C. 2 - On United and Discrete Theology and What Is Divine Unition and Discretion

On United and Discrete Theology and What Is Divine Unition and Discretion

Lectio 1

What Things Are Said Commonly and What Distinctly in the Trinity

C. II, § 1. 31. Per se goodness, determining and manifesting the whole thearchic essence, whatever it is, is praised by the eloquences. For what else is there to say from the holy theology, when it says that the thearchy itself narrating says, why do you ask me about the good? No one is good but God alone (Matt 19:17, Mark 10:18, Luke 18:19). Therefore, this having been inquired into also in the others, we must demonstrate that all the namings of God befitting God always are praised by the eloquences, not particularly, but in the whole and perfect and integral and first deity, and all these simply, absolutely, and totally unobservedly are appointed to the universal totality of the perfect and all deity.

32. And indeed, as we remembered in the Theological Hypotyposes, if anyone should say that this is said not of the whole deity, he also dares unfittingly to tear apart the super-united unity. Therefore it must be said that even the Word, good itself by nature, said, I am good (Matt 20:15); and indeed one of the God-received prophets praises the good Spirit (Ps 143:10); and again, if anyone should have said that: I am who am, (Ex 3:14) is not praised of the whole deity, yet he tries to circumscribe it according to one part, how shall they hear: these things he says who is, who was, who is to come, omnipotent (Rev 1:8); and: yet you are the very same (Ps 102:27); and: the Spirit of truth, who is, who proceeds from the Father? (John 15:26) And if they say that not the whole thearchy is life, how can what the holy Word said be true: as the Father raises the dead and vivifies, so also the Son vivifies whom he wills (John 5:21); and: the Holy Spirit is who vivifies? (John 6:63) Yet because the whole deity has also the domination of the whole of things, indeed it is not said of the deigenic or filial deity, as I reckon, in as many places of theology as Lord is said frequently in Father and Son; but also the Holy Spirit is Lord (2 Cor 3:17); and there is praised the beautiful and the wise in the whole deity, and light and deific and cause; and all things whatever that are of the whole thearchy, the eloquences reduce to all thearchic praising: comprehensively indeed, as when they say, all things are from God (1 Cor 2:12); yet diffusively, as when they say, all things were made through him and in him, and all things consist in him (Col 1:16); and: send out your Spirit and they shall be created (Ps 104:30).

33. And, so that anyone should say it summarily, the thearchic Word itself said, the Father and I are one (John 10:30); and: everything that the Father has is mine (John 16:15); and: all mine are his and his, mine (John 17:10); and again, whatever things are of the Father himself, it attributes communicatively and unitively to the thearchic Spirit: divine operations, honor, fontal and unfailing cause, and distribution of kind gifts. And I reckon that nothing in the divine eloquences, not perverted by the intentions of their companions, contradicts these, because all befitting God pertain to the whole thearchy, according to the perfect Word in God.

34. Therefore these things having been demonstrated and determined by us from the eloquences, briefly indeed in these and particularly, yet in others sufficiently, whatever naming of God we try to treat totally, it is fitting to receive it in the whole deity.

§ 2. 35. Yet if anyone should say, we introduce confusion in this against the division befitting God, we do not reckon that such a word as this is sufficient to persuade that this is true.

36. For if anyone indeed is one who totally resists the eloquences, he shall be altogether far also from our philosophy, and if there is for him no concern of the veneration of God from the eloquences, how can there be concern for us of that leading by the hand to theological science? Yet if he respects the truth of the eloquences, we also, using this as a canon and light, unto excusing, as we can, go indeclinably, saying that a certain theology indeed hands on unitively, yet a certain one discretely; and it is fitting granted neither to divide the united, nor to confound the discrete, but following this, according to truth, to respect the divine splendors; for thence assuming the divine manifestations as a certain best canon of truth, we shall strive to guard those placed there in our very selves, not multiplied and not lessened and not perverse, ourselves guarded in the guarding of holy things and confirmed by them to guard those guarding them.

§ 3. 37. Therefore the united of the whole deity, as we have demonstrated in the Theological Hypotyposes through many things from the eloquences, are: super-good, super-God, supersubstantial, super-living, super-wise, and whatever are of exceeding removal; with these also all causal names: good, beautiful, existing, generative of life, wise, and whatever from his kind gifts are named by the cause of all good things. Yet the discrete, the supersubstantial name of the Father and use and of the Son and of the Spirit, with no conversion or communion totally super-induced. Yet again it is discrete with this, according to us the perfect and invariable essence of Jesus, and whatever substantial mysteries of kindness are according to this.

108. After Denys, in the preceding chapter, handed on the mode of proceeding in this work and the ratio of the divine names, in this second chapter he intends to show that the divine names, which are treated in this book, are common to the whole Trinity; and for this reason this chapter is entitled On United and Discrete Theology, because in this chapter there is handed on those things that are said commonly of the whole Trinity and those that are said of the distinct persons. And there is handed on also in this same chapter what is the ratio of community and distinction in divine things, which pertains to the second part of the title, when he says, and What Is Divine Unition and Discretion.

109. Yet this chapter is divided into two parts:

in the first he shows what things are said commonly and what distinctly in the Trinity;

in the second he assigns the ratio of community and of distinction, at yet it is necessary, as I reckon.

110. About the first, he does two things:

first, he shows that the divine names, which must be treated in this book, must be received in the whole Trinity;

in the second, he removes an objection made to the contrary, at yet if anyone should say.

111. About the first, he does three things:

first, he posits the intended truth;

second, he proves it, at and indeed, as we remembered;

third, he excuses himself from a more diligent proof, at therefore these things having been demonstrated.

112. Therefore he says, first, that per se goodness is praised by the eloquences, that is, the Sacred Scriptures, as determining, that is, distinguishing from others, and manifesting the whole divine essence, whatever it is, because whatever the divine essence befits, it befits it to be goodness per se and conversely. And he proves this through the fact that in Sacred Scripture the divinity itself is introduced, in the person of the Son, saying, why do you ask me about the good? No one is good but God alone, as is had in Luke 18:19; which must be understood concerning goodness per se. And because it is such concerning the name of goodness, therefore also in the other books after the inquiry, we must demonstrate that all names befitting to God are praised in the Sacred Scriptures, not particularly, as though befitting only one perfectly, but in the whole and perfect integral and first deity of the Trinity.

113. Yet a whole here is not received according as it is composed of parts, for thus it could not correspond to the deity, as repugnant to its simplicity, but as according to the Platonists a certain totality is said to be before parts, which is before the totality that is out of parts; as if we should say that a house that is in matter is a whole out of parts, and a house that preexists in the art of the builder is a whole before parts. And in this mode the whole universe of things, which is as a whole out of parts, preexists as in a primordial cause in the deity itself; and thus, the deity itself of Father and Son and Holy Spirit, is called whole, as though prepossessing all things in itself.

114. Perfect must not be received according to the mode of signifying of a word by which perfect is said as though completely made, as we say that we have per-walked, when we have completed a walk; whence what is not made cannot be called perfect according to this ratio; but because things that are made then arrive at the end of their perfection, when they attain the nature and virtue of their proper species, thence it is that this name perfect is assumed to signify everything that attains its proper virtue and nature. And in this mode the divinity is called perfect, inasmuch as it is most of all in its nature and virtue.

115. Yet the integral and the perfect seem to be the same; nevertheless they differ by ratio: for something seems to be called perfect in attaining to its proper nature, yet integral through the removal of diminution, as we say that some man is not integral, if after he attains his proper nature, he is mutilated in some member. And because nothing can be subtracted from the deity of the Trinity, to signify this he adds, integral.

116. Yet first to signify that the deity of three persons is not participated deity; for first is said of what is unparticipated, as per se deity and per se goodness. And they seem to be posited to exclude the error of Origen and Arius, who posited that the deity of the Son is participated.

117. And in order that he might show that the names of God not only are said commonly of the three persons, but equally and in the same mode, he adds that it also must be demonstrated that all the aforementioned namings are appointed, that is, attributed, simply, absolutely, and totally unobservedly, to the universal totality of the perfect and all, that is, whole, deity; so that what he says: universal, might be referred to the number of persons, whereas the other things to the perfection of essence; and this: simply, which responds to what he had said: first; for those things that are unparticipated are called good simply, whereas those that are participated are called goods particularly, according to Augustine: take this and that and you shall see the good of every good; (Augustine, De Trinitate, bk. 8, c. 3 [Opp. t. VIII, Parisiis 1694, col. 867 G; ML 42, 949]. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, Q. 6, A. 4, 1a.) absolutely, which responds to what he had said: integral; for those things that are corrupted cannot be named absolutely, as a dead man is not called man absolutely; totally unobservedly, that is, without the rest of distinction observing, which responds to what he had said: perfect; for unless there were perfect deity in whichever of the persons, it would be necessary to observe how something was said of one and how of another.

