Chapter 43 — That the distinction among things does not result from some secondary agent introducing various forms into matter

Certain modern heretics say that God created the matter of all visible things, but that this was diversified with various forms by an angel. The falseness of this opinion is evident.

For the heavenly bodies, in which no contrariety is to be found, cannot have been formed from any matter, since whatever is made from preexisting matter must be made from a contrary. Therefore, it is impossible that any angel should have formed the heavenly bodies from matter previously created by God.

Moreover. The heavenly bodies either have no matter in common with the lower bodies, or they only have prime matter in common with them. For the heaven neither is composed of elements, nor is of an elemental nature, which is proved by its movement, which differs from that of all the elements. And prime matter could not by itself precede all formed bodies, since it is nothing but pure potency, and all actual being is from some form. Therefore, it is impossible that an angel should have formed all visible bodies from matter previously created by God.

Again. Everything that is made, is made to be, since making is the way to being. To each thing caused, therefore, it is becoming to be made as it is becoming to be. Now being is not becoming to form alone, nor to matter alone, but to the composite: for matter is merely in potency, while form is that by which a thing is, since it is act. Hence it follows that the composite, properly speaking, is. Therefore, it belongs to it alone to be made, and not to matter without form. Therefore, there is not one agent that creates matter only, and another that induces the form.

Again. The first induction of forms into matter cannot be from an agent acting by movement only, for all movement towards a form is from a determinate form towards a determinate form, because matter cannot be without all form, and thus some form is presupposed in matter. But every agent intending a merely material form must be an agent by movement: For, since material forms are not subsistent of themselves, and their being is to be in matter, they cannot be brought into being except either by the production of the whole composite, or by the transmutation of matter to this or that form. Therefore, it is impossible that the first induction of forms into matter be from someone creating the form only, but it must be from him who is the Creator of the whole composite.

Further. Movement towards a form comes naturally after local movement: for it is the act of that which is more imperfect, as the Philosopher proves. (Aristotle, Physics 8.7, 261a1–23.) Now in the natural order, things that come afterwards are caused by those which come before. Hence movement towards a form is caused by local movement. But the first local movement is the movement of the heaven. Therefore, all movement towards a form takes place through the means of the heavenly movement. Hence those things that cannot be made through the means of the heavenly movement cannot be made by an agent which can only act by movement, and such must be the agent that cannot act except by inducing form into matter, as we have proved. (In the preceding argument.) Now many sensible forms cannot be produced by the heavenly movement except by means of certain presupposed determinate principles: thus certain animals are not made except from seed. Therefore, the original production of these forms, for producing which the heavenly movement is not sufficient without the preexistence of those forms in the species, must proceed from the Creator alone.

Again. Just as local movement of part and whole are the same, like that of the whole earth and of one clod, (Aristotle, Physics 3.5, 205a10–28.) so the change of generation is the same in the part and in the whole. Now the parts of those things that are subject to generation and corruption are generated by acquiring actual forms from forms in matter, and not from forms existing outside matter, since the generator must be like the thing generated, as the Philosopher proves in Metaphysics 7. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 7.8, 1033b29–1034a8.) Neither, therefore, can the total acquisition of forms by matter be effected by any separate substance, such as an angel, but this must be done either by means of a corporeal agent or by a creative agent which acts without movement.

Further. Even as being is first among effects, so does it correspond to the first cause as its proper effect. Now being is by form and not by matter. Therefore, the first causation of forms is to be ascribed especially to the first cause.

Moreover. Since every agent produces its like, the effect obtains its form from that to which it is likened by the form it acquired, even as the material house acquires its form from the art, which is the likeness of the house in the mind. Now all things are like God, who is pure act, inasmuch as they have forms by which they become actual, and inasmuch as they desire forms, they are said to desire the divine likeness. (See Aristotle, Physics 1.9, 192a13–24.) Therefore, it is absurd to say that the formation of things belongs to another than God the Creator of all.

Hence it is that in order to exclude this error, Moses, after saying that in the beginning God created the heavens and the earth (Gen 1:1), added how he distinguished all things by forming them in their respective species. Moreover, the Apostle says that in Christ all things were created, in heaven and on earth, visible and invisible (Col 1:16).