D. 27 - On the cause of marriage

After the Master has considered the institution of marriage and its signification, here he begins to examine its causes; and this is divided into two parts: the first, concerning the constituent causes of marriage; the second, concerning the causes ennobling it in Distinction 31 where he says: after these matters we must speak of the goods of marriage: what they are, and how they excuse coitus. (Sententiae IV, 31.1 (182). 1.)

The first part is divided into two: in the first, he determines the efficient cause of marriage; in the second, its final cause, around the end of Distinction 30, where it says: after expounding what the efficient cause of marriage is, it remains to show the cause for which marriage is, or ought to be, contracted. (Sent. IV, 30.3 (180). 1.)

The first is divided into two parts: in the first part, he determines the efficient cause of marriage; in the second, he establishes the impediment of that cause, at Distinction 29: it is necessary that conjugal consent be free of coercion. (Sent. IV, 29.1 (177). 1.)

The first part is divided into two parts: in the first he shows that consent makes marriage; in the second, he shows what sort of consent it must be, at Distinction 28: here it must be asked whether future consent, even with the addition of an oath, makes a marriage. (Sent. IV, 28.1 (173). 1.)

The first is divided in two: in the first, having set forth what intention is, he defines marriage, so that the cause may be seen in proportion to the effect; in the second, he shows what the cause of marriage is, where he says: the efficient cause of marriage is consent. (Sent. IV, 27.3 (165). 1.)

And this is divided into three: in the first, he proposes what he intends; in the second part, he proves what he had proposed, at: that consent makes a marriage is proved by the authorities below; (Sent. IV, 27.3 (165). 2.) in the third part he excludes errors, at: but some assert that no true marriage is contracted before the handing over [of the bride] and carnal joining. (Sent. IV, 27.5 (167). 1.) And this is divided into two parts: in the first part, the parts of their error are traced; in the second part, he excludes it, where he says: to these we respond as follows. (Sent. IV, 27.7–8 (169–170). 8.)

Concerning the first, he does three things: first, he sets forth the false opinion of those men; second, he sets forth their argument for it, where he says: they conclude that there is a great difference between a spouse and a marriage partner, etc.; (Sent. IV, 27.5 (167). 2.) third, he sets forth their answer to the argument adduced on behalf of the truth, where he says: they want the above authorities . . . to be understood [like this]. (Sent. IV, 27.7–8 (169–170). 7.)

To these we respond as follows. Here he responds to the argument those men set out; and concerning this he does three things: first, he establishes a certain distinction, by which the aforementioned texts are resolved; second, he proves that distinction through various texts from the saints, where he says: for at times they call spouses women who had an espousal in which their was a present conjugal pact; (Sent. IV, 27.9 (171). 1.) third, he demonstrates it by reasons, where he says: and it is to be known that the spouse regarding whom a promise of future effect was made is not a widow at her spouse’s death. (Sent. IV, 27.10 (172). 1.)

Here there are three questions. First, concerning matrimony. Second, concerning betrothals. Third, concerning bigamy.

Question 1

The cause of marriage

Three questions arise concerning the first:

first, what matrimony is;

• second, whether consent is the cause of matrimony;
• third, whether matrimony can be dissolved by entrance into religious life.
• Article 1

What matrimony is

Quaestiuncula 1

Obj. 1: To the first question, we proceed thus. It seems that marriage is not a kind of union. For the bond by which things are bound, differs from the union itself as a cause from its effect. But marriage is a kind of bond by which those joined in marriage are bound. Therefore, it is not a kind of union.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, every sacrament is a sensible sign. But no relation is a sensible accident. Therefore, marriage, since it is a sacrament, will not be in the genus of relation; and so it will also not be in the genus of union.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, a con-joining is an equal-sided relation, like equality. But the relation of equality is not one in number in both of two extremes, as Avicenna says. (Avicenna, Metaphysics, tr. 3, ch. 10 (83rb).) Therefore, neither is there one union; and thus if marriage is in the genus of union, there will not be only one marriage between two spouses.

On the contrary (1), a relation is that by which two things are referred to each other. But in marriage they are referred to each other in a certain way: for it is said, a man is husband to his wife, and a wife is the wife of her husband. Therefore, marriage is a kind of relation, nor is it anything other than a union.

Furthermore (2), the union of two into one only happens by a union. But this happens through marriage, as is evident from Genesis 2:24: they shall be two in one flesh. Therefore, marriage is a kind of union.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that matrimony is inappropriately named. For a thing should be named from what is more noble. But a father has greater dignity than a mother. Therefore, the union of the two should rather be named from the father than from the mother.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, a thing should be named from what belongs to its essence; since the account that the name signifies is the definition, as is said in Book 4 of the Metaphysics. (Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. IV, ch. 7 (1012a23).) But nuptials do not belong to the essence of marriage. Therefore, matrimony should not be called nuptials.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, a species cannot be given its proper name from something that belongs to the genus. But union is the genus of marriage. Therefore, it should not properly be called conjugal union.

On the contrary, this is the common way that people speak.

Quaestiuncula 3

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that it is unfittingly defined in the text. For in the definition of ‘husband’, it is necessary that marriage be included: for a husband is one who is joined to a wife in marriage. But he includes marital union in the definition of matrimony. And therefore it seems that these definitions are circular.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, just as a man is made the husband of his wife through marriage, so also a woman is made the wife of her husband. Therefore, it should not be called a ‘marital union’ rather than an ‘uxorial union’.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, custom belongs to the genus of mores. But frequently those joined in marriage are of completely different mores. Therefore, the following should not be included in the definition of marriage: retaining an undivided custom of life.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, other definitions given for marriage are found. For according to Hugh, marriage is the lawful consent to union of two suitable persons. (Pseudo-Hugh of St. Victor, Summa Sent., tr. 7, ch. 6 (PL 176:158).) But according to some people, marriage is a consortium of shared life, and a community of divine and human law. (See Digest., Bk. 23, tit. 2, leg. 1, ‘Nuptiae’; Raymond of Peñafort, Summa, Bk. 4, tit. 2, n. 1 (470a).) And it must be determined how these definitions differ.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

I answer that, union conveys a certain uniting together; and thus wherever there is a uniting of certain things together, there is some kind of union. Now, things that are ordered to some one thing are said to be united together in their ordering to it; as when many men are united for carrying out one military expedition or one business affair, by that fact they are called fellow soldiers or business partners. And so, since by marriage two people are ordered to one single generation and education of children, and also to one single domestic life, it is clear that in marriage there is a union, because of which a man and a woman are called ‘husband’ and ‘wife’; and such a union, by the fact that it is ordained to some one thing, is marriage. Moreover, the union of bodies or of souls follows upon marriage.

Reply Obj. 1: Marriage is the bond by which they are bound formally, not effectively; and thus it is not necessary that it be anything other than the union.

Reply Obj. 2: Although the relationship itself is not a sensible accident, nevertheless, its causes can be sensible; nor is it required in the sacrament that the reality-and-sacrament be sensible (for this is how the union is related to this sacrament), but the words expressing consent, which are the sacrament alone and the cause of this union, are sensible.

Reply Obj. 3: A relation is founded on something as its cause, as similarity is founded on quality, and in something as its subject, which would be the things themselves that are similar; and in these two aspects one can consider its unity and diversity. Now, in similarity quality is not the same in number in both things, but is the same in species; and the subjects of the similarity are two in number. It is the same way with equality. Thus both equality and similarity are in every way different in number in each of the two similar things or equal things. But the relation that is marriage has unity from one side of each its terms, namely on the side of the cause, because it is ordered to one and the same generation. But on the part of the subject, it has diversity of number. And consequently this relation is both one and multi-sided. The fact that it is multi-sided on the part of the subjects is signified in the names, ‘husband’ and ‘wife,’ while the fact that it is one is signified in the name ‘matrimony.’