118. Then when he says, and indeed, as we remembered, he proves what he had presupposed;

and first: it is said specially of certain names;

second: of all, at and, so that anyone should say it summarily.

119. Therefore he says, first, that, as was commemorated in the book On the Theological Hypotyposes, if anyone should say that this which has been said: no one is good but God alone, is not said of the whole deity, that is, of all the persons, and through this he presumes an error, daring to divide the unity of the divine unity, it must be said against him that even the Word itself, that is, the Son of God, as naturally having goodness, said, I am the good shepherd (John 10:11), and in the psalms it is said, of course in Psalm 142:10: your good spirit. And likewise if anyone should have said that what is said in Exodus 3:14: I am who am, is not praised of the whole Trinity, that is, of all the persons, but of one only, how shall he receive what is said in Revelation 1:4: these things he says who is and who was and who is to come, omnipotent; and what the Apostle introduces about the Son: yet you are the very same (Heb. 1:12); and about the Holy Spirit: the Spirit of truth who is, who proceeds from the Father (John 15:26)?—although our letters do not have: who is. And likewise if anyone should say that not the whole divinity is life, how is what the Son of God said true: as the Father raises the dead and vivifies, so also the Son vivifies whom he wills (John 5:21); and: the Spirit is who vivifies (John 6:64)? And that the whole deity has the domination of all things, could not be said in as many places in Sacred Scripture as this name Lord is said frequently of Father and Son, and this so that we might speak of the deigenic deity of Father or the filial deity of the Son. But the Spirit also is Lord, as is said in 2 Corinthians 3:17. And likewise there is praised the beautiful and the wise, in all the persons of the deity, and light and deific and cause and all things whatever that are of the whole deity the sacred eloquences reduce to all divine praising, sometimes indeed simultaneously by comprehending that it befits all the persons, as when it is said, all things are from God (Rom. 11:36), yet sometimes distinct concerning one person, as when it is said of the Son: all things were made through him and in him and . . . consist in him (Col. 1:16); and in the psalms: send out your Spirit and they shall be created (Ps. 103:30).

120. Then when he says, and, so that anyone should say it summarily, he shows the proposition commonly of all the names of God, saying that, so that in sum it might be said of all the names of God, the very Word of God said, the Father and I are one (John 10:30), through which it is shown that whatever things are said of the Son also are said of the Father; and: and everything that the Father has is mine (John 16:15); and likewise whatever things are of the Father and of the Son, Sacred Scripture attributes commonly and unitedly to the divine Spirit: divine operations, divine honor, fontal and unfailing cause, and distribution of kind gifts. And all these things are had in 1 Corinthians 12:11: one and the same Spirit works all these things. And these things are so true that I reckon that no custom in the divine eloquences, which does not have a corrupt intention in them, contradicts these, namely that all the names befitting God pertain to the whole deity, according to the perfect mode of speaking of God.

121. Then when he says, therefore these things having been demonstrated, he excuses himself from a more diligent inquiry of the aforementioned things; and he says that these things have been determined here briefly and particularly from the Sacred Scriptures, but more sufficiently in another book. Whence whatever naming of God we shall try to expound in the present work, it is necessary that this name be received in the whole deity, that is, in all the persons; and to this end there is introduced the whole present chapter.

122. Then when he says, yet if anyone should say, he excludes an objection;

and first, he poses the objection;

second, the mode of solving, at for if anyone indeed is one.

123. Yet someone could object that through the fact that all names that are said of the Father are attributed to the Son and the Holy Spirit, the distinction of persons is removed altogether and confusion is introduced in the divine persons, which does not befit God. But he says that if anyone should object thus it must not be reckoned that his speech is sufficient to persuade that he tells the truth; for the distinction of persons is not removed through this.

124. Then when he says, for if anyone indeed is one, he posits the mode of solving, saying that if the man who so objects totally contradicts the Sacred Scriptures, such a man is altogether withdrawn from our wisdom. For it does not pertain to theology to prove those things that are of faith to him who does not receive the Scriptures, since faith is above reason. Whence if he does not have concern to venerate the divine eloquences, how can there be concern for us to lead him by the hand to the divine science?—because in the philosophical sciences it is such that no wise man disputes against one denying the principles of his art.

125. But if anyone thus objecting should wish to respect the truth of the sacred eloquences, we, using Sacred Scripture as a certain rule and light manifesting truth, proceed, not declining from Sacred Scripture, to excuse ourselves from the aforementioned objection, and we say that Sacred Scripture hands on certain things commonly concerning the three persons, certain things more distinctly, and it is fitting for us granted not to distinguish those that are common, nor to confound those that are distinct; but, by following Sacred Scripture, according to our ability, to respect the divine truths. Because it is necessary that we, receiving from Sacred Scripture the manifestation of God, should guard those things that are posited in Sacred Scripture as a certain best rule of truth, such that we should neither multiply, by adding; nor lessen, by subtracting; nor pervert, by expounding badly; because while we guard holy things we are guarded by them, and we are confirmed by them to guard those who guard holy things. For it is necessary not only to conserve those things that are handed on in the Sacred Scriptures, but also those things that are said by the sacred doctors, who conserved Holy Scripture intact.

126. Then when he says, therefore the united of the whole deity, he manifests the solution posed as regards what he said: that Sacred Scripture hands on certain things about the Trinity unitedly and certain things discretely; and he says that the united of the whole deity, that is, those common to the whole Trinity, as has been said in the book On the Divine Hypotyposes and has been proven through many authorities received from the Sacred Scriptures, are two genera of names:

first of all, those that are said of God remotively through a certain excellence, as super-good, supersubstantial, super-living, super-wise, and whatever others are said of God through removal, on account of his excess; with these, I say, there must be co-numbered all causal names, that is, which designate God as the principle of the procession of perfections that emanate from him into creatures, namely: good, beautiful, existing, generative of life, wise, and whatever others through which the cause of all good things is named from the gift of his goodness. And from this there can be received the magistral rule that all names designating an effect into creatures pertain to the divine essence.

127. Yet the discrete names, that is, those pertaining distinctly to the three persons, are: the supersubstantial or hypostatic, that is, personal, name of the Father and use of the Father, that is, his act which is generation; and likewise the name of the Son and his act, which is to be generated; and the name of the Holy Spirit and his act which is procession; such that, in such things, no conversion ought to be super-induced, as if he were to say that the Father generates the Son and conversely; or whatever sort of communion, as if he were to say that the Father and the Son generate some other person. And likewise the mystery of the Incarnation pertains distinctly to a divine person, because only the person of the Son was incarnated; and this is what he says: that with the aforementioned things it is discrete: because the perfect and invariable essence of Jesus according to the nature of the deity, is according to us through the unition of humanity; and whatever other substantial, that is, personal, mysteries pertain to the kindness of the Incarnation.

Lectio 2

Of What Sort Is Unition and Discretion in Divine Matters

§ 4. 38. Yet it is necessary, as I reckon, taking it up again, for us to expound more the perfect mode of divine unition and discretion, in order that every speech should be made conspicuous to us: rejecting indeed everything various and not plain, yet discretely and plainly and ordinately, determining proper things according to virtue.

39. For our holy masters of theological tradition, which I have said also in other works, indeed call the divine unitions, which are of the super-ineffable and super-unknown singularity, hidden and inegressible super-gatherings;

40. yet discretions befitting the good, thearchic processions and manifestations.

41. And they say, following the holy eloquences, and the proper things of the said unition and again of discretion, that there are certain proper discretions and unitions.

42. As in divine unition, that is, supersubstantiality, there is united indeed and common to the principal Trinity: supersubstantial essence, super-godly divinity, super-good goodness, which is identity above all things of the total propriety existing above all things, unity above principate; ineffable, by ignorance of much light, perfectly not intelligible, the positing of all things, the removal of all things, which is above every positing and removal;

43. the dwelling of the principal persons in one another, if it is necessary so to say, all the totally super-united gathering.

44. In which mode the lights of lamps, so that I might use sensible and proper examples, being in one house, both are all together wholly in the whole of one another, and have diligent discretion from one another properly subsisting, united by discretion and discrete by unition.

45. And indeed we see, with many lamps being in the house, the lights of all united into one certain light and resplendent by one indiscrete clarity, and no one, as I reckon, could discern the light of this lamp from the others out of the air containing all the lights, and see one without another, with all in all blended without mixing.

46. But also if anyone should take one out from the house, there shall leave with it also its whole proper light, tearing away with it nothing of the other lights in itself and leaving nothing of its own self to the others. For there was of these, which I have said, perfect unition of whole to whole, not mixed universally and with no part confused.

47. And these things totally in the body air and light dependent upon material fire. Yet there we say that supersubstantial unition is gathered, not over only those unitions that are in the body, but also over all those that are in souls themselves and in minds themselves, which they have not mixedly and super-mundanely, the whole through the whole deiform and supercelestial lights, according to the proportional participation of the unition segregated from all participating things.

