C. 8 - On Virtue, Justice, Salvation, Liberation, In Which Also On Inequality

On Virtue, Justice, Salvation, Liberation, In Which Also On Inequality

Lectio 1

How Virtue Is Received in God and On His Infinity

C. VIII, § I. 330. But because the theologians praise the divine truth and super-wise wisdom as virtue and as justice and as salvation and as liberation, come, let us open up also those namings of God, as is possible for us.

331. And that the thearchy indeed is segregated from and surpasses every virtue in whatever way both existing and thought, I do not reckon that anyone of those versed in the divine eloquences is ignorant: for many times theology has been handed on determining domination both to it and also of those celestial virtues. How therefore do the theologians praise it also as virtue segregated from every virtue, or how should we receive the naming of virtue in it?

§2. 332. Therefore we say that God is virtue as prepossessing and super-possessing every virtue in himself and as the cause of every virtue; and producing all things, according to virtue indeclinable and incircumfinite; and as existing as the cause of this very what-it-is-to-be-virtue either whole or particular;

333. and as of infinite virtue not only because it produces every virtue, but also because it is above every and per se virtue itself; and because it super-can produce also infinitely infinite ones other than the existing virtues; and because never can virtues infinite and produced unto the infinite blunt the super-infinite action of this virtue-making virtue; and because its virtue exceeding all things is ineffable and unknown and unthinkable;

334. which on account of the abundance of the possible both makes infirmity firm and contains and strongly holds the last of its resonances; in which way also in possible things according to sense we see that super-resplendent lights arrive even unto blunted visions and great sounds speak unto hearings not very easily receiving sounds to enter. For what is altogether not hearing neither hears; and what universally is not seeing neither sees.

§3. Therefore this distribution of the infinite-virtue of God goes to all existing things, and nothing is of existing things from which having a certain virtue is perfectly removed, but it has either intellectual or rational or sensible or vivifying or substantial virtue, and even being itself, if it is permissible to say, has virtue from the supersubstantial virtue unto this: that it should be.

741. After Denys has determined about the wisdom of God, here he determines about virtue and justice. For just as the procession of wisdom extends itself less than the procession of life, because not all living things have knowledge, so the procession of virtue and of justice fails of the procession of wisdom. About this therefore he does two things:

first, he says what his intention is about;

second, he pursues the proposition, at and that the thearchy indeed is segregated.

742. Therefore he says, first, that, because truth and wisdom existing above all wisdom are praised in Sacred Scripture as virtue and as justice and as salvation and as liberation, that is, as the cause of salvation and of liberation, we shall expound those namings of God also, as is possible for us.

743. Then when he says, and that the thearchy indeed is segregated, he pursues the proposition:

and first, he determines about virtue;

second, about justice which is a species of virtue, at yet God again is praised as justice;

third, about salvation and liberation and inequality which are effects of justice, at therefore this divine justice is praised also.

744. The first part is divided into two parts:

in the first, he determines about the virtue of God;

in the second, he solves a certain objection against the infinity of divine virtue, at and indeed Elymas the magician.

About the first, he does two things:

first, he raises a question: how virtue is said of God;

second, he solves the question, at therefore we say that God is virtue.

745. Therefore he says, first, that no one who has had familiarity with the sacred eloquences is ignorant that the principal deity is separated from every virtue, which, in whatever way, exists in things or can be thought. Yet he is separated from every virtue, not as though failing of it, but surpassing and exceeding it, whence also Sacred Scripture has been handed on which attributes to God also the domination of celestial virtues, according to Psalm 23:10: the Lord of virtues, himself, is the King of Glory; and in many places he is called the Lord of Hosts, from which there is given to be understood that if he exceeds the celestial virtues, much more the others. Since therefore the divinity is segregated from every virtue, it can be asked: how indeed did those who produced the Sacred Scriptures praise God as virtue, according to 1 Corinthians 1:24: Christ the virtue of God and the wisdom of God; and again: how do we who expound Sacred Scripture receive the naming of virtue in the divinity?

746. Then when he says, therefore we say that God is virtue, he solves the proposed question; and about this, he does two things:

first, he shows how virtue is received in God;

second, he shows the procession of virtue from God into singulars, at from this are the deiform virtues.

747. About the first, he does two things:

first, he shows how virtue is attributed to God;

second, by what ratio the virtue of God is called infinite, at and as of infinite virtue.

