D. 26 - On matrimony

After the Master has discussed the sacrament of holy orders, which is ordered to the spiritual multiplication of the Church, here he begins to consider matrimony, which is ordered to the material multiplication of the faithful. And it is divided into two parts: in the first, he considers matrimony; in the second, persons contracting matrimony, at Distinction 34: now it remains to note what persons are lawful to contract marriage. (Sententiae IV, 34.1 (198). 1.)

The first is in two parts: in the first he determines those things that pertain to marriage as it is a sacrament; in the second he determines the causes of marriage, at Distinction 27: after these matters it is to be considered what marriage is. (Sent. IV, 27.1 (163). 1.)

The first is in two parts: in the first he considers marriage’s institution; in the second, its signification, for these two things are common to all the sacraments: while the other sacraments took their origin after sin and because of sin, etc. (Sent. IV, 26.1 (157). 1.)

Concerning the first, he does three things: first, he shows the two institutions of matrimony; second, he shows the difference between them, where he states: the first institution had a precept; (Sent. IV, 26.3 (159). 1.) third, he excludes a certain error which can be occasioned by what has been said, where he says: there were a few heretics who detested nuptials. (Sent. IV, 26.5 (161). 1.)

Concerning the second, he does two things; first, he shows the difference between the second institution and the first, by the fact that the first was under precept, the second was granted as an indulgence; second, he shows how this indulgence should be taken, where he says: indulgence is understood in different ways. (Sent. IV, 26.4 (160). 1.)

And so, since marriage is a sacrament, it is both a sacred sign and the sign of a sacred thing. (Sent. IV, 26.6 (162). 1.) Here he considers the signification of matrimony; and concerning this he does two things: first, he determines the signification of matrimony; second, he excludes a certain false opinion, which arose from those things said before, when he says: that is why some teachers said that a woman has no part in marriage who does not experience carnal joining. (Sent. IV, 26.6 (162). 2.)

Concerning this he does three things: first, he sets forth those things that seem to favor the opinion stated; second, he shows the opinion to be false, where he says: if one should take this according to the superficial meaning of the words, he would be induced into so great an error; (Sent. IV, 26.6 (162). 3.) third, he responds to the proof, where he says: but what has been said above is to be understood in this sense, etc. (Sent. IV, 26.6 (162). 4.)

There are two questions here. First, concerning marriage according as it is an office of nature. The second, according as it is a sacrament.

Question 1

The essence of marriage

Concerning the first, four questions arise:

first, whether marriage is natural;

• second, whether it is now under precept;
• third, whether its act is licit;
• fourth, whether it can be meritorious.
• Article 1

Whether marriage is natural

Obj. 1: To the first question, we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST II-II, q. 154, a. 2; SCG III, ch. 122; Super Eth. 8, lec. 12; Super I Cor. 7, lec. 1.) It seems that marriage is not natural. For natural law is what nature has taught all animals. But in other animals there is sexual union without marriage. Therefore, matrimony is not of natural law.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, what is of natural law is found among people no matter what their state. But marriage has not existed in every state of man, for, as Cicero says in the beginning of his Rhetoric: men were living in the woods in the beginning, and back then no one knew his own children, nor were there any particular wedding ceremonies in which marriage consisted. (Cicero, De Inventione, Bk. II, Section 65.) Therefore, it is not natural.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, natural things are the same among all people. But marriage is not the same among all people, since it is celebrated in different ways under diverse laws. Therefore, it is not natural.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, those things without which nature’s intention can be preserved do not seem to be natural. But nature intends the conservation of the species by generation, which can happen without marriage, as is clear in the case of fornicators. Therefore, marriage is not natural.