§ 5. 48. Yet there is discretion in the supersubstantial theologies, not which I said: only that according to this unition each of the principal persons unmixedly and unconfusedly is gathered, but also that those that are of the supersubstantial fecundity of God, are not converted to one another: yet the only font of supersubstantial deity is the Father, nor is the Son the Father, nor is the Father the Son, with the hymns guarding by religion the proper things of each of the thearchic persons. Those things indeed, according to the ineffable both unition and essence, are both unitions and discretions.

128. Because in the solution to the objection posed above he had said that a certain theology concerning the divine persons hands on unitively and a certain one discretely, he intends here to expound of what sort is unition and discretion in divine matters;

and first, he expounds according as it is possible;

second, he says that it cannot totally and perfectly be expounded by us, at but indeed whatever causes.

129. About the first he does two things:

first, he hands on the mode according to which he intends to expound;

second, he expounds according to that mode, at for our holy masters of theological tradition.

130. Therefore he says that for a fuller understanding of the solutions given, it is necessary, according to his reckoning, to expound more the perfect mode of divine unition and discretion, taking up the solution again from the beginning, such that every speech of ours about this might be made conspicuous, that is, manifest. To attain which, he posits two things to be avoided and three to be observed: for there must be avoided or rejected everything various, confused or mixed. For when someone says diverse things confusedly and indistinctly, it is necessary that he should speak now about this, now about that, and thus variety appears in his speech; there must be rejected everything not plain, that is, obscure, which indeed can happen if intelligible things are handed on without the leading by the hand of sensible examples or if some manifest things were to be handed on through unaccustomed words. Yet against these two, he posits two things to be observed: namely that his speech should determine, according to the virtue of speaking, proper things, that is, things connatural to us; discretely, against what he had said: various; and plainly, against what he had said: not plain; and he adds a third, namely, ordinately; for it is necessary, for this doctrine to be manifest, that it should be proceeded according to the order of the discipline, by beginning from more manifest things and from those through the knowledge of which others are known. He even promises that he will expound the perfect mode of divine unition and discretion, because he will assign all the modes according to which unition and discretion can be received in divine things, yet not that he can manifest the very mode, according as it is perfect in God; for this is above our power, as he will prove below.

131. Then when he says, for our holy masters of theological tradition, he pursues the exposition of divine unition and discretion:

and first, as it pertains to the deity;

second, as it pertains to the humanity of Christ, at yet it is discrete by the divine operation.

132. About the first, he does two things:

first, he expounds the two modes of unition and discretion;

second, he applies both, at and they say, following the holy eloquences.

133. About the first, he does two things:

first, he expounds the common mode of unition;

second, the common mode of discretion, at yet discretions befitting the good.

134. Therefore he says, first, that as he had said in his other books, namely in the book On the Divine Hypotyposes, our holy masters of theological tradition, that is, of Christian doctrine, namely the apostles and their disciples, call the divine unitions certain hidden and inegressible divine super-gatherings that are of the divine singularity, super-ineffable and super-unknown.

135. For the evidence of which it must be considered that, since every multitude of things flows out from a first principle, the first principle, according as it is considered in itself, is one; yet according to the emanation by which a multitude proceeds from it, already there is found from what the first principle can be distinguished, because the ratio of multitude consists in distinction. Therefore to consider the first principle, according as it is in itself, this is to consider its unition, and this existence of the first principle in itself, he calls super-gathering; and he names this super-gathering both hidden and inegressible: hidden indeed because God can be known by us, inasmuch as we know the participations of his goodness; yet according as he is in himself, he is hidden to us; yet he says inegressible, because according as it is in itself the first principle is communicated to none, and thus it is as though it does not go out from itself: and on account of this the divinity itself so considered, through excellence distinguishing it from all things, he calls singularity, because the singular is what is incommunicable.

136. Then when he says, yet discretions befitting the good, he expounds, through its opposite, the common mode of discretions; and he says that the aforementioned teachers call discretions processions and manifestations of the deity, which befit it inasmuch as it is the good itself, because it is of the ratio of the good that from it there should proceed effects through its communication. And it must be considered that against what he had said above: hidden and inegressible, he posited fittingly enough processions and manifestations, because it is manifested through effects going forth from it, and in a certain mode the deity itself proceeds into its effects, while it hands on a likeness of itself to things, according to the proportion of each, such that, nevertheless, its excellence and singularity remain for itself, uncommunicated to things and hidden to them. Therefore these processions are called discretions, because unless other things were to flow out from a first principle, the first principle would not have anything by which it would be discerned.

137. Then when he says, and they say, following the holy eloquences, he applies both of the said modes;

and first, he poses a subdivision;

second, he manifests it, at as in divine unition.

138. Therefore he says, first, that those who follow the Sacred Scriptures and follow the proper rationes of the aforementioned unition and again of the aforementioned discretion, say that both in the aforementioned common unition there are certain proper unitions and discretions, and also in the aforementioned common discretion.

139. Then when he says, as in divine unition, he expounds the subdivision;

and first, he shows how, in the aforementioned common mode of unition, there is a certain unition and discretion;

second, he shows that, even in the aforementioned discretion, there is unition and discretion, at yet there is discretion in the supersubstantial theologies.

140. About the first, he does two things:

first, he shows how in the aforementioned unition there is a proper unition;

second, how in the aforementioned unition there is discretion, at the dwelling of the principal persons.

141. Therefore for the understanding of this part it must be considered that, since above he received the ratio of divine unition from the fact that God in himself is considered according to his excellence, that consideration is twofold. For there can be considered that super-excelling essence of God in itself: either according to the essence, and thus it is united and common to the whole Trinity; or according as one of the persons is in another, and thus in unition there is found discretion.

142. Therefore this is what he says: as in divine unition, that is, supersubstantiality, as though he should say: I so receive the divine unition in this mode according to the common ratio of unition posited above, according as the ratio of union consists in a certain excellence of the deity; in this common unition, I say, whatever pertains to the super-excellence of the divine essence** is united and common to the principal Trinity**, and, through this, he gives to understand that the ratio of proper unity, which now he is expounding, is nothing other than the being common to the three persons; and he exemplifies: as supersubstantial essence, super-godly divinity, that is, above the mode of deity communicated to things, and super-good goodness, and identity which is above all things, namely according to which God is the same to himself, and unity above principate, unity, I say, of the total existing propriety, namely above all things.

143. And he says this because one has the ratio of a principle. Yet one is one according as it is undivided in itself; yet this is what retains the propriety of its nature. As if he should say that God, inasmuch as he is unity, is the principle over every principle, having in himself his propriety by which he exists above all things. To this excellence also there is that he is unknown by us on account of the excellence of his light, and that he is perfectly intelligible, that is, comprehensible, by no created intellect, and that all things can be affirmed of him and all things denied, according to the mode expounded in the preceding chapter, since nevertheless he is above every affirmation and negation; for he is above every understanding of ours, which composes affirmations and negations.

144. Then when he says, the dwelling of the principal persons, he expounds how discretion is in the common mode of unition, which is super-excelling gathering; and about this, he does three things:

first, he posits what he intends;

second, he manifests the proposition, through a sensible example, at in which mode the lights of lamps;

third, he shows the example to be failing of the representation of so great a thing, at and these things totally in the body air etc.

145. Therefore he says that the dwelling of the principal persons in one another, that is, according as one of the divine persons is in another, and the gathering of one into another, if it should be necessary so to be named, since it imports distinction, nevertheless is totally super-united, that is, pertaining to that unition of excellence about which it has been said above.

146. Then when he says in which mode the lights of lamps, he manifests, through a sensible example, that in the aforementioned unition there can be discretion; in which example indeed he does three things:

first, he posits a sensible example, in which he says that there is simultaneously unition and discretion;

second, he shows that in that example there is unition, at and indeed we see;

third, that in it there is discretion, at but also if anyone should take one.

147. Therefore he says first that so that we might use examples sensible and proper to us, the lights of many lamps, being in one house, both are all together wholly in the whole of one another and nevertheless have diligent, that is, best and perfect, discretion from one another properly subsisting; and thus many lights are united with discretion and discrete with unition.

148. Then when he says, and indeed we see, he shows that the aforementioned lights have unition with one another; and he says that we see, with many lamps being in one house, that the lights of all the lamps are united into one certain light, because in the same part of the air the lights of all the lamps are resplendent; and this is what he adds: and resplendent by one indiscrete, that is, indistinct, clarity, according to place or subject; and no one, as I reckon, could discern the light of this lamp, in the air, according as it contains all lights, from the others, and see one of them without another, because one whole light is blended with another, without mixing, namely removing discretion.

