C. 11 - On Peace; And What Per Se Being Means; What Per Se Life; And What Per Se Virtue; And What Are Said Thus

On Peace; And What Per Se Being Means; What Per Se Life; And What Per Se Virtue; And What Are Said Thus

Lectio 1

On the Divine Peace and On Its Causality in Common

C. XI, §1. 399. Come, therefore, let us praise the divine and foremost peace of gathering with peaceful hymns.

400. For it is unitive of all things and the generative and operative consensus and connaturality of the whole of things;

401. on account of which also all things desire it, their divisible multitude converting to the whole unity and the natural war of each thing uniting unto conformed cohabitation.

402. By participation of the divine peace, the worthier of the gathering virtues are united to themselves and to other things and to the one principate of the peace of all things;

403. and they unite subjects and these to themselves and to one another and to the one and perfect principle and cause of the peace of all things.

404. Which simply supervening upon the whole of things, as by certain enclosing bars of diverse things, defines, terminates, and makes all things firm; and it does not allow the things divided to be poured out unto the unterminated and infinite, inordinate and not gathered and made deserted by God and going out from the unition of their own selves and interspersed among one another by every mixing.

876. Above, Denys expounded the divine names by which there are signified the perfections proceeding from God into creatures. For each thing desires its perfection, which it participates from God and loves it and when it has attained it its appetite rests, in which rest the ratio of peace consists. And for this reason in this chapter Denys determines about the divine peace and also about those perfections proceeding from God into creatures, according as they are considered in the abstract: for being considered in the abstract is called per se being and similarly concerning the others. And these two things appear in the title.

877. Therefore this chapter is divided into two parts:

in the first, he determines about the divine peace;

in the second, about the perfections proceeding from God, according as they are considered in the abstract as per se, at but because you also have interrogated me.

878. Yet the first part is divided into two:

in the first, he determines about peace according as it pertains to the divine nature;

in the second, according as it pertains to the incarnation of Christ, at what indeed should someone say concerning the kindness.

879. About the first, he does to things:

first, he says what his intention is about;

second, he pursues it, at for it is unitive of all things.

880. Yet it must be considered that something properly is said to have peace in itself from the fact that its appetite rests in its proper good attained; which indeed happens when there is not anything repugnant, either interior or exterior, that impedes such rest. And therefore something is said to have peace for itself and for others from a certain union by which every repugnance is excluded: which union indeed is understood here in the name of gathering, when he says that we ought to praise the divine peace, which is the principal cause of gathering. Because, I say, we do not suffice to praise this divine peace according as it is in itself, it is necessary that we should praise it with peaceful hymns, that is, with praises taken from this: that it makes peace in things.

881. Then when he says, for it is unitive of all things, he pursues the proposition:

and first, he determines the truth;

second, he excludes objections, at yet how, someone should say.

882. About the first, he does two things:

first, he shows the causality of the divine peace in common;

second, he expounds it in particular, at therefore concerning the divine peace itself.

883. About the first, he does two things:

first, he shows what the divine peace makes in things;

second, how it makes this in diverse ways in diverse things, at by participation of the divine peace.

884. About the first, he does two things:

first, he shows the effective causality of the divine peace;

second, how it is a final cause, at on account of which also all things desire it.

885. Whereas because, rightly, the name of peace is used more frequently in rational creatures, in whom the ratio of peace is found, from them it must be considered what peace properly is and in what the ratio of peace consists: for this is what the divine peace effectively produces in things.

Yet any men are said to have peace when their wills harmonize in one: for thus one is not opposed to another. Yet that many harmonize in one happens from the fact that they communicate in some one: for example, those who communicate in one city harmonize unto the common good of the city, and something similar is clear in other things. And therefore two things concur unto the ratio of peace: first of all, that some things are united; second, that they harmonize unto one; and according to this, peace also is said in natural things.

And for this reason Denys says that the divine peace is unitive of all things, as regards the first, namely inasmuch as it makes all things to communicate in one; and again, generative, as regards the first institution, and operative, as regards government, of the consensus and connaturality of the whole of things: so that consensus might be referred to harmonious will; connaturality, to harmonious appetite of natural things.

Where it must be considered that, although some things are discordant as regards their proper ends, nevertheless all things harmonize in the appetite of the last end.

886. Then when he says, on account of which also all things desire it, he shows how the divine peace is the final cause of all things. Yet it is natural to whatever thing that it should desire unity, as also being and the good; because through division a thing fails and is corrupted and goodness is lessened for a thing. And because the divine peace causes unity in things, for this reason he concludes that all things in their way desire the divine peace, inasmuch as it is also unitive of all things; and this is what he says: their divisible multitude converting to the whole unity, namely because those things that are divided in themselves are united in a whole, inasmuch as they are parts of the universal; and likewise, inasmuch as above he said that it is the generative and operative consensus and connaturality, to which there responds what is added here: and the natural war for a thing, unifying unto conformed cohabitation; for those things that naturally fight one another, on account of the contrariety that they have in their proper natures, harmonize in the universal order, according to which in a certain way they are united and dwell together in the world; and this is from the participation of the divine peace that, inasmuch as it is desired by all things, has the ratio of an end.

887. Then when he says, by participation of the divine peace, he shows how the divine peace effects the aforementioned in diverse things:

and first, how in the supreme creatures;

second, how in inferior creatures, at and they unite subjects;

third, how commonly in all things, showing the mode of the aforementioned things, at which simply supervening upon the whole of things.