748. Therefore he says, first, that virtue is attributed to God on account of three things:

first of all, according to the fact that the virtues of all things exist in him primordially and supereminently, as has been said of life and wisdom;

whereas second, according to the fact that he is the cause of every virtue;

whereas third, according to the fact that he operates by producing all things according to virtue indeclinable, that is, which cannot be lessened or fatigued, and incircumfinite; just as also wisdom is attributed to God, inasmuch as every wisdom preexists in him and inasmuch as he is the cause of wisdom and inasmuch as he has the act of wisdom by knowing; and not only is he the cause of virtue as lavishing virtue, but because he causes virtue itself, whether we should receive universal virtue or some particular virtue.

749. Then when he says, and as of infinite virtue, because he had said that God produces all things according to infinite virtue, he shows second how the virtue of God is called infinite; and about this, he does two things:

first, he says according to what ratio the virtue of God is called infinite;

second, he manifests the infinity of the divine virtue through examples, at which on account of the abundance.

750. Yet it must be considered that infinite in God is not said through extension as in continuous quantity, but through negation, namely because he is not bounded or determined by anything. And therefore the virtue of God is called infinite in five ways:

first of all because it is not determined to any effect, but produces every virtue;

second, not only on account of this, but because it is not terminated through the commensuration of any virtue, but is above every particular virtue and further above every per se virtue itself, because this very thing that is understood by the common name of virtue is less than the divine virtue;

third, because it is not terminated through those things that are, but can produce in infinite ways and infinite other virtues, beyond those that are;

fourth, because if it were to produce in infinite ways also infinite virtues beyond those that are, not on account of this would its super-infinite action be blunted or debilitated, which action is factive of every virtue; and thus also it is clear that neither is it bounded by its action, according as action is terminated unto effects;

fifth, it is called infinite because it is not terminated by intellect: for the divine virtue exceeding all things is ineffable and unknown and what cannot be thought.

751. Then when he says, which on account of the abundance, he manifests the infinity of the divine virtue through signs and examples; and he says that the divine virtue through the abundance of the possible, that is, of power, makes firm, that is, conserves, even those things that are infirm, contains and strongly holds even those things in which there is the last resonance of virtue, that is, which participate of virtue the least; which is the sign of infinite virtue: just as we see in the powers of sensible things that lights that are very splendid can be seen even by those who have feeble sight and great sounds arrive unto feeble hearings, which do not receive sounds easily; and beyond this the virtue of light and of sound cannot extend itself, because what altogether does not have hearing cannot hear however great a sound, and what totally does not see cannot see a splendid light.

And therefore he concludes that the distribution of the divine virtue, on account of its infinity, proceeds to all existing things, and none is existing which does not have some virtue; but it is necessary that it should have either intellectual virtue, as the angels, or rational, as men, or sensible, as animals, or vivifying, as plants, or substantial, as other things; and not only existing things, but even being itself has virtue unto this: that it should be, from the supersubstantial virtue of God. And he says, if it is permissible to say, because it is not properly said that being is, but that through being something is.

Lectio 2

On the Procession of the Divine Virtue to Beings in Particular

§4. 335. From this are the deiform virtues of the angelic adornments, from this also they have being unchangeably and all their intellectual and immortal sempiternal motions, and they have received fortitude itself and the non-diminishable desire of the good from the virtue of the infinite good, with this sending to them that ability and being and desiring, which is always, and the very ability to desire which they always have.

§ 5. 336. Yet there proceed those things that are of unfailing virtue, to men and animals and plants and the whole nature of each thing;

337. and it makes firm things united unto a mutual friendship and communion with itself; and discrete things unto this: that singulars should be according to their proper ratio and definition, unconfused and unmixed; and it preserves the orders and directions of each thing to its proper good;

338. and it guards the immortal lives of the angelic unities immaculate; and makes the heavens and illuminatives and stellar substances and invariable orders and the aevum to be able to be; and indeed it discerns the circumvolutions of time by processions, yet gathers by restitutions; and makes the inextinguishable virtues of fire; and the unfailing flows of water; and terminates the airy effusion; and gathers the earth in nothing; and guards the indifferent generative parts of life itself; and preserves in itself the harmony and concretion of the elements unconfused and indivisible; and contains the conjunction of soul and body; and moves the nutritive and augmentative virtues of plants upwards; and strongly holds the substantial virtues of the whole of things; and makes firm the indissoluble dwelling of each thing; and gives deification itself, granting virtue unto this for those things that are deified; and totally, nothing universally of existing things is segregated from the firmness of the omnipotent and the ambit of the divine virtue: for what universally has no virtue, neither is there nor shall there be any position of this whatsoever.

752. After Denys has shown, in common, the procession of the divine virtue to beings, here he shows it in particular;

and first, by distinguishing the things into which the effects of the divine virtue come;

second, by distinguishing those things that are found from the divine virtue in things, at and it makes firm the things united.

