D. 36 - The impediment of slavery

After the Master has considered impotence to have intercourse, which de facto impedes the marital act from taking place at all, here he addresses the impediment of servile condition, which impedes the marital act from taking place freely; and this is divided into two parts: in the first he considers the servile condition, in the second he gives an epilogue, continuing from what he has said before to its consequences, at: we have set out two of those things by which . . . marriage can be dissolved, etc. (Sententiae IV, 36.4 (211). 3.)

The first part is divided into two parts: in the first, he considers the impediment of servile condition, in the second, the impediment of insufficient age, since such a person is no different from a slave, as long as he is under his guardians (Galatians 4), at: it is also to be known that, according to the laws, boys cannot enter into marriage before the age of fourteen years, and girls before twelve. (Sent. IV, 36.4 (211). 1.)

The first is divided into two: first, he considers when servitude precedes the marriage; second, he addresses slavery occurring after a marriage exists, at: it is also to be noted, etc. (Sent. IV, 36.3 (210). 1.)

The first is divided into two parts: first, he considers the pre-existing slavery that exists only on the part of one of those contracting marriage; second, that servitude which is pre-existing in both parties, at: it is also asked if one man’s serf should take another man’s serving-girl, whether there is a marriage between them. (Sent. IV, 36.2 (209). 1.)

Question 1

The impediment of slavery

Here five questions arise:

first, whether the condition of slavery impedes marriage;

• second, whether a slave can contract marriage without the consent of his master;
• third, concerning servitude that is introduced during the marriage;
• fourth, whether the children follow the condition of their mother;
• fifth, whether a defect of age impedes marriage.
• Article 1

Whether the condition of slavery impedes marriage

Obj. 1: To the first question, we proceed thus. (Parallel: above, d. 34, a. 2, ad 4.) It seems that the condition of servitude does not impede marriage. For nothing impedes marriage except what is somehow contrary to it. But slavery has nothing in it contrary to marriage; otherwise, there could not be marriages between slaves. Therefore, slavery does not impede marriage.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, what is against nature cannot impede something that is according to nature. But slavery is against nature; for as Gregory says, it is against nature for a man to want to dominate another man, (Gregory the Great, Regula pastoralis, Bk. 2, ch. 6, passim; cf. Moralia in Iob, Bk. 21, ch. 15.) which is also evident from what is said to man in Genesis 1:26: let him be master of the fish of the sea, etc., but not that he should be master of a man. Therefore, it cannot impede marriage, which is natural.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, if marriage is impeded, either this occurs by natural law or by positive law. But this does not occur by natural law, for according to natural law, all men are equal, as Gregory states in the place quoted above; and in the beginning of the Digests it is stated that slavery is not of natural law; (See Digests, Bk. 1, tit. 1, leg. 4, ‘Manumissiones’.) and positive law derives from natural law, as Cicero says. (Rhetoric, Bk. 2, ch. 53.) Therefore, according to no law can slavery impede marriage.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, what impedes marriage impedes it equally whether it be known or unknown, as is clear in the case of consanguinity. But the slavery of one person, when it is known by the other, does not impede marriage. (See Gratian, Decretals, pt. 2, cause 29, q. 2, can. 2; can. 3.) Therefore, slavery in itself poses no impediment to marriage. So it should not be counted as an impediment to marriage per se and distinct from all the others.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, just as it happens that there is error about the condition of servitude, so that someone may be believed a free man who is really a slave; so also there can be error about freedom, so that someone is believed to be a slave who is in fact free. But freedom is not considered an impediment to matrimony. Therefore, slavery should not be considered one either.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, the disease of leprosy encumbers the partnership of marriage and impedes the good of offspring more than slavery does. But leprosy is not counted among the impediments to matrimony. (See Gregory IX, Decretals, Bk. 4, tit. 8, ch. 1, ‘Pervenit’; ch. 2, ‘Quoniam.’) Therefore, neither should slavery be.

On the contrary (1), the Decretals say about the marriage of slaves that an error about their condition impedes marriage from being contracted, and voids the contract. (Gregory IX, Decretals, Bk. 4, tit. 9, ch. 2, ‘Proposuit’; ch. 4, ‘Ad nostram.’)

Furthermore (2), marriage concerns goods desirable in themselves, inasmuch as it has dignity. But slavery is to be shunned in itself. Therefore, marriage and slavery are contraries, and thus slavery impedes marriage.