888. Yet it must be considered that, as with the other perfections proceeding from God, the supreme creatures participate those more abundantly than other things such that through them they can be derived in a certain way to the lowest things. Therefore he says that the supreme creatures are worthier from the number of gathering virtues, namely because they participate the gathering of the divine peace in so great an abundance that they might also be gathering of others.

For each of these virtues, through the participation of the divine peace, has a threefold union:

one of which indeed is to themselves, according as each of these, according to itself, is some one thing.

Whereas another union is according as one is united to another, in the order of the truly one.

Whereas the third union is that according to which they are united to one principle of the peace of all things, that is, God.

889. And just as those are united in three ways, so in three ways do they unite those things that are subjected to them; and this is what he says: and they unite subjects, namely each of those things, to themselves and these things to one another and all things to one cause and to the perfect principle of the peace of all things, namely God, into whom, as into a last end and first cause, all things are led back.

890. Then when he says, which simply supervening upon the whole of things, he shows what the divine peace makes commonly in all things; and he says that the first cause of peace supervenes upon all things simply because, although the things in which it operates are diverse, nevertheless on the part of the operator there is not any diversity either in operation or in the mode of operating.

891. Yet he shows that it supervenes upon things both for conserving and for establishing unity of peace. Yet unity of peace consists in tranquility of order, as Augustine says in the nineteenth book of the City of God, for which tranquility of order indeed three things are required: (Augustine, City of God, bk. 19, c. 13.)

first of all, that they be distinguished from one another: for there cannot be an order unless of distinct things; and for this reason he says that it defines all things.

Second, it is necessary for tranquility of order that none of the distinct things should go out of the limit of its nature; and to this there pertains what he says: terminates.

Third, there is required that this definition and termination should be stabilized; and to this there pertains what he says: and makes firm; otherwise if the definition and termination of things were not firm, but one thing going out from its term were to invade the ends of another, the order of things would be confounded and thus there would not be tranquility of order.

Yet he says that it defines and terminates and makes all things firm, as by certain enclosing bars of diverse things, using a likeness of sensible things: for it is customary, if many boards are erected according to some order, that certain bars be inserted by which the erected boards might be made firm; thus is the distinction and termination of things made firm by the perfections and virtues imparted to things by God, as though by certain bars of distinct things.

892. Yet he manifests the mode of making firm, which pertains to the conservation of peace, adding, and it does not allow the things divided to be poured out unto the unterminated and infinite, inordinate and not gathered and made deserted by God and going out from the unition of their own selves and interspersed among one another by every mixing; and he says that God does not permit that the distinct things should be poured out unto the unterminated and infinite, namely so that the operations and changes of things might not tend to any fixed term and end, as though they should be inordinate and not gathered, that is, not made firm in any conservative principle. Yet this effusion into the infinite would be opposed to the threefold unition of things, which above he said is made in things through the participation of the divine peace.

For there would be removed the union to the first principle, not to be arrived at, and as regards this he says, and made deserted by God; there would be removed also the union of the thing to itself, and as regards this he says, and going out from the unition of their own selves; there would be removed also the unition of one thing to another, and as regards this he says, and interspersed among one another by every mixing through a certain confusion of things to one another, if they were allowed to be poured out unto the infinite.

Lectio 2

On the Causality of the Divine Peace in Particular

405. Therefore concerning the divine peace itself, whatever it is, and silence and that which the holy man Justus calls ineffability and immobility to every known procession and how it rests and keeps silence and how it is in itself and within itself and to its whole self, is super-united whole and neither entering into itself and multiplying itself does it forsake the unition of its own self, but also proceeds to all things, remaining whole inside, through the excess of the unition surpassing all things, is neither speakable nor possible to say or to think for any of existing things, we shall inspect its intelligible and spoken participations, as this as is possible for men and for us by many good men failing.

§2. 406. And first of all this must be said: that it makes to subsist per se peace itself both whole and particular,

407. and that it makes all things cemented to one another according to the unconfused unition of these, according to which they subsist as indivisibly and closely united and nevertheless as pure singulars according to their proper species, not veiled through concretion to opposites nor blunting anything of unitive diligence and purity. Therefore let us contemplate the one certain and simple nature of peaceful unition, uniting the whole of things to its own self and to these themselves and to one another and preserving all things in a not confused and unmixed and concrete containing of all things.

408. On account of which the divine minds united to the intellects are united also to those united and again ascend to the unknown joining of things gathered above mind.

409. On account of which souls, uniting their most lavish reasons and gathering to one intellectual purity, arrive according to their propriety by way and order through immaterial and simple intellect to that unition which is above intellect.

410. On account of which the one and indissoluble complexion of all things consists according to its divine harmony and is harmonized by perfect consonance and consensus and connaturality and gathered unconfusedly and indissolubly contained.

411. For the peace of perfect totality crosses to all existing things, according to its most simple and unmixed presence of unifying virtue, uniting all things and joining extremes to extremes through middles, joined according to one connatural friendship and giving to enjoy this and the extreme terminations of each thing,

412. and making all things unanimous by unities, identities, unitions, gatherings, indivisibly,

413. clearly, with the divine peace standing and showing all things in one and proceeding through all things and not receding from its proper identity; for it proceeds to all things and hands itself on to all things according to their propriety, and it super-flows by the abundance of peaceful fecundity, and it remains on account of the excess of unition, super-united whole to whole and according to its whole self.