149. Then when he says, but also if anyone should take one, he shows that discretion remains there, because if anyone should take out one of the lamps, as in one of the candles, simultaneously its whole proper light would leave with it, which was from that lamp in the house—from which it is clear that the light, in the house, will be found lessened; nevertheless such that the light leaving will not simultaneously tear away something of the other lights with it, nor also will something of itself remain with the other lights; which could not be, if there were made a mixing of lights, as if water should be mixed with ash or flour, the whole cannot be extracted, so that nothing should remain of the flour or ash mixed in and also so that nothing from the ashes or flour should be lost or should leave simultaneously. But because this does not happen in the lights, it is for this reason that there was perfect joining of the whole of the lights to the whole, without every mixing and with no confusion of the parts existing.

150. Yet it must be considered that, concerning light, there was a twofold opinion of the physicists:

for certain men said that light is a body, and according to this opinion, the example introduced seems to proceed plainly enough. For thus Denys seems to speak about many lights from diverse lamps proceeding in the one air, as if he were to speak of many bodies, and especially because he says that they have subsisting discretion, for to subsist pertains to substances only, and on account of this he says that one light leaves without another, in which there seems to be designated a certain local motion, which pertains to bodies only.

151. Whereas if light should not be a body, but a quality, according to the opinion of others, the lights would not have subsisting discretion, or rather, from the diverse lamps, as from diverse agent causes, there would be made one light only, more intense in the air, and with one light removed, the superaddition of intensity would cease, as from many causes heating, heat is extended into the heatable and, with one cause subtracted, the heat is lessened.

Yet this second opinion is the truer; whence it can be said that Denys here is speaking of the subsisting discretion of the lights and of the leaving of one of them with respect to the lamps and not according to themselves. Nevertheless it must be considered that both the philosophers and also the sacred doctors were accustomed, sometimes, for manifesting a proposition, to use some examples according to some opinions probable with some men, although they themselves did not follow it.

152. Then when he says, and these things totally in the body air, he shows that that example fails of the representation of so great a thing; and he says that these things which have been said of the diverse lights, totally occur in bodily and material things, namely in the body air as in a place, whether the lights should be bodies, or in a subject if light is a quality; and, again, with sensible light being dependent upon material fire. But in the divine persons, we say that supersubstantial unition is gathered, not over only those unitions that are in the body, but also over all those that are in souls themselves and in angelic minds; which unitions indeed the deiform and supercelestial lights, that is, the angels themselves, have, the whole through the whole not mixedly and super-mundanely, namely while one angel is joined to the whole of another through understanding and affection. And unconfused unition of this sort in minds and souls is made according to the proportional participation of that unition that is in the divine persons, which is super-segregated from all participating things, namely because none of the participating things can perfectly imitate the divine unition.

153. Then when he says, yet there is discretion in the supersubstantial theologies, he expounds how in the common mode of discretion signified above, there is found both discretion and unition, that is, something common to the whole Trinity and something distinct pertaining to the persons. For it has been said above that the divine discretions are named according to the processions of the deity. Yet procession is twofold: one indeed according as one person proceeds from another, and through this the divine persons are multiplied and distinguished, and as regards this proper discretion is considered in the common mode of discretion; the other is the procession according to which a creature proceeds from God, according to which there is made a multitude of things and the distinction of creatures from God, and this is united discretion, that is, common to the whole Trinity.

154. First, therefore, he expounds how some discretion pertains to the discretion of persons;

second, how some discretion pertains to the unity of essence, at yet if also a procession befitting the good.

155. Therefore he says, first, that discretion in the supersubstantial theologies to the divine persons, not only is that which I said: that through this common unition, which pertains to the superexcellence of the deity, each of the divine persons unmixedly and unconfusedly is gathered into the others, but also that those that pertain to the supersubstantial fecundity of God never are converted to one another, as those that pertain to personal gathering were converted. For mutually the Father is in the Son and the Son in the Father, but nevertheless not mutually does the Father generate the Son and the Son the Father; and this is what he adds: that only the Father is the font of supersubstantial deity, as in a font there is understood authority or a principle not from a principle; nor is the Son the Father nor the Father the Son, since the divine praises, according to the faith of the Christian religion, conserve the divine proprieties of each of the divine persons.

156. Finally by way of an epilogue, he adds that those things that have been said are unitions and discretions pertaining to the ineffable divine essence itself and to its ineffable unition; because what follows concerning unition and discretion pertains to creatures.

Lectio 3

How Under the Common Mode of Discretion There Is Contained a Certain Proper Unition, Which Is According to the Proportion of Creatures from God, Pertaining to the Whole Trinity

49. Yet if also a procession befitting the good, of the divine and super-united unition, driving and multiplying goodness itself into plurality, is a divine discretion, then there are united indeed according to divine discretion the incomprehensible traditions, substantifications, vivifications, sapientifications, and other gifts of goodness which is the cause of all things, according to which from participations and participatings participated things are praised not participably. And this is common and united and one to the whole deity, that all the whole itself is participated from each of the participating things and from none, by no part.

50. In which mode a point in the middle of a circle from all the lines placed around it in the circle, and just as many impressions of a seal participate the archetype seal and with the whole and the same existing in each of the impressions and in none according to no part.

51. Yet the imparticipability of divinity, the cause of all things, exceeds even these, because neither is there a touch of it, nor a certain other communion of mixing to parts.

§ 6. 52. Although someone might say: the seal is not in the whole of its impressions, whole and the same; yet the cause of this is not the seal, for one and the same bears all of itself to each; but the diversity of participating things makes dissimilar impressions of one and the same whole principal form, just as if they should be soft indeed and easily figurable and plain and immaculate and not of a contrary figure and hard, nor shall easily fusible and unstable things have a cleansed and plain permanent figure; yet if something should fail of the aforementioned suitability, this also shall be the cause of the unparticipated and not plain and whatever of other things should be made by unsuitability of participation.

53. Yet it is discrete by the divine operation kind to us, that the supersubstantial Word should be made according to us from us totally and truly, and should do and suffer whatever are of his human contemplation, elect and remote. For the Father and the Spirit have communicated in these according to no ratio; unless someone should say that according to will befitting the good and kind and according to every super-posited and ineffable divine operation, which also the one made according to us, invariable, according as God and the Word of God, did. So also we strive both to unite divine things by word and to discern them, just as they are both united and discrete.

157. After Denys has expounded how under the common mode of discretion, which is according to procession, there is contained a proper discretion, which is according to the procession of one person from another, now he intends to expound how under the same common mode of discretion, there is contained also a certain proper unition, which is according to the procession of creatures from God, pertaining to the whole Trinity; and about this he does two things:

first, he proposes what he intends;

second, he manifests it through examples, at in which mode a point.

158. Yet for the evidence of the first part, it must be considered that someone could say that the procession of creatures is not contained under divine discretion, whence although the procession of creatures commonly pertains to the whole Trinity, nevertheless it cannot be said that any divine discretion is common or united in the Trinity. And for this reason he wishes to show that the procession of creatures is in a certain way a divine discretion, nevertheless not in that mode in which is the procession of divine persons. For in the procession of divine persons, the same divine essence itself is communicated to the person proceeding, and thus there are many persons having the divine essence, but in the procession of creatures the divine essence itself is not communicated to the creatures proceeding, but it remains uncommunicated or unparticipated; but its likeness, through those things that it gives to creatures, is propagated and multiplied in creatures, and thus in a certain way the divinity, through a likeness of itself, not through its essence, proceeds into creatures and in a certain way is multiplied in them, such that this procession of creatures can be called a divine discretion, if respect should be had to the divine likeness, yet not if the divine essence should be respected.

159. Therefore this is what he says, that if the divine essence befitting goodness can be called a procession, which essence is of the divine super-united unition, that is, unity of essence, in which the three persons are united, which is above every unity, which in a certain way drives or leads itself out of its goodness into plurality and multiplies itself, namely according to its likeness, if, I say, such a procession, by reason of the fact that through it the divine unity in a certain way is multiplied, can be called a divine discretion, then consequently it must be said that the traditions, that is, the donations of divine gifts, which are uncomprehended on the part of the principle, are united, that is, common to the whole Trinity according to divine discretion, that is, according to the common mode of divine discretion, which is considered according to procession.

160. And he shows what those traditions are, adding, substantifications, according as he gives being to all subsistent things; vivifications, according as he gives life; sapientifications, according as he gives wisdom; and other gifts of the divine goodness, which is the cause of all things, according to which divine gifts participated through likeness, not participably, inasmuch as the essence remains unparticipated, are praised from participations, that is, from participated gifts, as are being, wisdom, and life, and participatings, namely by which those are communicated. Yet he speaks plurally of divine things either on account of the plurality of persons or on account of the plurality of names which are attributed to God himself; and this is common to the whole divinity.

161. And lest there should be understood only a community of reason, as genus is common to species and species to individuals, he adds, and united, to show that in the three it is one in number. And lest anyone should understand unity gathered from many, as a house is united from parts, he adds, and this one, namely all the whole divinity itself, that is, according to whichever person, is participated from each of the participating things through likeness and is participated from none of the participating things in no part of it, through the commixing of its substance. Yet he says that that whole is participated, nevertheless not totally or perfectly, which is incomprehensible to all, as has been said above.

