C. 10 - On Omnipotent; Ancient of Days; In Which Also On Aevum and On Time

On Omnipotent; Ancient of Days; In Which Also On Aevum and On Time

Lectio 1

How God Is Called Omnipotent

C. X, §1. 384. Yet see to it that you praise by the word the God of many names, as omnipotent, as Ancient of Days (Dan 7:9).

385. For this is said indeed on account of the fact that he is the omnipotent session of all things, containing and circum-possessing the whole of things and gathering and founding and binding and perfecting every firm thing in himself, as from an all-holding root, producing and converting all things to himself, as also an all-holding plantation.

386. And containing, as the all-holding session of all things, all those things contained according to one containing exceeding all things, making firm and not dismissing those falling away from himself, as moved from perfect essence, to be destroyed.

387. Yet he is called the all-holding thearchy both as holding all things and ruling unmixed with the governed and as desirable for all things and existing as interminable and super-sending over all things voluntary laws and sweet births of the divine and omnipotent and indissoluble love of his goodness.

847. After Denys has expounded the divine names that signify the perfections inhering in things either absolutely or according to the comparison of one to another, here he expounds certain names that are said of God according to the ratio of the universal principle of the being and duration of things. For God is called omnipotent inasmuch as he is the universal principle of every being of things; whereas he is called Ancient of Days inasmuch as he is the principle of every duration. And because the names of duration are aevum and time, consequently it is determined about the aevum and time. And these things are touched on manifestly in the title which is thus: On Omnipotent; Ancient of Days; In Which Also On Aevum and On Time.

848. Yet this chapter is divided into three parts:

in the first, he determines about omnipotent;

in the second, about Ancient of Days, at yet God is praised as Ancient of Days;

in the third, about aevum and about time, at yet it is necessary, as I reckon, to see.

849. About the first, he does two things:

first, he says what the intention is about; and he says that God, who is of many names, is praised by the word of Sacred Scripture both as omnipotent, according to Genesis 17:1: I God omnipotent; walk before me and be perfect; and as Ancient of Days, according to Daniel 7:9: the Ancient of Days sits.

850. Second, at for this is said indeed, he posits how God is called omnipotent; and about this, he does two things:

first, he assigns the ratio of omnipotence;

second, he expounds certain things that he had said, at and containing, as the all-holding session.

851. Yet he shows the ratio of omnipotence according to four things in which the ratio of power is considered:

first of all, according to ambit: for a power is said to be great, whether in natural things or in human things, which contains many things under itself; and this is what he says: that God is called omnipotent on account of the fact that he is a certain omnipotent session, containing the whole of things, that is, all things, by a certain stability, inasmuch as all things are placed under his power, and circum-possessing, inasmuch as all things are under his providence.

Whereas second, as regards firmness: for a power is called great which both is immobile in itself and can hold other things immobily; and as regards this he says, and gathering and founding and binding and perfecting every firm thing in himself; and he touches on the four modes by which anything is made firm:

for something is made firm inasmuch as it is in its natural place, whence all natural bodies rest in their places; and as regards this he says, and gathering;

whereas some things are made firm upon something that is standing under them, as a foundation stands under a wall and a base under a column; and as regards this he says, and founding;

whereas certain things are made firm through some band, as is clear in vases, which are made firm by circles; and as regards this he says, and binding.

And these three modes of firmness pertain to the fact that one thing is made firm through another: for location can pertain in general to the fact that inferior creatures are made firm in a certain way through superiors which are the places of the inferiors, as the celestial bodies of inferior bodies; whereas foundation to the fact that forms are founded upon matter and accidents upon subjects; whereas binding to the fact that elements are made firm in a mixture and, universally, all parts in a whole.

Yet the fourth mode of firmness is according as each thing has firmness in its nature; and this is what he says: and perfecting every firm thing in himself; or it can be said otherwise that the divine session gathers and founds and binds, making all things firm in itself, as though he were to say: God himself is the place and foundation and chain connecting all things.

852. Whereas third, he shows the ratio of omnipotence according to production: for a potency is called great which can produce many things, as a root is called virtuous which produces many sprouts; and as regards this he says that the divine session produces all things from its own virtue, as from a certain omnipotent root.

Fourth, he manifests the ratio of omnipotence according to the ratio of attraction: for a power is called great which can attract or convert any things to itself, and as regards this he says that he converts all things to himself, as to a certain all-holding plantation: for in him all things are planted, as in a first principle.

853. Then when he says, and containing, as the all-holding session, he shows certain things that he had said:

and first, how deity is called containing;

second, how it is called all-holding, at yet he is called the all-holding thearchy.