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that in marriage there are three things to consider. First, its essence, which is a union; and with regard to this it is conjugal. Second, its cause, which is the marriage promise; and with regard to this it is called nuptials from nubere, to veil, for in the ceremony of the marriage promise, which brings about the marriage, the heads of those marrying are veiled. Third, the effect, which is children; and thus it is called matrimony, as Augustine says against Faustus, on account of this, that a woman should not marry for anything else, except so that she might be a mother. (Augustine, Contra Faustum, Bk. 19, ch. 26: “Matrimonium quippe ex hoc appellatum est, quod non ob aliud debeat femina nubere, quam ut mater fiat” (CSEL 25:529).) It can also be called matrimony, as though from matris munium, that is, the mother’s office: for the office of educating the children falls mostly to women. Or it is called matrimony, as if matrem muniens (fortifying the mother): for now she has what will defend and fortify her, namely, a husband. Or it is called matrimony, as if matrem monens (warning the mother), lest she leave her husband, to cleave to another. Or it is called matrimony, as if materia unius (matter of one), since it brings about a union for bringing forth one offspring materially, so that it may be called matrimony from monos and materia. Or it is called matrimony, as Isidore says, from matre and *nato (*mother and child), for by marriage, in a certain way, someone is made the mother of a child. (See Isidore, Etymologiarum (OCT, ed. Lindsay), Bk. 9, ch. 7, par. 13: “Matrona est quae iam nupsit, et dicta matrona, quasi mater nati, uel quia iam mater fieri potest, unde et matrimonium dictum.”)

Reply Obj. 1: Although the father is nobler than the mother, nevertheless, concerning children the mother is more dutiful than the father. Or since the woman was chiefly made for being a help for the man in the area of offspring, but the man was not made for the sake of this, for this reason ‘mother’ belongs more to the notion of matrimony than ‘father.’

Reply Obj. 2: Sometimes essentials are known by accidentals, and so some things can also be named from accidentals, since the name is given for the sake of knowing the thing.

Reply Obj. 3: Sometimes a species is named from what belongs to the genus, because of an imperfection of the species, namely when it has completely the account of the genus yet it does not add anything that belongs to its dignity, as when the accidental characteristic retains the name of the common characteristic. But sometimes this happens because of a perfection, when the account of the genus is completely found in one species, and not in others; as animal is denominated from anima (soul), which belongs to the animated body, which is the genus of animal; but being animate is not found perfectly in animated things that are not animals. And it is the same way in this argument: for the union of man and woman by matrimony is the greatest union since it is a union of souls and of bodies; and therefore it is named conjugium.

Response to Quaestiuncula 3

To the third question, it must be said that, as was said above, in marriage three things are to be considered: namely, its cause, its essence, and its effect. And accordingly we find three definitions given for matrimony. For the definition of Hugh touches on the cause, namely consent, and is self-evident. But the definition set forth in the text touches on the essence of marriage, namely, union, and it adds a determinate subject by saying: between eligible persons. It also establishes a specifying difference by saying marital: for since matrimony is a union that is ordered to one thing, such a union is specified by what it is ordered to; and this is what maritum (husband) refers to. It also sets out the power of this union, that it is indissoluble, in saying, retaining an indivisible custom of life.

But the other definition touches on the effect to which marriage is ordered, namely, common life in domestic matters. And since any community is ordered by some law, for this reason is included the regulating principle of this communion, which is divine and human law: for other communities, such as business associations and military bodies, were instituted by human law alone.

Reply Obj. 1: Sometimes prior things, from which a definition should be given, are not named; and therefore, in the definition of some things certain things are included which are posterior simply speaking, but which are prior with respect to us: as in the definition of quality the Philosopher includes quale (what kind), when he says: quality is that according to which we are said to be of a certain kind. (Aristotle, Categories, ch. 8 (8b25).) And so also here in the definition of matrimony marital union is included, so that the sense is that marriage is a union for those things that require the office of a husband, which could not be named by one name.

Reply Obj. 2: This difference touches upon the end of the union, as was said; and since, as the Apostle says, the man is not for the sake of the woman, but the woman for the sake of the man (1 Cor 11:9), therefore this difference should be taken rather from the man than from the woman.

Reply Obj. 3: Just as civil life does not convey the singular act of this person or of that person, but those things which pertain to civil community, so conjugal life is nothing other than the companionship belonging to that kind of community; and therefore, the custom of this life is always an indivisible one, however diverse may be the singular acts of each of the two.

Reply Obj. 4: The solution is evident from what has been said.

Article 2

Whether consent is the cause of matrimony

Quaestiuncula 1

Obj. 1: To the second question, we proceed thus. (Parallels: below, d. 29, a. 3, qa. 1, ad 1; De veritate, q. 28, a. 8, ad 7; Quodl. V, q. 8, a. 1.) It seems that consent is not the efficient cause of marriage. For sacraments are not from the human will, but from divine institution. But consent belongs to the will. Therefore, it is not the cause of marriage, just as it is not a cause of any other sacraments.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the same thing is not a cause of itself. But marriage seems to be nothing other than consent: for the consent itself signifies the union of Christ to the Church. Therefore, consent is not the cause of marriage.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the cause of one thing should be one. But matrimony is one thing between two people, as was said; however, the consents of two people are diverse, for they are from diverse persons, and also they are consents to diverse things: for on one side the consent is to the man, and on the other side the consent is to the woman. Therefore, mutual consent is not the cause of matrimony.

On the contrary (1), Chrysostom says in the text: it is not coitus, but free will that causes marriage. (Pseudo-Chrysostom, In Matthaeum opus imperfectum, hom. 32.)

Furthermore (2), one person does not receive power over what is freely another’s, except by his consent. But by marriage both spouses receive power over each other’s bodies, as is evident from 1 Corinthians 7, since beforehand each would have had free power over his own body. Therefore, consent causes marriage.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that it is not necessary that consent be expressed by words. (Parallel: De forma absolutionis, ch. 1.) For a person is handed over into the power of another by marriage, just as also happens by a religious vow. But a vow obligates with respect to God, even if it is not expressed in words. Therefore, consent also brings about the obligation of marriage even without the expression of words.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, there can be a marriage between people who are not able to express their consent to each other by words, if, for example, they are mute, or speak different languages. Therefore, the expression of consent by words is not required for marriage.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, if what is necessary to the sacrament is omitted for any reason whatsoever, there is no sacrament. But in some cases there is matrimony without the expression of words: as when a girl remains silent out of modesty, while her parents commit her to the man. Therefore, the expression of words is not necessary to marriage.

On the contrary (1), marriage is one of the sacraments. But in every sacrament some sensible sign is required. Therefore, also in marriage; and thus here it is necessary that there be at least words expressing consent sensibly.

Furthermore (2), in marriage a contract is made between a man and a woman. But in every contract there needs to be an expression of words, by which people oblige themselves to each other. Therefore, in marriage there must be consent expressed in words.

Quaestiuncula 3

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that consent expressed in words concerning the future brings about marriage. For just as the present relates to what is present, so is the future related to what lies in future. But consent expressed by words concerning the present effects marriage in the present. Therefore, consent expressed by words concerning the future effects marriage in the future.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, in marriage a certain obligation is brought about by the words expressing consent, just as in other civil contracts. But in other contracts it makes no difference whether the obligation is undertaken through words about the present or words about the future. Neither therefore does it make a different in marriage.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, by religious vows a person contracts a spiritual marriage with God. But a religious vow is made by words concerning the future, and it is binding. Therefore, in the same way marriage can be caused by words about the future.