753. About the first, he does two things:

first, he shows the procession of the divine virtue to superior creatures, namely the angels;

second, to inferior creatures, at yet there proceed those things.

754. Therefore he says, first, that from the divine virtue there proceed all the virtues of the angelic adornments, which are conformed to God. Yet virtue is apparent in the angels as regards being itself: and according to this he says that from the divine goodness they have unchangeable being.

Second, as regards understanding: and according to this he says that from the divine virtue they have sempiternal intellectual and immortal motions, namely because they always understand actually.

Third, as regards desiring: and as regards this he says that they have received fortitude itself from the virtue of the infinite good, through which they desire the good without diminution of such desire. All these things indeed they have from the divine virtue, inasmuch as the divine virtue sends to them both being and ability with respect to those, and that they desire without loathing, having those things that are always present to them; and this very thing which is the ability to desire, which they always have, they have from God.

755. Then when he says, yet there proceed those things, he shows the procession of the divine virtue to inferior creatures; and he says that the effects of the unfailing virtue of God proceed to men and to animals and to plants and to all natural things.

756. Then when he says, and it makes firm the things united, he shows what are found in things by the divine virtue;

and first, as regards those that are common to all things: the first of which is unition; and as regards this he says that the divine virtue confirms all things that are united unto a certain friendship and communion with itself.

The second is discretion; and as regards this he says that the divine virtue makes firm those things that are discrete from one another, unto this: that it should conserve singulars according to their proper* ratio *and definition, unconfused and unmixed with one another.

The third is order; and as regards this he says that the divine virtue conserves the orders of whatever thing, according to which things are ordered to one another, and again it directs each thing in order to the end which is the proper good of the thing.

757. Then he posits those things that pertain to singulars:

and first, as regards the angels, he says that the divine virtue guards the immortal lives of the angelic unities, that is, their simple substances, immaculately from whatever corruption.

Second, as regards the celestial bodies, he says that it guards the substances and orders of the celestial bodies and the luminaries, namely the moon and stars, invariably.

Third, as regards the aevum which measures the substance of heaven, and he says that the divine virtue makes it that it can be the aevum, which is the simple measure of being; and as regards time which is the measure of the motion of heaven, he adds that the divine virtue discerns all the circumvolutions of time by processions and gathers by restitutions. Yet he attributes circumvolution to time because it follows the circular revolution of heaven.

Yet there are two things to consider in the motion of heaven: first of all that in the motion of heaven there is always renewing of position, according to the transition from place to place; whereas second that heaven returns to the same position according to circular motion; so also is it in the case of time, because, according to the procession of motion, time succeeds time, as hour hour and day day; and as regards this he says that time is discerned by processions; yet according to the return of any celestial body to the same place, time also is restored into that which had gone before, and thus what was in a certain way future is gathered to the past: for example, when day and morning beginning is terminated, again it is returned to morning, and the same is apparent in a month and in a year.

758. Fourth, he shows the effect of the divine virtue from the elements, and he says that the divine virtue makes the inextinguishable virtues of fire; for although fire in this matter can be extinguished, nevertheless fire universally is inextinguishable. It also makes the unfailing fluctuations of water, which he says on account of the perpetual flow of rivers and commotions of the sea, which are apparent in the waves and ebb and flow of the sea. Which also terminates the airy effusion: yet he says this because the property of the wet applies especially to air, so that it is not well terminated by a proper term, and for this reason, as much as is from itself, air has every kind of effusion, but it is terminated by the divine virtue within the limits of its natural place.

The divine virtue also gathers the earth in nothing, because by the divine virtue it is always gathered in the middle of the world, and there is nothing that sustains it.

The divine virtue also conserves the generative parts of this earth, namely of plants and of other things that are born indifferent from the earth, that is, uniformly remaining in their nature, namely while from the mandated seeds of the earth, like plants are born.

And the divine virtue makes not only those things that pertain to the singular elements, but also those that pertain to the commixing of the elements with one another. In which commixing indeed, three things are found:

for it is necessary first that there should be a certain proportion of the elements to one another, which here Denys names harmony;

second, there is required that the proper virtue of whatever element should remain uncorrupted, otherwise there would not be mixture, but corruption; and as regards this, he says, and unconfused concretion;

third, there is required that the elements should be concrete and simultaneously should remain together and should not be separated from one another at once; and as regards this, he says, and preserves indivisible.

759. Fifth, he also posits the effect of the divine virtue in animate things; and universally indeed he says that the divine virtue holds the conjunction of soul and body into one; and specially concerning plants, he adds that it moves the nutritive and augmentative virtues of plants upwards: nutritive indeed, inasmuch as food is lifted up through the roots, drawn even to the top of plants; whereas augmentative, inasmuch as the very body of the plant, proceeding from the earth, is led gradually unto height.