854. Therefore he says, first, that the divinity is called containing inasmuch as it is the session, that is, the firmness or immobility, of all things; which makes firm all existing things under itself, not as some principle that is of the essence of things, which is diversified in diverse things, but according to one common containing, which exceeds all things; and this containing is so strong that it not only gives firmness to things contained under itself, but also does not permit them to be destroyed altogether and those things that fall away from God himself to be reduced to nothing. And there are said to fall away from God, who is perfect essence, whatever things are removed from his perfection: for these shall not be reduced to nothing.

855. Then when he says, yet he is called the all-holding thearchy, he shows how the deity is called all-holding; and he says that the divinity is called all-holding, inasmuch as it holds all things in that mode by which he who rules over others is said to hold them: for also someone is said to hold a possession, which is under his care; yet if anyone should rule over others as one existing from their number, he holds them indeed inasmuch as he is ruling, but he is also held by them, inasmuch as he is mixed with them and is included under their order. Yet God so holds all things that he is held by none; and this is what he says: ruling unmixed with the governed.

856. Yet it happens that something rules over others in two ways:

in one way, through the mode of fear, and that mode of ruling is not efficacious for holding subjects: for those who are subjected against their will, who serve by fear, given the opportunity, cast off the yoke of servitude.

In another way, through the mode of love, and this mode of ruling is efficacious for holding subjects who are subjected voluntarily; and he attributes this mode of ruling to God, when he says, and as desirable for all things, for all things desire him, as has been said many times.

857. Yet it happens that some particular good, although it should be desired, does not efficaciously hold the one desiring, because since it is terminated and limited it does not have in itself all the things that can be desired, and for this reason he who desires it on account of some goodness found in it does not totally rest in it, but crosses over to something else in which he finds a goodness which was lacking for him. But God is desirable in such a way that he is altogether interminable, whence by necessity he holds every desiring thing, while in whatever desired object he is desired; for nothing is desirable except inasmuch as it has some participation of the highest good.

Yet again it could happen that someone ruling would be desirable in his person, but would give his subjects heavy laws, which he would not hold to, and for this reason the subjects would not be held under him efficaciously. But excluding this from God, he adds that he super-sends voluntary laws over all: for the law of God for whatever creature is its natural inclination fixed in it for doing what befits it according to nature; and for this reason, as all things are held by the divine desire, so they are held by his laws, according to Psalm 148:6: he has placed a precept and it shall not perish over any creatures. And on account of this also it is said of the divine wisdom in Wisdom 8:1 that it disposes all things sweetly. Whence that the laws divinely imposed upon all things are voluntary is shown through what is added: and sweet births of the divine and omnipotent and indissoluble love of his goodness.

858. Where it must be considered that, from the love and desire of the end, there arises the desire of what is adapted to the end. Yet the last end of all things is the divine good, to which as to an end are ordered all the previous and particular ends to which things naturally are inclined.

And therefore those natural inclinations of things to their proper ends, which we say are natural laws, are certain births, that is, effects, sweet, that is, consonant with natural appetite, I say effects or births of love by which the divine goodness is loved; which love indeed is divine and holding all things and insoluble: whether this should be understood concerning the love by which God himself loves his goodness, through which he holds all things and is insoluble because by necessity he loves himself; or it should be said for the divine love which is divinely put into all things, through which all things are held by God and which cannot be dissolved, because all things love God by necessity, at least in his effects.

Lectio 2

Why God Is Called Ancient of Days

388. Yet God is praised as Ancient of Days on account of the fact that he is both the aevum and the time of all things and before days and the aevum and times.

389. And indeed it is fitting to call him time and day and fourth part of a year and aevum, as befits God, as existing as unchangeable according to every motion and immobile and in this: that he always is moved remaining in himself.

390. And as the cause of the aevum and of time and of days.

391. On account of which in the holy apparitions of the mystical visions of God he is composed as both white and new; with older indeed signifying ancient and existing from the beginning; yet younger without aging: or by both teaching that he proceeds from the beginning even unto the end through all things, or, as our divine perfector of sanctity says, with both showing the divine principality: by older indeed first in time, yet by junior having more principally according to number; because unity and those that are around unity are more principle than numbers that have proceeded much.

859. After Denys has determined about omnipotent, here he determines about Ancient of Days; and about this he does three things:

first, he shows why God is called Ancient of Days;

second, he expounds the assigned ratio, at and indeed it is fitting to call him time;

third, he manifests what he had said through the authority of Scripture, at on account of which in the holy apparitions.

860. Yet it must be considered that among us something is called ancient by twofold ratio: first of all because it has much of time; yet second because it precedes in time those things that are younger. Yet ancient is said for what is past, remote from the present; and this is before in time.