On the contrary (1), it says in the beginning of the Digests: the union of a husband and wife, which we call marriage, is a natural right. (Cf. Digesto veteri, Bk. 1, tit. 1, leg. 1. Ulpian’s definition is given almost verbatim in Justinian’s Institutes, Bk. 1, tit. 2: “Ius naturale est quod natura omnia animalia docuit. Nam ius istud non humani generis proprium est, sed omnium animalium, quae in caelo, quae in terra, quae in mari nascuntur. Hinc descendit maris atque feminae coniugatio, quam nos matrimonium appellamus, hinc liberorum procreatio et educatio: videmus etenim cetera quoque animalia istius iuris peritia censeri.”)

Furthermore (2), in the Ethics 8, the Philosopher says that a human being is more naturally a conjugal animal than a political one. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 8, ch. 12.) But man is naturally political and social, as he himself says. (See Aristotle, Politics, Bk. 1, ch. 2.) Therefore, man is naturally conjugal, and thus wedlock, or marriage, is natural.

I answer that, something is said to be natural in two ways. In one way, as caused by necessity from the principles of nature, like being moved upward is natural to fire, etc.; and in this way marriage is not natural, nor are any of those things that are completed by means of free will. In another way, ‘natural’ is said of what nature inclines to, but is completed by means of free will, as acts of virtues are called natural. And this is the way that marriage is natural, for natural reason is inclined to it in two ways. First, as concerns its principal end, which is the good of children: for nature does not intend only their generation, but their upbringing, and their advancement to the perfect state of a human being as human, which is the state of virtue. Therefore, according to the Philosopher, we have three things from our parents: namely, being, nourishment, and learning. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 8, ch. 11.) But a child could not be educated and instructed by a parent unless he had certain, definite parents, which would not be the case unless there were some obligation of a man to a particular woman, which constitutes marriage. Second, as to the secondary end of matrimony, which is the mutual service that the spouses devote to each other in domestic matters. For as natural reason dictates that humans live together, because one person is not sufficient to himself in all things that pertain to life, which is the reason a man is said to be naturally political; in the same way, certain works of those things that are needed for human life are suited to men and certain to women. And this is why nature moves that there be that association of a man with a woman, in which marriage consists. And the Philosopher sets forth these two reasons in Book 8 of the Ethics. (See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 8, ch. 7 and ch. 12.)

Reply Obj. 1: The nature of a human being inclines to something in two ways. In one way, because it befits the nature of his genus: and then it is common to all animals. In another way, because it befits the nature of the difference by which the human species surpasses its genus, inasmuch as it is rational; like acts of prudence and temperance. And as the nature of the genus is one among all animals, yet is not in all in the same way, similarly it does not cause inclination in all in the same way, but according to what befits each species. Therefore, the nature of man inclines to marriage on the part of the difference, as to the second reason given; which is why the Philosopher assigns this reason to men above all animals. But as to the first reason, it inclines on the part of the genus; and so he says that the procreation of children is common to all animals. Nevertheless, it does not incline to this in the same way in all animals, for with certain animals, the children are sufficiently able to seek their own food immediately after birth, or the mother suffices for their sustenance; and among these animals there is no determination of male to female. Among those animals whose children need the sustenance of both, but only for a little time, some determination is found corresponding to that time, as is seen among certain birds. But in human beings, since the child needs the care of parents for a long time, there is the greatest determination of male to female, to which the nature of the genus also inclines.

Reply Obj. 2: The words of Cicero can be true as regards some particular people, if we consider that nation’s unique origin by which it is distinct from all other nations. For the effect that natural reason inclines to is not attained by all nations. But Cicero’s statement is not true universally, for from the beginning of the human race Sacred Scripture reports that there were marriages.

Reply Obj. 3: According to the Philosopher in the Ethics 6, human nature is not unmovable like the divine nature. And thus those things that belong to natural law are diversified according to the diverse states and conditions of man; even though in divine matters things do not naturally vary at all. (Perhaps the reference is to Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 6, chs. 3 and 7; but cf. Bk. 5, ch. 7.)

Reply Obj. 4: Nature intends not only the being of the children, but their perfect being, for which marriage is required, as is clear from what has been said.