760. Then, as regards all things, universally he adds that the divine virtue strongly holds the substantial and natural virtues of all things, and makes firm the indissoluble dwelling of whatever thing, namely inasmuch as all things preserve the grade prefixed for them by God.

761. Yet he shows a further effect of the divine virtue in those things that pertain to grace; and he says that the divine virtue gives deification itself, that is, the participation of deity, which is through grace; and lest anyone should believe that someone can acquire this participation by his own virtue, he adds that God grants virtue unto this: that any things should be deified in the aforementioned mode.

762. Yet last he concludes universally that universally nothing is among beings that is segregated and not contained by the continence of the divine virtue, which gives firmness to things through its omnipotence. For just as from the divine life whatever thing cannot be segregated except that which lacks life, so there cannot be segregated from the divine virtue except that which lacks virtue. Yet what universally has no virtue altogether is not, nor does it have any position, that is, order in the universe or firmness.

Lectio 3

Why It Is Said that God Cannot Do Something

§ 6. 339. And indeed Elymas (Acts 13:8) the magician says, if God is omnipotent, how is he said by our theologian not to be able to do something? Yet he was reproaching the divine Paul, who said that God cannot deny himself (2 Tim 2:15).

340. Yet positing this, doubtless I fear lest I deserve laughter for stupidity, to destroy the buildings both infirm and upon sand of unruly boys: struggling and as though striving to hurl against a certain impossible intention against theological deliberation concerning this.

341. For the negation of his very self is a fall from truth; yet truth is existing and a fall from truth is a fall from existing. If therefore truth is existing, yet the negation of truth is a fall from truth, God cannot fall from existing; and he is not this non-being. Just as if someone should say, he cannot not be able, and he does not know that he does not know according to privation.

342. Which the wise man not understanding, imitates the inexperienced of boxers who many times, supposing that their adversaries are infirm, according as it seems to themselves, and manfully making the shadow of a fight against those absent, confidently striking the air with vain blows, think that they have prevailed over these adversaries, and they praise themselves, not knowing the virtue of those.

343. Yet we, considering the sayings of the theologian, according as is possible, praise the super-powerful God; as omnipotent; as blessed and alone powerful; as dominating the aevum in his power; as according to nothing cut off from existing things; yet more both super-possessing and prepossessing all existing things according to supersubstantial virtue, and lavishing upon all existing things the ability to be and this being according to the abundance of exceeding virtue by a copious effusion.

763. After Denys has determined about the divine virtue, here he excludes a certain objection, and about this, he does three things:

first, he poses an objection;

second, he solves it, at yet positing this, doubtless I fear;

third, with the doubt excluded, he asserts the truth, at yet we, considering the sayings of the theologian.

764. Therefore first he poses the doubt that Elymas the magician, about whom we read in Acts 13, objects against Paul’s saying in 2 Timothy 2:15 that he cannot deny himself, that this seems contrary to his omnipotence.

765. Then when he says, yet positing this, doubtless I fear, he solves the proposed doubt; and about this, he does three things:

first, he sets forth his excuse about what he intends for the solution of so weak an objection;

second, he poses the solution, at for the negation of his very self;

third, he refutes the presumption of the objection, at which the wise man not understanding.

766. Therefore he says, first, that over the doubt set forth he adds that he fears much lest he ought to be derided for stupidity, as someone who would attempt to destroy the small houses made by dissolute boys, which do not have a firm foundation, because they are built upon sand, and in themselves they are infirm, because they are bound without cement; and so it could seem that, when he intends to speak against the deliberation concerning divine things which the aforementioned Elymas had concerning the proposed word, it is as though he should send certain javelins against some impossible position. For his position is manifestly impossible, infirm in itself; because it is not confirmed by truth and it leans on frivolous reason, as on a weak foundation.

767. Then when he says, for the negation of his very self, he solves the proposed question; and he says that, since God is truth itself, that God should deny himself is nothing else than that God should cut himself off from the truth. Yet since the true is the same as being, it would follow that to cut off from the truth is the same as to cut off from being. Therefore that he says that God cannot deny himself is the same as if he were to say that God cannot fail of being. Yet this which is not to fail of being is the same as if he were to say that God is not non-being; by which indeed being itself rather is signified; just as if it should be said that God cannot not be able, this does not show that God is impotent, but that he is maximally powerful; and likewise, if it should be said that he does not know himself to be ignorant, such that he has the privation of knowledge, this is to have perfect science itself. Therefore through this: that God cannot deny himself, nothing of his power is detracted by the impossible, but it is the same as if it were to be said that God cannot not be true and being and powerful.