And therefore by a twofold ratio God is called Ancient of Days: first, because he pre-possesses the duration of all things both of the aevum and of time, so that through aevum there might be understood the duration that measures being itself; yet through time the duration that measures becoming itself or being moved; second, because he is before all days and before the aevum and before times.

861. Then when he says, and indeed it is fitting to call him time, he expounds the assigned rationes,

and first, the first;

second, the second, at and as the cause of the aevum.

862. Therefore he says, first, that we say that God is time or some part of time, as for example day and fourth part of a year and when we say that he is the aevum, it is necessary to understand this in the way in which it befits God, not indeed such that God is something whose being is something successive and divisible or adjacent to another, but he is called aevum, which is the measure of the permanent, inasmuch as he is unchangeable according to every motion, namely because he is moved by no other motion.

Yet he is called time, which is the number of motion, from the fact that God himself always is moved in that way in which above in chapter 9 it was said concerning motion. Nevertheless he is not so moved that in his motion there is any succession, as there is in the motion that is numbered through time, but God himself always is permanent in himself.

863. Then when he says, and as the cause of the aevum, he expounds the second ratio: for he is said to be before days and the aevum and times, not through the mode of becoming past, as those things that are called ancient among us, but through the mode by which a cause is prior to its effects: for he is the cause of the aevum and of time and of days.

864. Then when he says, on account of which in the holy apparitions, he adduces the authorities of Scripture unto the manifestation of the things set forth; and he says that, on account of the things set forth, in the apparitions of the hidden visions of God, God is described as new and as white: new indeed, according to Isaiah 62:2: there shall be called for you a new name; yet white, according to Psalm 70:18: and even into old age and seniority, O God, do not forsake me; and Isaiah 46:4: even unto old age I myself and even unto white hairs I shall bear.

Yet through the fact that he is called white or aged, there is signified his antiquity; namely that he exists always from the beginning of eternity; yet through the fact that he is called new or younger, there is signified that he is ancient without aging, that is, without any deficiency or even past, because, as has been said above, he is moved, remaining immobile in himself.

Or: because old age and antiquity seem to pertain to the beginning on account of its priority of youth whereas to the end on account of its posteriority, through the fact that both are attributed to God, we are taught that he proceeds through all things from the beginning even unto the end.

He posits a third exposition according to the thought of Hierotheus, whom he names his perfector, that is, master, in divine things, who said that through both of those set forth there is demonstrated the priority of God himself and that he is the beginning: for through the fact that he is called older there is demonstrated his priority in time; for we call those things older that are prior in time. But through the fact that he is called younger there is designated the priority or principality that is according to the ratio of number: for he is called younger who has proceeded less in time. Yet as much as something proceeds less in numbers, so much is it prior: for unity and numbers near to unity are prior to those that have proceeded much.

Lectio 3

On Aevum and Time

§3. 392. Yet it is necessary, as I reckon, to see from the eloquences the nature both of time and of the aevum.

393. For it calls eternal not the altogether and absolutely unbegotten and truly eternal everywhere, but also the incorruptible and immortal and invariable and existing in the same way, as when it says, lift up, eternal gates (Ps 24:7); and similar things. Yet many times also it figures most ancient things by the naming of aevum and the whole setting out of time again according to us, when it labels aevum.

394. According to which also the propriety of the aevum is ancient and invariable and to measure whole according to whole.

395. Yet they call time what in generation and corruption and variation and sometimes has itself otherwise.

396. On account of which also theology says that we here terminated according to time will participate the aevum when we obtain the aevum, incorruptible and always having in the same way.

397. Yet there is sometimes in the eloquences both the temporal glorified as aevum and the eternal as time (Rom 16:25, 2 Tim 1:9), although we know that for these existence more and more properly is said and shown by the aevum, and those that are in generation, both said and shown by time.

398. Yet it is necessary that things called eternal not be reckoned as simply coeternal with God who is before the aevum. Yet following the most venerable eloquences, to understand eternal things indeed inconvertibly and without time according to modes known to themselves; yet middles of existing things and things made, whatever according to something indeed participate the aevum, whereas according to something participate time. Yet it is fitting to praise God both as aevum and as time, as the cause of every time and aevum, and the Ancient of Days, as before time and above time and varying the four parts of the year and times (Dan 2:21); and again existing before the ages, inasmuch as he is before the aevum, and his kingdom is the kingdom of all ages (Ps 145:13). Amen.

865. After Denys has determined about Ancient of Days, here he determines about aevum and time;

and first he says what the intention is about;

second, he pursues the proposition, at for it calls eternal not the altogether.