162. And because this last saying seemed difficult and implying contradiction, here he manifests it consequently through examples, when he says, in which mode a point; and about this he does three things:

first, he posits the examples;

second, he shows that they are deficient, at yet the imparticipability of divinity;

third, he objects against the aforementioned and resolves it, at although someone might say.

163. Therefore he says that, concerning the participation of the deity, it is just as a point which is in the middle of a circle is participated by all the lines placed around it in the circle, namely which are protracted from the center to the circumference, inasmuch as whatever line obtains indivisibility according to width, unto the likeness of a indivisible point, as we imagine that a point by its motion makes a line and nevertheless that the point according to its position is distinct from the length of the line.

164. And just as also many impressions of a seal participate the archetype seal, that is, the principal figure of the seal (for archetype derives from arch, which is foremost, and type, which is figure) with the whole and the same archetype existing in each of the impressions, according to likeness, and in none of them according to no part of it through the commixing of substance.

165. Then when he says, yet the imparticipability of divinity, he shows that these examples are deficient from divine representation, and he says that the imparticipability of divinity, which is the cause of all things, exceeds these aforementioned examples, because the deity is more imparticipable and less commixed with participating things, than a point and a seal. For there is no touch of the deity to creatures, namely by that mode in which, from a seal and wax, there is made one through contact; nor also is there a certain other communion through which he is mixed with the parts of things, as a point is mixed with a line, inasmuch as it is its term.

166. Then when he says, although someone might say, he objects against what he had said: that the whole seal exists in each of its impressions. For someone can say that this is not true, because some impression is found that does not perfectly receive the form of the seal.

167. But he responds that the cause of this is not on the part of the seal, because one and the same whole seal bears itself to each impression, but the diversity of participating things makes dissimilar impressions, that is, representations, of one and the same principal form, which has the form totally.

Yet he shows how the form of one seal is received in diverse ways in diverse things, adding, for if those things in which an impression is made are so soft that they can easily receive the figure; and plain, that is, without swellings, so that a uniform impression is made in them; and immaculate, lest a commixing of foreign matter should impede the impression of the figure; and nor is there a contrary figure, as if anyone should wish to impress the figure of one seal on wax already signed with another seal; and nevertheless for receiving the figure they are somehow hard, such that they are not easily fusible and heatable, or too watery and soft and unstable, because thus the impression of the figure would not remain; with these conditions existing, the matters in which an impression is made shall have a certain figure of the seal, without the mixing of another figure, impressed and plain, that is, unswollen, without deformity, and permanent. But if anything should fail of the aforementioned suitability of figuring, this shall be the cause: that the figure is not participated or that it is not plainly, that is, uniformly, participated, and of other defects, whatever ones pertain to unsuitability of participation.

168. Then when he says, yet it is discrete by the divine operation, he expounds the discretion that is according to the humanity of Christ, and he says that it is discrete, that is, pertaining only to one person, the supersubstantial Word, that is, the Son of God, to be made according to us, that is, a man like us in nature; from us, with flesh received, not brought from heaven, according to Valentinus; totally, that is, not with soul or intellect removed, according to Arius and Apollinarius; and truly, not fantastically, according to Mani. And not only is the Incarnation itself discrete, but also the actions and passions of God incarnate; whatever things attributed to Christ are with a certain election and segregation from the others, according to a consideration of his humanity, as to be conceived, to be born, to eat, to drink, to sleep, to be crucified, and other things of this sort; for the Father and the Spirit have communicated in these according to no ratio, because neither of them was incarnated or died; unless perhaps someone should say that they communicated in the aforementioned according to will befitting the divine goodness and kind in regard to us: for the Father and the Holy Spirit accepted the Incarnation of the Son and his passion and other things of this sort and likewise communicated according to every divine operation super-posited above creatures and ineffable to us, which Christ, having been made according to us, that is, made a passible man, remaining invariable according as God and the Word of God, did. For he was not made man such that he lost divinity, but existing as man he had the divine operation, which is common to himself and to the Father and to the Holy Spirit. And thus here there is destroyed the error of those positing one operation in Christ, through the fact that he attributes to Christ the divine operation common to the whole Trinity and an operation proper to himself.

169. Yet last by way of an epilogue, he says that thus we strive by our speech both to unite and to discern divine things, just as, according to the truth of the matter, they are united and discrete.

Lectio 4

That the Divine Discretions Cannot be Manifested Sufficiently by Us

§ 7. 54. But indeed whatever causes of these unitions and discretions we found in the eloquences befitting God, in the Theological Hypotyposes, treating the proper things of each, we expounded as was possible, reflecting on certain things indeed whereas opening up by speech and adducing both a holy and a revealed understanding into manifest visions of the eloquences, yet for certain things, as for mystic things, united according to the divine tradition above intellectual operation.

55. For all divine things and whatever have been manifested to us, are known by participations only. Yet these, whatever sort they are, according to proper principle and gathering, are above mind and every substance and knowledge.

56. Just as if we should name the supersubstantial hidden, God or life or substance or light or reason, we understand nothing else than deific or substantific or vivific or sapientific virtues led forth from it to us; yet we send ourselves to this, according to absolution, from all intellectual operations, seeing no deification or life or substance, which diligently is comparable to the cause segregated from all things according to all excess.

57. Again we receive from the holy eloquences that the Father indeed is fontal deity, yet the Son and the Holy Spirit of the deigenic deity, if it is proper so to speak, springs of the divine nature and as flowers and supersubstantial lights. Yet how these are it is possible neither to say nor to think;

§ 8. but even unto this is every virtue of our intellectual operation: that every divine paternity and filiation is given both to us and to the supercelestial virtues from the patriarchy segregated from all things and the filiarchy, from which gods and sons of gods and fathers of gods, become deiform and are named minds, namely spiritually by such paternity and perfect filiation; that is: incorporeally, immaterially, intelligibly, with the thearchic Spirit super-gathered above every intelligibility, immateriality, and deification and with the Father and the Son segregated from every paternity and divine filiation by exceeding.

58. For neither is there diligent comparison for things caused and causes, but indeed things caused have contingent images of causes; yet these causes are segregated from things caused and are super-gathered according to the ratio of a proper principle. And, so that I might use our examples, delights and sadnesses are called effective of delighting and saddening, yet these are neither delighted nor saddened; and fire heating and burning, is not said to be heated or burned; and if anyone should say that per se life lives, or per se light is illuminated, he does not speak rightly, according to my reason, unless he says these things according to another mode, because those things that are of things caused preexist in causes abundantly and substantially.

§ 9. 59. But what is manifestive of all theology, the divine composition of Jesus according to us both is ineffable by every word and unknown by every mind even the first most worthy of the angels itself. And manfully indeed we receive that mystically he was made this substance; yet we do not know how he was composed from virginal bloods by another law beyond nature; how with dry feet, having bodily weight and heaviness of matter, he walked on a wet and unstable substance, and whatever other things of Jesus are of the apparition of supernatural light or of natural reason.

60. Yet these things both have been said sufficiently by us in other places and have been praised exceedingly supernaturally by a noble leader in his Theological Elements: which he either received from the holy theologians, or observed from an expert scrutinizing of the eloquences, from much struggling about them and contrition, or even was taught from a certain more divine inspiration, not only learning, but also suffering divine things, and from compassion for them, if it is proper so to speak, was perfected unto the unteachable and mystic unition and faith of these; and, so that we might appoint the many and blessed visions of his powerful deliberation in short, he says these things of Jesus in the Theological Elements gathered by him.

170. After Denys has expounded the mode of divine unition and discretion, he excuses himself from a perfect manifestation of these; and it is divided into two parts:

in the first, he shows that the divine discretions and unitions cannot be manifested sufficiently by us;

in the second, he pursues the discretion that is according to the procession of creatures, because this especially pertains to the intention of the present book, at therefore concerning these indeed.

171. About the first, he does two things:

first, he poses an excuse from a perfect manifestation of the aforementioned things;

second, he assigns the reason, at for all divine things.

172. Therefore he says, first, that in the book On the Theological Hypotyposes, he expounds as was possible for him the causes, that is, the rationes of the aforementioned unitions and discretions, whatever ones he found in the Sacred Scriptures, befitting God, treating what was proper to each; such that, nevertheless, he reflected on and examined certain things by a truthful speech and opened up, that is, uncovered, and further reduced into manifest visions of the eloquences, that is, manifest authorities of Sacred Scripture that contain the visions and revelations made to the prophets and apostles; what could be understood in a holy and manifest way, after examination and opening up.

173. For it does not suffice in divine things to examine and uncover the truth by human ingenuity, unless the truth, which is found after examination, accords with Sacred Scripture and is confirmed through it. And when he opened up certain things thus, nevertheless for certain things, as for mystic things, that is, hidden things, he was united above intellectual operation and this according as it was handed on by God: for it is ordained for us by God, that in these things that are above our intellect, we should be united by adhering through faith.