Article 2

Whether it is now under precept

Obj. 1: To the second question, we proceed thus. (Parallels: SCG III, ch. 136.) It seems that marriage still remains under precept. For a command obliges as long as it is not revoked. But the first institution of marriage was under precept, as it says in the text, nor do we read that this precept was ever revoked, but rather confirmed: *what God has joined together, let no man put asunder (*Matt 19:6). Therefore, even now marriage is under precept.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the precepts of natural law oblige in every age. But marriage is of natural law, as was said. Therefore, etc.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the good of a species is better than the good of the individual: for the good of a nation is more divine than the good of one man, as is said in the Ethics 1. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 1, ch. 1, 1094b8.) But the precept given to the first man for the conservation of the individual by the nutritive act, obliges even now. Therefore, much more does the precept of marriage, which pertains to the conservation of the species.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, where the obligating reason remains, the same obligation must remain. But men were obliged to marry in ancient times for this reason: so that the multiplication of the human race should not cease. Therefore, since the same thing would result if anyone could freely abstain from marriage, it seems that marriage is still under precept.

On the contrary (1), it says in 1 Corinthians: he who does not give his virgin in marriage, does better (1 Cor 7:38)—that is, than someone who does give her away in marriage. Therefore, the contract of marriage is not now under precept.

Furthermore (2), no one should be given a reward for transgressing a precept. But a special reward is due to virgins, namely the golden crown. (Aquinas uses the term aureola or “little crown,” to express an added honor or special distinction that some of the blessed are awarded in addition to the aurea, “golden crown” or “halo,” that represents the main substantial reward of heavenly beatitude. See also Dist. 49, q. 5.) Therefore, marriage is not under precept.

I answer that, nature inclines to something in two ways. In one way, as toward something that is necessary for the perfection of the individual; and such an inclination obliges everyone, for natural perfections are common to all. In another way it inclines to what is necessary for the perfection of the multitude: and since there are many things like this which would impede each other, every person is not obliged by this kind of inclination in the manner of a precept. Otherwise everyone would be obliged to farming and building and duties like this, which are necessary to human community. But for the inclination of nature it is enough if different tasks are completed by different men. Since, then, it is necessary for the perfection of the human multitude that some be in service to the contemplative life, which is most greatly impeded by marriage, the inclination of nature to marriage does not oblige by the mode of a precept, even according to the philosophers; for this reason Theophrastus proves that for a wise man it is not expedient to marry. (The original work by Theophrastus is not extant, but the saying is quoted by Jerome in Bk. 1 of Adversus Iovinianum (PL 23:276).)

Reply Obj. 1: That precept has not been revoked; but neither does it oblige each and every person, for the reason just given, except back in the days when the scarcity of human beings required everyone to be available for generation.

The solutions to the second and third are evident from what has been said.

Reply Obj. 4: Human nature commonly inclines to diverse offices and acts, as was said. But since it exists in diverse ways in different men, according to how it is individuated in this man or that man, one man inclines more to one of those offices, another to another. And from this diversity together with divine providence, which moderates all things, it happens that one man chooses one task, like farming, while another chooses something else. And so it also happens that certain men choose matrimonial life and others choose contemplative life. So no danger threatens.

Article 3

Whether its act is licit

Obj 1: To the third question, we proceed thus. (Parallels: below, d. 31, q. 2, aa. 1–2; ST I-II, q. 34, a. 1, ad 1; ST II-II, q. 153, a. 2; In II Sent. d. 31, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3; Super I Thess. 4, lec. 1; Super Heb. 13, lec. 1; SCG III, ch. 126; Super I Cor. 7, lec. 1.) It seems that the marital act is always a sin. For 1 Corinthians 7:29 says, let those who marry be as if they were unmarried. But the unmarried do not have the marital act. Therefore, even married people would sin in that act.