768. Then when he says, which the wise man not understanding, he reproves the presumption of the objector; and he says that Elymas, who reputed himself wise, not understanding the reason of the aforementioned solution, was like inexperienced boxers who frequently suppose that the adversaries against whom they ought to fight are infirm, according as it seems to them, and while they are absent they throw punches against them boldly, making a certain likeness of a fight, and without fear they strike the air with useless blows and so think that they have conquered their adversaries, and for this they praise themselves, although they do not yet know the virtue of their adversaries. So also it is for those who, making weak objections, when there is no one who resists them, reckon themselves to have prevailed.

769. Then when he says, yet we, considering the sayings of the theologian, he first excludes the objection against divine omnipotence;

second, he commends the science of the Apostle, saying that we, considering the sayings of the Apostle according to our ability, praise God, who exceeds every power, as omnipotent, inasmuch as his power extends itself to all things; as blessed, inasmuch as he has the fullness of every good, lacking none; and as alone powerful from himself: for all other powers are not powerful from themselves, but from God; and as through his power dominating the aevum: for other dominating things are dominated by those that are in the aevum or in time, but he dominates the whole aevum. And again we praise him as according to nothing cut off from existing things and because nothing that is in him can recede from him.

Whereas creatures, although some are found that are not cut off from being simply, can nevertheless be cut off from something, inasmuch as they are mutable; but God, who is altogether immutable, can be cut off from being according to nothing. Or these words are taken from those that the Apostle says in 1 Timothy 6:15: which in his times the blessed and alone powerful shows, the King of Kings and Lord of Lords, who alone has immortality; which he designates through what he says: according to nothing cut off from existing things.

770. And not only do those things befit God, but he has them excellently; whence he adds that we can praise God even more, as supereminently having virtue and as prepossessing all existing things, that is, whatever is in things, not indeed in the same way in which it is in things, but according to supersubstantial virtue, that is, as effects are in their cause through virtue, according to the mode of a cause exceeding every substance. And not only do these things befit him supereminently, but also causally; whence he adds that he gives ability and determinate being to all existing things. And this befits him from the abundance of his exceeding virtue which he gives to all things by pouring out goodnesses copiously. For he gives to all abundantly, as is said in James 1:5.

Lectio 4

On the Justice of God

§ 7. 344. Yet God again is praised as justice, as distributing to all according to dignity and commensuration and beauty and good ordination and adornment (Wis 11:20), and segregating to each all distributions and orders according to the truly existing most just definition, and existing as the cause of the proper operation of these for all things.

345. For the divine justice orders and terminates all things and preserves all from all unmixed and not confused, gives to all existing things what befits each, according to the dignity supervening upon each of existing things.

346. And if we say these things rightly, whatever men reproach the divine justice, it hides itself, with them manifestly condemning their own injustice.

347. For they say that immortality ought to be in mortal things and the perfect in imperfect things and necessity through another mobile thing in things per se mobile and identity in variable things and the power to be perfectly in infirm things; and that temporal things ought to be eternal and that things moved by nature should be immutable and that temporal delights should be eternal and, totally, those things that belong to others are attributed to others.

348. Yet it is necessary to see the divine justice in this truly existing as true justice: that it attributes proper things to all, according to the dignity of each of existing things, and it preserves the nature of each in its proper order and virtue.

§ 8. 349. If someone should say: it is not of justice to send holy men unaided crucified by depraved men.

350. To which it must be said that if those, whom you call holy, love indeed those things that are upon the earth, striven for by those adhering to matter, they fall altogether from the divine love, and I do not know how they should be called holy, doing injury to things truly lovable and divine condemned by those same ones not religiously on account of things unappealing and unlovable. Yet if they love the truly existing, it befits those desiring certain things to rejoice, when they obtain the desirable things. Or can it be that then they approach more to the angelic virtues, when, as is possible, by the desire of divine things they recede from the passible affection for material things, wrestling for this strongly and manfully against adversities for the good? Wherefore it is true to say that this is more proper to the divine justice: not to soften and to destroy the animosity of the best men by gifts of material things; nor if someone should try to do this, that he sends them unaided, but that he gathers them in the beautiful and inflexible station and that he attributes to such men existing according to dignity.

771. After Denys has determined about the virtue of God, here he determines about justice; for justice is a species of virtue. Yet it must be considered that among the moral virtues, only justice can be attributed to God more properly: for the other moral virtues are about the passions, which do not have a place in God, as temperance about concupiscences, fortitude about fears and darings; but justice is about actions, for example about distributions or retributions, which can apply to God.

772. Yet the present part is divided into two:

in the first, he determines about the justice of God;

in the second, about the effects of the divine justice, at therefore this divine justice is praised also.