893. After Denys has shown the causality of the divine peace in common, here he pursues it in particular; and about this he does two things:

first, he shows what can be said of the divine peace in particular;

second, he manifests the proposition, at and first of all this must be said.

894. Therefore he says, first, that it is neither licit nor possible, not only for any of men, but also for any of existing creatures, to say with the mouth or to think with the heart, the divine peace itself according as it is in itself, and the divine silence itself, which a certain holy man by the name of Justus called the ineffability of God, namely because neither can we express God nor can he so express to us that we might be able to know him perfectly according as he is.

895. Yet he adds the silence of peace, because the sign of perturbed peace customarily is noise and clamor. He also adds to peace the immobility of God to every procession that is known by us: for although he is said to proceed according as he diffuses his likeness into things, nevertheless according to every procession of this sort he remains immobile in his own self. Yet to peace there is added rest and immobility, as also silence, because those things that have peace, from this very thing, seem to have a certain rest.

896. Therefore we cannot say or think these things concerning the divine peace and silence and rest, namely how it rests and keeps silence, as has been said, and how the divine peace is whole supereminently united in itself and within itself and to its whole self.

Yet unition, as has been said above, pertains to the ratio of peace. Yet there are found some things that are diverse in themselves but are united in some one, as many men are united in one house, but God is united in himself. Yet there is something that is indeed one in itself, but nevertheless within itself it is not one, as one man within himself is not one, because many and diverse things are contained within himself. But God is one within himself, because no diversity is found in him. There is also found something that is one within itself, because it is not composed from divisible parts, but nevertheless is not united whole to its whole self, because one part of it is not one with another. But God is united whole to his whole self, because in him there is no number of parts, but he is altogether simple; and so great is his unition, that neither when he goes into himself, namely by understanding and by loving, nor when he multiplies himself, through the fact that he impresses multiple likenesses of himself upon things, does he forsake his proper unition, but on account of the excess of his unition, which surpasses every unity, the deity so proceeds to all things through the likenesses of himself communicated to things, that nevertheless it remains whole within itself, as a seal which impresses its image and likeness on diverse waxes and nevertheless remains the same by the identity which it is.

897. Therefore it is necessary to attribute things of this sort, since they are ineffable and unknown to us, to God alone who knows himself perfectly through himself, because he exists above all the participations of him which can be understood and which can be said by a created intellect: for God is above every being and above every life and above all things of this sort that are participated by creatures; and thus, since it is connatural to the created intellect that it should understand and speak the participations of God, it can neither perfectly understand nor perfectly speak God himself, who is above all things of this sort.

Therefore this is what we intend to speak concerning the divine peace, namely the participations of the divine peace itself, as is possible for us who fail of understanding divine things, not only by the angels, by also by good and perfect men.

898. Then when he says, and first of all this must be said, he shows in particular the causality of the divine peace;

and first, as regards created peace itself, considered according to itself;

second, as regards those things in which peace is found, at and that it makes all things cemented.

899. Therefore he says, first, that this must be said first: that God makes there to be per se peace itself, considered in the abstract, considered both in the universal and in particular: for here to subsist is received commonly for to be: for there is not any created peace subsisting per se.

900. Then when he says, and that it makes all things cemented, he shows the causality of the divine peace as regards those things that participate peace;

and first, in common;

second, in particular, at on account of which the divine minds.

901. Therefore he says, first, that it must be said that the divine peace makes all things cemented to one another: for there is nothing in things that does not have union with some other, either through agreement in species or in genus, or in any order whatever. But because this unition does not remove the distinctions of things, for this reason he says that it is unconfused; and to expound this he adds that, according to the aforementioned unconfused unition, all things are united indivisibly and closely, namely because there is nothing that can remove the union that God imparts to things either by dividing or by making more distant: for it is not possible that white and pale either should be divided according to genus or should be as distant as white and black. And although all things are united, nevertheless singulars are conserved in the purity of their proper species; and man, although he is united to others in the aforementioned ways, nevertheless is not in another species than human. Yet to this purity of species, there follows the purity both of knowability and of virtue: for each thing is known through its species.

902. Therefore because each thing remains in the purity of its proper species, there is the consequence that the unition of one thing to another through a certain agreement is not for it in a covering, lest it should not be able to be discerned from others; and this is what he says: not veiled through concretion to opposites; as for example: white has concretion with black, inasmuch as it comes together with it in genus, nevertheless this agreement does not impede white’s being known in its proper nature, according as it is distant from black. Likewise also the proper virtue of each thing follows its species; and for this reason, with purity of species conserved, the proper virtue following the species is not blunted; and this is what he says: nor blunting anything of unitive diligence and purity, namely because neither is the purity of a thing blunted through diligence, that is, perfect union, nor conversely; as white through the fact that it differs in species from black, according to the purity of its species, is not impeded from being united to it according to genus, nor conversely.

903. Therefore from these things he concludes that we ought to consider one certain simple nature, which through the mode of union makes peace in things, namely the divine nature, which unites all things to its own self while it assimilates all things to itself through the influence of its gifts and orders them to itself as to a last end and again unites the whole of things to these themselves, that is, whatever thing to itself. For each thing is united to itself and to one another, that is, it unites one to another, to the degree that one thing comes together with another in whatever way. For this divine nature so conserves all things, according to a certain not confused, that is, not inordinate to one another, so that they might be simultaneously, unmixed, that is, not mixed, and nevertheless concrete containing: not mixed indeed, while each thing remains in the purity of its species; and concrete, according as they are coordinated to one another.