I answer that, in the marriage contract one spouse is obligated to another in the rendering of the debt; and therefore, if the one who obliges himself is unable to acquit himself, the ignorance of this inability in the person to whom the obligation is made destroys the contract. However, just as by impotence in intercourse someone becomes unable to pay the debt, so that it cannot be paid in any way, likewise in slavery he becomes unable to render the debt freely; and therefore just as unknown impotence in intercourse impedes marriage, but not if it is known, so also the unknown condition of slavery impedes marriage, but not if the servitude is known. (See Gregory IX, Decretals, Bk. 4, tit. 9, ch. 4, ‘Ad nostram.’)

Reply Obj. 1: Slavery is contrary to marriage as concerns its act, for which someone is obliged to another in marriage, since this act cannot be accomplished freely; and also as concerns the good of offspring, who are given a worse condition by the slavery of their parents. But since anyone is able of his own accord to submit to some loss in what is due to him, if one spouse knows the other’s condition of slavery, the marriage would hold nevertheless. In the same way, since in marriage there is an equal obligation on both parties for the rendering of the debt, someone cannot require a greater obligation on the part of another than he can fulfill himself; and because of this, the marriage is not impeded if a slave should contract with a slave-girl whom he believes to be free. Thus it is clear that slavery does not impede marriage unless it is without the knowledge of one of the spouses, even if it be that party who is of a free condition; (Ibid.) and therefore, nothing prohibits marriage between slaves, or between a free man and a slave-girl.

Reply Obj. 2: Nothing prevents something from being against nature as concerns nature’s primary intention, but not against nature as concerns its secondary intention. For example, all corruption and defect and decay is against nature, as is stated in Book 2 of On the Heavens, (Aristotle, On the Heavens, Bk. 2, ch. 6 (288b15).) for nature intends being and perfection; but it is not against the second intention of nature, for by the fact that nature cannot preserve being in one, it preserves it in another, which is generated by the corruption of the first; and when nature cannot bring something to a greater perfection, it leads it to a lesser one; as when it cannot make a male, it makes a female, which is a defective male, as it says in Book 2 of On the Generation of Animals. (Aristotle, On the Generation of Animals, Bk. 2, ch. 3 (737a27).) Likewise also, I say that slavery is against the first intention of nature, but not against the second; for natural reason inclines to this, and nature seeks this, namely that any given thing be good; but from the fact that someone sins, it is also nature’s inclination that he incur punishment for his sin; and thus slavery was introduced as a punishment for sin. Nor is it unfitting for something natural to be impeded by something that is unnatural in this way; for in the same way marriage is impeded by impotence in intercourse, which is against nature in the way stated.

Reply Obj. 3: Natural law dictates that punishment be inflicted for fault, and that nothing without fault should be punished. But to determine the punishment according to the condition of the person and the fault is for positive law; and therefore, slavery, which is a certain determinate penalty, belongs to positive law, and proceeds from natural law as the determined from the undetermined; and with the same positive law determining, it has happened that unknown slavery may impede marriage, (See Gregory IX, Decretals, Bk. 4, tit. 9, ch. 4, ‘Ad nostram.’) lest someone without fault be penalized: for it is a certain penalty for a wife that her husband be a slave, and vice versa.

Reply Obj. 4: There are some impediments which make marriage illicit. And since our wills do not make something to be illicit or licit, but rather the law, to which our wills should be subject, therefore ignorance of such an impediment, even though it removes willing or knowledge, does nothing for the validity of the marriage. And such an impediment is affinity, or a vow, or others like these. However, there are some impediments which make marriage incapable of rendering what is owed; and since it is within the power of our wills to release a debt that is owed to us, therefore, this kind of impediment, if it be known, does not take away matrimony, but only when ignorance makes willingness impossible. And slavery is an impediment of this kind, as is impotence in intercourse. And since they also have in themselves a certain character of impediment, they are counted as specific impediments beyond the impediment of error. But a change in the person is not considered a specific impediment beyond error, for the substitution of another person does not have the character of impediment, except from the intention of the one contracting marriage.

Reply Obj. 5: Liberty does not impede the marital act; and so an unknown free condition does not impede marriage.

Reply Obj. 6: Leprosy does not impede marriage as concerns its first act, by the fact that lepers can freely render the marital debt, although they impose certain difficulties on the marriage as concerns its second effects; and therefore, it does not impede matrimony in the same way that slavery does.