773. About the first, he does two things:

first, he shows what pertains to the ratio of the divine justice;

second, he solves the objections of certain men against the divine justice, at and if we say these things rightly.

774. About the first, he does two things:

first, he shows according to what acts justice befits God;

second, he manifests what he had said, at for the divine justice orders and terminates.

775. Yet justice befits God according to three acts:

first of all, according to that which is to distribute. Yet commutative justice does not have a place in God, as there is in sellers and buyers, because, as is said in Romans 2:35, who prior has given to him and repaid to him? But distributive justice is attributed to him, which does not observe equality of quantity, so that it might give equal things to all, but equality of proportion, so that it might give to each according as it is worthy. And for this reason he says that justice is praised in God inasmuch as he distributes to all, according to their dignity. Yet he is the distributor of good things; yet good, as Augustine says, consists in mode and species and order: yet measure prefixes for each thing its proper mode, as he says; (Augustine, On the Nature of Good Against the Manichees, c. 3; On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 4, c. 3.) so that therefore he would signify that God is the distributor of the whole of the good, he says indeed as regards mode, commensuration; as regards species, beauty or form, according to another translation; yet as regards order he says, and good ordination and adornment or disposition according to another translation. (John Duns Scotus.) And here he receives adornment for decency of order.

776. Yet not only does it pertain to justice that it should distribute diverse things to diverse men according to their dignity, but also that it should preserve a diversity of this sort unconfused, namely lest one should presume to usurp that which belongs to another; and as regards this according to the act of justice he says that the divine justice distributes to each all distributions and orders according to a certain determination that is truly justice, namely so that one might not intrude upon that which belongs to another.

777. Whereas the third act of justice is that each should work that which is fitting to him; on account of which and in a certain way every virtue is called justice; and as regards this third act, he adds that the divine justice is the cause of their proper operation for all things.

778. Then when he says, for the divine justice orders and terminates, he manifests what he had said, assigning the reason for the aforementioned things. For the things set forth pertain to the divine justice for this reason: because it is proper to justice that it should establish order in things; and that it should prefix the term for each thing, beyond which it may not go forth; and that it should conserve an ordination and termination of this sort without confusion; and that further, with things thus ordered and terminated, it should give to each from supervening gifts, according to the proper dignity bestowed upon it by God.

779. Then when he says, and if we say these things rightly, he solves two doubts about the divine justice;

about the first of which, he does three things:

first, he shows from the things set forth that those who struggle to condemn the divine justice show that they are ignorant of the things set forth; and this is what he says: that if the things set forth were said with reason, namely that it belongs to justice to give to each according to his dignity, whatever men wish to accuse the divine justice which does this, these are ignorant that while they wish to condemn the divine justice, they manifest their own injustice.

780. Second, at for they say that immortality, he poses their objection: for they say that, since God is the best and through this it applies to him to do each thing the best, he ought also to give immortality to those who are mortal, so that men and animals would never die; and to give perfection to imperfect things, so that men would be born perfect at once; and to give necessity through another mobile thing to things* per se *mobile, so that those would apply to men per se, because they can be moved per se both to good and to evil. Yet they would wish that God would give to men or to other rational creatures that they could not sin, which would be to have necessity that they would always be moved by another: for it would not apply otherwise that they could fall into evil, unless they were moved by others by a certain force, not from free will. For it applies to the holy from this very perfection that they should not be able to fall, as is clear in the blessed who are confirmed in the good.

They also say that identity ought to be in variable things, namely so that all things always would have themselves in the same way, and that there would be perfect power for infirm things and that temporal things would be eternal and that those things that are moved according to their nature would be immutable and that delights, which are temporal, would be eternal. And according to their judgment, universally, they attribute to others those things that belong to others, that is, to inferiors those things that belong to superior beings.

781. Third, at yet it is necessary to see the divine justice, he excludes their perverse judgment; and he says that it is necessary to consider about the divine judgment, that in this truly is justice: that it gives to all according to their proper dignity and that it conserves the nature of each in its proper order and virtue, namely such that in these things that are immortal according to their nature, it conserves immortality, and in mortals mortality; and thus concerning the others that were treated above.

782. He poses a second objection at if someone should say: it is not of justice; and about this, he does two things:

first, he poses the objection: for someone could object that it is not just that God permits holy men to be crucified by depraved men and does not give them help so that they might not be crucified.

783. Second, at to which it must be said, he solves the aforementioned objection; and he says that if those who are called holy love those things that are upon the earth, for which men adhering to material things strive, they fall altogether from the divine love. Which must be understood if they so love those things that they establish their end in them and that for the sake of those they spurn spiritual goods. And this is what he adds: that he does not know how those men ought to be called holy who do injury to divine things, which are truly lovable, so that they condemn those against the debt of religion on account of temporal goods, which must not be loved principally nor striven for.

