hebrews 4:12, and first he shows specifically that God penetrates all things that pertain to human nature; in which first there is found the composition of soul and body, whose distinction and mode of unition the divine wisdom understands and operates; and for this reason he says that he reaches even unto the division of soul and body.

Second, in man there is the composition of the parts of the body which also is known to God, and for this reason he adds, and of joints, as regards the joining; and marrows, as regards those things that are contained within the members.

Third, he adds about those things that pertain to the soul: among which the intentions of the heart are most of all hidden and nevertheless are known to God; and for this reason he adds, and the intentions of the heart.

And because those are most secret, much more does he reach through his science to universal beings: for no creature is hidden or invisible in his sight, as is said in Hebrews 4:13.

812. Then when he says, this small is without quantity, he manifests the divine smallness through difference to other small things.

And first of all, it must be considered that small is in the genus of quantity, but the small that is said of God is without quantity: for just as there is a great without quantity, so there is a small without quantity.

Second, it must be considered that every small can easily be measured, but the small that is said of God is without number: for it cannot be comprehended by any measure.

Third, it must be considered that something small is detained easily whether through being impeded from its course or through being grasped easily, but the divine small can be held in neither way: because its virtue cannot be impeded nor can anyone grasp God perfectly.

Fourth, it must be considered that there are some small things from the fact that they are terminated quickly from the term of quantity or are defined by the definition of substance, comprehending substance, but the divine small is without term and without definition.

Fifth, it must be considered that those things that are small can comprehend little, but they are comprehended easily by others; yet the divine small is comprehensive of all things, but is incomprehensible by all things.

Lectio 2

On Same and Other, How They Are Attributed to God

§4. 366. Yet the same is supersubstantially eternal and unconvertible remaining in itself, always according to the same and having in the same way, present in the same way to all things,

367. and this, according to itself, in itself, firmly and uncontaminatedly gathered in the best ends of abundant identity,

368. unchangeable, not prevailing to fall into the opposite, strong, invariable, cleansed, immaterial, most simple, not needy, not augmentable, not diminishable, unbegotten; not as not yet begotten or imperfect or as not made from this or that or never in any way existing, but as everything unbegotten and absolutely unbegotten and always existing and per se perfect existing and the same existing according to itself and from itself uniformly and determined by the form of identity;

369. and the same from the same super-shining upon all things unto participating fitting things and coordinating others to others, abundance and cause of identity in itself and prepossessing contraries in the same mode, according to the one and singular exceeding cause of the whole of identity.

§ 5. 370. Yet other, because God is present to all things providingly and is made all things in all things on account of the salvation of all things, remaining in himself and by proper identity and inegressibly according to one operation and unpausable standing and giving himself by indeclinable virtue unto the deification of the converted,

371. and the otherness of the various figures of God, according to manifold visions, must be thought to signify certain other things by the things appearing beyond what they appear: for just as if a speech were to form the soul itself corporeally and were to place bodily parts around the simple, we would understand the parts placed around simplicity otherwise in it according to the propriety of the soul; and we would discern head indeed as mind, yet neck as opinion, as in the middle of reason and irrationality, yet breast as fury, yet belly as concupiscence, yet legs and feet as nature, using the names of the parts as signs of the powers; much more is it fitting that the otherness of forms and figures should be purged in him who is above all things, by the holy and mystical openings up befitting God. And if you wish to place the threefold figures of bodies around the untouchable and unfigurable God, the divine width indeed must be said for the super-wide procession of God to all things; yet length for the virtue extended above the whole of things; yet depth for the hidden and unknown incomprehensible to all existing things.

372. But lest we should hide ourselves from the opening up of the figures of otherness and of the forms, mixing the incorporeal namings of God with those that are through sensible signs; on account of which concerning those indeed in symbolic theology; yet now let us not suppose this divine otherness to be a certain variation of super-inconvertible identity, but the manifold formation unitive of this and the many uniform processions of fecundity to all things.