174. Then when he says, for all divine things, he assigns the reason why in divine things there are certain mystic things, which exceed our intellect; and about this, he does two things:

first, he manifests this on the part of the deity;

second, on the part of the humanity of Christ, at but what is manifestive of all theology.

175. About the first, he does three things:

first, he assigns the reason for the aforementioned things;

second, he manifests the assigned reason through examples, at just as if we should name;

third, he proves it through a likeness in other causes and things caused, at for neither is there diligent comparison.

176. Therefore he says, first, that all divine things also that have been manifested to us, are known by us only by participations. The reason for which is that nothing is known unless according as it is in the knower. Yet there are certain knowable things that are below our intellect, which indeed have a simpler being in our intellect than in themselves, as are all bodily things, whence things of this sort are said to be known by us through abstraction. Yet divine things are simpler and more perfect in themselves than in our intellect or in whatever other things known to us, whence the knowledge of divine things is said to be made not through abstraction, but through participation.

177. But this participation is twofold: one indeed, according as divine things are participated in the intellect itself, namely as our intellect participates the intellectual virtue and light of the divine wisdom; whereas the other, according as divine things are participated in things that offer themselves to our intellect, namely inasmuch as through the participation of the divine goodness all things are good, and through the participation of the divine being or life, things are called existing or living. And we know divine things according to both of these participations.

178. Yet it has been shown above that God is participated by creatures through likeness, such that nevertheless he remains unparticipated above all things through the propriety of his substance. Whence, if divine things are not known by us unless by participations only, the consequence is that these divine things, as they are both according to the proper ratio of principle and according as divine things are gathered in themselves, are above all things, as above every mind and above every substance and above all knowledge.

179. Then when he says, just as if we should name, he manifests the proposed reason through examples;

and first, in the processions of creatures;

second, in the processions of the divine persons, at again we receive from the holy eloquences.

180. Therefore he says, first, that if we should name that hidden of the divine essence, which is above every substance, either God or life or substance or light or reason or whatever other such name, through this we do not understand this very what-God-is itself, but the intellect conceives nothing else, except virtues that come to things from God, by which formally they are deified or substantified or vivified or sapientified. But since God is above all processions of this sort, it is necessary that we should send ourselves into God, unto knowing him according to removal from all intellectual operations, that is, from everything that falls into our intellect, and this for this reason: because through the intellect we cannot see any deification or life or substance that perfectly can be compared to that cause that is segregated from all things according to total excess. For nothing falls into the vision of our intellect except some created and finite being that altogether fails of uncreated and infinite being, and for this reason it is necessary that we should understand God to be above everything that we can apprehend by intellect.

181. Then when he says, again we receive from the holy eloquences, he manifests the same in these things that pertain to the processions of the divine persons, and he says that from the Sacred Scriptures we receive that the Father is fontal deity, that is, that the Father is the font and principle of the whole deity, and that the Son and the Holy Spirit, if it is proper so to speak, are certain springs of deigenic deity, that is, of the Father who is God generating, springs I say not outside of the divine nature, as creatures, but in the divine nature itself, and they are also as flowers and supersubstantial lights.

182. Nor is it a marvel if we say these things plurally of the divine persons, because if the signified of the metaphors should be received in metaphorical sayings, it is necessary that they should be predicated singularly of the divine persons; whereas if the metaphors themselves should be received, they can be predicated plurally; for through light truth is understood metaphorically. Therefore we can say that the Son and the Holy Spirit are one light, because they are one truth; we can also say that they are two lights, so that the sense might be that they are signified through two lights, that is, through two rays proceeding from one light, as through two flowers, because each proceeds from the Father. Nevertheless neither through this is there excluded that the Holy Spirit should proceed from the Son.

183. But how these are we cannot say nor think, namely so that we might express or know how that paternity or filiation is, but even unto knowing this alone the whole virtue of our intellect extends itself: that both to us and to the supercelestial virtues, namely the angels, from the principal divine paternity, which is segregated from all creatures, and likewise from the principal filiation, every paternity and filiation is given that is according to propagation in divine things, namely as one angel purges, illuminates, and perfects another and one man another; from which, namely the principal paternity and filiation, the minds of the angels conformed to God both are made through participation of divine gifts and are named in the Scriptures gods and sons of gods and fathers of gods, through assimilation to the principal paternity and filiation.

184. And lest it should seem that communication of the proper things of the Holy Spirit is lacking, he adds that such paternity and filiation is perfected in the holy angels spiritually, when he expounds spirituality through three things: for spiritual signifies something incorporeal and immaterial and intelligible. And although this spirituality is found in angels, nevertheless the divine Spirit is super-gathered above every intelligible immateriality of angels or souls, just as both the Father and the Son are segregated through the mode of excess from every paternity and filiation that is in creatures, according to the participation of divine things.

185. Then when he says, for neither is there diligent comparison, he proves what he had said, through assimilation in other causes and things caused, and he says that between causes and things caused, there cannot be diligent, that is, perfect, comparison, because causes exceed the things they cause, but there is a certain other comparison of things caused to causes, inasmuch as things caused have images, that is, likenesses, of causes. For every cause produces its effect through some mode of likeness, nevertheless things caused do not attain a perfect likeness of the cause; contingent, that is, as it happens according to its proportion. But for this reason it is not a perfect comparison: because causes are separated from things caused, inasmuch as they are super-posited above them, according to the* ratio *of a proper principle, that is, in that ratio in which principles are.

186. And he manifests this through examples taken up from things that are before us: and first of all from the passions, according as delights and sadnesses make men to be delighted and saddened not through the mode of an efficient cause, but of a formal cause, as it is said that whiteness makes a white thing, but these delights and sadnesses are neither delighted or saddened. For of what is delighted or saddened, delight or sadness is predicated through participation, but not of delight or sadness itself through its essence, and thus the cause exceeds the effect. Then he posits an example in agent causes when he says, fire that heats and burns is not said to be heated or burned, but to be hot and thus, through its own nature, to heat other things. Afterwards he posits an example in formal causes, namely concerning per se life, and per se light, so that thence through this there might not be understood some separated light or life, but the participated forms themselves, according to which mode neither can it be said of life that it lives or of light that it is illuminated, according to the aforementioned ratio, unless perhaps equivocally, so that life might be understood to live, because it is the cause of living. And he assigns the ratio of these examples and similar ones, through the fact that those things that are of things caused through the mode of participation, are of causes superabundantly and substantially, as to live is participative of a living thing, whereas it is of life itself essentially.

187. Then when he says, but what is manifestive of all theology, he manifests the same about the humanity of Christ;

and first, through his own words;

second, through the words of Hierotheus, at yet these things both have been said.

188. Therefore he says, first, that although among all the things that are said of God, the most manifest seems to be what pertains to the Incarnation, nevertheless the composition by which, divinely, Jesus is composed according to us, that is, according as he has our nature, cannot sufficiently be expressed by whatever word, nor sufficiently known by whatever mind, even of the supreme angel itself. We receive indeed according to the Scriptures, as a certain hidden mystery, that Jesus himself was made substance manfully, that is, of a manly hypostasis, but we do not know sufficiently how his body was compacted from virginal bloods, by a certain law beyond nature: for he was made by the power of the Holy Spirit, which is incomprehensible to every created mind. And we cannot perfectly know even how he walked upon the water of the sea, which is a wet and unstable substance, with dry feet, not indeed with heaviness of body set aside through the assumption of the gift of agility, as certain men have said, but still with his feet having the heaviness of matter: for this was done by incomprehensible divine power. And the same ratio is in all of whatever other things pertain to the knowledge of Jesus, which exceeds natural light or natural reason.

189. Yet these things both have been said sufficiently by us in other places and have been praised exceedingly supernaturally by a noble leader in his Theological Elements.** To those things necessary for the mystery of the Incarnation that he had introduced above, he adds certain words of Hierotheus concerning the praise of Christ; and about this he does two things:

first, he shows whence Hierotheus received these words that he said; namely that he had these either from the teaching of the apostles or from the study of the Sacred Scriptures or from a special revelation made to him;

second, he posits his words, at the cause of all things.

190. Therefore he says, first, that the aforementioned things that pertain to the praise of Christ he said sufficiently in other places, namely in the book On the Divine Hypotyposes, and they are also, exceedingly excellently above the natural mode, praised by a certain Hierotheus, who was a noble leader, that is, teacher, a disciple of the apostles, and this in a certain book of his that he entitled On the Theological Elements, that is, obscure divine comments; and consequently he posits three modes by which Hierotheus was able to acquire the things that follow: one mode is that he received them by learning from the holy theologians, that is, from the apostles; another mode is that he, by his own proper study, inspected them, from a wise and subtle examination of the Holy Scriptures. Which subtle examination indeed consists in two things: the first of which he adds, saying, from much struggling about them, in which assiduousness of study is designated: for then someone struggles much with Scripture, when, having inspected the difficulty of Scripture, he presses on to seeing the difficulty; the second he adds, saying, and contrition, in which there is designated a diligent exposition of Scripture, for what is contrited or ground is divided even unto the smallest bits; then therefore someone grinds Sacred Scripture, when he seeks out the subtle senses latent in it.

