Chapter 41 — That the distinction of things is not on account of a contrariety of agents

From the above we may also prove that the cause of distinction among things is not a diversity or even a contrariety of agents.

For if the diverse agents who cause the diversity among things are ordered to one another, there must be some cause of this order, since many are not united together save by some one. And thus the principle of this order will be the first and sole cause of the distinction of things. If, on the other hand, these various agents are not ordered to one another, their convergence to the effect of producing the diversity of things will be accidental: therefore, the distinction of things will be by chance—the contrary of which has been proved above. (Ch. 39.)

Again. Ordered effects do not proceed from diverse causes having no order, except perhaps accidentally, for diverse things as such do not produce one. Now things mutually distinct are found to have a mutual order, and this is not by chance, since for the most part one is helped by another. Therefore, it is impossible that the distinction among things thus ordered be on account of a diversity of agents without order.

Moreover. Things that have a cause of their distinction cannot be the first cause of the distinction of things. Now, if we take several coordinate agents, they must have a cause of their distinction, because they have a cause of their being, since all beings are from one first being, as was shown above. (Ch. 15.) Now the cause of a thing’s being is the same as the cause of its distinction from others, as we have proved. (Ch. 40.) Therefore, diversity of agents cannot be the first cause of distinction among things.

Again. If the diversity of things comes of the diversity or contrariety of various agents, this would seem especially to apply, as many maintain, to the contrariety of good and evil, so that all good things proceed from a good principle, and evil things from an evil principle: for good and evil are in every genus. But there cannot be one first principle of all evil things. For, since those things that are through another are reduced to those that are of themselves, it would follow that the first active cause of evils is evil of itself. Now a thing is said to be such “of itself” if it is such by its essence. Therefore, its essence will not be good. But this is impossible. For everything that exists must of necessity be good insofar as it is a being, because everything loves its being and desires it to be preserved (a sign of which is that everything resists its own corruption, and good is what all desire). (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.1, 1094a1–2.) Therefore, distinction among things cannot proceed from two contrary principles, the one good, and the other evil.

Further. Every agent acts insofar as it is actual. But everything is perfect insofar as it is in act, and everything that is perfect, as such, is said to be good. Therefore, every agent, as such, is good. Therefore if a thing is essentially evil, it cannot be an agent. But if it is the first principle of evils, it must be essentially evil, as we have proved. Therefore, it is impossible that the distinction among things proceed from two principles, good and evil.

Moreover. If every being, as such, is good, it follows that evil, as such, is a non-being. Now, no efficient cause can be assigned to non-being, as such, since every agent acts insofar as it is an actual being, and every agent produces its like. Therefore, no essentially efficient cause can be assigned to evil, as such. Therefore, evils cannot be reduced to one first cause that is of itself the cause of all evils.

Further. That which results beside the intention of the agent, has no essential cause, but happens accidentally (for instance, when a man finds a treasure while digging to plant). Now evil cannot result in an effect except beside the intention of the agent, for every agent intends a good, since the good is what all desire. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.1, 1094a2.) Therefore, evil does not have an essential cause, but happens accidentally in the effects of causes. Therefore, we cannot assign one first principle to all evils.

Further. Contrary agents have contrary actions. Therefore, we must not assign contrary principles to things that result from one action. Now good and evil are produced by the same action: thus by the same action water is corrupted and air generated. Therefore, the difference of good and evil that we find in things is no reason for affirming contrary principles.

Moreover. That which altogether is not is neither good nor evil. Now that which is, insofar as it is, is good, as proved above. Therefore, a thing is evil insofar as it is a non-being. But this is a being with a privation. Therefore, evil as such is a being with a privation, and the evil itself is this very privation. Now privation has no essential efficient cause, since every agent acts inasmuch as it has a form; and thus the essential effect of an agent must be something having that form, because an agent produces its like, except accidentally. It follows, then, that evil has no essential efficient cause, but happens accidentally in the effects of causes which are essentially effective.

Consequently, there is not one essential principle of evil, but the first principle of all things is one first good, in whose effects evil is an accidental consequence.

Hence it is said: I am the Lord, and there is no other. I form light and create darkness, I make peace and create evil; I am the Lord, who do all these things (Isa 45:6–7). And: good things and bad, life and death, poverty and wealth, come from the Lord (Sir 11:14). And: *good is the opposite of evil *. . . so the sinner is the opposite of the godly. Look upon all the works of the Most High; they likewise are in pairs, one the opposite of the other (Sir 33:14–15).

God is said to make or create evils, insofar as he creates things that are good in themselves, and yet hurtful to others: for instance, the wolf, although in his species he is a good of nature, is nevertheless evil to the sheep; and likewise fire to water, inasmuch as it is corruptive of it. In like manner, he causes in men those evils called “punishments.” Hence it is said: does evil befall a city unless the Lord has done it? (Amos 3:6). In this sense Gregory says: even evils, which have no natural subsistence of their own, are created by the Lord. But he is said to ‘create’ evils when he employs creatures that are good in themselves to punish us who do evil. (Gregory the Great, Morals on the Book of Job 3.9.)

By this is excluded the error of those who asserted contrary first principles. This error began with Empedocles, for he held that there are two first active principles, love and strife, of which he asserted that love is the cause of generation, and strife the cause of corruption. Therefore, it would seem that he was the first to assert two contrary principles, good and evil, as Aristotle says in Metaphysics 1. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 1.4, 984b32–985a9.)

Pythagoras asserted two primaries, good and evil: not as active principles, however, but as formal. For he stated that these two are the genera under which all other things are comprised, as the Philosopher declares in Metaphysics 1. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 1.5.)

Now, though these errors of the earlier philosophers were refuted by those of later times, certain men of perverted sense have presumed to combine them with Christian doctrine. The first of these was Marchius (Marcion of Sinope.)—from whom the Marchians take their name—who, under the guise of a Christian, founded a heresy, holding the existence of two contrary principles. He was followed by the Cerdonians, afterwards by the Marchianists, and lastly by the Manicheans, who especially spread this error abroad.