Chapter 46 — That for the perfection of the universe it was necessary that there should be some intellectual creatures

Such being the cause of diversity among things, it remains for us to inquire into the diverse things as far as this concerns the truth of faith: for this was the third thing we proposed to do. (Ch. 5.) We shall show, first, that as a result of the divine ordinance allotting to creatures that perfection which is best in keeping with their mode, certain creatures were made intellectual so as to occupy the highest point in the universe.

For an effect is most perfect when it returns to its source: hence of all figures the circle, and of all movements the circular, are the most perfect, because in them a return is made to the beginning. Hence, in order that the universe of creatures may attain its ultimate perfection, creatures must return to their principle. Now each and every creature returns to its principle insofar as it bears a likeness to its principle, in keeping with its being and nature, in which it has a certain perfection, even as all effects are most perfect when they are most like their effective cause, as a house when it is most like art, and fire when it is most like its generator. Since, then, God’s intellect is the principle of the creature’s production, as we proved above, (Cc. 23–24.) it was necessary for the creature’s perfection that some creatures should be intelligent.

Moreover. Second perfection in things adds to first perfection. Now, as the being and nature of a thing is considered as pertaining to its first perfection, so is operation considered as belonging to its second perfection. Therefore, for the complete perfection of the universe, there should be some creatures which return to God not only in likeness of nature, but also by their operation. And this cannot be save by the act of the intellect and will, since not even God himself has any other operation towards himself than these. Therefore, it was necessary for the greatest perfection of the universe that there should be some intellectual creatures.

Further. In order that creatures might render perfectly a representation of the divine goodness, it was necessary, as above stated, (Ch. 45.) that things should not only be made good, but also that they should operate for the goodness of others. Now a thing is perfectly likened to another in its operation when the action is not only of the same species, but also the mode of acting is the same. Hence it was necessary for the highest perfection of things that there should be some creatures who act in the same way as God. But it has been proved above (Cc. 23–24.) that God acts by intellect and will. Therefore, it was necessary for some creatures to have intelligence and will.

Moreover. Likeness of the effect to its efficient cause is considered on the part of the effect’s form which preexists in the agent: for an agent produces its like as regards the form by which it acts. Now the form of the agent is received in the effect sometimes indeed according to the same mode of being as it has in the agent (thus the form of the fire generated has the same mode of being as the form of the generating fire), and sometimes according to another mode of being (thus the form of the house, which exists intelligibly in the craftsman’s mind, is received in the house that is outside the mind according to a material manner): and it is clear that the former likeness is more perfect than the latter. Now, the perfection of the universe of creatures consists in a likeness to God, just as the perfection of every effect consists in a likeness to its efficient cause. Therefore, the highest perfection of the universe requires not only the second likeness of the creature to God, but also the first, as far as possible. But the form by which God produces the creature is an intelligible form in him, since he is an agent by intellect, as proved above. (Cc. 23–24.) Therefore, the highest perfection of the universe requires that there should be some creatures in which the form of the divine intellect is reproduced according to an intelligible mode of being, and this means that there should be creatures of an intellectual nature.

Again. Nothing but his goodness moves God to the production of creatures, which goodness he wished to communicate to other things by way of likeness to himself, as shown above. (Bk. 1, ch. 74.) Now likeness to another is found in a thing in two ways: in one way, as regards natural being, as the likeness of fiery heat is in the thing heated by fire; in another way, as regards knowledge, as the likeness of fire is in sight or touch. In order, therefore, that the likeness of God might be in things in such ways as are possible, the divine goodness must be communicated by likeness not only in being but also in knowledge. But only an intellect is capable of knowing the divine goodness. Therefore, it was necessary that there should be intellectual creatures.

Further. In all things suitably ordered, the relation of second to last imitates the order of first to all both second and last, though sometimes defectively. Now it has been proved (Bk. 1, ch. 54.) that God comprises all creatures in himself. And this is reproduced in corporeal creatures, although in a different way: for the higher body is always found to comprise and contain the lower, yet according to quantitative extension. But God contains all creatures in a simple manner, and not by extension of quantity. Hence, so that creatures might not lack the imitation of God in this way, intellectual creatures were made that comprise and contain the lower not according to quantitative extension, but simply by way of intelligibility, since what is understood is in the intelligent subject, and is grasped by his intellectual operation.