813. After Denys has determined about great and small, here he determines about same and other;

and first, he shows how same is attributed to God;

second, how other is attributed to him, at yet other, because God is present.

814. About the first, he does two things:

first, he proposes in a certain form the ways in which same is attributed to God;

second, he manifests them, at and this, according to itself.

815. Yet same is attributed to God according to his immutability, as in Psalm 101:28 we read, yet you yourself are the same.

Yet the immutability of God first of all is considered as regards the fact that he is not changed according to being and non-being, as generable and corruptible things, and for this reason he says that God is the eternal same, inasmuch as he is supersubstantially eternal; but because certain things have a certain eternity, inasmuch as they do not fall utterly into non-being, convertible into some other things, to exclude this consequently he says, unconvertible.

Second, he excludes local motion through what he says: remaining in itself: for God is contained by himself, as by a place without place.

Third, he excludes the motion of alteration and growth and diminution, when he says that he always has standing according to a certain form, namely because he is not changed from form into form, as from white into black or from quantity into quantity, as from small into great; because nothing in him is extended or drawn back: for what is otherwise has itself indeed according to the same, but not in the same way.

Fourth, he excludes the motion that is according to habitude to things; and he says that he, inasmuch as is on his part, always is in the same way, present to all things, but the fact that all things do not always have themselves in the same way to him arises from the variation that happens around things.

816. Then when he says, and this, according to itself, he expounds those things that he had touched on summarily; and first, what he had said: remaining in itself; and he excludes those things through which the remaining of something in some place could be impeded; which indeed are five:

for first, each thing remains in a place that befits it per se and according to its nature, yet easily is removed from a place that befits it accidentally; and as regards this he says that God is gathered in himself according to itself, that is, per se and not accidentally.

Second, something remains where it is made firm, whence some things are fastened by nails so that they might remain; and this is what he adds: firmly, for he is made firm in himself, according to the infinity of his virtue.

Third, it happens that something made firm in some place cannot remain in that place, because there befalls the corruption or putrefaction of that which was making it firm, as stones do not remain in a wall when the cement has corrupted; and to exclude this from God he adds, and uncontaminatedly.

Fourth, something is prohibited to remain because it is not gathered in the best way, but can be led unto the better; and to exclude this he says, in the best ends, that is, summits.

Fifth, something is prohibited to remain on account of the diversity of those things that come together unto the establishment of the thing, one of which draws here and another there; and as regards this he says, of abundant identity, because in God there is most perfect identity, excluding every diversity.

817. Then when he says, unchangeable, not prevailing to fall, he expounds what he had said: always according to the same and having in the same way; and first, as regards alteration; and he says that he is unchangeable, inasmuch as he cannot be varied according to more and less; and not prevailing to fall into the opposite, inasmuch as he is not changed from form into opposite form.

Then, he expounds the cause of the things said: for that something should not be changed or should not fall into its contrary, one cause can be because it has a strong active virtue for resisting, as is clear in fire, and as regards this he says, strong. Another cause can be because it does not have a principle of changeability in itself; and as regards this he says, invariable.

Yet this principle of variability sometimes indeed is from the mixing of something extraneous; and to exclude this he says, cleansed or pure, according to another translation: pure or cleansed is said of what is unmixed with an extraneous blemish.

Whereas sometimes the principle of variability is the potency of matter in what is varied, on account of which it is reduced by an agent into another disposition; and to exclude this he says, immaterial.

Whereas sometimes the principle of variability is the composition of something from diverse things, as mixed bodies are variable not only because they are material, but also because they are composed from contraries; and to exclude this he says, most simple.

Whereas sometimes the reason for variation is the neediness of what is varied: for what is imperfect naturally tends to its perfection; and to exclude this he says, not needy.

818. Then, to exclude the motion of growth, he adds, not augmentable; whereas to exclude the motion of decrease, he adds, not diminishable; whereas to exclude the change of generation, he adds, unbegotten, that is, not generated.

