Chapter 37 — Solution of the arguments taken from the making of things

It remains for us to show that neither does any argument taken from the point of view of the making of things compel us to draw the aforesaid conclusion. (Ch. 34.)

The common opinion of the philosophers who asserted that nothing is made from nothing (on which the first argument was based) holds good for that particular making which they had under consideration. For, since all our knowledge begins from the senses which are about singulars, human speculations proceeded from particular to universal considerations. Therefore, those who sought the principle of things considered only the particular makings of beings, and inquired in what manner this particular fire or this particular stone was made.

At first, considering the making of things more from an outward point of view than they should have, they stated that a thing is made only in respect of certain accidental dispositions, such as rarity, density, and so forth. They said, in consequence, that to be made was nothing else than to be altered, for the reason that they understood everything to be made from an actual being. Later on, they considered the making of things more inwardly and made a step forward to the making of things in regard to their substance, for they asserted that a thing does not need to be made from an actual being except accidentally, and that it is made in itself from a being in potency.

But this making, which is of a being from any being whatsoever, is the making of a particular being, which is made insofar as it is this being (for instance, a man or a fire), but not insofar as it is considered universally: for there was previously a being which is transformed into this being. Entering still more deeply into the origin of things, they considered at last the procession of all created being from one first cause, as appears from the arguments given above (Ch. 16.) which prove this.

In this procession of all being from God, it is not possible for anything to be made from something already existing, since it would not be the making of all created being. The early natural philosophers had no conception of such a making, for it was their common opinion that nothing is made from nothing. Or if any of them conceived the idea, they did not consider that the name of “making” was applicable to it, since the word “making” implies movement or change, whereas in this origin of all being from one first being, the transformation of one being into another is inconceivable, as we have proved. (Ch. 17.) Because of this, neither does it belong to the natural philosophers to consider this same origin of things, but to the metaphysician, who considers universal being and things that are devoid of movement. We, however, transfer the name “making” by a kind of metaphor even to that origin, so that we say that anything is made if its essence or nature originates from something else.

Therefore, it is clear that neither does the second argument follow, which was taken from the nature of movement. For creation cannot be described as a change save metaphorically, insofar as the created thing is considered to have being after non-being, in which way one thing is said to be made out of another—even in those things where the one is not changed into the other—only because one succeeds the other, as day out of night. Nor does the nature of movement that is brought into the argument justify the conclusion, since what in no way exists is not in any particular state, so that it follows that when it begins to exist, it is in a different state now and before.

Hence again it is evident that there is no need for a passive potency to precede the existence of all created being, as the third argument inferred. For this is necessary in those things which take their origin of being from movement, since movement is the act of a potential being. (Aristotle, Physics 3.1, 201a9–28.) But before a created thing was, it was possible for it to be through the power of the agent, by which power also it began to be. Or it was possible on account of the relation of the terms, in which no incompatibility is found: which kind of possibility is said to be in respect of no potency, as the Philosopher says in Metaphysics 5. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.12, 1019b10.) For this predicate “being” is not incompatible with this subject “world” or “man,” as “measurable” is incompatible with “diameter.” And thus it follows that it is not impossible for it to be, and consequently that before it was, it was possible for it to be, apart from all potency. But in those things which are made by movement, it is necessary that they be previously possible in respect of a passive potency, and it is with regard to these that the Philosopher employs this argument in Metaphysics 7. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 7.7, 1032b15–1033a4.)

From this it is also clear that neither is the fourth argument conclusive for the purpose. For in things made by movement, to be made and to be are not simultaneous, because succession is found in their making. In things that are not made by movement, however, their making is not before their being.

It is, therefore, evident that nothing prevents our asserting that the world has not been always, and this is affirmed by the Catholic faith: in the beginning God created the heavens and the earth (Gen 1:1); and it is said of God: before anything was made, from the beginning (Prov 8:22).