904. Then when he says, on account of which the divine minds, he shows the causality of the divine peace as regards those things that participate peace in particular:

and first, as regards the angels;

second, as regards rational souls, at on account of which souls;

third, as regards the whole universe, at on account of which the one and indissoluble complexion of all things.

905. Therefore he says, first, that on account of the first and simple cause, peacefully uniting, the divine minds, that is, the angels, are united in three ways:

first of all, each according to its proper intellect;

second, as certain ones are united by a certain order to the other united angels;

third, according as they ascend further unto this: that they are joined to divine things, which are gathered above every mind; and this joining is unknown to us.

906. Then when he says, on account of which souls, he shows the effect of the divine peace in the rational soul, namely as it is reduced to unity. In which reduction indeed a threefold grade is considered:

for first, the soul is said to have most lavish reason, insofar as the reason diffuses itself to diverse things from many acts or effects, by investigating the nature of a thing.

Second, the lavishness of the reason is reduced to the unity of intellectual purity or simplicity; for the investigation of reason would have no effect, unless it were to lead to intelligible truth.

Third, by a certain order, through immaterial and intellectual truth of this sort, the soul comes according to the propriety of its virtue to be united to God, who is above intellect, to whom the soul cannot be so perfectly united in this life, as are the good angels.

907. Then when he says, on account of which the one and indissoluble complexion of all things, he shows the effect of the divine peace as regards the whole universe; and about this, he does two things:

first, he shows what the divine peace perfects in the universe;

second, he shows through what mode, at for the peace of perfect totality.

908. Therefore he says, first, that on account of the aforementioned simple nature there is a certain one and indissoluble complexion of all things, namely according as all things come together in one order of the universe which remains indissoluble according as a certain harmony, that is, a proportionate concordance, is caused by God in the universe itself; and this is what he expounds, adding, and harmonized by perfect consonance. For harmony is nothing else than concordant consonance. Yet this concordant consonance in things is caused according to consensus and connaturality: namely so that consensus might be referred to consonance of will in those things that have will; yet connaturality to concordance of natural appetite. Yet this harmonic complexion or concordant consonance has both order and firmness; whence as regards order he says, and gathered unconfusedly: for confusion removes order; whence those things are gathered unconfusedly that have complexion to one another according to a certain order. Yet as regards firmness he adds, and indissolubly contained: for there is indissoluble firmness in the complexion of things, not from the multitude of things gathered, but from the virtue of the one cause containing and gathering into one.

909. Then when he says, for the peace of perfect totality, he shows how the aforementioned concordant harmony is established in things from the divine peace. Yet he expounds this mode of connection in three ways:

first of all, as regards those things that are connected;

second, as regards the connection itself, at and making all things unanimous;

third, as regards the connecting cause, at clearly, with the divine peace standing.

910. Therefore he says, first, that it has been said that, on account of the divine nature, there consists in things a connection one and indissoluble for this reason: because the peace of perfect totality, that is, the peace that is from the perfect universal cause, according as universal causes are called total causes, this peace, I say, passing from the first cause to all existing things, according as the unified virtue of the first cause uniting, that is, making unity in things, is present to all things simply, that is, without any multiplication of itself, and unmixedly, because it is not mixed with things, but is separated from things according to its essence.

This divine peace indeed crosses to all things, by uniting all things, through this: that it leads all things back into a certain order: which order indeed consists in this: that certain extremes are joined to other extremes through middles. For the supreme things flow into the lowest things through the middle things, and the lowest things are converted to receiving from the supreme things through the middle things; and thus all things are joined according to one connatural friendship. And not only does the divine peace join extremes to extremes through middles, but also further it joins all things to its own self, inasmuch as it gives to all things in its mode that they should enjoy this divine peace, both the lowest creatures and whatever is lowest in whatever creature; and this is what he says: and the extreme terminations of each thing; for nothing is so low in things that it does not participate in any divine gift, from which participation it obtains that it should have connatural friendship for other creatures and that it should be ordered to God, as to a last end, which is to enjoy God.

911. Then when he says, and making all things unanimous, he shows the mode of the aforementioned connection as regards the connection itself. Yet the ratio of connection is perfected in a certain unity, and for this reason, according to the mode of unity, there is considered the mode of connection. Yet it must be considered that unity is attributed to things in many ways: for there is something that is one simply and according to itself, as something simply is called one in itself, and as regards this he says that it makes all things unanimous by unities.

Yet something is called simply the same, not according to itself, but through relation to something that is other: either by ratio or name only, as if we should call Marcus the same as Tully or a garment the same as clothing; or it is other according to the thing, as if we should say, Socrates is the same as Plato in species and a horse is the same as an ox in genus; and as regards this he says, identities; for one is said absolutely, but same relatively.

Whereas there is something that is not one simply, but as though united from many, as every composite, and as regards this he says, unitions.

Whereas there is something that is called one neither simply nor according to itself, but through a relation to another, as the unities of things gathered, and for this reason he adds, gatherings; for things gathered have less of the ratio of unity than things united: for the united can be called one absolutely, although not simply, but the gathered absolutely indeed are many, but one secundum quid.

Therefore indivisible consensus is constituted from the divine peace in things, according as they pursue unity whether through the mode of simple unity or through the mode of identity or through the mode of unition or through the mode of gathering.