Obj. 2: Furthermore: your iniquities have made a division between you and your God (Is 59:2). But the marital act divides man from God; and this is why in Exodus 19 it is commanded to the people who had to see God that they not approach their wives. And Jerome says that in the marital act the Holy Spirit did not touch the hearts of the prophets. (Jerome, Epistle 123 (PL 22:1034).) Therefore, it is iniquity.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, what is base in itself cannot be made good in any way. But the marital act has concupiscence attached to it, which is always base. Therefore, it is always a sin.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, nothing is excused if it is not a sin. But the marital act needs to be excused by the goods of marriage, as the Master says. Therefore, it is a sin.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, the judgment of things identical in species, is the same. But intercourse in marriage is of the same species as the act of adultery, since it results in the same thing, namely, the human species. Therefore, since the act of adultery is a sin, the marital act is as well.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, excess in passions corrupts virtue. But there is always an excess of pleasure in the marital act to the extent that it absorbs reason, which is the principal good in man; and this is why the Philosopher says in the Ethics 7 that during that pleasure it is impossible for a person to understand anything. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 7, ch. 11 (1152b18).) Therefore, the marital act is always a sin.

On the contrary (1), a virgin does not sin if she marries (1 Cor 7:36); and I would like for the young ones to marry, in order to bear children (1 Tim 5:14). But procreation of children cannot happen except by physical union. Therefore, the marital act is not a sin; otherwise, the Apostle would not have wished it.

Furthermore (2), no sin is commanded. But the marital act is commanded: a man should render the debt to his wife (1 Cor 7:3). Therefore, it is not a sin.

I answer that, given that bodily nature was instituted by God, it is impossible to say that those things pertaining to the conservation of bodily nature, and to which that nature is inclined, are universally bad. And therefore, since the inclination to the procreation of children, by which the nature of the species is conserved, is natural, it is impossible to say that the act by which children are procreated is universally illicit, so that the mean of virtue could not be found in it; unless it were argued according to the insanity of certain people, that corporeal things were caused by an evil god; from which perhaps is derived that opinion that is referred to in the text. And this is why it is the worst heresy.

Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle did not prohibit the marital act in those words, as neither the possession of things when he said, those who make use of this world, as though not using it (1 Cor 7:31). But in both he prohibits resting in their enjoyment: which is clear from his very manner of speaking: for he did not say, “let them not use,” or, “let them not have,” but as though not using, or not having.

Reply Obj. 2: We are joined to God both by the habit of grace, and by the act of contemplation and love. Therefore, anything that separates the first union is always a sin. But not what separates the second: for any licit occupation dealing with inferior things distracts the soul, so that it is not capable of being joined to God actually. And this particularly happens in carnal union, in which the mind is absorbed because of intense pleasure. And because of this, for those men whose task is to contemplate divine things or to handle sacred things, abstinence from their wives is enjoined for that time. And also according to this it is said that the Holy Spirit did not touch the minds of the prophets with the act of revelation of secrets when they were availing themselves of their marital rights.

Reply Obj. 3: That baseness of concupiscence which always accompanies the marital act is not the baseness of fault, but of punishment, coming from the first sin, namely that the lower powers and members of the body do not obey reason; and because of this the argument does not follow.

Reply Obj. 4: Something is properly said to be excused which has a resemblance to evil, and yet is not evil, or not as much as it seems; for some things are excused entirely, and some to a certain degree. And since the marital act has likeness to an inordinate act because of the corruption of concupiscence, therefore, for the good of marriage it is excused entirely, so that it is not a sin.

Reply Obj. 5: Although they are the same in natural species, nevertheless they differ in species of moral act, which may differ by one circumstance, for example approaching one’s own wife or someone who is not one’s wife; just as also killing a man by violence or by justice makes different species of moral act, although it is one natural species; and yet one is licit and the other illicit.

Reply Obj. 6: The excess of passion which corrupts virtue not only impedes the act of reason, but takes away the ordering of reason, which the intensity of pleasure in the marital act does not do, for even if man is not ordered at that moment, nevertheless he is pre-ordered by reason.

