Chapter 48 — That intellectual substances are of free will in acting

From this it is clear that the aforesaid substances are of free will (Liberum arbitrium, literally, free judgment.) in acting.

That they act by judgment is clear, since through their intellective knowledge they judge of things to be done. And they must have freedom if, as proved, (Ch. 47.) they have dominion over their action. Therefore, the aforesaid substances are of free will in acting.

Again. The free is that which is its own cause. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 1.2, 982b25–27.) Therefore, that which is not the cause of its own acting is not free in acting. Now whatever things are not moved, nor act except they be moved by others, are not a cause of their own acting. Therefore, self-movers alone have liberty in acting. These alone act by judgment, for the self-mover is divided into mover and moved, and the mover is the appetite moved by intellect, imagination, or sense, to which faculties judgment belongs. Of these, then, those alone judge freely which move themselves in judging. Now, no judging power moves itself to judge unless it reflects on its own action, for if it moves itself to judge it must know its own judgment: and this belongs to the intellect alone. Hence irrational animals have, in a sense, free movement or action, but not free judgment: but inanimate beings, which are moved only by others, do not have even free action or movement, while intellectual beings have freedom not only of action, but also of judgment, and this is to have free will.

Further. The apprehended form is a moving principle according as it is apprehended under the aspect of good or fittingness, because the external action in self-movers comes from the judgment by which it is judged that something is good or fitting through the aforesaid form. Accordingly, if he who judges moves himself to judge, he must move himself to judge by some higher apprehended form. And this form can be no other than the idea itself of good or fittingness, by which one judges of any determinate good or fitting thing. Therefore, those alone move themselves to judge who apprehend the common notion of goodness or fittingness. And these are intellectual beings alone. Therefore, intellectual beings alone move themselves not only to act, but also to judge. Therefore, they alone are free in judging, and this is to have free will.

Moreover. Movement and action do not follow from a universal concept save through the medium of a particular apprehension, for movement and action are about particular things. Now the intellect is naturally apprehensive of universals. Therefore, so that movement and action of any kind follow from the apprehension of the intellect, it is necessary for the universal concept of the intellect to be applied to particulars. But the universal contains many particulars potentially. Hence application of the intellectual concept may be made to many and diverse things. Consequently, the judgment of the intellect about matters of action is not determined to one thing only. Therefore, all intellectual beings have free will.

Further. Certain things lack liberty of judgment either because they have no judgment at all (like plants and stones), or because they have a judgment determined by nature to one thing, like irrational animals: for the sheep by its natural estimate judges the wolf to be harmful to it, and as a result of this judgment flies from the wolf; and the same applies to others. Whatever beings, therefore, have a judgment that is not determined to one thing by nature must have free will. Now such are all intellectual beings. For the intellect apprehends not only this or that good, but good itself in general. Therefore, since the intellect moves the will by the form apprehended, and since in all things mover and moved must be mutually proportionate, the will of an intellectual substance will not be determined by nature otherwise than to the good in general. Hence, it is possible for the will to be inclined to whatever be offered to it under the aspect of good, since there is no natural determination to the contrary to prevent it. Therefore, in all intellectual beings, the will’s act resulting from the judgments of the intellect is free, and this is to have free will, which is defined as the free judgment of reason.