191. The third mode of having is that he was taught these things that he said from a certain more divine inspiration, which commonly is made for many, not only learning, but also suffering divine things, that is, not only receiving the knowledge of divine things in the intellect, but also by loving, he is united to these through affection. For passion seems to pertain more to the appetite than to knowledge, because things known are in the knower according to the mode of the knower and not according to the mode of the things known, but the appetite moves to things, according to the mode in which they are in themselves, and thus in a certain way it is affected to those things.

192. Yet just as some virtuous man, from the habit of virtue that he has in his affection, is perfected for judging rightly about these things that pertain to that virtue, so he who is affected to divine things, divinely receives right judgment about divine things. And for this reason he adds that from compassion for divine things, that is, from the fact that by loving divine things he is joined to them (if nevertheless the union of love ought to be called compassion, that is, simultaneous passion), Hierotheus was perfected, that is, instituted, unto the unition and faith of these, that is, so that he would be united to these things that he said through the unition of faith; I say, unteachable, that is, that cannot be taught by a human master; and mystic, that is, hidden, because it exceeds natural knowledge. And, so that we might comprehend in a few the many and blessed visions, that is, revelations, of powerful deliberation, that is, of his, namely Hierotheus’, virtuous examination, although he said many other things, nevertheless these, that follow, he says to the praise of Jesus Christ, in the book named above.

Lectio 5

The Words of Hierotheus Concerning the Deity and Incarnation of Christ

§ 10. 61. The cause of all things and fulfilling is the deity of Jesus;

62. which parts consonant to the totality it saves and neither is it part nor whole and both whole and part, as receiving together in itself and super-having and pre-having both part and whole of all things.

63. It is perfect indeed in imperfect things, as the foremost of perfection, yet imperfect in perfect things, as super-perfect and pre-perfect.

64. Form, making form in things lacking form, as the foremost of form; without form in forms, as above form.

65. Substance, supervening immaculately on the whole of substances and supersubstantially segregated from the universe of substance.

66. Determining the whole of the principles and orders and gathered above every principate and order.

67. And it is the measure of existing things and the aevum above aevum and before aevum;

68. and full in things having less, super-full in full things.

69. Unspeakable, ineffable, above mind, above life, above substance, it has the supernatural supernaturally, the supersubstantial supersubstantially.

70. Whence, because also from kindness he comes even to nature, and truly is made substance and super-God exists as man—yet by propitiation are these things praised by us above mind and reason—although also in these he has the supernatural and the supersubstantial, not only according as he communicated with us invariably and unconfusedly, having suffered nothing to his super-fullness from ineffable emptying, but because also, what is to all new things more new, in our natural things he was supernaturally, in substantial things supersubstantially, having all our things above us.

193. Then when he says, the cause of all things, he posits the words of Hierotheus concerning Christ;

and first, he posits those things that pertain to the praise of the deity of Christ;

second, those things that pertain to the praise of his Incarnation, at whence, because also from kindness.

194. About the first, he does two things:

first, he comprehends in summary the praise of the deity of Christ;

second, he explicates it in particular, at which parts consonant to the totality.

195. Therefore he says, first, that the deity of Jesus Christ is the cause of all things, inasmuch as through it all things are reduced into being; and it is also fulfilling of all things, inasmuch as through it all things are filled with their perfections.

196. Then when he says, which parts consonant to the totality, he expounds, through singulars, the aforementioned causality.

Where it must be considered that, first, he shows that the aforementioned deity is the cause of those things that pertain to the essence of things;

second, of those things that are an example of the essences of things, at and it is the measure of existing things.

197. About the first, it must be considered that, in the essences of things, such a process and order indeed must be considered:

for, first, there are the principles of things;

second, the substance of a thing, constituted from principles;

third, the determination of a thing to its proper species which is through form;

fourth, from form the thing attains perfection, not only in specific being, but also as regards its proper operation and end:

fifth, diverse things that each have a certain perfection in themselves, united by a certain order, perfect some whole.

198. Therefore Hierotheus proceeds to show the divine causality of the deity of Christ, by circling backwards, through the way of resolution, beginning this from the whole; and he says that the deity of Jesus conserves the parts consonant, that is, proportionate, to the totality, in which the perfection of the whole consists; and neither is it part nor whole and it is** both whole and part**. The deity of Christ is indeed whole and part, as not divided in itself, but simultaneously receiving both part and whole of all things, because whatever is of perfection, in whatever whole or part, preexists whole in God. Yet it is neither whole nor part, because it does not have the perfection of whole and part by the same mode as whole and part, but more supereminently and priorly.

199. Second, he shows the causality of the deity of Christ as regards the perfection of things, at it is perfect indeed, and he says that the deity of Christ is called perfect, through comparison to imperfection, inasmuch as it is the principal cause of every perfection; but if it should be compared to perfect things, it is called not perfect, not as though failing of perfection, but having perfection supereminently and priorly.

200. Third, he shows the same about forms; and he says that the deity of Christ compared to those things that lack form, can be called form effectively, inasmuch as it is form making form; whereas compared to forms, it can be called without form, not through defect, but through excess, because it surpasses every form.

201. Fourth, he shows the same as regards substances; and he says that the deity of Christ can be called substance causally, inasmuch as it supervenes upon the whole of substances, that is on all and each according to the whole, through the mode of a certain participation; but nevertheless it supervenes immaculately, because it is not participated through the commixing of substance, but through the mode of likeness; and, again, it is segregated from every substance, inasmuch as it exists supersubstantially.

202. Fifth, he shows the same as regards principles; and he says that the deity of Christ determines all principles (for of diverse things there are diverse principles) and determines the order of the principles to the things principled, but nevertheless, it is super-gathered above every order and above every principate.

203. Then he shows the same through a comparison to those things that are the example of a thing;

and first, as regards the measure of the duration of things, and he says that the deity of Christ is the measure of existing things, as though determining for each the measure of its being, or because each one has being inasmuch as it approaches it; and also it is the aevum which is called the measure of being, as time is the measure of duration, and nevertheless it is above aevum, inasmuch as it is a measure super-exceeding the created whole.

204. Second, he shows its causality, as regards the supervening perfection by which the capacity of things is fulfilled, as the intellect is fulfilled by intelligible species; and he says that the deity of Christ, compared to deficient things that are called less existing, is called full, as though the cause of fullness, and compared to those things that are full, is called super-full, as though exceeding above every fullness.

205. Third, he shows it through comparison to the understanding and speech that are outside a thing, and he says that it is unspeakable and ineffable, because by neither a complex nor an uncomplex speech can it be expressed sufficiently; and it is above mind and above all life, because it exceeds all knowledge and every act of life.

206. And because he had attributed many supernatural things to the deity of Christ, consequently he shows that it does not have these in a defective mode, but in a supereminent one; and this is what he says: that it has what is supernatural supernaturally and what is supersubstantial supersubstantially. For to absolve from sins is supernatural, but a pure man does not have this supernaturally as the Son of God has it, and it must be said likewise concerning other things of this sort.

207. Then when he says, whence, because also from kindness, he praises the humanity of Christ, and he says that the deity of Christ is so great and excellent; thence it is that through his kindness he comes even to our nature and truly is made substance, that is, a hypostasis of our nature, and although he was super-God, he was made man, that is, human. These things that are said according to his propitiation, through which he assumed human nature, ought to be praised above mind and above reason. For although he received the proper things of our nature, nevertheless in these human things he had the supernatural and the supersubstantial, that is:

in one mode, inasmuch as he communicated with us, assuming our nature without variation of the divine nature and without its commixing and confusion with human nature, such that through ineffable emptying, concerning which the Apostle speaks in Philippians 2, he suffered nothing to his super-fullness, that is, nothing was diminished from the fullness of his deity; for “emptied” is not said through the diminution of deity, but through the assumption of our deficient nature;

in another mode, because what is among all new things more new and wondrous, he was in our natural things supernaturally and in our substantial things supersubstantially, having above us all the human things that he received from us; because his flesh is of greater virtue and dignity than that of another and his soul worthier than every soul and his acts were also of mutually unifying operation, by virtue of the deity.

Lectio 6

On the Divine Discretion That Is Considered According to the Procession of Creatures

C. II, § 1. 71. Therefore concerning these that indeed is enough; yet let us proceed to the intention of the word, the common and united names of divine discretion, according as it is possible for us, reconsidering.

72. And so that we might predetermine consequently concerning all, we say that the divine discretion is, as has been said, the processions befitting the thearchy by the good. For giving to all existing things and super-filling the participations of all good things, unitively indeed it is discerned and into a plurality it is driven singularly and it is multiplied from one inegressibly.