Article 4

Whether it can be meritorious

Obj. 1: To the fourth question, we proceed thus. (Parallels: De malo, q. 4, a. 1, ad 17; Super I Cor. 7, lec. 1.) It seems that the marital act is not meritorious. For Chrysostom comments on Matthew: even if marriage does not carry a punishment for those availing themselves of it, nevertheless, it does not furnish a reward. (Pseudo-Chrysostom, Homilies on Matthew, hom. 1 (PG 56:631).) But merit is said in relation to reward. Therefore, the marital act is not meritorious.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, it is not praiseworthy to give up what is meritorious. But virginity is praiseworthy, and because of it marriage is given up. Therefore, the marital act is not meritorious.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, whoever takes advantage of indulgences granted him, enjoys a benefit received. But no one merits by being granted a benefit. Therefore, the marital act is not meritorious.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, merit consists in difficulty, as does virtue. But the marital act contains no difficulty, but rather pleasure. Therefore, it is not meritorious.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, what cannot be done without venial sin is never meritorious; for man cannot simultaneously merit and demerit. But in the marital act there is always venial sin: for even the first movement in this kind of pleasure is a venial sin. Therefore, the act mentioned cannot be meritorious.

On the contrary (1), every act in which a precept is fulfilled is meritorious, if it is done out of charity. But this is the case with the marital act, for it says in 1 Corinthians 7:3, a man must render the debt to his wife. Therefore, etc.

Furthermore (2), every act of virtue is meritorious. But the act mentioned is an act of justice, since it is called the rendering of a debt. Therefore, it is meritorious.

I answer that, since no act proceeding from a deliberate will is indifferent, as was said in Book II, (In 2 Sent., d. 40, q. 1, a. 5.) the marital act is always either a sin or it is meritorious in someone who has grace. For if a virtue leads one to the marital act—whether justice, in order to render the debt, or religion, in order to procreate children for the worship of God—it is meritorious. But if sexual appetite should move one, yet remaining within the goods of marriage, so that a man in no way wants to approach some other woman, then it is a venial sin. But if it is borne outside the goods of marriage, so that one would do it with any woman whatsoever, it is a mortal sin. However, nature cannot move unless either it is ordered by reason, and then it will be motivated by virtue; or else it is not ordered, and then it will be motivated by sexual appetite.

Reply Obj. 1: The root of meriting as to the substantial prize is charity itself, but as to any incidental prize, the notion of merit consists in the difficulty of the act; and the marital act is not meritorious in this way, but in the first way.

Reply Obj. 2: Man can merit in lesser things and in greater things: and so when someone foregoes a lesser good so that he might do the greater, his abandoning a less meritorious act is to be praised.

Reply Obj. 3: An indulgence sometimes has to do with lesser evils; and thus the marital act is indulged when sexual appetite moves one to it while remaining within the bounds of marriage, for then it is a venial sin. But when virtue moves one to it, so that it is meritorious, it does not require an indulgence except to the extent that there is an indulgence for lesser goods, which is the same as a concession. Nor is it unfitting that someone who takes advantage of this concession should merit: for the good use of the benefits of God is meritorious.

Reply Obj. 4: The difficulty of a work is required to merit a special distinction, but for meriting the essential prize, the difficulty required consists in ordering to the mean, and this also exists in the marital act.

Reply Obj. 5: The first movement, according to which it is called venial sin, is the motion of the appetite toward some unordered delectable, which is not the case in the marital act; and thus the argument does not follow.