On the contrary (1), a man who consents to one woman in words concerning the future, and afterward consents to another in words concerning the present, should, according to the laws, have the second one as his wife. But this would not be the case if consent by words about the future effected matrimony: for by the fact that there is a valid marriage with one person, it could not be contracted with another while she lived. Therefore, consent through words concerning the future does not bring about marriage.

Furthermore (2), whoever promises that he will contract something, does not yet do it. But whoever consents through words about the future promises that he will contract marriage. Therefore, he does not contract it with her as yet.

Quaestiuncula 4

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the expression of consent through words effects marriage even if interior consent is lacking. For no one should be acquitted of fraud and deception according to the laws. But someone who expresses in words consent that he does not have in his heart commits a deception. Therefore, it should not protect him, such that he is rendered free from the obligation of marriage.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, mental assent cannot be known to anyone except insofar as it is expressed by words. If, therefore, the expression of words does not suffice, but interior consent is required in both spouses, then neither could know if the other is truly his or her spouse, and thus they will be fornicators whenever they enjoy the rights of marriage.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, if someone is proved to have consented to someone else through words about the present, he is forced to have her as his wife, under pain of excommunication, even if he says that mental consent was lacking; even if he has afterward consented to another with words expressive of his mental consent. But this would not be the case, if mental consent were required for marriage. Therefore, it is not required.

On the contrary (1), Innocent III says in the Decretals: without consent, the other things are insufficient to effect the conjugal covenant. (Innocent III, Decretals, extra. de sponsal. et matrimonio, ch. 26: “Tua nos.”)

Furthermore (2), intention is required in all the sacraments. But someone who does not consent in his heart does not have the intention of contracting marriage. Therefore, no marriage happens.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

I answer that, in all sacraments there is some spiritual activity by means of a material activity that signifies it, just as by the bodily cleansing in baptism an interior spiritual cleansing happens. Therefore, since in marriage there is a certain spiritual union, inasmuch as marriage is a sacrament, and another material one according as it serves an office of nature and of civil life, it is fitting that a spiritual thing be done by divine power through the mediation of a material thing. And so, since the unions in material contracts happen by mutual consent, it is fitting that the matrimonial union also be done in this manner.

Reply Obj. 1: The first cause of the sacraments is divine power, which works our salvation in these things, but the secondary, instrumental causes are material actions having efficacy from divine institution; and this is how consent is the cause in matrimony.

Reply Obj. 2: Marriage is not the consent itself, but a union of two people ordered to one thing, as was said, which consent brings about. Nor does consent, properly speaking, signify the union of Christ to the Church, but his will, by which it happened that he was conjoined to the Church.

Reply Obj. 3: Just as marriage is one on the part of that in which the union happens, although it is multiple on the part of the ones united, so also consent is one thing in what is consented to, namely, that union, although it is multiple on the part of the ones consenting. Nor is it consent to the man directly, but to the union of the woman with the man, and likewise, for the man’s part, he consents to his union with the woman.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that, as is clear from what was already said, the matrimonial union comes about as do obligations in material contracts. And since material contracts cannot be made unless the contracting parties express their wills to each other with words, therefore, it is also necessary that the consent effecting matrimony be expressed in words, so that the expression of words is related to matrimony as the exterior washing is related to baptism.

Reply Obj. 1: In a vow there is no sacramental obligation, but only a spiritual one; and therefore it is not necessary that it be in the mode of material contracts for it to be binding, as it is with marriage.

Reply Obj. 2: Although such people cannot express their own vows to each other in words, they can nevertheless express them by nodding; and such nods are counted as words.

Reply Obj. 3: As Hugh of St. Victor says, those who are united must consent to each other in such a way that they receive each other of their own wills; (Hugh of St. Victor, Summa Sent., tr. 7, ch. 6 (PL 186:159).) which is judged to happen in the espousal if they do not speak against it. Therefore in this case the words of the parents are counted as if they were those of the girl, for they are a sufficient sign because they are hers from the fact that she does not contradict them.

Response to Quaestiuncula 3

To the third question, it should be said that sacramental causes cause by signifying, which is why they effect what they signify. And since when someone expresses his consent in terms of the future, it does not signify that he contracts marriage, but that he promises he will do it, such an expression of consent does not effect the marriage, but the pledging of it, which is called betrothal.

Reply Obj. 1: Consent is expressed in words about the present, and the words are present, and in the present consent is given for the same time. But when consent is made in words concerning the future, the words are present, but consent is given for the future; and therefore it is not for the same time, and because of this it is not the same thing.

Reply Obj. 2: Even in other contracts which use future words, one party does not transfer power over his property to the other if he says, I will give to you, but only when he uses words in the present tense.

Reply Obj. 3: In the vow of religious profession, an act of spiritual marriage is expressed in terms of the future, namely, obedience, or observance of the rule, and not the spiritual marriage itself. But if spiritual marriage is vowed in the future, it is not a spiritual vow, for someone is not yet a monk by this fact; but he pledges that he is going to be a monk.

Response to Quaestiuncula 4

To the fourth question, it should be said that external washing is related to baptism as the expression of words is related to this sacrament, as was said. Thus, just as when someone receives an external washing while not intending to receive a sacrament, but doing it as a game or trickery, he is not be baptized, in the same way the expression of words without interior consent does not effect matrimony.

Reply Obj. 1: There are two things here: first, the lack of consent, which one must justify to himself in the court of conscience in order for him not to be bound by the bond of matrimony, although not in the external forum of the Church, in which things are judged according as they are adduced; and second, the deceitful words; and this will stand up neither in the forum of penance nor in the forum of the Church, for in either place it is punished.

Reply Obj. 2: If mental consent is lacking in one party, marriage exists in neither party: for marriage consists in a mutual union, as was said. However, it can be probably believed that there is no deception unless signs of deception appear, since good is presumed of anyone, unless the contrary is proved; and this is why the party in whom there is no deception is excused from sin by ignorance.

Reply Obj. 3: In such a case the Church compels him to stay with his first wife, since it judges based on what appears externally. Nor is it deceived in justice, although it may be deceived in fact. But that man should undergo excommunication rather than be intimate with his first wife, or he should flee to some other distant region.

Article 3

Whether matrimony can be dissolved by entrance into religious life

Quaestiuncula 1

Obj. 1: To the third question, we proceed thus. It seems that one spouse, even after physical intimacy, can enter religious life against the will of the other spouse. For divine law should favor spiritual things more than human law does. But human law has permitted this. Therefore, much more should divine law have permitted it.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, a lesser good does not impede a greater good. But the state of matrimony is a lesser good than the state of religious life, as is clear from 1 Corinthians 7. Therefore, someone should not be impeded by marriage from entering religious life.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, in any religious life a certain spiritual marriage occurs. But it is permissible to pass from a more lax to a more strict religious community. Therefore, someone is also allowed to pass from the more lax marriage, which is the carnal one, to the stricter marriage, which is the marriage of religious life, even against the will of his wife.

On the contrary (1), 1 Corinthians 7 says: so neither should spouses abstain from marriage except by mutual consent to be free for prayer for a time.

Furthermore (2), no one can licitly infringe upon the rights of another against that person’s will. But for one spouse to take religious vows infringes upon the rights of the other: for one has power over the body of the other. Therefore, one cannot take religious vows without the other’s consent.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that one of the spouses cannot enter the religious life even before physical intimacy. (Parallels: In IV Sent. d. 39, a. 4, ad 2; Super I Cor. 7, lec. 5.) For the indissolubility of marriage belongs to the sacrament of marriage, inasmuch as it signifies the perpetual union of Christ to the Church. But there is a true sacrament of marriage after the words of consent are expressed in terms of the present but before physical intimacy. Therefore, a division cannot be made by one party entering religious life.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, in the consent itself, expressed in terms of the present, one spouse transfers power over his own body to the other spouse. Therefore, the debt can be exacted right away, and the other is bound to render it. And therefore one spouse cannot enter into religious life while the other is unwilling.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, what God has joined together, let no man put asunder (Matt 19:6). But the union which exists before physical intimacy was divinely made. Therefore, it cannot be separated by human will.