912. Then when he says, clearly, with the divine peace standing, he shows the mode of the aforementioned connection on the part of the connecting cause; and he says that the aforementioned connection is established in things according as the divine peace first indeed is considered immobily in itself; yet second it is considered as the one exemplar in which exemplarily all things, which pertain to peace, are demonstrated; third, it is considered according as it hands on its likeness to all things. For according to this it is said to proceed through all things and nevertheless not to recede from its proper identity.

For the divine peace itself proceeds to all things, according as through its likeness it hands itself on to all things, according to the propriety of each thing; and nevertheless it super-flows according to the abundance of peaceful fecundity, namely because there is more of virtue in God for making peace, than there is in things for receiving, and for this reason the emanation of peace from God is above every receptibility of things. And although the reception of peace is according to the propriety of things, since the divine peace so proceeds to all things according to the emanation of effects, nevertheless this flows immobile in itself, supereminently united whole to whole, because there is no diversity of parts there, which should impede whole’s being united to whole.

For a whole line is not one with the whole, because thus it would be necessary that whatever part of the line would be one with whatever part; but in simple things whole is one with whole. Yet he adds, and according to its whole self, because it is not one by participation, but essentially; for a point, although it is whole one with whole, nevertheless not according to its whole self, but according to the unity that it participates. Yet if unity itself were to subsist as separated, it would be whole one with whole and according to its whole self. And thus it must be understood of God, who is whole united to whole, according to his whole self, through the fact that he is simply and essentially one.

Lectio 3

Certain Objections Are Excluded and It Is Determined About the Peace Made Through the Incarnation of Christ

§3. 414. Yet how, someone should say, do all things desire peace? For many rejoice over otherness and discretion and do not wish to rest spontaneously at any time.

415. And if indeed saying this, he says otherness and discretion for the propriety of each of existing things and that no one existing thing of existing things that is wishes to destroy this at any time, indeed we shall not contradict this, but let us announce that even this is the desire of peace: for all things love to have peace for themselves and to be united and that their own things and those that are theirs should be immobile and not prevailing to fall,

416. and perfect peace is preservative also of the cleansed propriety of singulars, with providences giving the peace of this, preserving all things not warring and unconfused and to themselves and to one another and establishing all things, by stable and indeclinable virtue, unto its peace and immobility.

§4. 417. And if all moved things should wish not to rest, but always to be moved by their motion, this desire also is of the divine peace of the whole of things, preserving all things in themselves not prevailing to fall and guarding the propriety of all movers and immobile motive life also not prevailing to fall, in this: that moved things having peace for themselves and having in the same mode, work those things that belong to them.

§ 5. 418. Yet if saying otherness according to a fall from peace, he tries to prove that peace is not lovable for all things, indeed most of all there is nothing of existing things that has fallen perfectly from every unition: for what is altogether unstable and unterminated and ungatherable and indefinite is neither existing nor in existing things.

419. Yet if he says that those make enemies of peace and the goods of peace who rejoice over quarrels and furies and variations and instabilities, those too are held by obscure imaginations of peaceful desire, assaulted much by the moving passions and desiring to allay them stupidly and reckoning that they should have peace by the fulfilling always of the flowings, not disturbed by the pursuing of delights detaining them.

420. What indeed should someone say concerning the kindness pouring out peace according to Christ (Tit 3:4)? According to which already we have learned not to wage war either against our own selves or against others or against the angels, but also with them we shall work divine things according to virtue according to the providence of Jesus cooperating all in all, but also making peace ineffable and predefined from the age and reconciling us to his own self in the Spirit and through him and in him to the Father (Col 1:20, Eph 1:23, Rom 5:1). Concerning which supernatural gifts it has been said sufficiently in the Theological Hypotyposes, presenting testimony to us by the holy inspiration of the eloquences.

913. After Denys has determined about peace, here he raises a doubt about the things determined before: for he had said above that all things desire peace; here he raises a question about this:

first therefore, he raises a doubt;

second, he solves it, at and if indeed saying this.

914. Therefore he asks, first, how it can be said that all things desire peace, since there are many that rejoice in the fact that they are others discrete from others and do not wish to rest spontaneously in their proper things, but always desire to be moved. Yet since the ratio of peace consists in unity and rest, all these things seem to be opposed to the ratio of peace.

915. Then when he says, and if indeed saying this, he solves the proposed doubt, according to three understandings of the proposed doubt;

the first of which he pursues first;

second, the second, at yet if saying otherness according to a fall;

third, the third, at yet if he says that those make enemies.

916. About the first, he does two things:

first, he poses a solution;

second, he manifests it, at and perfect peace is preservative.

917. Therefore he says, first, that if that man who raises the doubt set forth, when he says that many rejoice over otherness and discretion, understands concerning otherness and discretion that which applies to each thing according to its proper nature, through which any things are distinguished from others, which indeed following proper nature and distinction nothing wishes to destroy, it is not necessary that we should contradict this understanding, but we shall say that to desire such discretion is to desire peace: for all things love to have peace for themselves and to be united to themselves through this: that they will their own things and those that are theirs, that is, their proper natures and whatever things pertain to the same, to remain immobily and without fall. Yet through this: that what is proper to each thing is conserved, both the thing’s peace and its unity are preserved for itself. Whence it follows that to desire the discretion that follows one’s proper nature is to desire peace.