819. Yet sometimes something is called not generated because it has not yet received being through generation, just as things that will be generated in the future; to exclude this mode he adds, not as not yet begotten.

Yet sometimes something is called not generated because its generation is begun, but not yet consummated; and to exclude this he says, or imperfect.

Yet sometimes something is called not generated, not simply, but secundum quid, as if we should say that that man has not been generated by that one or if we should say that this is not a generated man, but is a generated animal; and to exclude this he says, or not as made by this, that is, by some determinate generator, or that, as regards a fixed term of generation.

Yet sometimes that is called not generated or not made, which is impossible to be, as that a man should be an ass; and to exclude this he adds, nor as never, that is, in no place, or never, that is, in no time, and in any way existing.

820. Then he adds how unbegotten is said of God through the opposite of the things set forth, saying that God is called unbegotten as everything, that is, because in a certain way he is all things, inasmuch as all things preexist in him; and for this reason, what he had said is opposed to him: nor as never in any way existing.

He also is called unbegotten, not secundum quid, but absolutely, against what he had said: or as not made from this or that.

He also is called unbegotten not as not yet begotten, but as always existing.

He also is called unbegotten not as imperfect, but as per se perfect existing. And therefore he shows the difference of God to those things that are not called generated.

821. Whence consequently he shows the difference of God to those things that are called generated: for every generation is a change from this whole into that whole, from which it follows that it is not always the same; and to exclude this he says, and the same existing.

Yet that a thing generated should not be always the same happens from two causes:

first of all, because it is determined to specific being not through its whole self, but through some part of it, namely through form, and on account of this it is corrupted and generated according as one form is separated from matter and another comes to it; yet what is form only is determined according to its whole self to its own specific being.

Second, because a thing generated is determined to its being not by itself but by the action of a generator; and for this reason to exclude this from God, he says that God exists the same as determined to this: that he should have himself uniformly and according to the form of identity, not according to another or from another, but according to itself and from itself.

822. Then when he says, and the same from the same super-shining, he shows how other things have identity through God; and this in two ways:

in one way, according as he grants identity to things existing in their proper natures; and he says that this same that is God super-shines upon all things unto this: that they might participate his identity, according to the fittingness of each: for he gives to one that it should be the same simply; and to those that are diverse according to themselves he gives identity of order, according as he coordinates others to others.

In another way, according as things that are diverse in their proper natures are the same inasmuch as they are in God; and as regards this he says that this is on account of the abundance of his identity, and on account of this he is the cause of every identity. And he prepossesses contraries in itself not in diverse modes, but in the same mode, as diverse effects are uniformly in that which is the one and singular cause of the whole of identity through excess.

823. Then when he says, yet other, because God is present, he shows how other is attributed to God, and he posits two modes, the first of which is that other is attributed to God inasmuch as he is present to all things as participating him and through a certain likeness according to the perfections that they receive from his providence, because, on account of the salvation and good of all things, he is made all things in all things, namely inasmuch as there is no perfection in things that is not some likeness of God such that he can always be called, through the participation of his likeness, in wise things, wisdom; in just things, justice; in living things, living; and in powerful things, virtue; and thus concerning the others.

824. And lest anyone were to understand badly that God is all things in all things, he excludes from God the modes in which one creature is made in another. Which indeed happens in two ways:

in one way, through the change of what is said to be made in another, as fire is made in a mixed body through the fact that it is converted into the body; whence to exclude this he says, remaining in himself.

In another way, something is made in another through the fact that by its action that thing changes into a likeness of it, as fire generating form for itself according a likeness of it is made in a certain way in the fire generated; and this, in some way, approaches to the mode in which he had said that God is made in things, but it fails in many ways:

first of all, because those things that generate things like themselves in natural things do not remain always the same, and for this reason, in order to conserve themselves, according to likeness of species, they generate things like themselves; and to exclude this he says, and by proper identity.

Second, because the action of an agent by which it makes something like itself is something going out from the agent into the patient, which does not have a place in God, because his action is his substance; whence to exclude this he says, and inegressibly.