On the contrary, according to Jerome, the Lord called John from his wedding. (The Vives edition carries this note: “Not Jerome, but an unknown author of a Prologue on John falsely ascribed to Jerome.”)

Quaestiuncula 3

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that if a woman’s husband has entered religious life before physical intimacy took place, she cannot marry another. For anything that can remain alongside marriage does not dissolve the matrimonial bond. But the matrimonial bond remains between those who both vow to enter religious life. Therefore, by the fact that one enters religious life, the other is not absolved from the marital bond. But as long as the marital bond remains for one person, he may not marry anyone else. Therefore, etc.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, after entering religious life a man can return to the world before his profession. But then if a woman could marry another after her husband entered religious life, he could also marry another once he returned to the world; which is absurd.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, by the new decretals, a religious profession made before one year is considered null. (It is not clear what these new decretals are, but the Vives edition cites Bk. 6, tit. De regularibus, ch. “Non solum”; one may compare the citation at ST II-II, q. 189, a. 2, obj. 1, of a statute of Innocent IV, which may be found in Bremond, Bull. Ord. Praed., Innocentius IV, diplom. 74, anno 1244, die 17a Iunii (I, 144).) Therefore, if after such a profession someone should return to his wife, she is bound to receive him; therefore, neither by her husband’s entrance into religious life nor by his vow is the woman given power to marry another: otherwise one woman would have two husbands.

On the contrary, no one can oblige another to those things that belong to the life of perfection. But continence is one of the things that belong to the life of perfection. Therefore, a woman should not be constrained to continence by her husband’s entrance into religious life, and so she can marry.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

I answer that, no one can make an offering to God from what belongs to someone else. Therefore, since in a consummated marriage the body of the man has already become his wife’s, he cannot offer himself to God by a vow of continence without her consent.

Reply Obj. 1: Human law considered marriage only as it is an office, but divine law considers it according as it is a sacrament, by which it has absolute indissolubility; and therefore, they are not the same.

Reply Obj. 2: It is not inappropriate for a greater good to be impeded by a lesser good which is contrary to it, just as good is also impeded by evil.

Reply Obj. 3: In every religious community marriage is contracted with one person, namely, Christ, for whose sake someone is pledged to one religious community rather than another in many respects; but material marriage and religious life are not directed toward the same person; therefore, it is not the same.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that before physical intimacy there is only a spiritual bond between the spouses, but after it there is a physical bond between them as well. And therefore, just as after physical intimacy, marriage is dissolved by physical death, so also it is dissolved before physical intimacy by entrance into religious life: for the religious life is a certain spiritual death, by which someone, dying to the world, lives for God.

Reply Obj. 1: Before physical intimacy marriage signifies the union of Christ to the soul by grace; which indeed is dissolved by a contrary spiritual disposition, namely, sin. But by physical intimacy is signified his union with the Church by the assumption of human nature into the unity of his person, which is indivisible in every way.

Reply Obj. 2: Before physical intimacy one person’s body has not been transferred to the power of the other absolutely, but under the condition that in the interim the other spouse does not aspire to the fruits of a better life. But by physical intimacy the aforementioned transfer is completed, for then each person enters into bodily possession of the power handed over to each other. This is also why before sexual intercourse someone is not bound to render the debt immediately after the marriage is contracted in terms of the present, but the time of two months is given to them, for three reasons. First, so that in the meantime he might deliberate about entering religious life. Second, so that the necessary things may be prepared for solemnization of the wedding. Third, lest the husband should hold cheap a wife whom he did not have to pine in wait for.

Reply Obj. 3: The matrimonial union before physical intimacy is something imperfect as regards first being, as was said above, but not consummated as regards second act which is activity; and likewise for bodily possession; and thus it does not have indivisibility in every way.

Response to Quaestiuncula 3

To the third question, it must be said that just as the bodily death of a man dissolves the matrimonial bond so that the wife may marry whomever she wishes, according to the statement of the Apostle, so also after the spiritual death of the man by entry into religious life, she could marry whomever she wanted.

Reply Obj. 1: When both vow continence by equivalent vows, then neither renounces the conjugal bond, and thus it continues to endure afterward. But when only one makes the vow, then as far as in him lies he renounces the conjugal bond, and that is why the other is loosed from this bond.

Reply Obj. 2: Someone is not considered dead to the world by entrance into religious life until he has made his profession; and thus until that time his wife is bound to wait for him.

Reply Obj. 3: A profession made in this way, before the time determined by law, is judged as if it were a simple vow. Therefore, just as after a man’s simple vow, the woman is not bound to render the debt to him, but she does not have the power to marry another, so it is in this case.

Question 2

On betrothals

Next betrothals are investigated; and concerning this, three questions arise:

first, what betrothals are;

• second, who can contract a betrothal;
• third, whether betrothals can be dissolved.
• Article 1

What betrothals are

Obj. 1: To the first question, we proceed thus. It seems that betrothals are not fittingly called the promise of a future wedding, as we have from the words of Pope Nicholas. (See Decretals, pt. 2, cause 30, q. 5, ch. 3 (PL 187:1448).) For as Isidore says, someone is not a spouse because he promises, but because he pledges himself and gives sureties of his pledge. (The Latin wordplay is impossible to capture in English. See Isidore, Etymologiarum (OCT, ed. Lindsay), Bk. 9, ch. 7.) But after the betrothal, one is called a spouse. Therefore, it is misnamed a promise.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, whoever promises something should be compelled to keep his promise. But people who contract a betrothal are not compelled by the Church to contract a marriage. Therefore, a betrothal is not a promise.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, in a betrothal there is sometimes not only a promise, but an oath is added to it, and some earnest money. Therefore, it seems that it should not have been defined only as a promise.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, marriages should be free and absolute. But betrothals are sometimes done under the condition of also receiving money. Therefore, it is not fittingly called a promise to wed.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, a promise that regards future things is blameworthy according to James 4. But there should not be anything blameworthy about the sacraments. Therefore, nor should there be the promise of future nuptials.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, one is only called a spouse by a betrothal. But someone is called a spouse from present nuptials, as is said in the text. Therefore, betrothals are not always a promise of future nuptials.

I answer that, as was said above, consenting to conjugal intimacy in terms of the future does not make a marriage, but the promise of marriage, and this promise is called betrothal from pledging, as Isidore says. For before the use of written records, people used to give securities of marriage, by which they pledged to consent to each other under the laws of matrimony, and they also gave guarantees. Now, a promise like this can happen in two ways: absolutely or conditionally. Absolutely, in four ways. The first is by a mere promise, as when it is said, “I will receive you as my own,” and vice versa. In the second, a betrothal pledge is given, like money or something of that kind. The third is with a ring as pledge. In the fourth, an oath accompanies it.

But if it is a promise given conditionally, then we must make a distinction: for either it is an honorable condition, as when is said, “I will receive you, if your parents agree,” and then, when the condition is fulfilled, the promise stands, and if the condition is not fulfilled, then the promise does not stand. Or it is dishonorable, and this can be in two ways: either it is contrary to the goods of matrimony, as if I said, “I will receive you, if you will procure drugs of sterility,” and then the betrothal is not contracted; or it is not contrary to the goods of marriage, as if I said, “I will receive you, if you consent to my secret thievery.” And then the promise stands, but the condition should be removed.

Reply Obj. 1: The betrothal ceremony itself and the giving of sureties is confirmation of the promise. Thus it is named from this as from what is more perfect.