73. Afterwards, because God is existing supersubstantially, yet he gives being to existing things and leads out all substances, that one existing thing is said to be multiplied, because from it many existing things are led out. Yet nevertheless it remains one in multiplication and united in procession and full in discretion, because it is segregated supersubstantially from all existing things, and because all things are led out from it unitively, and because the effusion of its undiminishable distributions is not lessened.

74. But also existing as one, handing on one to every part and whole and one and multitude, it is one simply supersubstantially, neither a part existing of a multitude, nor a whole from parts, and thus neither is it one, nor does it have one. Yet far from these, it is one above the one that is in existing things, and leading out the multitude and perfecting and containing it.

75. Again, many gods having been made from its deification of each deiform thing according to virtue, discretion and multiplication seem to be and are said of the one God, yet nevertheless there is foremost God and super-God supersubstantially one God, indivisible, and in divisible things united in his own self, unmixed and not multiplied. And understanding this supernaturally, our and our leader’s common leader by the hand unto divine illumination, who is much in divine things, who is the light of the world, says these things moved by God, in his holy letters: for if there are many called gods, whether in heaven or on earth—as indeed there are many gods and many lords—but for us indeed there is one God the Father from whom are all things and we in him, and one Lord Jesus Christ through whom are all things and we through him (1 Cor 8:5–6).

76. For in divine things unitions surpass and pre-rule over discretions, and nevertheless are united even after the inegressible and unitive discretion of the one.

77. We shall attempt, according as it is possible, to praise those common and united discretions of the whole deity or processions befitting the good, from the namings of God manifesting them in the eloquences. With this, as it has been said, known before: that every beneficent naming of God, in whichever of the thearchic persons it is posited, is received in the whole thearchic totality, unobservantly.

208. After Denys has expounded the mode of divine discretion and unition, here he pursues that mode that principally pertains to the matter of this book, namely the divine discretion that is considered according to the procession of creatures; which indeed is a united discretion and common to the whole Trinity, as was said above.

209. About this, therefore, he does two things:

first, he expounds how that discretion is with unition;

second, he promises that he will determine about those things that pertain to this discretion in what follows, at we shall attempt, according as it is possible.

210. About the first, he does three things:

first, he says what the intention is about;

second, he manifests the proposition, at and so that consequently we might predetermine;

third, he assigns the reason for the things said, at for in divine things unitions.

211. Therefore he says, first, that concerning those things that pertain to the praise of Christ, there suffice for the present those things that have been said both by him and by Hierotheus; but it must be proceeded further to those things that pertain to the intention of the word that he intends in this work, namely so that we might examine, according to our ability, the names pertaining to that divine discretion that is considered according to the procession of creatures; which indeed are names common to the whole Trinity, and not only common, but also united. For animal is common to man and to horse, nevertheless not the same animality in number is in each; but goodness and essence and things of this sort so are common to the whole Trinity, that they are one in number in the three.

212. Then when he says, and so that consequently we might predetermine, he manifests how there can be divine discretion with unition; and this he manifests in four things:

first of all, in the good itself;

second, in being, at afterwards, because God is existing;

third, in one, at but also existing as one;

fourth, in the very name of deity, at again, many gods having been made.

For these four seem especially to befit God: first of all, on account of their community, for what seems to befit the infinity of the divine nature is not determined to genus or species, and also on account of the use of the name, which all attribute to the supposit principle of things.

213. Therefore he says, first, that we say that the divine discretion is the processions of the deity, which befit him according to the ratio of the good, as has been said above. And for this reason let us begin first from the good, so that consequently we might show more manifestly in the others what will have been shown concerning the good. For the good has itself universally to all processions: for whatever God communicates to a creature, he communicates from his goodness. Whereas the other names designate some special processions. And therefore, what will have been manifested in the universal will be able to be seen more plainly in special instances.

214. Yet it must be considered that a multitude proceeds from one in three ways:

in one way indeed, through division, as one whole is divided into many parts, but such a multitude removes the fullness and unity which was in the whole.

In another way, through the mode of community, as from one genus there come forth many species and from one species many individuals, but that one is not multiplied thus as a singular one, but a common one.

In a third way, some one is multiplied before us through effusion, as from one font there come forth many brooks, but this is done with a certain going out, namely inasmuch as water going out from the font diffuses itself into many brooks.

215. Yet in the existence of all good participations of wisdom, of life, and of things of this sort, goodness itself indeed is discerned, that is, distinguished, while distinct good things come forth from it, but this is done unitively: for nothing is diminished from the fullness by which all good things are united in it; and again into a plurality it is driven singularly, that is, it is plurificated into a plurality in its effects not as something universal, but remaining singular in its own self; and again it is multiplied through diffusion from one, inegressibly, because nothing of its substance goes out. And this is because discretion and multiplications and diffusion are considered according to certain likenesses of the divine goodness; yet with the divine goodness itself remaining, according to its essence, indistinct and one and gathered in itself.

216. Then when he says, afterwards, because God is existing, he manifests the same in being, and he says that because God is supersubstantially being, as regards his existence, but nevertheless he gives being to all existing things and produces universally the substances of things, on account of the fact that that one supersubstantial being that God is, is said to be multiplied in his things, namely, by likeness; and although many existing things are led out from it, but still nevertheless, being of this sort remains one, according to its existence, in multiplication that is made through its likeness; and it remains united, that is, unified, in procession; and it remains full and whole in distinction. And this because, in its substance, it is supersubstantially segregated from all beings; and because all things are produced from it unitively, that is, according to one virtue, which is not divided by producing diverse things; and because the diffusion of its gifts, which it distributes to things, cannot be lessened nor is lessened. For it must not be said that he so communicates good things to one that he cannot communicate more: for in none is the fullness of his goodness, through communication of this sort, diminished.

217. Then when he says, but also existing as one, he shows the same as regards one, and he says that God, since he is one and gives being one to part and whole and common unity and multitude, inasmuch as every multitude somehow participates one, he, I say, thus existing as one and giving unity, supersubstantially is one simply, as good and being; because he is not something of those to which he gives being one. For he is not as the one that is part of a multitude, since nothing can be numbered equally together with him; nor also is he one, as something whole constituted from parts; and thus he is not one in that mode in which other things are, nor does it have one as participating it; but nevertheless it is one, withdrawn from those that are this one, inasmuch as it is above the one that is found in existing created things; and this is the one that produces the multitude of things in being and perfects them, by attributing to things their proper perfections, and contains them, by conserving all things in their being and in their order.

218. Then when he says, again, many gods having been made, he shows the same in the very name of deity; and he says that discretion and multiplication seem to be and are said of the one God, inasmuch as many gods are made from the fact that God deifies some creatures through conformity to God according to the virtue of each deified thing, not that they could be conformed perfectly to him or that through existence they should be called gods. And although there are and are called many beatified gods, still nevertheless there is one principal God who is above every communicated deity, the supersubstantially existing one God. And since he exists in all things, he remains existing indivisible in the divisible things to which he communicates being and is united in himself and not mixed with the multitude and not multiplied according as he is considered in himself.

219. And understanding this supernaturally, blessed Paul, who was the leader by the hand, that is, the instructor, unto divine illumination both of Denys himself and also of his leader, that is, Hierotheus (who, namely Paul, knew many things concerning divine things and who is the light of the world, as he says in Acts 13:47 that he fulfilled in himself what is said in Isaiah 49:6: I have placed you unto the light of the nations), these things he says in his holy epistles, namely in 1 Corinthians 8:6, moved through inspiration by God, because although there are those who are called gods whether in heaven or on earth . . . nevertheless for us there is one God the Father from whom are all things and we in him; and one Lord Jesus Christ through whom are all things and we through him. For from this authority, it is clear that the multitude of deified things, both in the heavens as are the angels and on earth as are holy men, do not prejudice the unity of the deity, which is common to the Father and the Son.

220. Then when he says, for in divine things unitions, he assigns the reason for the things said. For the aforementioned procession and multiplication and discretion do not remove the divine unity for this reason: because in divine things unitions surpass discretions and rule over them; for the unitions are considered according to the divine essence itself, yet the discretions according to the likenesses of God impressed on things, which fail much of their principle, and for this reason divine things nevertheless remain united, after that one which is God is discerned through diverse likenesses, by inegressible discretion, because nothing goes out from the divine essence, and unitive, because such discretion does not remove the divine unity.

221. Then when he says, we shall attempt, according as it is possible, he promises that he will discuss about things of this sort in what follows, and he says that he shall attempt, according to his ability, with the praise of God, to expound the aforementioned discretions that are united and common to the whole deity or also are named processions befitting the divine goodness. Yet he intends to manifest them from the divine names that are handed on in the Scriptures, which demonstrate processions of this sort, as when we call God living or wise, there is demonstrated the procession of life and of wisdom from God into creatures. Nevertheless this ought to be known beforehand: that, as has been said, whatever naming of God pertaining to his beneficence, of whichever of the divine persons it should be said, must be received, without a doubt, concerning all the persons.