Article 2

Whether a slave can contract marriage without the consent of his master

Obj. 1: To the second question, we proceed thus. (Parallel: ST II-II, q. 104, a. 5.) It seems that a slave cannot contract marriage without the consent of his master. For no one can give to someone else what belongs to another, without his consent. But a slave is the belonging of his master. Therefore, he cannot give the power over his own body to his wife by contracting marriage without the consent of his master.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, a slave is bound to obey his master. But his master can command him not to consent in marriage. Therefore, without his consent he cannot contract marriage.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, after having contracted marriage, a slave is bound to render the debt to his wife by command of divine law. (See 1 Corinthians 7:3.) But at the same time that the wife requests it, the master could impose some other service upon the slave, which he could not do if he wished to be free for physical intimacy. Therefore, if without the consent of his master a slave could contract marriage, the master would be deprived of the service owed him through no fault of his; which should not happen.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, a master can sell his slave into foreign lands, where the wife could not follow him either because of physical weakness, or because of imminent danger to her faith, if he were sold to infidels, or even because her master did not permit it, if she were a slave; and thus the marriage would be dissolved, which is unfitting. Therefore, a slave cannot contract marriage without the consent of his master.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, an obligation in which a man binds himself to divine service is preferable to that in which a man subjects himself to his wife. But a slave cannot enter religious life (See Gratian, Decretals, pt. 1, dist. 54, can. 20.) or be promoted to the priesthood (See Gregory IX, Decretals, Bk. 1, tit. 18, ch. 2, ‘De servorum ordinatione.’) without the consent of his master. Therefore, much less can he be joined in marriage without his consent.

On the contrary (1), Galatians 3:28 says: in Christ Jesus there is neither slave nor free. Therefore, in the faith of Christ Jesus the same freedom for contracting marriage belongs to slaves and free men.

Furthermore (2), slavery comes from positive law. (See Digests, Bk. 1, tit. 5, leg. 4, ‘Libertas’; Bk. 50, tit. 17, leg. 32, ‘Quod attinet.’) But marriage comes from divine and natural law. Since, therefore, positive law does not prejudice natural or divine law, it seems that a slave can contract marriage without the consent of his master.

I answer that, since positive law, as was said, proceeds from natural law, for this reason slavery, which comes from positive law, cannot prejudice those things which are of natural law. Yet as the natural appetite is ordered to the conservation of the individual, so it is ordered to the conservation of the species through generation. Therefore, as a slave is not subjected to his master without being free to eat and to sleep, and other things of this kind which belong to the necessity of the body without which nature cannot be preserved, so also he is not subject to him such that he cannot freely contract marriage, even if his master does not know or forbids it.

Reply Obj. 1: A slave is his master’s belonging as regards those things which are superadded to nature; but as to natural things they are equals. For this reason, in those things that pertain to natural acts, a slave can furnish to another the power over his own body in marriage, against the will of his master.

Reply Obj. 2: A slave is bound to obey his master in those things that the master can licitly command. But just as the master cannot licitly command his servant not to eat or sleep, neither can he command that the slave abstain from contracting marriage. For how someone uses what is his own does not concern the legislator; therefore, if the master commands his slave not to contract marriage, the slave is not bound to obey.

Reply Obj. 3: If a slave contracts marriage with his master’s permission, then he should leave undone the service that his master commands, and render the debt to his wife: for by the fact that the master allowed the slave to contract matrimony, it is understood that he conceded all the things that marriage requires. But if the marriage was contracted without the master’s knowledge or permission, the slave is not bound to render the debt but rather to obey his master, if both cannot be done at the same time. (See Raymond of Peñafort, Summa, Bk. 4, tit. 4 (483b).) But nevertheless, in these things many particulars should be considered, as in all human acts; for example, the imminent danger to the chastity of the wife, and the impediment that it will generate to the service commanded if he renders the debt, and other things like this. By thinking through these things properly, it could be decided whom the slave would be bound to obey, his master or his wife.

Reply Obj. 4: In such cases it says that the master should be compelled not to sell his slave such that he places too heavy a burden on the marriage, especially when he does not lack the possibility of selling his slave at a just price somewhere else.