Third, because a created agent makes itself in diverse things according to diverse operations, which does not befit God; and for this reason he adds, according to one operation.

Fourth, because the action of an agent making something like itself is not continuous and sempiternal, as is the action of God; and for this reason he says, and unpausable.

Fifth, because a natural agent simultaneously both suffers and is moved; and to exclude this from God he adds, standing.

Sixth, because the virtue of an agent naturally in its action is debilitated on account of the fact that it suffers simultaneously; and to exclude this he says that God by indeclinable virtue gives himself through a certain participation of himself unto the deification of the converted, that is, in order that he might assimilate to himself those things that he converts to himself.

825. Then when he says, and the otherness of the various figures, he posits the second mode in which other is attributed to God;

and first, he posits that mode;

second, he shows that it does not pertain to the proposed intention, at but lest we should hide ourselves.

826. Therefore he says, first, that the otherness of diverse figures also is attributed to God, according to the manifold visions of the prophets, in which sometimes he was seen as a lion, sometimes as a lamb, sometimes as a man; which indeed signify in diverse ways. They signify other things indeed beyond what appear on the surface; and he manifests this through an example in the soul: for if someone were to wish to describe the soul according to the mode of the body, although it is simple, we would understand otherwise in it than in the body, the bodily parts attributed to simplicity.

For through the head we would understand the mind which presides over all the parts of the soul, as the head over all the parts of the body; yet through the neck, opinion, which has itself in a middle way between the reason knowing truth and the irrational parts of the soul, lacking the science of truth; yet through the breast we would understand fury, that is, the irascible, on account of the fortitude of the breast; yet through the belly concupiscence, on account of the softness of the belly or because concupiscence serves the belly, as also the irascible has its seat in the heart which is in the breast; but through the legs and feet we discern that the natural forces of the nutritive soul are signified, through which life is sustained. And thus he would use the names of the bodily parts, as though certain signs of the powers of the soul, according to a certain likeness.

Whence much more is it necessary that the diversity of forms and figures in God, who is above all things, should be purged of bodily phantasms, through the holy and mystical expositions befitting God, namely because they receive the hidden from the manifest. Whence it is that if someone should wish to attribute to God, who is untouchable and unfigurable, the three dimensions of bodies, as the Apostle does in Ephesians 3:18, it will have to be said that the width of God is nothing other than the procession of divine providence, which is super-borne to all things, as though containing all things; yet the length of God shall be said for the virtue which is extended above the whole of things, penetrating all things from the highest even unto the lowest; yet the depth of God shall be said for the hidden and unknown essence of God, which is incomprehensible to all existing things.

827. Then when he says, but lest we should hide ourselves, he shows that the aforementioned variety does not pertain to the proposition; and he says that we ought not deceive ourselves by expounding the namings of God that are according to forms and figures, because through this we mix in that doctrine of symbolic theology, to which it pertains to expound the bodily namings of God, which are received through sensible signs.

But it pertains to the present proposition that we should not suppose that the otherness attributed to God is some variation of God who has supereminent and inconvertible, that is, unchangeable, identity, but through this we understand the formation according to which he attributes manifold forms and nevertheless reduces all things into one order, and conversely the uniformity of the many processions of the divine fecundity to all things; which pertains to the first mode of otherness assigned above.

Lectio 3

On Like and Unlike, How They Are Attributed to God

§ 6. 373. Yet if someone indeed should call God like as the same, as whole through whole singularly and indivisibly existing like himself, this naming of God as like must not be rejected by us.

374. Yet the theologians say that God, existing above all things according as he is, is like none; yet that he gives the divine likeness to those who are converted to him existing above every definition and reason according to virtue by imitation; and it is the virtue of the divine likeness which converts all things coming to the cause. Therefore it is fitting to call those things like God and them according to the divine image and assimilation; for not that God is like them, because neither is man properly like an image. For in coordinates indeed it is possible both to be like one another and to convert to each other by likeness and to be both like one another according to the preceding species of like; yet in a cause and things caused we shall not receive conversion: for to be like is given not only to those or those.