Question 2

The sacrament of matrimony

Next we must consider marriage as it is a sacrament: and concerning this, four questions arise:

first, whether it is a sacrament;

• second, about its institution;
• third, about its effect;
• fourth, about its integrity.
• Article 1

Whether it is a sacrament

Obj. 1: To the first question, we proceed thus. (Parallels: below, d. 31, q. 1, a. 2, ad 7; In IV Sent. d. 1, q. 1, a. 3, ad 5; SCG IV, ch. 78.) It seems that marriage is not a sacrament. For every sacrament of the New Law has some form, which belongs to the essence of the sacrament. But the blessing which is done by the priests in the marriage ceremony is not of the essence of matrimony. Therefore, it is not a sacrament.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, according to Hugh, a sacrament is a material element. (Hugh of St. Victor, De sacramentis fidei, Bk. 1, pt. 9, ch. 2 (PL 176:317).) But marriage does not have for its matter any material element. Therefore, it is not a sacrament.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the sacraments have efficacy from the Passion of Christ. But by marriage a man is not conformed to the Passion of Christ, which was painful, since it has pleasure attached to it. Therefore, it is not a sacrament.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, every sacrament of the New Law effects what it represents. But marriage does not effect the union of Christ and the Church which it signifies. Therefore, marriage is not a sacrament.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, in the other sacraments, there is something that is reality-and-sacrament. But this cannot be found in marriage since it does not impress a character; otherwise it could not be repeated. Therefore, it is not a sacrament.

On the contrary (1), it says in Ephesians 5:32, this is a great sacrament, etc.

Furthermore (2), a sacrament is a sign of a sacred thing. But that is what marriage is. Therefore, etc.

I answer that, a sacrament carries a certain remedy of holiness for man against sin, presented by sensible signs, as was said in Distinction 1. (In 1 Sent., q. 1, a. 2, qa. 1.) Therefore, since this is found in marriage, it is counted among the sacraments.

Reply Obj. 1: The words in which the matrimonial consent is expressed are the form of this sacrament, not the blessing of the priest, which is a kind of sacramental.

Reply Obj. 2: The sacrament of matrimony is completed by the act of the person who avails himself of this sacrament, just like penance. And thus, just as penance does not have any matter other than those sensible acts themselves which are in place of a material element, so it is with marriage.

Reply Obj. 3: Although marriage does not conform to the Passion of Christ in suffering, yet it does conform to it in the love by which he suffered for the Church in order that she might be joined to him as bride.

Reply Obj. 4: The union of Christ to the Church is not a reality contained in this sacrament, but a reality signified and not contained; and no sacrament can bring about a thing like this. But it has another reality contained and signified, which it does bring about, as will be said. However, the Master argued that it was a reality not contained; for he was of the opinion that it does not have a reality contained.

Reply Obj. 5: In this sacrament also there are three things: for what is sacrament alone are the external acts appearing; but the reality-and-sacrament is the obligation which a man contracts toward a woman by such acts; while the final reality contained is the effect of this sacrament. However, the reality that the Master describes is not contained.

Article 2

About its institution

Obj. 1: To the second question, we proceed thus. It seems that marriage did not have to be instituted before sin. For what is of natural law does not need an institution. But marriage is of natural law, as is clear from what has been said. Therefore, it did not have to be instituted.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, sacraments are a kind of medicine against the sickness of sin. But medicine is only prepared for someone sick. Therefore, before sin it did not have to be instituted.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, one institution suffices for one thing. But marriage was also instituted after sin, as it says in the text. Therefore, before sin it was not instituted.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the institution of a sacrament should be from God. But before sin the words which pertain to marriage were not spoken in a determinate way by God, but by Adam: for when God said, increase and multiply (Gen 1:28), those words were also said to the beasts, in whom there is no marriage. Therefore, marriage was not instituted before sin.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, marriage is a sacrament of the New Law. But sacraments of the New Law took their beginning from Christ. Therefore, it should not have been instituted before sin.

On the contrary (1), it says in Matthew 19:4: have you not read that he who made them from the beginning, made them male and female, etc.

Furthermore (2), marriage was instituted for the procreation of offspring. But before sin the procreation of children was necessary for man, as was said in Book II, Distinction 20. Therefore, marriage had to be instituted before sin.