Reply Obj. 2: By such a promising, one person is obliged to contract marriage with another, and he sins mortally who does not keep his promise, unless a legitimate impediment intervenes; and because of this the Church even compels by imposing penance for the sin. However, a person is not compelled in a court of law: for forced marriages tend to end badly; unless perhaps an oath accompanied the promise, for then, certain people say, it must be compelled; although it would not seem so to others, because of the reason mentioned above, particularly if there is a danger of wife-murder.

Reply Obj. 3: Those things are only added for confirming the promise; and so, they are not anything other than the promise.

Reply Obj. 4: A condition that is attached does not remove the freedom of marriage: for if it is dishonorable, it should be rejected; but if it is honorable, either it concerns good things simply, as when someone says, “I will take you, if our parents agree,” and this condition does not remove the freedom of the betrothal, but increases its honorableness; or else it concerns matters of utility, as when one says, “I will contract with you, if you will give me so much money,” and then this is not considered as selling matrimonial consent, but it is understood as a promise of dowry; and from this the marriage does not lose its freedom. Sometimes, however, the condition of money is attached after the manner a penalty, and then, because marriages should be free, such a condition does not stand, nor can that penalty be exacted from someone who does not want to complete the marriage.

Reply Obj. 5: James does not intend to prohibit someone from making any kind of promise concerning the future, but that one should not promise as someone having assurance of his own life. This is why he teaches that the condition should be attached, if God wills; which should be understood in the heart, even if the words are not expressed.

Reply Obj. 6: In marriage one can consider the matrimonial union itself, and its act. From the pledging [sponsio] of the first in the future he is called a spouse [sponsus], from the betrothal contracted in terms of the future; and from the pledging of the second, someone is also called a spouse when marriage is contracted in terms of the present, for in so doing, he pledges the act of matrimony. However, from the first pledging it is properly called betrothal, which is a certain sacramental related to marriage, like the exorcisms in baptism.

Article 2

Who can contract a betrothal

Obj. 1: To the second question, we proceed thus. It seems that the age of seven years is not fittingly assigned for contracting betrothals. For a contract that can be made by others does not require discretion in the parties that it pertains to. But betrothals can be made by parents, without the knowledge of either of the betrothed. Therefore, betrothals can happen just as well before seven years as after.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the use of reason is required for someone to contract a betrothal, just as also for the act of consent in a mortal sin. But as Gregory tells in the Fourth Dialogue, a certain boy was destroyed by the devil because of the sin of blasphemy. (Gregory the Great, Dialogorum, Bk. 4, ch. 19 (SChr 265); the same passage in PL 77:349 is given as ch. 18.) Therefore, even before the age of seven years a betrothal may be contracted.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, betrothals are ordered to marriage. But in marriage the same age is not assigned for a girl as for a boy. Therefore, in betrothals the age of seven should not be assigned to both.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, people can contract betrothals from the time that they can find future nuptials pleasing. But signs of such affection frequently appear in boys before the age of seven years. Therefore, they can contract betrothals before then.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, if two people contract a betrothal before the age of seven, and then if after the age of seven but before the time of puberty they should contract in terms of the present, there is considered to be a betrothal between them. But this is not because of the second contract, for at that time they do not intend to contract a betrothal, but a marriage. Therefore, it is from the first contract; and consequently betrothals may be contracted before seven years of age.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, in those things which are done by many people together, what is lacking to one is supplied by another, as is seen in the case of those rowing a ship. But the contract of betrothal is an action shared between the contractants. Therefore, if one of them is a young man, he can contract a betrothal with a girl who is not seven years old: for what is lacking in age to one is made up for in the other.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, if two people on the verge of puberty, although before it, contract in terms of the present, there is considered to be a marriage between them. Therefore, by the same reasoning, if before the age of seven years, but close to it, they should contract in terms of the future, there will be considered to be a betrothal between them.

I answer that, seven years is the age determined reasonably enough by law for contracting a betrothal: for since the betrothal is a certain promise of future things, as was said, it is necessary that it be between those who in some way are able to promise such things; which is only those who have a certain prudence concerning future matters, which requires the use of reason, in regard to which three stages are noted according to the Philosopher in the Ethics 1. (This is not found in Book 1 of the Nichomachean Ethics. Perhaps Thomas had in mind hints from Bk. 1, ch. 3, Bk. 6, ch. 6, and Politics, Bk. 1, ch. 13.) The first is when someone neither understands by himself, nor can receive from another. The second stage is when a person can gain understanding from another, but by himself he is capable of understanding. The third is when a person can both receive from another and consider things for himself.

And since reason in human beings grows strong gradually as the movements and fluidity of humors are quieted, therefore, a person occupies the first state of reason before the age of seven years; and for this reason he is not qualified for any contract at that time, including a betrothal. But a person begins to arrive at the second stage at the end of seven years, which is why this is also the established time for a boy to go to school. But someone begins to arrive at the third stage at the end of the second seven years, as concerns those things which pertain to his person, regarding which his natural reason develops more quickly; but as concerns those things which are outside him, at the end of the third seven years. And therefore before the first seven years, a person is not qualified to make any contract. But at the end of the first seven years he begins to be capable of promising something in the future, especially about those things that reason naturally inclines to, but he is not capable of obliging himself with a perpetual bond, for at that point he does not have a firm will. And thus at such an age betrothals may be contracted. But at the end of the second seven years he can already oblige himself in those things which pertain to his own person, whether to the religious life or to conjugal life. But after the third seven years he can also oblige himself regarding other things, and according to the laws the power of disposing of his own things is established for him after twenty-five years of age.

Reply Obj. 1: If before the years of puberty a betrothal contract is arranged by other people, both parties or either one may denounce it, for nothing was enacted at that time, as seen by the fact that also no affinity is contracted by this. Therefore a betrothal that is contracted between two parties by other people has strength as long as the ones for whom it is contracted do not denounce it when they reach the due age; and by this they are understood to consent to what was done by others.

Reply Obj. 2: Certain people say that the boy St. Gregory speaks about was not damned, nor did he sin mortally, but that vision was shown to his father to make him sorry, for he had sinned in not correcting the boy in that sin. But this is expressly against the intention of Gregory’s saying that the father, who neglected the soul of his little son previously, did not preserve the little sinner from the fires of Gehenna. And thus it should be said that for mortal sin even present consent is enough; but in a betrothal the consent is to something future. Yet much greater discretion of reason is required to plan for the future than to consent to a single present action; and thus a man is able to sin mortally before he is able to oblige himself to something in the future.

Reply Obj. 3: At the time of a marriage contract, not only is a disposition required as regards the use of reason, but also on the part of the body, so that the time is suited to generation. And since a girl becomes capable of the act of generation at twelve years of age, but a boy at the end of the second seven years, as the Philosopher says in Book 9 of the History of Animals, (Aristotle, History of Animals, Bk. 5, ch. 14 (544b27).) while they receive the use of discretion at the same time, which is all that is required for a betrothal, this is why one age is determined for both of them in betrothals, but not in marriage.

Reply Obj. 4: That affection which is in boys younger than seven years of age does not proceed from the perfect use of reason, since they are not yet fully susceptible to learning, but it arises more from the movement of nature than from reason; and thus such an affection does not suffice for contracting betrothals.

Reply Obj. 5: Although in this case they do not enact a marriage by the second contract, nevertheless, they show that they have confirmed the prior promise; and therefore the prior contract acquires strength.

Reply Obj. 6: Those rowing a ship act in the mode of a single cause, and thus what one lacks can be supplied by another; but those contracting a betrothal act as distinct persons, for a betrothal can only exist between two people. This is why what is sufficient for contracting is required in both parties, and thus a lack in one person impedes the betrothal, and it cannot be supplied by the other person.