Reply Obj. 5: Through religious life and holy orders someone is obliged to undertake divine service all the time; but a man is not bound to render the debt to his wife at all times, but at suitable times; and therefore it is not the same. Furthermore, someone who enters religious life and receives holy orders obliges himself to works that exceed those natural things to which a master’s power extends. But this is not the case in those natural things to which one obliges himself in marriage; for which reason one could vow continence without the consent of one’s master.

Article 3

Whether servitude can be introduced during the marriage

Obj. 1: To the third question, we proceed thus. It seems that slavery cannot be introduced into a marriage, as when the husband sells himself to another as a slave, since what is done as a fraud and in prejudice of another’s rights should not be enforceable. But someone who sells himself as a slave does this sometimes to cheat marriage, and at least to the detriment of his wife. Therefore, such a sale should not be able to bind someone in slavery.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, two favorable things outweigh one thing that is not favorable. But marriage and freedom enjoy the favor of the law, (See Gregory IX, Decretals, Bk. 2, tit. 27, ch. 26, ‘Duobus iudicibus’; cf. Digests, Bk. 50, tit. 17, leg. 122, ‘Libertas.’) and are contrary to servitude, which is not favored by the law. Therefore, slavery of this kind should be altogether cancelled.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, in marriage the husband and the wife are judged equals, (See Gratian, Decretals, pt. 2, cause 32, q. 5, can. 20; q. 1, can. 4, with the Glossa ordin. in Decretum on this canon (II, 1490a).) as was stated above in Distinction 31. But the wife cannot give herself as a slave against the will of the husband. Therefore, neither can the husband against the will of his wife.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, in nature, what impedes the generation of a thing destroys also the thing generated. But man’s slavery, without the knowledge of his wife, impedes the marriage contract made beforehand. (See Gregory IX, Decretals, Bk. 4, tit. 9, ch. 4, ‘Ad nostram.’) Therefore, if it could be introduced into the marriage, it would destroy the marriage, which is unfitting.

On the contrary (1), anyone can give to another what is his own. But a man is sui juris, when he is free. Therefore, he can give to another the right to himself.

Furthermore (2), a slave can take a wife against the will of his master, as was stated. Therefore, by the same rationale, a man may subject himself to a master against the will of his wife.

I answer that, a man is subject to his wife only in those things which pertain to the act of nature, in which they are equals, to which the subjection of slavery does not extend. And for this reason, a man can give himself as a slave even against the will of his wife: and yet the marriage will not be dissolved by this, for no impediment superimposed upon an existing marriage can dissolve it, as was stated above, Distinction 34, Question 1, Article 1, reply to objection 6.

Reply Obj. 1: Fraud can easily injure the one who commits it, but it cannot generate prejudice of another’s rights; and therefore, if a man defrauds his wife by giving himself as a slave, he himself will reap the blame, losing the inestimable good of freedom. But by this he can do nothing to prejudice the rights of his wife, since he is bound to render the debt to her when she asks, and to all those things which marriage requires: for his master’s command cannot withdraw him from these things.

Reply Obj. 2: To the degree that slavery is contrary to matrimony, matrimony takes precedence over servitude: for then the slave is bound to render the debt to his wife, even against the will of his master.

Reply Obj. 3: Although in the marital act and those things that have to do with nature, the husband and wife are judged equals, the condition of slavery does not extend to this. Nonetheless, as regards the management of the home, and other things like this added on to the marriage, the man is the head of the woman, and should correct her, but not the reverse; and therefore, the wife cannot give herself as a slave against the will of her husband.

Reply Obj. 4: This argument follows as regards corruptible things, in which many things also impede generation which are not enough to destroy the thing generated. But among things that endure perpetually, an impediment can prevail to the extent preventing such a thing from beginning to exist, but not so far as to stop its being once it exists, as is clear in the case of the rational soul; and it is also the same way with marriage, which is a bond remaining perpetually during the present life.

Article 4

Whether the children follow the condition of their mother

Obj. 1: To the fourth question, we proceed thus. (Parallel: De malo, q. 4, a. 8, arg. 15.) It seems that the children should follow the condition of their father. For denomination happens from the more noble. But the father is nobler in generation than the mother. Therefore, etc.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the being of a thing depends more on its form than on its matter. But in generation, the father gives the form, the mother the matter, as is stated in Book 2 of On the Generation of Animals. (Aristotle, On the Generation of Animals, Bk. 1, ch. 2 (716a5) and ch. 20 (729a9); Bk. 2, ch. 4 (738b20); Bk. 4, ch. 1 (765b10).) Therefore, the children should follow the father more than the mother.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, something should especially follow what it resembles more. But a son is more like his father than his mother, as a daughter is more like her mother. Therefore, at least a son should follow his father’s condition, and a daughter her mother’s.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, in Sacred Scripture genealogy is not reckoned through the women, but through the men. (See, inter alia, Genesis 4, 5, and 10; Matthew 1; Luke 3:23.) Therefore, children should follow more their father than their mother.