But if they love spiritual goods which are truly existing because they are sempiternal, they ought to rejoice, if they desire those, when they can obtain the things desired. Yet they obtain them when, suffering afflictions in temporal things, with a certain fervor of love, they adhere rather to spiritual things. For then they approach more through likeness to the angelic virtues, in which there is no affection for material things, when men, according to their ability, recede by the desire of divine things from the affection of material things. And this indeed they do when for the good, that is, for the love of God, and for justice and virtue they wrestle manfully, standing against adversities. And thus, if the truly holy men of that age obtain what they desire against adversities, namely, by spurning temporal goods, to adhere to spiritual ones, it is done not evilly with them, but well. Whence truly it can be said that it is proper to the divine justice that it does not destroy manly virtue or soften it through the gathering of prosperity, but if someone tries to do this, namely to fight for the truth, that he does not send such men without help, but makes them firm in the beautiful and firm station of spiritual goods through which they are consoled in adversities; and further, that he rewards such men in the future, according to the dignity of their proper merit.

Lectio 5

On the Effects of the Divine Justice: On Salvation, On Liberation, On Inequality

§ 9. 351. Therefore this divine justice is praised also as the salvation of all things, saving and guarding the proper and cleansed substance and order of each thing from others and existing cleanly as the cause of proper operation in all things.

352. Yet if someone should praise salvation also as savingly rescuing all from worse things altogether elsewhere, we also shall receive this praiser of most lavish salvation.

353. And we shall ask him to define this first salvation of all things, which saves all things in themselves unchangeable and not fighting and strong against the worse; and guards all things not fighting and not warring, singulars ordered by their own rationes; and exterminates every inequality and alien operation from all things; and establishes the proportions of each, not prevailing to fall to contraries nor to cross over. Because also someone shall so praise salvation, not far from the intention of holy theology, as saving all things existing by the goodness of all things, freeing from the fall of their proper goods, according as the nature of each of those that are saved receives.

354. On account of which also the theologians name this liberation, inasmuch as it does not allow truly existing things to fall to nothing of being, and if something should be deceived into sin and inordinateness and should suffer a certain lessening of the perfection of its proper goods, it also frees these from passion and infirmity and privation, filling the thing having less and paternally supporting infirmity and reviving from evil; yet more, establishing in the good and fulfilling the beaten good and ordering and establishing and adorning its inordinateness and perfecting the unadorned and integral and releasing from all stains.

355. But of those indeed and of justice it has been said, according to which there is measured and defined the equality of all things, and every inequality, which is according to the privation of equality, which is in these singular things, is exterminated.

356. For if anyone should receive inequality as differences in the whole, of the whole of things to the whole of things, justice also is preservative of this, not conceding that all things should be made disturbed, mixed with all things, yet guarding all existing things, according to each species, in which each has being according to nature.

784. After Denys has determined about the divine justice, here he determines about the effects of the divine justice;

and first, about salvation;

second, about liberation, at on account of which also the theologians;

third, about inequality, which justice in a certain way makes, whereas in a certain way removes, at but of those indeed and of justice.

785. About the first, he does three things:

first, he posits the proper ratio of salvation;

second, he posits a certain other ratio of salvation, assigned by others, at yet if someone should praise salvation;

third, he shows how the two rationes have themselves to one another, at and we shall ask him to define this first salvation.

786. Therefore he says, first, that the divine justice is praised as the salvation of all things, namely because it saves all things, namely inasmuch as it guards and conserves three things in each:

first of all, conserving the substance of each thing both proper, that is, in the propriety of its nature, and cleansed, that is, without the mixture of anything extraneous;

second, likewise, it conserves the order of each thing, proper and cleansed;

whereas third, it is the cause in all things of proper and cleansed operation.

And thus consists every ratio of salvation according as things are conserved in those things that befit them according to their propriety.

787. Then when he says, yet if someone should praise salvation, he posits a second ratio of salvation; and he says that if someone should wish to say that the ratio of salvation consists in this: that God altogether rescues from evils, he must not be opposed in this, but we ought to receive him who thus praises lavishly the divine salvation not only as regards conservation in God, but also as regards separation from evil.

788. Then when he says, and we shall ask him to define this first salvation, he compares these two rationes to one another; and he says that he asks humbly by persuading him who assigns the second ratio of salvation, that he should define this such that the first ratio of salvation consists in conservation in the good, which conservation in the good indeed is done in many ways.

789. For certain things are conserved in the good by God who establishes them as unchangeable in themselves, as are the celestial bodies that are far from corruption, and the blessed who cannot sin.

