Chapter 32 — Arguments of those who wish to prove the eternity of the world from God’s side of the question

Since, however, many have held that the world has been always and of necessity, and have endeavored to prove this, it remains for us to give their arguments, so as to show that they do not necessarily prove the eternity of the world. (Ch. 35.) In the first place, we shall set forth the arguments that are taken from God’s side; second, those which are taken from the side of creatures; (Ch. 33.) third, those which are taken from the manner of their making, on account of which they are said to begin to be anew. (Ch. 34.)

On the part of God the following arguments are produced in order to prove the eternity of the world.

Every agent that does not always act is moved either essentially or accidentally: essentially, as fire which was not always burning begins to burn, either because it is newly lit, or because it is newly transferred so as to be near the fuel; accidentally, as the mover of an animal begins anew to move the animal with some movement made in its regard, either from within—as an animal begins to be moved when it awakes after its digestion is complete—or from without, as when there newly arise actions that lead to the beginning of a new action. Now God is not moved, neither essentially nor accidentally, as we proved in the first book. (Ch. 13.) Therefore, God always acts in the same way. But created things are established in being by his action. Therefore, creatures always have been.

Again. The effect proceeds from the active cause by the latter’s action. But God’s action is eternal: else he would become an actual agent from being an agent in potency, and he would have to be reduced to act by some previous agent, which is impossible. Therefore, the things created by God have been from eternity.

Moreover. Given a sufficient cause, its effect must necessarily be granted. For if, given the cause, it were still unnecessary to grant its effect, it would be therefore possible that, given the cause, the effect would be or not be. Therefore, the sequence of the effect to its cause would only be possible, and what is possible requires something to reduce it to act. Hence it will be necessary to suppose some cause whereby it comes about that the effect is made actual: and thus the first cause was not sufficient. But God is the sufficient cause of creatures being produced, or else he would not be a cause. Rather he would be in potency to a cause, since he would become a cause by the addition of something, which is impossible. Therefore, it would seem necessary, since God is from eternity, that the creature was also from eternity.

Again. A voluntary agent does not delay to carry out his purpose of making a thing, except on account of something expected and not yet present. This latter is either sometimes in the agent himself, as where one awaits perfect capability to do something, or the removal of an obstacle to one’s capability; and sometimes it is outside the agent, as when one awaits the presence of a person in whose presence the action is to be done, or at least when one awaits the presence of a suitable time which has not yet arrived. For if the will be complete, the power immediately follows, unless there be a fault in it: thus at the command of the will, the movement of a limb follows at once, unless there be a fault in the motive power which carries out the movement.

Hence it is clear that when one wills to do a thing and it is not done at once, it must be either that this is owing to a fault in the power, of which fault one awaits the removal, or else the will to do it is not complete. And by the will being complete I mean that it wills to do this thing absolutely and from every point of view, whereas the will is incomplete when one does not will absolutely to do this thing, but on a certain condition that does not yet obtain, or when one does not will it except a present obstacle be removed. Now it is evident that whatever God now wills to be, he has willed from eternity to be, for a new movement of the will cannot accrue to him. Neither could any fault or obstacle affect his power: nor could anything else be awaited for the universal production of creatures, since nothing besides him is uncreated, as we have proved above. (Ch. 15.) Therefore, it is seemingly evident that he produced the creature from eternity.

Further. An intellectual agent does not choose one thing rather than another except on account of the eminence of one over the other. But where there is no difference there can be no preponderance. Hence where there is no difference, there is no choice of the one rather than of the other. And for this reason there will be no action of an agent equally indifferent to both of two alternatives, as neither is there of matter, for such a potency is like the potency of matter. Now, there can be no difference between non-being and non-being. Therefore, one non-being is not more eligible than another non-being. But besides the whole universe of creatures there is nothing but the eternity of God. And in nothingness it is impossible to assign any difference of moments, so that it be more fitting to make a certain thing in one moment than in another. Likewise, neither is it possible in eternity, the whole of which is uniform and simple, as we proved in the first book. (Bk. 1, ch. 15.) It follows, therefore, that God’s will is indifferent to produce creatures through the whole of eternity. Consequently, his will is either that the creature should never be produced in his eternity, or that it should always have been produced. But it is clear that his will is not that the creature should never be made in his eternity, since it is evident that creatures were formed by his will. Therefore, it remains that necessarily, as it seems, the creature has been always.

Again. Things directed to an end take their necessity from the end, especially in those that are done voluntarily. Hence it follows that as long as there is no change in the end, things directed to the end suffer no change or are produced invariably, unless there arise some new relation between them and the end. Now the end of creatures, which proceed from the divine will, is the divine goodness, which alone can be the end of the divine will. (Bk. 1, ch. 75.) Therefore, since the divine goodness is unchangeable both in itself and in relation to the divine will throughout all eternity, it would seem that creatures are brought into being by the divine will in the same way through the whole of eternity: for it cannot be said that any new relation to the end accrued to them, if it be supposed that they were utterly nonexistent before a particular time from which they are supposed to have begun their existence.

Further. Since the divine goodness is most perfect, when we say that all things came from God on account of his goodness, the sense is not that anything accrued to him from creatures, but that it belongs to goodness to communicate itself to others as far as possible, and it is by doing so that goodness makes itself known. Now since all things partake of God’s goodness insofar as they have being, the more lasting they are, the more they participate in the goodness of God. Hence the everlasting being of a species is called a divine being. (Aristotle, On the Soul, 2.4, 415a27–415b1.) But the divine goodness is infinite. Consequently, it belongs to it to communicate itself in an infinite manner, and not only at a particular time. Therefore, it would seem to belong to the divine goodness that some creatures should have existed from eternity.

Accordingly, these are the arguments taken from God’s side, which would seem to show that creatures have been always.