Reply Obj. 7: In a betrothal it is also the same: if the contractants are approaching the age of seven years, the betrothal contract has strength, for according to the Philosopher in Book 2 of the Physics, what only lacks a little seems to lack nothing. (Aristotle, Physics, Bk. 2, ch. 5 (197a30).) Now, some people determine this nearness to the required age to be a space of six months; but it is better that it be determined based on the condition of the ones contracting, for in certain children the use of reason is more advanced than in others.

Article 3

Whether betrothals can be dissolved

Obj. 1: To the third question, we proceed thus. It seems that a betrothal cannot be dissolved by one member entering religious life. For when I have promised money to someone, I cannot licitly contract a debt to someone else. But that person who contracts a betrothal promises his body to the woman. Therefore, he cannot further offer himself to God in the religious life.

Obj. 2: Again, it seems that neither should it be dissolved when one of the betrothed transfers himself to a distant region. For in doubtful matters, the safer part is to be chosen. But it would be safer if the other party waited for him. Therefore, she is bound to wait for him.

Obj. 3: Again, it seems that neither would the contract be dissolved by an illness which one person incurred after the betrothal contract. For no one should be punished for suffering. But a man who incurs infirmity, is punished by the fact that his right to have his fiancee is taken away. Therefore, because of bodily infirmity the betrothal contract should not be invalidated.

Obj. 4: Again, it seems that neither is a betrothal dissolved because of an affinity intervening, as, for example, if the bridegroom should sleep together fornicatiously with a family member of the bride: for according to this, the bride would be punished for the sin of the bridegroom, which is unfitting.

Obj. 5: Again, it seems that the two cannot release each other from this contract. For this shows a great inconstancy, that first they would contract, and afterward they would release each other. But such things should not be tolerated by the Church. Therefore, etc.

Obj. 6: Again, it seems that neither is a betrothal dissolved on account of one them fornicating. For one person does not yet receive power over the body of the other by a betrothal, and so it seems that they do not in any way sin against each other if they fornicate in the meantime; and thus a betrothal should not be invalidated by this.

Obj. 7: Again, it seems that neither is a betrothal dissolved by a contract with someone else in terms of the present. For a second sale does not repeal a first sale. Therefore, neither does a second contract repeal a first one.

Obj. 8: Again, it seems that neither can it be dissolved because of one of the parties is too young. For what does not exist cannot be dissolved. But before the determined age a betrothal contract would be null. Therefore, it cannot be invalidated.

I answer that, in all the cases mentioned above the betrothal contract is dissolved, but in different ways. For in two of these instances, namely when one person leaves for religious life, and when the one party contracts with another person in terms of the present, the betrothal is invalidated by the law itself. But in all other cases it must be invalidated through a judgment of the Church.

Reply Obj. 1: Since a promise like that is purely spiritual, it is dissolved by spiritual death, as was said.

Reply Obj. 2: That doubt is resolved by the fact that the other party did not appear in the time established for the completion of the marriage. And so if nothing was lacking for the marriage to be completed on one person’s part, he may marry another without any sin. However, if it was his fault that the marriage was not completed, he must do penance for the sin of a breach of promise (or of oath, if an oath was attached), and if he wishes to contract with another, he may contract only by the judgment of the Church.

Reply Obj. 3: If before the matrimonial contract one of the betrothed incurs some grave infirmity, which extremely debilitates him, such as epilepsy, or paralysis; or which deforms him, such as his nose being cut off, or his eyes put out, or something of this kind; or which is against the good of offspring, as leprosy, which tends to infect the children; then the betrothal can be dissolved, lest the two should displease each other, and the marriage contracted in this way should end badly. Nor is anyone punished for his suffering, but he does incur a loss by his suffering, which is not unusual.

Reply Obj. 4: If the bridegroom has known a relative of his bride, or vice versa, then the betrothal must be dissolved; and for proof, rumor alone is sufficient because of the scandal to be avoided. For causes that have their effects in the future, are impeded from producing their effects not only by what is, but also by what will be. And so, just as if an affinity had existed at the time of the betrothal contract, it would have impeded that contract; in the same way if it should come to be before the marriage, which is a certain effect of a betrothal, the prior contract is impeded from its effect. Nor does this deprive the other party of anything, but rather benefits her; for she is released from someone who has made himself odious to God by fornication.

Reply Obj. 5: Certain people do not accept this case, but against them stand the Decretals, which expressly say, in regard to those who contract an association of fidelity, and afterward remit the same to each other, it can be tolerated in patience, if those who have contracted a betrothal mutually release each other. (Innocent III, Decretals, extra. De sponsal. et matrimonio, ch. “Praeterea.”) But in response they say that the Church allows this to prevent a worse thing, rather than that this is de jure. But this does not seem to fit the example that the Decretals give. And thus it should be said that it is not always a sign of inconstancy to retract what previously was affirmed: for our plans are uncertain, as it says in the Book of Wisdom (9:14).

Reply Obj. 6: Although those contracting a betrothal have not yet given to each other the power over their respective bodies, nevertheless, by this act they become suspect of not keeping faith in the future. And thus one party can protect himself against the other by nullifying the betrothal.

Reply Obj. 7: That argument would hold if both contracts had the same nature, but the second contract of marriage is stronger than the first, and thus it dissolves it.

Reply Obj. 8: Although this was not a true betrothal, nevertheless there was a certain mode of betrothal here. And for this reason, so that it does not seem to be acceptable, upon arriving at legal age they should seek dissolution of the betrothal to be made by the judgment of the Church for the sake of a good example.

Question 3

Irregularity from second marriages

Next bigamy should be examined; and concerning this, three questions arise:

first, whether irregularity accompanies bigamy; (Bigamy here refers to a second marriage after the death of the first wife. For the discussion of multiple wives simultaneously, see D.33, Q. 1.)

• second, whether this is resolved by baptism;
• third, whether a dispensation can be given in such irregularity.
• Article 1

Whether irregularity accompanies bigamy

Quaestiuncula 1

Obj. 1: To the first question, we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST II-II, q. 108, a. 4, ad 2; In IV Sent. d. 42, q. 3, a. 2, ad 4; Super I Tim. 3, lec. 1; Super Tit. 1, lec. 2.) It seems that irregularity (Irregularity is not a matter of guilt or penalty, but refers to an imperfect signification in the sacrament.) is not attached to the bigamy that arises from someone having two wives successively. For multitude and unity are consequent on being. Therefore being and non-being do not add up to any multitude. But if a man has two wives successively, when one is in being, the other is not in being. Therefore, by this fact a man has not become the husband of more than one wife, which would prohibit him from the episcopate according to the Apostle. (See 1 Timothy 3:2.)

Obj. 2: Furthermore, a greater sign of incontinence appears in someone who fornicates with several women than someone who has several wives sucessively. But by the first a person is not made irregular. Therefore, neither by the second.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, if bigamy causes irregularity, either this is by reason of the sacrament or by reason of physical intimacy. But it is not for the first reason; for then if someone had contracted with one woman in terms of the present, and if she had died before physical intimacy took place, and he had taken another wife, it would seem irregular; which is against the decree of Innocent III. (Innocent III, extra. De bigamis, ch. “Nuper,” par. “Nos autem.”) Nor again is it for the second reason, since according to this even those who fornicated by sleeping with many women would be irregular, which is false. Therefore, in no way does bigamy cause irregularity.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that irregularity is not attached to the bigamy that happens when a man has two wives at the same time, or successively one wife de jure, and another de facto. (Sometimes called a “common-law marriage.”) For where there is no sacrament, there cannot be a defect of sacrament. But when someone contracts with a woman de facto and not de jure, there is no sacrament there: for such a union does not signify the union of Christ with the Church. Therefore, since irregularity does not follow upon bigamy except from some defect in the sacrament, it seems that irregularity does not follow upon such bigamy.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, someone approaching a woman with whom he contracts de facto, and not de jure, commits fornication if he does not have another woman as his legal wife; or else he commits adultery, if he does have another. But to distribute his own flesh among many women by fornication or adultery does not cause irregularity. Therefore, neither does this manner of bigamy.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, it happens that one person, before he has known another carnally with whom he contracted de jure, contracts with another de facto, not de jure, and knows her carnally, either when the first one has died or the first one is still living. Such a man has contracted with more than one woman, either de jure or de facto; and nevertheless he is not irregular, for his own flesh is not distributed among many women. Therefore, by this mode of bigamy, irregularity is not contracted.