On the contrary (1), if someone sows in the land of another, his fruit belongs to whoever owns the land. (Codex, Bk. 3, tit. 32, leg. 11, ‘Si quis sciens’; cf. Digests, Bk. 41, tit. 1, leg. 9, ‘Qua ratione.’) But the womb of the woman is related to the seed of the man as land is related to seed. Therefore, etc.

Furthermore (2), among other animals that are born from animals of diverse species, we observe that the young follow more the mother than the father, for which reason a mule that is born from crossing a mare and a male donkey resembles horses more than one which is born from crossing a she-donkey and a stallion. And it should be the same way among humans.

I answer that, according to civil laws, the young follow the womb. (Codex, Bk. 3, tit. 32, leg. 7, ‘Partum ancillae.’) And this is reasonable, for children have the perfection of their form from their fathers, but from their mothers they have the substance of their bodies. Now, slavery is a corporeal condition, since a slave is as the instrument of his master in operating. Therefore, children follow their mother in their condition of freedom or servitude; (See Gratian, Decretals, pt. 2, cause 32, q. 4, can. 15, ‘Liberi’; Gregory IX, Decretals, Bk. 4, tit. 10, ch. ‘Indecens’; Codex, Bk. 3, tit. 32, leg. 7, ‘Partum ancillae.’) but in those things that pertain to dignity, which is the form of a thing, they follow their father, as it is in honors and citizenship (municipiis) and inheritance and other things: (See Glossa ordin. in Decretum, pt. 2, cause 32, q. 4, can. 15 (II, 1514a); can. 9, ‘Dicat aliquis’ (II, 1511b).) and in this the canons and the law of Moses agree, as is clear from Exodus 21:4. However, in certain lands which are not ruled by civil law, the children follow the lower condition; (Among the Longobards and the Teutons: see Glossa ordin. in Decretum, pt. 2, cause 32, q. 4, can. 15, ‘Liberi’ (II, 1514a).) so that if the father is a slave, even if the mother is a freewoman, the children will be slaves; but not if, after the marriage is officiated, the father should indenture himself as a slave against the will of his wife, and likewise if it be the other way around.

However, if both are of a servile condition, and belong to different masters, then they divide the children, if there are many of them, or if there is only one, one master compensates the other for the price, and he receives the child born into his own possession. Yet it is not credible that such a custom could be as reasonable as the one that was determined by many wise men through long study. This is found also in natural things, that something is received by the recipient in the mode of the recipient, and not in the mode of the giver; and therefore, it is reasonable that the seed received by the mother is endowed with her condition.

Reply Obj. 1: Although the father is a nobler principle, the mother gives corporeal substance, and the condition of slavery is applied from this side.

Reply Obj. 2: In those things which belong to the account of the species, a son is more like his father than his mother, but in material conditions he should be more like his mother than his father, for a thing has specific being from its form, but material conditions from its matter.

Reply Obj. 3: A son resembles his father by reason of the form which fills out his perfection, as his father does too; and therefore this argument does not address the issue.

Reply Obj. 4: Since the honor of the son is more from his father than from his mother, therefore in genealogies in Scripture and according to the common custom sons are named from their father rather than from their mother; nevertheless, in those things which regard slavery, they follow their mother more.