I answer that, nature inclines to marriage, intending a certain good, which indeed varies according to the diverse states of man, and thus it is fitting that in regard to that good, it is instituted in different ways for the different states of men.

And this is why marriage was instituted before sin, according as it is ordained to the procreation of offspring, which was necessary even when sin did not exist. But according as it is a remedy provided against the wound of sin, it was instituted after sin in the time of the law of nature. But according to the determination of persons, it had its institution under the law of Moses. Yet, according as it represents the mystery of the union of Christ and the Church, it had its institution under the New Law; and according to this it is a sacrament of the New Law. But as to the other benefits that are consequent upon marriage, like friendship and the mutual service devoted to each other by the spouses, it has its institution in civil law. But since it belongs to the account of a sacrament to be a sign and a remedy, it is the middle institutions that have to do with it under the account of a sacrament. But as to the first institution, it has to do with what it is in the office of nature; but as to the last, what it is as an office of civic life.

Reply Obj. 1: Those things that are of natural law in general need an institution as to their determination, which is applicable in different ways to men in different conditions; just as it belongs to natural law that wrongdoing be punished, but how a certain punishment is fitted to a certain crime happens by the determination of positive law.

Reply Obj. 2: Marriage is not only a remedy against sin, but principally it exists as an office of nature. And thus it was instituted before sin, but not as a remedy.

Reply Obj. 3: It is not unfitting for marriage to have diverse institutions according to the different things that need to be determined in it. And so the different institutions are not of the same thing in the same respect.

Reply Obj. 4: Before sin, marriage was instituted by God when he formed the woman for the man from his side as a helper, and he said to them: increase and multiply, etc.; for, although he said this to the other animals, it was not to be fulfilled by them in the same way as by humans. But Adam brought forth those words as one inspired by God to understand that God had instituted marriage.

Reply Obj. 5: Marriage as a sacrament of the New Law was not instituted before Christ, as is clear from what has been said.

Article 3

About its effect

Obj. 1: To the third question, we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST II-II, q. 100, a. 2, ad 6; In IV Sent. d. 2, q. 1, a. 1, qa. 2; SCG IV, ch. 78.) It seems that marriage does not confer grace. For according to Hugh, the sacraments confer invisible grace by sanctification. (Hugh of St. Victor, De sacramentis fidei, Bk. 1, pt. 9, ch. 2 (PL 176:317).) But marriage does not have any sanctification that belongs to its essence. Therefore, grace is not conferred in it.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, every sacrament that confers grace confers it by its matter and its form. But the acts that are the matter in this sacrament are not causes of grace, because this would be the Pelagian heresy, that our actions are causes of grace; and the words expressing consent are not a cause of grace, since no sanctification results from them. Therefore, grace is given in no way in marriage.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the grace ordained against the wound of sin is necessary for all who have that wound. But the wound of concupiscence is found in all people. If, therefore, in marriage grace is given against the wound of concupiscence, all people should contract marriage; and thus it would be very stupid to abstain from marriage.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, infirmity does not receive medicine from the same thing from which it takes its intensity. But by marriage, concupiscence gains intensity, for as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 3, the concupiscible appetite is insatiable, and grows by its own activity. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. III, ch. 12 (1119a18).) Therefore, it seems that in marriage a remedy of grace is not bestowed against concupiscence.

On the contrary (1), the definition should be convertible with the thing defined. But in the definition of sacrament is included the causality of grace, as was clear in Distinction 1. Therefore, since marriage is a sacrament, it will be a cause of grace.

Furthermore (2), Augustine says that marriage is a remedy for the diseased. (Augustine, On the Literal Meaning of Genesis, Bk. 9, ch. 7 (CSEL 28.1:275).) But it is only a remedy to the extent that it has some effect. Therefore, it does have some efficacy for repressing concupiscence. But concupiscence is only repressed by grace. Therefore, grace is conferred in it.