866. Therefore he says, first, that it is necessary to consider from the Holy Scriptures the nature of time and of the aevum; where it must be considered that here he receives the aevum for eternity.

867. Then when he says, for it calls eternal not the altogether, he determines the nature of the aevum and of time; and about this, he does two things:

first, he expounds the signification of the aevum and of time;

second, how the aevum and time befit things, at yet it is necessary that things called eternal.

868. About the first, he does three things:

first, he shows in how many ways aevum is said;

second, what properly is the aevum and time, at according to which also the propriety;

third, he shows how each is posited for the other, at yet there is sometimes in the eloquences.

869. Therefore he posits, first, four receptions of the aevum or of eternity:

for first those things are truly and properly called eternal that are unbegotten, that is, that do not have a cause, as those that are said of God.

Nevertheless not everywhere does Scripture receive eternal thus, but sometimes as those things that are incorruptible, because they never cease to be; and immortal, because they never cease to live; and invariable, because they are not varied from form into form or from quantity into quantity; and always existing in the same way, which always have themselves in the same habitude, as the angels, concerning whom it is said in Psalm 23:7: lift up, eternal gates; and Psalm 75:5: you illuminating marvelously from the eternal mountains; and other things of this sort.

In a third way, there are signified by the name of aevum or of eternal all the things that are most ancient, although they are corruptible, as it is said in Deuteronomy 33:15: from the fruits of the eternal hills.

In a fourth way, the whole mass of our time is labeled aevum or eternal, as it is in Romans 16:25: according to the revelation of the mystery, hidden in eternal times.

870. Then when he says, according to which also the propriety, he shows what properly is called aevum and time; and about this, he does three things:

first, he shows what properly is the aevum;

second, what properly is time, at yet they call time;

third, he proves through the authorities of Scripture, at on account of which also theology.

871. Therefore he says, first, that all the things set forth are signified by the name of aevum, according as they participate something from the propriety of the aevum: for the aevum properly is what is ancient, that is, does not begin newly to be; and what is invariable, because it is not the measure of motion, but of unchangeable being itself; and what measures whole according to whole, through which it differs from time: for the whole of time does not measure the whole according to its whole self, but according to the diverse parts of itself it measures the diverse parts of motion; for time is the number of motion according to before and after. But because being, which eternity measures, does not have before and after since it is remaining and invariable, and eternity itself is simple, not having before and after, and thus whatever it measures, it measures according to its whole self.

872. Then when he says, yet they call time, he shows what properly is time; and he says that time properly is said for what according to itself is the measure of generation and of corruption and of whatever variation and of every diverse habitude.

873. Then when he says, on account of which also theology, he confirms the stated difference of time and eternity through the authority of Scripture, which says that in this changeable life we are contained under time and that then we shall participate eternity, when we obtain life incorruptible and always having itself in the same way, as it is said in Matthew 25:46 that the just shall go into eternal life; and the Apostle says in 2 Corinthians 4:18: the things that are seen are temporal, yet those that are not seen eternal.

874. Then when he says, yet there is sometimes in the eloquences, he shows how in Sacred Scripture one is posited for the other; and he says that in the sacred eloquences sometimes what is temporal is praised by the name of aevum or eternal, as has been said above, as the mountains or hills are called eternal on account of antiquity.

Yet sometimes eternity is designated by a temporal name, according to Psalm 101:28: yet you are yourself the same, and your years shall not fail; although we know that those things that exist immobily more properly are described through eternity, yet those that exist in generation and corruption are described through time.

875. Then when he says, yet it is necessary that things called eternal, he shows how things have themselves to eternity and time; and he says that it is not necessary that those things that are called eternal in the Scriptures should be reckoned to be simply and equally simultaneously eternal with God, who is before participated eternity, but by following the understanding of the Scriptures it is necessary to understand that some things are eternal according to fixed modes, namely, inasmuch as they exist immutable and without time, as are angelic spirits of this sort.

But those things that are middles between things existing immobily and those that are generated and corrupted, according to something participate time and according to something eternity, as celestial bodies come together indeed with superior spirits, inasmuch as they are incorruptible according to substance and according to this participate eternity; yet inasmuch as they are changed according to place, they come together with things generable and corruptible, and thus they participate time.

But it is fitting to praise God commonly both through aevum and through time; because he is the cause both of temporal things and of eternal things and is above eternity and time, as eternity and time are understood as participated by creatures; and it is fitting also to praise him as Ancient of Days, as he is prior and superior to every time; and that he varies the four parts of the year and all times and nevertheless he exists immobile before all ages, inasmuch as he is not only prior and superior to time, but also to the aevum, that is, eternity, as it is participated by creatures; and thus his kingdom is the kingdom of all ages, both temporal and eternal.