Chapter 45 — What is in truth the first cause of the distinction of things

From what we have said it may be shown what is truly the first cause of the distinction of things.

Since every agent intends to induce its likeness into its effect, as far as the effect can admit of it, it does this the more perfectly according as it is more perfect itself: for it is clear that the hotter a thing is, the hotter it makes a thing, and the better the craftsman, the more perfectly he induces the form of his art into matter. Now God is the most perfect agent. Therefore, it belonged to God to induce his likeness into created things most perfectly, as far as is befitting to a created nature. But created things cannot come by a perfect likeness to God with respect to only one species of the creature, for, since the cause surpasses its effect, that which is simply and unitedly in the cause is found in the effect to have a composite and multiple nature—unless the effect reach to the species of the cause, which does not apply to the case in point, since the creature cannot be equal to God. Therefore, there was need for multiplicity and variety in things created, in order that we might find in them a perfect likeness to God according to their mode.

Moreover. Just as things made of matter are in the passive potency of matter, so things made by an agent must be in the active potency of the agent. Now the passive potency of matter would not be perfectly reduced to act if only one of those things to which matter is in potency were reduced to act. Therefore, if an agent, whose potency embraces several effects, were to make only one of them, its potency would not be so perfectly reduced to act as when it makes several. Now, the effect receives the likeness of the agent by the active potency being reduced to act. Therefore, there would not be a perfect likeness of God in the universe if all things were of one degree. For this reason, therefore, there is distinction in created things: in order that they may receive God’s likeness more perfectly by multiplicity than by unity.

Further. A thing approaches the more perfectly to God’s likeness, according as it is like him in more things. Now in God is goodness, and the outpouring of that goodness into other things. Therefore, the creature approaches more perfectly to God’s likeness if it is not only good, but can also act for the goodness of other things, than if it were merely good in itself, even as that which both shines and enlightens is more like the sun than that which only shines. Now a creature would be unable to act for the goodness of another creature unless in creatures there were plurality and inequality, because the agent is distinct from and more noble (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.5, 430a17–18.) than the patient. Therefore, it was necessary that there be also different species of things, and consequently different degrees in things.

Again. A plurality of goods is better than one finite good, since they contain this and more besides. Now all goodness of the creature is finite, for it fails of God’s infinite goodness. Therefore, the universe of creatures, if they are of many degrees, is more perfect than if things were of but one degree. But it becomes the highest good to make what is best. Therefore, it was becoming that it should make many degrees of creatures.

Further. The goodness of the species surpasses the good of the individual, even as the formal exceeds that which is material. Hence multitude of species adds more to the goodness of the universe than multitude of individuals in one species. Therefore, it concerns the perfection of the universe, that there be not only many individuals, but that there be also different species of things, and consequently different degrees in things.

Again. Whatever acts by intellect reproduces the species of its intellect in the thing made, for thus an agent by art produces his like. Now God made the creature as an agent by intellect and not by a necessity of his nature, as we proved above. (Ch. 23.) Therefore, the species of God’s intellect is reproduced in the creature made by him. But an intellect that understands many things is not sufficiently reproduced in one only. Since, then, the divine intellect understands many things, as was proved in the first book, (Bk. 1, ch. 49.) it reproduces itself more perfectly if it produces many creatures of all degrees than if it had produced one only.

Moreover. Supreme perfection should not be wanting to a work made by the supremely good workman. Now the good of order among diverse things is better than any one of those things that are ordered taken by itself: for it is formal in respect of each as the perfection of the whole in respect of the parts. Therefore, it was unbecoming that the good of order should be wanting to God’s work. Yet this good could not be if there were no diversity and inequality of creatures.

Accordingly, there is diversity and inequality in things created, not by chance, (Ch. 39.) not as a result of a diversity of matter, (Ch. 40.) not on account of certain causes, (Cc. 41–43.) or merits (Ch. 44.) intervening, but from God’s own intention, in that he willed to give the creature such perfection as it was possible for it to have.

Hence it is said: God saw everything that he had made, and behold, it was very good (Gen 1:31), after it had been said of each that they are good. For each one in its nature is good, but all together are very good, on account of the order of the universe, which is the ultimate and noblest perfection in things.

Intellectual creatures