Quaestiuncula 3

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that irregularity is not contracted by the fact that someone takes as his wife a woman who is not a virgin. For someone is impeded more by his own defect than by the defect of another. But if the man contracting is not a virgin, he does not become irregular. Therefore, much less if his wife is not a virgin.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, it can be that someone has deflowered a certain woman, and afterward takes her as a wife. Such a person does not seem to become irregular, for he does not distribute his flesh among many women, nor in fact does his wife; and nevertheless, he takes a corrupted woman for his wife. Therefore, such a mode of bigamy does not cause irregularity.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, no one can contract irregularity unless voluntarily. But sometimes someone involuntarily takes a wife who is not a virgin, as when he believes her to be a virgin, and afterward, when he knows her, finds that she has been corrupted. Therefore, such a mode does not always cause irregularity.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, corruption following marriage is more detestable than before marriage. But if a wife, after the marriage is consummated, is known by another, her husband is not made irregular; otherwise he would be punished for the sin of his wife. Also, it can happen that after he knows this, he might render to her the debt when she asks before she is condemned of adultery. Therefore, it seems that this kind of bigamy does not cause irregularity.

On the contrary, Gregory says: we command that you never make illicit ordinations, neither a bigamist, whether someone who has not chosen a virgin for his wife, or unknowingly has such a wife; nor someone having vitiated any part of his body, whether in penance, or liable to whatsoever grievous condition, should you allow to approach holy orders. (Gregory the Great, Registrum epistularum (CCSL 140), Bk. 2, epist. 31, or PL 77:575.)

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

I answer that, someone is constituted a minister of the sacraments by the sacrament of orders; and the one who should administer the sacraments to others should himself suffer no defect in the sacraments. But a it is a defect in the sacrament when the full signification is not found in a sacrament. But the sacrament of matrimony signifies the union of Christ with the Church, which is of one to one; and thus it is required for the perfect signification of the sacrament that the man be the husband of only one woman, and the wife be the wife of only one man. And therefore, bigamy, which destroys this, produces irregularity. And there are four kinds of bigamy. The first kind is when someone has more than one wife de jure in succession. The second, when someone has more than one wife at the same time, one de jure, and another de facto. The third, when he has more than one wife in succession, one de jure, and another de facto. The fourth, when someone takes a widow as his wife. And there is irregularity attached to all of these things.

However, another consequent reason is assigned, for in those who receive the sacrament of holy orders, the greatest spirituality should appear: both because they administer spiritual things, namely the sacraments; and they teach spiritual things and should be occupied with spiritual things. And so, since concupiscence, by which the whole man is turned into the flesh, is greatly opposed to spirituality, no sign should appear in them of permanent concupiscence, which does in fact appear in bigamists, who refused to limit themselves to one wife. Yet the first argument is better.

Reply Obj. 1: A multitude of several wives existing at the same time is a multitude simply speaking; thus such a multitude is completely opposed to the signification of the sacrament, and because of this it destroys the sacrament. But a multitude of wives in succession is a multitude only under a certain aspect, and thus it does not remove the signification of the sacrament completely, nor does it do away with the essence of the sacrament, but rather its perfection, which is required in those who dispense the sacraments.

Reply Obj. 2: Although there is a sign of greater concupiscence in fornicators, yet it is not such an enduring concupiscence; for in fornication one person does not oblige himself to another in perpetuity. And therefore, here there is no defect of sacrament.

Reply Obj. 3: Bigamy causes irregularity inasmuch as it takes away the perfect signification of matrimony, which consists in the union of souls that occurs through consent, and in the union of bodies. And so the bigamy that causes irregularity must arise from both together; which is the Decretals of Innocent abrogate what the Master says in the text, namely that consent in terms of the present suffices by itself for introducing irregularity.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that in the second two kinds of bigamy, irregularity is contracted: for although there is no sacrament in the other person, there is nevertheless a certain likeness to a sacrament. This is why those two kinds are secondary, and the first is principal in causing irregularity.

Reply Obj. 1: Although here there is no sacrament, there is nonetheless some likeness to a sacrament, which does not exist in fornication or an adulterous sleeping together; and therefore it is not the same.

And from this the answer to the second objection is clear.

Reply Obj. 3: In such a case someone is not considered a bigamist, for the first marriage did not have its perfect signification. Nevertheless, if by the judgment of the Church the man is compelled to return to the first woman, and to know her, he immediately becomes irregular: for irregularity is not caused by sin but by imperfection of signification does.

Response to Quaestiuncula 3

To the third question, it should be said that in the union of Christ and the Church, unity is found on the part of both; and therefore, whether distribution of flesh is found on the part of the man or on the part of the woman, there is a defect in the sacrament, but nevertheless in different ways: for on the part of the man it is required that he has not taken another as his wife, not that he be a virgin, but on the part of the wife it is required also that she be a virgin. The reason for this is assigned by the decretists thus: the bishop signifies the Church militant, whose care he bears, in which there are many corruptions; but the bride signifies Christ, who was a virgin. Thus, on the part of the bride virginity is required, but not on the part of the bridegroom, for someone to become a bishop. But this argument is expressly against the Apostle: husbands, love your wives, as Christ loved the Church (Eph 5:25), from which it is clear that the wife signifies the Church, and the bridegroom, Christ; and again, since the man is head of the woman, as Christ of the Church (Eph 5:23).

And therefore others say that by the bridegroom Christ is signified, and by the bride is signified the Church triumphant, in which there is no stain; but Christ first had the synagogue as concubine, and thus nothing is taken away from the perfection of the signification of the sacrament, if the bridegroom had a concubine beforehand. But this is extremely absurd: for just as there is one faith of ancient and modern men, so there is one Church; therefore those who served God in the time of the synagogue belong to the unity of the Church in which we serve God. And furthermore, this is expressly against what we have in Jeremiah 3, Ezekiel 16, and Hosea 2, where the espousal of the synagogue is expressly mentioned; therefore, she was not as a concubine, but as a wife. And furthermore, according to this, fornication would be a sacrament of that union, which is absurd; and thus before the gentiles were espoused by Christ into the faith of the Church, they were deflowered by the devil through idolatry.

And therefore it is otherwise to be said, that a defect in the sacrament itself causes irregularity; however, corruption of the flesh that takes place outside of marriage and precedes marriage, makes no defect in the sacrament on the part of that person in whom the corruption is, but it makes a defect on the part of the other; for the act of someone contracting marriage is not directed to himself but is directed to the other; and thus it is specified by its term, which is also in relation to that act, like the matter of the sacrament. And so if a woman were susceptive of holy orders, then as a man is made irregular by the fact that he takes a wife who has been corrupted, but not by the fact that he has been corrupted when he makes the contract, so a woman would be irregular if she contracted with a corrupted man; but not if she herself, having been corrupted, contracted, unless she had been corrupted in another marriage beforehand.

And from this the answer to the first objection is evident.

Reply Obj. 2: In such a case there are diverse opinions: yet it is probable that there is no irregularity, for he did not distribute his own flesh among several women.

Reply Obj. 3: Irregularity is not a punishment inflicted, but a certain defect of the sacrament, and thus it is not necessary that it always be voluntary bigamy that causes irregularity; and thus that man who takes a corrupted wife, whom he believe to be a virgin, is irregular when he knows her.