918. Then when he says, and perfect peace is preservative, he manifests the aforementioned solution through the efficiency of the divine peace: for to establish the aforementioned discretion in things pertains to the divine peace, whence it is not contrary to the desire for peace, if such discretion were to be desired. Therefore this is what he says: that perfect peace, namely the divine, conserves the propriety, that is, the proper nature, of singulars, in their cleansing and purity, not mixed with anything extraneous, but discrete from it. And this indeed pertains to the providence of God, according as it gives peace to things; which providence indeed he names plurally on account of the diverse participations of providence.

And this is apparent thus: for it pertains to the providence of God, according as it makes peace in things, that it should exclude war from things, which is opposed to peace. Yet there would be war in things unless confusion were removed, because one thing would not be contained within its proper limits, but in a certain way would invade those of others. And therefore, through the fact that divine providence preserves all things not warring and unconfused and each thing to itself and diverse things to one another, it establishes peace in this; and this is what he adds: that it establishes all things, according to stability and indeclinable virtue, unto its peace and immobility, that is, so that they might remain immobily in their proper natures and so have peace for themselves.

919. And because he already has solved the doubt as regards what had been said: that many things rejoice over both otherness and discretion, consequently when he says, and if all moved things should wish not to rest, he solves a doubt in the same mode as regards what has been said: that many do not wish to rest spontaneously; and he says that if those, in whose nature it is that they should be moved, do not wish to rest, but wish always to be moved by their proper motion, this also is the desire of peace that is derived from God into all things, through which all things are conserved in themselves, without this: that they should fall from what applies to them according to their proper nature; and consequently, through the divine peace there is conserved the propriety of all mobile and motive things.

Yet the first motive things are immobile, because since in mobile things one cannot proceed into the infinite, it is necessary to arrive at some first of the movers that is immobile, as is proven in the eighth book of the Physics. (Aristotle, Physics, 8.5, 256a13–b2; cf. Aquinas, Commentary on Physics, lect. 9, n. 4.) Whereas it is necessary that the first immobile mover should be living, as is proven in the twelfth book of the Metaphysics; (Aristotle, Metaphysics, 12.7, 1072b26–30; cf. Aquinas, Commentary on Metaphysics, lect. 8, n. 2544.) and for this reason significantly he says, and immobile motive life. Yet the propriety of mobile things and the immobile life of motive things is so guarded through the divine peace, that they do not fall from their natural state.

Yet the conservation of the propriety of mobile things and motive things pertains to the divine peace, inasmuch as those things that are moved thus have peace for themselves and in the same mode have themselves in their mobility, according as they work those things that pertain to them; for to be moved is the proper work of the mobile, inasmuch as it is mobile. Yet what retains its proper operation has peace for itself. Whence it is clear that since those things that naturally are moved wish always to be moved and not to rest, they desire peace.

920. Then when he says, yet if saying otherness according to a fall, he solves the doubt raised, as regards the second understanding of the doubt; and he says that if he who raised the doubt, when he said that many rejoice over otherness and discretion, did not understand this concerning natural otherness and discretion, which pertains to the ratio of peace, but he understood this concerning otherness and discretion according to a fall from peace, that is, according as something falls from the union in which the ratio of peace consists and so wishes to prove that peace is not lovable for all things, against this opponent it must be said such that there is nothing that totally falls from every union, in which the ratio of peace consists.

921. And he proves this thus: because in no way can there be anything per se existing or anything in existing things, as an accident or a part, that altogether has fallen from unition; which fall indeed he speaks in a fourfold way through four things: first of all as regards the fall itself, to which station is opposed, according as something stands in natural unition; and as regards this he says, unstable.

Then he touches upon those things from which the fall happens: yet something falls, while there are removed those things through which it was standing; yet something stands in natural unition through three things:

first of all, through the term by which it is contained lest it should flow out; for both dry things are contained by their proper terms and wet things are contained by alien terms, and the form through which each thing is contained in its being is called a term; and as regards this he says, unterminated.

Second, something has station through some extrinsic container, as bodies are contained by place; and according to this likeness every exterior thing containing and not conserving can be called a place; and as regards this he says, ungatherable.

Third, something has station in its proper operation from the end; for because an artist has a determinate end of his operation, he operates regularly according to the rule of the end; yet it is necessary that what does not have a determinate end, but wanders around diverse ends, should be fluctuating and unstable about its proper operation; and as regards this he says, indefinite.

And therefore nothing totally falls from the unition of peace; yet each thing desires and loves what is conformed to itself, yet flees the contrary: for it is impossible that there should be any being which totally flees unition and desires otherness and discretion, which is according to a fall from natural peace.

922. Then when he says, yet if he says that those make enemies, he solves the doubt according to the third understanding, such that what has been said: that there are many things that rejoice over otherness and discretion, might not be referred to natural appetite, as in the preceding, but to voluntary appetite. And he says that, if he who raises the doubt should say that those men make enemies with peace and its goods, who rejoice in exterior quarrels and interior disturbances of mind that he calls furies, which two pertain to the contrary division of peace; and again they rejoice over variations and instabilities which seem to be contrary to peace, and this as regards the second part of the doubt, it must be said that such men also are detained by the desire of peace, according to a certain obscure likeness.