375. Yet for all things participating likeness God is made the cause that they should be like and he shall be also the substantifier of likeness itself; and what is like in all things, is like by a certain vestige of the divine likeness and completes their unition.

§ 7. 376. And what is necessary to say about that? For this theology preaches that he is unlike and not coordinated with all things, as other from all things. And this indeed is surprising: that it says that neither is anything like him. And indeed this speech is not contrary to assimilation to him: for the same things are like and unlike God. This indeed, according to contingent non-imitable imitation; yet this, according as things caused have less than the cause and deficient by infinite and incomparable measures.

828. After Denys has determined about same and different, here he determines about like and unlike;

and first about like;

second about unlike, at and what is necessary to say about that?

829. About the first, he does two things:

first, he shows how likeness is attributed to God;

second, that God is the cause of likeness, at yet for all things participating likeness.

830. About the first, he does two things:

first, he attributes likeness to God, according as he is said to be like himself;

second, through comparison to other things, at yet the theologians say.

831. Therefore he says, first, that if anyone should wish to say that God is like his own self, such an exposition of the divine likeness must not be rejected. Yet he excludes two things from God through which something can be unlike itself:

in one way, because it does not always remain the same, but is changed from form into form or from disposition into disposition.

Second, something can be called unlike itself because it is composed from contraries or from unlike parts. And to exclude this he says, whole through whole God like himself. And because whole was accustomed to be said for what is divided into parts, either subjective as a universal whole or integral as an integral whole, for this reason to exclude the ratio of a universal whole he says, singularly; whereas to exclude the ratio of an integral whole he says, indivisibly.

832. Then when he says, yet the theologians say, he treats of the likeness of God through comparison to other things, and he says that those treating divine things say that God who exists above all things, according as he is considered in his own being, is like none of things, but they say that he gives his likeness to things that are converted, that is, approach, to him according to a certain possible imitation according to their virtue; not such that they can imitate him perfectly, because he is above every definition and distinction, that is, above the terms of whatever nature and above every reason, that is, above every apprehension.

And the virtue of this likeness to God which is given to things by God is apparent in this: that all things that come forth from God, as effects from a cause, are converted through desire to him, as to a proper cause; which would not be the case unless all things were to have some likeness to God: for each thing loves and desires what is like itself.

Therefore because all things are converted through desire to God, it is fitting to say that all things are like God, not according to equality, but through a certain assimilation and participation, from which the ratio of image is taken.

And that the likeness of things to God is such is apparent from this: because we do not say that God is like other things, as neither man is said to be like his image: for in those things that are of one order it can be said that any mutually are like one another, such that likeness to each other is convertible, such that we say that this is like that and that like some other: for both can be called like one another, on account of the fact that they are called like according as they participate one form, which preexists in a common cause, to which both of the coordinates have a like habitude.

But in causes and things caused there ought not be received a conversion of likeness: for a thing caused and which is led out from another cannot be called like the cause from which it is led out, as neither an image a man; and this for this reason: because a cause does not depend on its effect, so that it should give its likeness only to this or to that, but an effect depends on its cause, from which alone it participates the ratio of likeness. And this dependence is designated when an effect is said to be in its cause. Whereas when it is said that coordinates are like one another, there is designated the dependence of both on one cause. And therefore it is clear that God, who is the cause of all things, cannot be called like other things, but other things are said to be like him.

833. Then when he says, yet for all things participating likeness, he shows how God is the cause of likeness for things; and he says that all things, whatever participate likeness, have this from God as from a cause: that they are like: for any things are called like according as they come together in some form; yet every form is from God. And not only is he the cause of like things, but he is also the cause of likeness itself, as it also has been said above that he is not only the cause of living things, but also of life itself. And whatever is called like in whatever created things, is called like by a certain vestige, that is, a certain representation, of the divine likeness, by which there is perfected not only likeness, but also every unition that is in things.