Reply Obj. 4: If a woman fornicates after having contracted marriage, the man is not made irregular by that fact, unless after her adulterous corruption he should know her again. For otherwise, the corruption of his wife in no way reflects upon the matrimonial act of the man. But even if he should be compelled to render the debt to her by right, or because of his own conscience, if she should ask for the debt before her condemnation as an adulterer, he is rendered irregular; although concerning this there may be various opinions. But what was said is most probable, for here we do not seek what would be a sin, but the signification only.

Article 2

Whether this is resolved by baptism

Obj. 1: To the second question, we proceed thus. (Parallels: Super I Tim. 3, lec. 1; Super Tit. 1, lec. 2.) It seems that bigamy is dissolved by baptism. For Jerome says in his commentary on the letter to Titus that if someone had more than one wife before baptism, or one before and one after, he is not a bigamist. (Jerome, Commentariorum in Epistolam ad Titum, ch. 1, v. 6 (PL 26:564).) Therefore, bigamy is dissolved by baptism.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, whatever does what is more, does what is less. But baptism takes away all sin, which is more serious than irregularity. Therefore, it takes away the irregularity of bigamy.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, baptism takes away all punishment arising from an act. But the irregularity of bigamy is of this kind. Therefore, etc.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, a bigamist is irregular inasmuch as he is lacking in his representation of Christ. But by baptism one is conformed fully to Christ. Therefore, that irregularity is dissolved.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, sacraments of the New Law are more efficacious than sacraments of the Old Law. But sacraments of the Old Law dissolved irregularities, as was said by the Master in Book I. Therefore, baptism, which is the most efficacious sacrament in the New Law, also resolves the irregularity contracted by bigamy.

On the contrary (1), Augustine says, they understand more acutely who forbade ordaining a man who either as a catechumen or pagan had a second wife, for it is a question of the sacrament, not of sin. (Augustine, On the Good of Marriage, ch. 18, par. 21 (CSEL 41:214).)

Furthermore (2), as it says in the same place, a woman, if she was ruined as a catechumen or pagan, cannot take the veil among the virgins of God after baptism. (Ibid.) Therefore, by the same reasoning, neither can a bigamist be ordained after baptism.

I answer that, baptism dissolves faults, not marriages. Therefore, since irregularity results from the marriage itself, it cannot be taken away by baptism, as Augustine says. (Ibid.)

Reply Obj. 1: In this case, the opinion of Jerome is not upheld; unless perhaps we wish to explain the text such that he speaks about a higher dispensation.

Reply Obj. 2: It is not necessary that whatever does a greater thing should do a lesser thing, unless it is ordered to it, and that is not the case here, for baptism is not ordered to taking away irregularity.

Reply Obj. 3: This is to be understood concerning the punishments which follow upon actual sin as inflicted, not as about to be inflicted; for someone does not recuperate his virginity by baptism, nor similarly does he regain the reservation of his body.

Reply Obj. 4: Baptism conforms one to Christ as concerns the power of the mind, not the state of the flesh, which is considered in virginity, or in distribution of the flesh.

Reply Obj. 5: Those irregularities were contracted by passing causes, not perpetual ones, and thus they could also be removed through those sacraments; and moreover, those sacraments were ordered to that end, but baptism is not.

Article 3

Whether a dispensation can be given in such irregularity

Obj. 1: To the third question, we proceed thus. It seems that one may not give a dispensation for bigamy. *(Parallel: Quodl. IV, q. 8, a. 2.)*Decretals, Extra., On Bigamy: with clergymen, who, as far as in them lies, have united themselves in marriage with second wives, just as with bigamists, it is not permitted to give a dispensation. (Innocent III, extra. De bigam., ch. “Nuper,” par. “Nos autem” (1, 21, 4).”)

Obj. 2: Furthermore, no dispensation can be given from divine law. But everything said in the canon belongs to divine law. Since, then, the Apostle says in the canonical Scriptures, it is necessary that a bishop have had only one wife (1 Tim 3:2), it seems that this cannot be dispensed.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, no one may give a dispensation from things which are necessary to the sacrament. But not to be irregular is necessary to the sacrament of holy orders, since signification, which is essential to the sacrament, would be lacking. Therefore, no dispensation can be given for this.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, what was reasonably done cannot be changed reasonably. But if a dispensation can be reasonably given to a bigamist, then irregularity was unreasonably attached to him, which is unfitting.

On the contrary (1), Pope Lucius gave a dispensation to the bishop of Palermo, who was a bigamist. (See Glossa ord. in Decr., 1, 30, 18.)

Furthermore (2), Pope Martin says: if the lector would accept a widow for his wife, he may remain in the lectorate; or if it were necessary, he could be made a subdeacon; but nothing higher: likewise, if he had been a bigamist. (Gratian, Decretals, pt. 1, d. 34, ch. 18 (PL 187:194).) Therefore, at least up to the subdiaconate a dispensation may be given for it.

I answer that, irregularity is not attached to bigamy by natural law, but by positive law; nor again is it something essential to holy orders that a man not be bigamous, as is evident from the fact that if someone bigamous advances to holy orders, he receives a character; and therefore the Pope can dispense completely from such irregularity, but a bishop only as to the minor orders. And certain people say that a dispensation can be given even as to the higher orders among those who wish to serve God in the religious life, in order to avoid the dispersal of religious.

Reply Obj. 1: By that decretal, the difficulty is shown to be the same in granting a dispensation to those men who have contracted de facto with many women, as if they had contracted de jure; not that the power of the Pope is lessened in such cases simply speaking.

Reply Obj. 2: This is true as regards those things which are of natural law, and as regards those things which are necessary to the sacraments and to the faith; but in other things which are by the institution of the apostles, since the Church has now the same power of establishing and abolishing that it had then, a dispensation can be given by the one who holds supremacy in the Church.

Reply Obj. 3: Not every signification is of the essence of the sacrament, but only that which belongs to the effect of the sacrament; and this is not removed by irregularity.

Reply Obj. 4: In particular things a reason cannot be found that applies equally to all, because of their diversity; and thus what has been universally established by reasonably considering those things which happen in most cases, can also be reasonably removed by a dispensation in a certain determinate case.

Exposition of the Text

But if they express in words what they do not will in their hearts, then, if there is no coercion or fraud, that obligation of words . . . makes a marriage. (Sententiae IV, 27.3 (165). 1.) And here the Master is speaking about the external forum of the Church, in which it is judged according as things appear; and deception hidden in the heart is not admitted, unless it is somehow expressed through external signs, like someone calling himself by some other name. But as to the forum of conscience, what the Master says here is not true.

“Chose for himself the solitude of the hermitage.” (Sent. IV, 27.6 (168).12, Theophilus, etc., Vita s. Macarii, c18.) Although hermits do not promise any obedience, nevertheless, they do have a vow of continence added, and according to custom their vow is solemnized after a determined time.

Even if he has already been tonsured. (Sent. IV, 27.7–8 (169–170). 2.) But he is not bound to defer the tonsure and the religious habit; for either his profession was not valid, if he took his vow against his wife’s objection; or else he took his vow of profession and she did not contradict and yet remained in the world; and although it was a valid vow, it is still suspended for a time while his wife lives since it was to her disadvantage. This is why after his wife’s death he is bound to return to religious life, nor can he marry another. But meanwhile he is not bound to defer the habit or the tonsure, whether because of the censure of his wife, or for the sake of avoiding scandal.

One who joined carnally with her, would no longer be able to proceed to sacred orders. (Sent. IV, 27.10 (172). 4.) The Master and Pelagius are speaking according to the strict interpretation of law, and thus today according to the new laws this is not held; for there is no obstacle on the part of the sacrament, as was said before.