Article 5

Whether a defect of age impedes marriage

Obj. 1: To the fifth question, we proceed thus. (Parallels: above, d. 25, q. 2, a. 1, qa. 2; d. 27, q. 2, a. 2.) It seems that a defect in age does not impede matrimony. For according to the laws (Digests, Bk. 4, tit. 4, leg. 3, ‘Denique.’) children receive a guardian up until twenty-five years of age. Therefore, it seems that up to that time their reason is not sound enough for the consent, and so it seems that that should be the age established by law for entering marriage. But before that time marriage can be contracted. Therefore, falling short of the age established by law does not impede marriage.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, just as the bond of religious life is perpetual, so also is the bond of matrimony. But before eighteen years of age one cannot make the profession of religious life, according to the new statutes. (See Sexti Decretal., Bk. 3, tit. 14, ch. 1, ‘Is qui monasterium’; cf. Gregory IX, Decretals, Bk. 3, tit. 31, ch. 8, ‘Ad nostram’; ch. 11, ‘Significatum est.’) Therefore, neither could one contract marriage if defect of age were an impediment.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, just as consent on the part of the man is required for matrimony, so it is also required on the part of the woman. But the woman can contract marriage before the fourteenth year. Therefore, so can the man.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, inability to have intercourse, unless it be perpetual and unknown, does not impede matrimony. But the defect of age is neither perpetual nor unknown. Therefore it does not impede matrimony.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, it is not contained in any of the previously mentioned impediments. And so it does not seem to be an impediment to matrimony.

On the contrary (1), the Decretals say that a boy who cannot render the debt is not suited to marriage. (Gregory IX, Decretals, Bk. 4, tit. 15, ch. 2, ‘Quod sedem.’) But before fourteen years of age, most boys cannot render the debt, as is evident from Book 9 of the History of Animals. (Aristotle, History of Animals, Bk. 7, ch. 1 (581a12).) Therefore, etc.

Furthermore (2), nature has fixed a limit to size and growth for all constant things; and thus it seems, since marriage is natural, that it should have a determined time, whose lack would impede it.

I answer that, because it is made in the mode of a kind of contract, marriage is subject to the ordering of positive law, just as other contracts are. For this reason, according to law, (Gregory IX, Decretals, Bk. 4, tit. 2, ch. 9, ‘De illis’; ch. 10, ‘Attestationes’; Codex, Bk. 5, tit. 4, leg. 24 ‘Sancimus’.) it is determined that before that time of discretion in which both parties can sufficiently deliberate about marriage, and render the debt to each other, marriage cannot be contracted; and if this rule is not followed, the marriage is invalidated. (See Gregory IX, Decretals, Bk. 4, tit. 2, ch. 11, ‘Ex litteris.’) Now, this time is typically fourteen years of age for males, but twelve years for females, and the reason for this was given above in Distinction 27, Question 2, Article 3. For, although the precepts of positive law follow what happens for the most part, if someone should arrive at the required maturity before the time established, such that the strength of his nature and his reason should supply the defect of age, the marriage is not dissolved; (See Gregory IX, Decretals, Bk. 4, tit. 2, ch. 9, ‘De illis qui in minori.’) and therefore, if the parties contracting before the age of puberty were joined sexually before the age established, the marriage would nevertheless stand as indissoluble.

Reply Obj. 1: Those things to which nature inclines do not require as much strength of reason for deliberating as is needed in other things. And therefore, someone considering marriage can consent sufficiently before he would be able to manage his own affairs in other contracts.

And the same must be said to the second objection: for a religious vow is among those things that are above the inclination of nature, that involve more difficulty than marriage.

Reply Obj. 3: A woman arrives at the age of puberty sooner than a man does, as is stated in Book 4 of On the Generation of Animals, (Aristotle, On the Generation of Animals, Bk. 4, ch. 6 (775a12).) and as was said above, in Distinction 37, Question 2, Article 2, reply to the third objection. And therefore it is not the same for both.

Reply Obj. 4: In this instance, there is not only an impediment because of the inability to have intercourse, but because of a defect of reason, which until then is not sufficient for properly making that consent which could endure perpetually.

Reply Obj. 5: Just as the impediment of insanity is reduced to the impediment of error, so also is the impediment of insufficient age, since a person does not have full use of his free will.

Exposition of the Text

“If . . . it is afterwards discovered that she is of servile condition, let him redeem her from her servitude if he can; if he cannot, he may marry another, if he should wish.” (Sententiae IV, 36.1 (208). 1, Augustine, De nuptiis et concupiscentia, bk 1c10 n11.) It should be known, that if the wife requests the debt before her suspected servitude is discovered, and if the man has only a slight suspicion, he should render the debt; nor would this result in any prejudice to his rights. However, if he has probable grounds to wonder about it, or if he should strongly suspect it, or if he should know it for certain, he should not render the debt to her, by the command of the Church, since he would either prejudice his own rights, if he should know her with uxorial affection, or else he would be fornicating.