834. Then when he says, and what is necessary to say about that?, he determines about unlike; and he says that it is necessary concerning this to say more that God is not like things, but rather the cause of likeness, for this reason: because sacred doctrine preaches that he is unlike and not of the same order as others, because he is diverse from all things, as is clear in Isaiah 40:18: what have you made God like? And, what seems more surprising, they say that nothing is like God, according to Psalm 70:19: O God, who is like you? And again Psalm 85:8: none is like you among the gods, O Lord. And nevertheless this is not contrary to what has been said above about the assimilation of the whole of things to God: for the same things can be called like and unlike God; like indeed, according as they imitate God who is not perfectly imitable by a creature, according as befits it, that is, inasmuch as it is possible for a creature; yet unlike, according as things caused have less of perfection than the cause.

Nevertheless lest anyone were to understand some proportion through what is said: less, as happens in things that are of one genus one of which is more perfect than another, he adds that creatures fail of God, not according to some determinate measure, but infinitely and incomparably; and to that extent they are called unlike him.

Lectio 4

On Station and Session; On Motion; On Equality; How They Are Attributed to God

§ 8. 377. Yet what do we say also concerning the divine station or session? Yet what else indeed beyond this: that God himself remains in himself and is fixed singularly by immobile identity and super-gathered; and that he operates according to the same and around the same and in the same mode; both according as he is altogether unchangeable from himself; and according as he cannot be moved into the contrary and is totally immobile;

378. and this supersubstantially: for he is the cause of the station and seat of all things, who is above every seat and station and in him all things consist (Col 1:17) from the station of their proper goods guarded undisturbed.

§ 9. 379. Yet what also when again the theologians call the immobile both proceeding to all things and moved? Can it be that this also must be understood as befits God? For religiously he must be reckoned to be moved, not according to carrying or change or alteration or modal or local motion, not direct, not circular, not from both, not intelligible, not animal, not natural, but by this: that God drives substance and contains all things and totally provides for all things; and by this: that he is present to all things by the immeasurable circuit of all things and by providential processions and operations to all existing things. But also the motion of the immobile God, as befits God, is permitted to be praised by the speech.

380. It is also fitting indeed to understand right as the indeclinable and inflexible procession of operations and the generation of the whole of things from him; yet oblique as the stable procession and generative state; yet according to a circle, identity, to contain both middles and extremes, surroundings and things surrounded, and the conversion to him of those things that have proceeded from him.

§10. 381. Yet if anyone, in the eloquences, should take up in equal the naming of the same or of justice, it must be said that God is equal, not only as simple and indeclinable, but also as proceeding to all things and through all things equally,

382. and as the substantifier of per se equality itself, according to which he operates equally through all things a like ambulation of those around one another and an equal participation of those receiving according to the opportunity of singulars and an equal donation distributed to all things according to dignity,

383. and according as he pre-receives every equality—intelligible, intellectual, rational, sensible, substantial, natural, voluntary—segregatedly and unitively in himself, according to the virtue effective of every equality, existing above all things.

835. After Denys has determined about like and unlike, here he determines about the divine station and session and motion;

and first, about station and session;

second, about motion, at yet what also when again the theologians.

836. About the first, he does two things:

first, he shows how session or station is attributed to God;

second, he determines the causality of the divine station or session, at and this supersubstantially.

837. Yet he attributes station and session to God in three ways:

first of all, as regards the fact that he exists in himself; and this is what he says: that concerning the divine station and session, through which a certain immobility is designated, we can say nothing else, beyond this: that he does not stand or sit as sustained in some other as we do, but he remains in himself: not indeed movably, as a man sits in a seat from which he can be removed, nor according to some diversity of himself from himself, as a man differs from a place in which he sits or stands, but according to immobile identity; nor again in the common mode, as whatever thing in a certain way is in itself, inasmuch as it is contained within the terms of its nature, but he is singularly simple in himself. For he so leans upon himself that he depends on no other and is fixed and super-gathered above all things.