And he manifests this thus: for such men are assaulted much by the passions, by which they are disturbed, and thus through passions of this sort their interior peace is disturbed. Therefore from the desires of peace they wish to allay the assault of passions of this sort not wisely, but stupidly. For they think that they can have an interior peace by fulfilling their superfluous and inordinate desires that are incited according to various passions, but through this they are perturbed more, while they cannot obtain the delights by which they are detained: for it is impossible that a man subject to superfluous and inordinate desires should be able to obtain all his desires; and for this reason quarrels disturb such men, seeking peace, so that they might fulfill their desires. And because they are subject to various desires, they rejoice over variations.

Yet wisely would they allay this assault of the passions if, repressing many desires, they were to be converted to the one desire of true peace.

923. Then when he says, what indeed should someone say concerning the kindness, he determines about the peace made through the incarnation of Christ, saying that nothing sufficient can be said concerning the compassion of God which pours out peace into the world through Christ; according to which peace, already liberated from sin, we have learned, by the doctrine and example of Christ and the interior inspiration of the Holy Spirit, not to wage war by sinning either against ourselves or by being discordant from the holy angels, but through this peace, according to our virtue, we work those things that are of God, simultaneously with the holy angels; and this, according to the providence and grace of Jesus who works all in all and who makes that ineffable peace that is preordained from eternity; through which peace we are reconciled to Christ himself in the Holy Spirit, who is the spirit of love and peace; through Christ himself and in Christ himself, simultaneously we are reconciled to God the Father.

924. Yet concerning these supernatural gifts pertaining to the peace made through Christ, it has been said sufficiently in the book on the Theological Hypotyposes, and this according to the testimonies of the Scriptures inspired by God; and for this reason here we pass through these things briefly.

Lectio 4

On the Divine Perfections According As They Are Considered Per Se In the Abstract

§ 6. 421. But because you also have interrogated me elsewhere through epistle: what perhaps I call per se being, per se life, and per se wisdom, and you said that for yourself you had doubted how I call God sometimes indeed per se life yet sometimes the substantifier of per se life, I reckon it necessary, O holy man of God, also to absolve you from this doubt in us.

422. And first of all, so that even now I might assume the things said manifoldly, it is not contrary to call God per se virtue or per se life and the substantifier of per se life or peace or virtue: for indeed he is called the former from existing things and most of all from things existing first, as the cause of all existing things; yet the latter as above all things and also super-existing supersubstantially over things that are prior.

423. Yet you say: what totally do we say that per se being is or per se life or whatever absolutely and principally is, and do we posit to subsist first from God?

424. Yet what we say is not oblique, but right and having simple manifestation: for we do not say that a certain divine or angelic substance is per se being which is the cause that all things are. For only the supersubstantial being itself is the principle and substance and cause that all existing things also are. Neither do we call another deity generative of life beyond the super-god life of all things whatever live and the cause of per se life itself; nor, so that we might speak by gathering, do we call the principals of existing things also causative substances and persons, which also they called the gods of existing things and the causers making per se, who truly and properly must not be called existing, nor did those nor their fathers know.

425. But we call per se being and per se life and per se deity both divinely and causally the one super-principle of all things and the supersubstantial principle and cause; yet participably from the imparticipable God given providing virtues: per se substantification, per se vivification, per se deification, by which existing things, according to their propriety, both are and are called participating and existing and living and divine, and others likewise; on account of which the good first is said to be the substantifier of these; afterwards, of the whole of these; afterwards, of these particulars; then, of those totally participating these; afterwards, of those particularly participating these.

426. And what is it necessary to say about these things? when indeed certain of our divine holy masters call the substantifier of per se goodness and deity itself super-good and super-god per se goodness and deity, calling benefic and deific being a gift coming forth from God; and per se beauty a per se pulchrific effusion and the whole of beauty and particular beauty and totally beautiful things and beautiful in part and whatever other things according to the same mode have been said and are said, showing the providences and goodnesses participated by existing things from the imparticipable God proceeding by a copious effusion and super-flowing, so that the cause of all things diligently might be above all things and the supersubstantial and supernatural might exceed existing things altogether, according to whatever substance and nature.

925. After Denys has determined about the peace that is established in things through the divine gifts, here he determines about the divine perfections themselves, according as they are considered per se in the abstract; and about this, he does three things:

first, he raises a doubt;

second, he solves it, at and first of all, so that even now;

third, he confirms the solution through the sayings of others, at and what is it necessary to say.

926. Therefore about the first it must be known that Timothy in a certain epistle written to Denys had interrogated him in it about two things:

first of all, what is per se life and per se wisdom: for Denys frequently uses such words, as is clear in the preceding.

Second, Timothy in the same epistle had said that he doubted how Denys sometimes said that God is per se life yet sometimes that God is the cause of* per se *life; and for this reason Denys says that he wished to free Timothy from this doubt, as much as he could.

927. Then when he says, and first of all, so that even now, he solves the doubts raised;

and first, the second: showing how God is per se life and the cause of per se life;

second, he solves the first: showing what is per se being and per se life, at yet you say: what totally do we say.

928. Therefore he says, first, that he does not wish now to take up the things said, as though said simply; and for this reason: because per se life is not said simply, but manifoldly, it is not contrary that we should call God* per se life or per se *virtue; and again that we should call him the substantifier, that is, creator, of* per se *life or per se peace or per se virtue. Yet it would be contrary if those were not said manifoldly.

