Chapter 34 — Arguments to prove the eternity of the world from the point of view of the making

Again, other arguments may be taken from the point of view of the making, in order to prove the same conclusion.

For what is asserted by all in common cannot possibly be entirely false, because a false opinion is a weakness of the understanding, even as a false judgment about its proper sensible results from a weakness of the sense. Now defects are accidental, since they are beside the intention of nature. And what is accidental cannot be always and in everything: for instance, the judgment given by all tastes about flavors cannot be false. Consequently, the judgment given by all about a truth cannot be erroneous. Now it is the common opinion of all philosophers that from nothing, naught is made. (Aristotle, Physics 1.4, 187a26–28; above, ch. 16.)

Therefore, this must be true. Hence if a thing is made, it must be made from something, and if this also is made, it must also be made from something. But this cannot go on indefinitely, for then no generation would be completed, since it is not possible to go through an infinite number of things. Therefore, we must come to some first thing that was not made. Now everything that has not always been must have been made. Therefore, the thing from which all things were first made must be eternal. But this is not God, since he cannot be the matter of a thing, as we proved in the first book. (Bk. 1, ch. 17.) Therefore, it follows that something beside God is eternal, namely, prime matter.

Moreover. If a thing is not in the same state now and before, it must be changed in some way, for to be moved is not to be in the same state now as before. (Aristotle, Physics 5.1, 224a30–b12.) Now everything that begins to be anew is not in the same state now as before. Therefore, this must result from some movement or change. But every movement or change is in a subject, for it is the act of a movable. (Aristotle, Physics 3.2, 201b27–202a9.) Now, since movement precedes that which is made by movement, for movement terminates in it, it follows that there preexists a movable subject before anything made. And since this cannot go on indefinitely, we must necessarily come to some first subject that begins not anew but always has been.

Again. Whatever begins to be anew, it was possible, before it was, that it would be. For if not, it was impossible for it to be and necessary for it not to be, so it would always have been a non-being, and it never would have begun to be. Now that for which it is possible to be is a subject potentially a being. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 7.2, 1028b8–15.) Therefore, before everything that begins to be anew, there must preexist a subject which is a potential being. And since this cannot go on indefinitely, we must suppose some first subject which did not begin to be anew.

Again. No permanent substance is while it is being made, for it is made in order that it may be; therefore, it would not have to be made if it were already. But while it is being made, there must be something that is the subject of the making, since a making, since it is an accident, cannot be without a subject. Therefore, whatever is made has a preexisting subject. And since this cannot go on indefinitely, it follows that the first subject was not made, but is eternal. Hence it also follows that something beside God is eternal, because he cannot be the subject of making or movement.

Accordingly, these are the arguments by which some people say that things created have necessarily been always, clinging to them as though they were demonstrations In this, they contradict the Catholic faith, which affirms that nothing beside God has always been, and that all things have begun to be, save the one eternal God.