Second, he attributes to God station and session as regards operation; and this is what he says: that God operates always according to the same wisdom, virtue, and goodness and things of this sort; and around the same, as regards the object of his operation: because his operation is always around himself, inasmuch as by understanding and loving himself he works all things; and in the same mode according to the mode of operations as he operates unto operation: for he is not debilitated or fortified in acting.

Third, he attributes to God station and session through the removal of every passion or change from him; and he says that station or session is attributed to God both according as he does not have from himself any cause of his change, and according as he cannot be moved from anything exterior into the contrary, but he is totally immobile.

838. Then when he says, and this supersubstantially, he treats of the causality of the divine station and session; and he says that those things that have been said above are attributed to God supersubstantially: because he is the cause of every station and session that is found in created things, inasmuch as he is above every session and station and all things are stabilized in God himself who guards them, lest they should be disturbed from station or permanence in their proper goods.

839. Then when he says, yet what also when again the theologians, he determines about the divine motion;

and first, he shows how motion is attributed to God;

second, how different motions are attributed to God, at it is also fitting indeed to understand.

840. Therefore he says, first, that when the doctors of Sacred Scripture say that God, who is immobile, is moved and proceeds to all things, it must be understood as befits God. For that God is moved must be reckoned religiously and according to right faith, not as those things that are carried by others or in whatever way are changed through themselves or through alteration, by which something is changed from quality into quality; or according to modal motion, by which something is moved from one mode of remaining into another, as from less white into more white or from lesser quantity into greater; or according to local motion, as right or circular or oblique composed from the two; neither also according to intelligible motion, according to which a created intellect is changed from one intelligible conception into another; nor also according to animal motion, according to which an animal is changed from one apprehension into another or from one affection into another; nor also according to natural motion, according to which something is changed from one nature into another; but God is said to be moved inasmuch as he leads all things to this: that they should be, and inasmuch as he contains all things in his being; and not only does he drive unto substance and contain things in it, but inasmuch as universally he provides for all things, giving to things life and wisdom and virtue and other things of this sort, and he conserves them in them.

841. Yet from these effects God is said to be moved, by a twofold ratio:

first of all because he, by providing for all things, is present to all things by a certain circuit which cannot be measured, by concluding all things; for since he is the measure of all things, he is measured by nothing. Thus while he exhibits his presence around diverse things, a certain likeness of motion is apparent in him: for we cannot be present to diverse things unless we should be moved.

By another ratio, he is said to be moved on account of the aforementioned effects, inasmuch as the operations and processions of the gifts which he confers upon things from his providence come to all existing things. And thus by a certain likeness motion is apparent in God, while first there is considered essence or wisdom or something of this sort in God as in the highest peak of things, and thence it is derived, as though through a certain flowing out, to other things. And not only do the theologians attribute motion to God, but also it is permitted to us that we should praise fittingly the motion of the immobile God.

842. Then when he says, it is also fitting indeed to understand, he shows how different motions are attributed to God. And because what is moved in a straight line is moved uniformly from a certain beginning even unto the end, he says that it is fitting to understand right motion in God according as his operations proceed indeclinably and inflexibly: for his operation is not curved, but always proceeds in a straight line, according to the disposition of God.

We can also understand through right motion the production of all things by him: for thus his causal operation proceeds through all middle points in a straight line even unto the last.

Yet oblique motion is composed from diverse things; and thus oblique motion is attributed to God inasmuch as in his operation there is understood simultaneously both procession and station: procession indeed, as regards the production of things, yet station as regards the invariability of the divine operation. And therefore, because the procession of God is not without stability, it is called a stable procession; whereas because the station of God is not without the production of things, he says generative state.

Yet in circular motion, there are three things to consider:

first of all, that whatever point designated in a circle is the same both beginning and end.

Second, that in this circular line there must be considered the concave and the convex; and on the part of concavity indeed it contains other things; whereas on the part of the convex it can be contained by others.

Third, what is moved circularly returns by its circular motion to the first point from which it begins to be moved.