Second, as some things that are unchangeable are conserved so that they might not have anything fighting against them, as sometimes God, seeing that some are infirm, does not permit them to be tempted, and so saves them by conserving them in the good.

Third, from the fact that he permits that some should be fought against, but he gives them fortitude so that they might be able to resist against those fighting them, as strong against the worse, that is, against the more infirm.

790. And thus he guards and saves all things, nor does he make them fighting nor warring, so that fight might be referred to actual fighting, whereas war to habitual fighting. And this is fitting: that they should not have fighting, as singulars are ordered, that is, firmly disposed, in those things that pertain to their proper rationes.

791. And not only does he make some things not fighting, but also he exterminates, that is, destroys from all things, every inequality and alien operation, so that inequality might be referred to what is extraneous in essence or virtue; yet alien operation to what is extraneous in operation. The saving divine justice also establishes the proportions of whatever thing, not prevailing to fall into unfittingness nor to cross over in whatever way. For the crossing over of superiors to inferiors can be called a fall; whereas the crossing over of inferiors to superiors is not called a fall at all, but according to itself a crossing over. Yet it must not be marveled at that he says that unchangeable things not fighting do not cross over to contraries either, although in many things there is found fighting and mixing of the extraneous and crossing over to contraries; because in all changeable things there always remains something not crossed over nor mixed and not fighting, just as a subject does not cross over, when a crossing over is made according to form.

792. And these three things that he posits second respond to the three things posited first, nevertheless not in the same order: for what be posits last among the second, when he says, and establishes the proportions of each, responds to what he posited first among the first, when he said, in themselves unchangeable; yet what is second among the last, namely: and exterminates every inequality and alien operation from all things, responds to what above he had said last: and saves them strong against the worse; whereas what he says first among the last: and guards all things not fighting and not warring, responds to what, first, he had posited in the middle: and not fighting.

And therefore, because the ratio of salvation consists first and principally in this: that something should be conserved in the good, it will not be far from the intention of Sacred Scripture if someone should wish to praise the salvation of God inasmuch as God himself saves all things through his proper goodness by freeing them from evil, which is a fall from proper goods. And this I say according as the nature of those that are said to be saved suffers: for those things that fall according to free will are restored in one way and those that fall according to natural corruption in another.

793. Then when he says, on account of which also the theologians, he determines the effect of liberation; and he says that the sacred doctors name the divine justice liberation and the cause of liberation, inasmuch as it saves from evil, and this in many ways:

first, inasmuch as it does not permit those things that are truly beings to fall from substances to this: that they should be nothing, but there always remains for them something of substances.

Second, as regards the fact that if something truly existing should fall into some sin in action, into some inordinateness by inclination of appetite and to some defect of proper operation, God frees that which thus falls from passion which induces to sin; and infirmity from which something does not hold its due order; and privation which pertains to the lessening of perfection. And thus these three respond to the first three.

And so that he might show how he frees from these, he adds three other responses to the first three set forth: for he frees from privation inasmuch as he fills what was had less; yet he frees from infirmity inasmuch as he supports our infirmity with paternal and merciful affection; yet he frees from passion, reviving, that is, calling back, from evil; and, what is more, firmly establishing in the good; and that good which was beaten, that is, lessened and debilitated, he fulfills by restoring; and what had flowed out to sin, he establishes, that is, makes firm, and adorns, that is, disposes with a certain decency; and thus he leads every inordinateness and indisposition to integrity and releases from all the stains of sins.

794. Then when he says, but of those indeed and of justice, he determines about inequality;

and first he shows what inequality justice excludes;

second, what inequality it establishes, at for if anyone should receive inequality.

For distributive justice excludes inequality of proportion; yet causes inequality of quantity, according as it gives greater or lesser things according to the proportion of the dignity of whatever nature.

795. Therefore he says, first, that of those, that is, salvation and liberation, and of justice it has been said, according to which there is measured and defined the equality of proportion which is in all things; and there is exterminated, that is, excluded, every inequality which is said according to the privation of the equality of proportion, which is in singular things: for it pertains to justice that it should give to each according to its proper proportion, and thus the equality of proportion is determined according to justice, according as all things do not have the same capacity and it is necessary that it should attribute diverse things to diverse things, and thus by causing equality of proportion, it causes inequality of quantity.

796. And for this reason he adds, if anyone should wish to receive inequality according to the difference that is in the universal, of all things to all things, through which they differ and something is better than something else according to whatever perfection, justice is conservative of inequality of this sort, while it does not permit disturbance or confusion to be made in things through all things being mixed with all things; and thus justice conserves all existing things, according to their species, as the nature of each receives and accepts.