For when we say that God is the substantifier of per se life and things of this sort, we praise him as the cause of all existing things from those existing things that most of all and first exist. For it is manifest that per se life is prior to a living thing and thus concerning the others. Whence, if God is the cause of these first things, he is the cause of all things. Whereas when we say that God is per se virtue or per se life, God is praised as existing above all things, and above those things that are first among all things he is called per se life, through a certain excess.

929. Then when he says, yet you say: what totally do we say, he solves the first doubt, namely what is per se life;

and first, he repeats the question;

second, he excludes a false understanding, at yet what we say is not oblique;

third, he determines the truth, at but we call* per se being and per se *life.

930. Therefore he proposes first, from the person of Timothy, what is signified when there is said per se being or per se life and whatever other things of this sort, and he says significantly, absolutely, that is, abstractly and principally, that is, as principles of other things; for per se life signifies the principles of living.

931. Then when he says, yet what we say is not oblique, he excludes an erroneous understanding. For the evidence of which it must be known that the Platonists, positing separated ideas of things, posited that all things that are said thus in the abstract subsist in the abstract as causes according to a certain order; namely such that they said that the first principle of things is per se goodness and per se unity, and they said that this first principle, which is essentially the good and one, is the highest God. Yet under the good they posited being, as has been said above, and under being they posited life, and thus concerning the others. And for this reason they said that under the highest God there is a certain divine substance that is named per se being and under this another that is named per se life.

932. Therefore, intending to exclude this, he says that what had been said above: that per se being and per se life subsist first from God, is not something erroneous, but is right and having plain manifestations: for we do not name per se being any divine or angelic substance, which is the cause of being for all things; yet he adds angelic, because those whom the Platonists called second gods we name angels. For only the supersubstantial divine being itself is the principle and substance and cause that all existing things are: so that what he says: principle, might be referred to the order of nature, according as the divine being precedes all beings; whereas substance imports the ratio of an exemplar: for that whose substance is its being is the exemplar of all existing things; yet what is called a cause pertains to this: that it gives being to existing things. Yet likewise when we say per se life, we do not understand a certain deity causative of life, which is another beyond the life of the highest God, who is the cause of all things that live and also of* per se *life itself.

933. And so that we might gather all things in the highest, we do not say that there are some separated essences and hypostases that are the principles of things and their creators, which the Platonists said were gods and creators of existing things, as though operating per se unto the production of things. Yet, if we wish to speak truly and properly, let us say that gods of this sort do not exist in things; nor have those who have posited such gods found this through some certitude of science either those or their fathers, because neither the first Platonists nor their followers could have received the science of this thing through sure and firm sciences, but through some human reasons they were deceived unto opining.

934. Then when he says, but we call* per se being and per se *life, with the error excluded, he solves the second truth; and he says that per se being and per se life and things of this sort are said in two ways:

in one way, they are said of God who is one supersubstantial principle and cause of all things; and God is called per se life or per se being, because he does not live by the participation of some life nor is he through the participation of some being, but he is his own living and his own life and exceeding every being and every life that is participated by creatures and existing as the principle of living and being for all things.

Yet in another way, per se being and per se life are called virtues or certain perfections according to the imparticipable providence of the one God given to creatures for participating. For although God, who is the principle of these virtues, remains imparticipable in himself and consequently is not participated, nevertheless his gifts are divided in creatures and partially received, whence also they are said to be participated by creatures; and according as they are participated according to the propriety of each of things participating, according to this things participating both are and are called existing from nature, inasmuch as they participate being; and living, inasmuch as they participate life; and divine, inasmuch as they participate deity; and it is similar concerning the others. And because the unparticipated principle is the cause both of participations and of things participating, for this reason God is the substantifier both of participations and of things participating.

935. Yet the participations themselves can be considered in three ways: in one way according to themselves, as they abstract both from universality and from particularity, as is signified when there is said per se life; in another way they are considered in the universal as there is said total or universal life; in a third way in the particular, according as life is said of this or that thing.

936. Likewise also things participating can be considered in two ways: in one way in the universal, as if there should be said the universal or total living; in another way, in particular, as if there should be said this or that living thing.

937. And God is the cause of all these things; and this is what he says: that the good, that is, God, first of all is said to be the substantifier of these, namely of per se life and per se being and things of this sort, as it is considered per se and absolutely; afterwards, of the whole of these, the same of universal being and like things; afterwards of these particulars, as of particular being or particular life; afterwards of those totally participating these, of universal living and universal existing; afterwards of those particularly participating these, as of this or that being or living thing.

938. Then when he says, and what is it necessary to say, he confirms the proposed solution through the sayings of others, and he says that it is not necessary to doubt about the things set forth, since some of the doctors of the divine and Christian religion, as Hierotheus and other disciples of the apostles, say this very thing, namely that the goodness and deity supereminent over all things is the cause of* per se *deity and goodness itself, naming per se goodness a certain gift coming forth from God through which beings are good; and per se deity a certain gift of God through which some are made gods participatively; and likewise they name per se beauty the effusion itself of beauty through which there is caused both universal and particular beauty in things and through which some things are made both universally and particularly beautiful.

And it must be said likewise concerning all other things whatever are said according to the same mode, by which there are demonstrated the gifts divinely provided and the goodnesses participated by created beings, which proceed by a copious effusion and super-flow from God who is imparticipable, since he is not made a part of anything; such that he who is the cause of all things perfectly is above all things and God himself, he who is supersubstantial and supernatural exceeds every substance and nature, inasmuch as he neither participates nor is participated, but remains in his own simple and undivided purity.