And therefore he is said to be moved according to a circle, inasmuch as he contains in himself every identity and all middles and all maximums, in which he touches on the first property; and inasmuch as he contains surroundings which pertains to the ratio of concavity, and things surrounded which pertains to the ratio of convexity, in which he touches on the second property; and inasmuch as he contains conversion to him, as to an end, of those things that have proceeded from him, as from a principle, in which he touches on the third property.

843. Then when he says, yet if anyone, in the eloquences, he determines about equality: for above, he had determined about inequality as it is an effect of justice which can either exclude or cause inequality; whereas now he determines about equality according to itself; and about this he does three things:

first, he shows how equality is attributed to God, as whom equality befits;

second, how it is attributed to him as cause, at and as the substantifier;

third, how it is attributed to him as prepossessing every equality, at and according as he pre-receives.

844. Therefore he says, first, that if anyone should wish to receive in the name of equality in Sacred Scripture a naming of the divine identity or of the divine justice, he could do this fittingly: for equality is unity of quantity. If therefore that unity should be attributed to God according to himself, God shall be said to be equal by reason of the divine unity, which is considered both according to his simplicity, because he is not composed from many, and according to immobility, because he has himself always in the same mode; and this is what he says: it must be said that God is equal . . . as simple and indeclinable.

Whereas if the divine unity should be considered through comparison to the effects around which he uniformly operates, as much as is on his part, thus equality is attributed to him inasmuch as he proceeds by diffusing effects to all things equally and through all things: he says, to all things, as regards the fact that all things receive the influence of the divine operation; whereas he says through all things, inasmuch as the divine operation crosses through a whole thing from the beginning even unto the end, and again inasmuch as through one thing it crosses over to another, while it uses one thing as acting in another.

And therefore the unity of simplicity and immobility pertains to the ratio of the divine identity; yet unity of operations in effects pertains to the ratio of justice, and for this reason he had said that in equality there is understood the naming of God both of the same and of justice.

845. Then when he says, and as the substantifier, he shows how equality is attributed to God as cause; and he says that we say that God is equal as substantifier, that is, cause, of* per se *equality itself, that is, of equality itself considered in the abstract, according to which equality indeed, in things caused God makes equals in two ways:

first of all as regards actions and passions or communications and receptions; and this is what he says: that God according to the equality caused operates equally in all things and likewise through all things an ambulation of those around one another, namely while the divine action crosses into all things and works an equal participation of those receiving, namely inasmuch as each passive thing receives the effect of the agent. But the likeness and equality of the aforementioned ambulation and reception must not be understood according to equality of quantity, because one thing is more receptive than another, but according to equality of proportion, because each thing proportionally acts or suffers according to its mode; and this is what he says: according to the opportunity of singulars.

In another way, equality can be considered in things according to those that are in things, as forms, quantities, qualities, and others of this sort; and as regards this he says that God works an equal donation distributed to all things. Which again must not be understood concerning equality of quantity, because not all white things have equal whiteness nor do all great things have equal greatness, but it must be understood concerning equality of proportion, because each thing has from the divine gifts according to equal proportion; and this is what he says: according to dignity.

846. Then when he says, and according as he pre-receives, he shows how equality is attributed to God according as he prepossesses every equality; and he says that we say that God is equal according as he pre-receives in himself every equality, namely intelligible and intellectual as regards angels, who are called intelligible according as they are understood and intellectual according as they understand; rational as regards men; sensible as regards animals; substantial as regards all things that are in whatever mode; natural as regards those things that are naturally made; voluntary as regards those that are made by intention.

God, he says, pre-receives every equality and in himself, not so that he would have them in that mode in which they are in singulars, but segregatedly, that is, in a singular mode beyond others; nor according to some diversity, as in creatures intelligible equality differs from rational, but unitively, that is, according to some one thing, namely according to the virtue which is effective of every equality, which also is existing above all things: for all effects preexist virtually in their cause, according to its virtue.