Chapter 35 — Solution of the foregoing arguments, and first of those taken from the standpoint of God

We must, accordingly, show that the foregoing reasons do not necessarily conclude, starting with those that are produced on the part of the agent. (Ch. 32.)

For it does not follow that God is moved either essentially or accidentally if his effect begin to be anew, as the first argument argued. For newness of effect may indicate change of the agent insofar as it proves newness of action, for it is impossible for a new action to be in the agent unless the latter be in some way moved (at least from inaction to action). But newness of effect does not prove newness of action in God, since his action is his essence, as we have proved above. (Ch. 9.) Neither, therefore, can newness of effect argue change in God the agent.

And yet it does not follow, if the action of the first agent is eternal, that his effect is eternal, as the second argument inferred. For it has been shown above (Ch. 23.) that in producing things God acts voluntarily. Not, however, as though there were an intermediate action of his—as in us the action of the motive power intervenes between the act of the will and the effect, as we have proved in a foregoing chapter (Ch. 9.)—but his act of understanding and willing must be his act of making. Now the effect follows from the intellect and the will according to the determination of the intellect and the command of the will. And just as every other condition of the thing made is determined by the intellect, so is time appointed to it: for art determines not only that this thing is to be such and such, but that it is to be at this particular time, even as a physician determines that a draught is to be taken at such and such a time. Therefore, if his willing were essentially efficacious for producing the effect, the effect would follow anew from his former will without any new action on his part. Therefore, nothing prevents our saying that God’s action was from eternity while his effect was not from eternity, but from the time when he appointed it from eternity.

Hence it is also clear that, although God is the sufficient cause of bringing things into being, it is not necessary to suppose that because he is eternal, his effect is eternal, as the third argument contended. For if we suppose a sufficient cause, we suppose its effect, but not an effect outside the cause: for this would be through insufficiency of the cause (for instance, as if a hot thing failed to give heat). Now the proper effect of the will is for that thing to be which the will wills: and if something else were to be than what the will wills, this would be an effect that is not proper to the cause, but foreign to it. But just as the will, as we have said, wills this thing to be such and such, so does it will it to be at such and such a time. Therefore, for the will to be a sufficient cause, it is not necessary for the effect to be when the will is, but when the will has appointed the effect to be. On the other hand, it is different with things which proceed from a cause acting naturally, because the action of nature is according as nature is; therefore, the effect must necessarily follow if the cause exists. Now, the will acts not according to the mode of its being, but according to the mode of its purpose. And consequently, just as the effect of a natural agent follows the being of the agent, so the effect of a voluntary agent follows the mode of his purpose.

From the foregoing it is again clear that the effect of the divine will is not delayed, although it was not always, since it was always willed, as the fourth reason argued. This is so because the object of the divine will is not only the existence of the effect, but also the time of its existence. Therefore, the thing willed (namely, that a creature should exist at such and such a time) is not delayed, because the creature began to exist at the time appointed by God from eternity.

Nor can we conceive a diversity of parts of any duration before the beginning of the whole creature, as was supposed in the fifth argument. For nothingness has neither measure nor duration. And the duration of God, which is eternity, has no parts, but is utterly simple, having no before and after, since God is immovable, as stated in the first book. (Bk. 1, ch. 15.) Therefore, there is no comparison between the beginning of the whole creature and any various signate parts of an already existing measure, to which parts the beginning of creatures can be related in a like or unlike manner, so that there need be a reason in the agent why he should have produced the creature at this particular point of that duration, and not at some particular or subsequent point. Such a reason would be necessary if there were some duration divisible into parts beside the whole creature produced, as happens in particular agents, who produce their effect in time but do not produce time itself. But God brought into being both the creature and time together. Hence in this matter we do not have to consider the reason he produced them now and not before, but only why not always.

This may be made clear by a comparison with place. For particular bodies are produced not only at a determined time, but also in a determined place; and since time and place by which they are contained are extraneous to them, there must be a reason why they are produced in this place and time rather than in another: whereas in the whole heaven, outside which there is no place, and together with which the entire place of all things is produced, we do not have to consider the reason why it is produced here and not there. Through thinking that this reason ought to be a matter of consideration, some have fallen into error, so as to place the infinite in bodies. In like manner, in the production of the entire creature, outside which there is no time, and together with which time is produced simultaneously, we do not have to consider the reason why it was produced now and not before (so that we be led to grant the infinity of time), but only why it was not always produced, or why after non-being, or so as to imply a beginning.

For the purpose of inquiring into this question, the sixth argument was adduced on the part of the end, which alone can bring about necessity in those things which are done voluntarily. Now the end of God’s will can only be his goodness. And he does not act in order to bring this end into being, as a craftsman works in order to produce his handiwork, since his goodness is eternal and unchangeable, so that nothing can accrue to it. Nor could it be said that God works for his betterment. Nor again does he act in order to obtain this end for himself, as a king fights in order to obtain possession of a city: for he is his own goodness. It remains, therefore, that he acts for an end by producing an effect, so that it participate his end. Accordingly, in thus producing an effect on account of an end, the uniform relation of the end to the agent is not to be taken as a reason for his work being eternal. Rather, we should consider the relation of the end to the effect which is made on account of the end, so that the effect be produced in such a way as to be most fittingly directed to the end. Consequently, we cannot conclude that the effect is eternal from the fact that the end is uniformly related to the agent.

Nor is it necessary that the divine effect should have been always, because thus it is more fittingly directed to the end, as the seventh argument seemed to infer; however, it is more fittingly directed to the end by the fact that it was not always. For every agent that produces an effect in participation of his own form intends to produce his likeness in it. Therefore, it was becoming to God’s will to produce the creature in participation of his goodness, so that it might reflect the divine goodness by its likeness. But this reflection cannot be by way of equality, as a univocal effect reflects its cause—so that it be necessary for eternal effects to be produced by the divine goodness—but it is after the manner in which the transcendent is reflected by that which is transcended. Now the transcendence of the divine goodness over the creature is especially manifested by the fact that creatures have not been always. For by that, it is manifest that all else beside him has him as the author of its being, and that his power is not constrained to produce these effects as nature is to natural effects, and consequently that he is a voluntary and intelligent agent. Some have affirmed the opposite through maintaining the eternity of creatures.

Accordingly, there is nothing on the part of the agent to oblige us to hold the eternity of creatures.