I answer that, concerning this there have been three opinions.

For certain people said that marriage is in no way a cause of grace, but it is only a sign. But this cannot stand. For according to this it would not differ at all from the sacraments of the Old Law; and so there would be no reason why it should be enumerated among the sacraments of the New Law. For the remedy that it offers by satisfying concupiscence lest it should drive someone over the edge from being too strictly restrained, it possessed also in the Old Law by the very nature of the act.

And thus others have said that grace is conferred here in order to withdraw one from evil: for the act which would have been a sin without marriage is excused from sin. But this would be scarcely anything: for this was also the case in the Old Law. So they say that it withdraws one from evil by diminishing concupiscence, lest it be borne outside the goods of marriage, while that grace offers no help for acting well. But this cannot stand, for it is the same grace which impedes sin and which inclines to good, just as the same heat which removes cold also warms.

This is why others say that marriage, inasmuch as it is contracted in the faith of Christ, is able to confer a grace that helps in doing the things which are required in marriage. And this is more probable: for wherever a certain faculty is divinely given, help is also given by which man can fittingly make use of that faculty; as it is clear that to every power of the soul there corresponds some member of the body by which it can discharge its act. Therefore, since in marriage a man is given by divine institution the faculty of enjoying his wife for the procreation of children, grace is also given without which he could not do this fittingly. Just as was said earlier about the power of holy orders, in the same way the grace given here stands as the reality contained in this sacrament.

Reply Obj. 1: Just as the water of baptism is able to touch the body and cleanse the heart by its contact with the flesh of Christ, so marriage has this from the fact that Christ represented it in his Passion, and not principally by some sanctification of the priest.

Reply Obj. 2: Just as the water of baptism with the form of words does not bring about grace directly, but rather a character, so the external acts and the words expressing consent directly effect a certain bond of obligation, which is the sacrament of marriage; and a bond of this kind operates dispositively for grace by the power of divine institution.

Reply Obj. 3: That argument would hold unless some more efficacious remedy could be applied against the illness of concupiscence. But a greater remedy is applied by spiritual works and mortification of the flesh by those who do not make use of marriage.

Reply Obj. 4: Against concupiscence a remedy may be applied in two ways. In one way on the part of concupiscence itself, as it is repressed in its root; and thus marriage offers a remedy by the grace which is given in it. In another way, on the part of its act; and this in two ways. In one way as the act that concupiscence inclines to loses baseness externally; and this happens through the goods of marriage, which ennoble carnal concupiscence. In another way, as the act having baseness is impeded, which happens by the very nature of the act; for as long as concupiscence is satisfied in the conjugal act, it is not so incited to other corrupting influences, because of which the Apostle says it is better to marry than to burn (1 Cor 7:9). For although the works corresponding to concupiscence in themselves are bound to increase concupiscence, yet according as they are ordered by reason, they repress it: for repeated acts leave behind habits and dispositions similar to themselves.

Article 4

About its integrity

Obj. 1: To the fourth question, we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST III, q. 29, a. 2; In IV Sent. d. 30, q. 2, a. 2.) It seems that physical intercourse is integral to marriage. For in the very institution of marriage was said: they shall be two in one flesh (Gen 2:24). But this only happens by physical intercourse. Therefore, it is integral to marriage.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, what pertains to the signification of the sacrament is necessary to the sacrament, as was said before. But physical intercourse belongs to the signification of the sacrament, as is said in the text. Therefore, it is integral to the sacrament.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, this sort of sacrament is ordered to the conservation of the species. But conservation of the species cannot happen without physical intercourse. Therefore, it is integral to the sacrament.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, marriage is a sacrament according as it supplies a remedy against concupiscence, concerning which the Apostle says that it is better to marry than to burn (1 Cor 7:9). But this remedy is not furnished to those who do not commingle sexually. Therefore, the same as above.

On the contrary (1), in paradise there was matrimony. But there was not physical intimacy. Therefore, physical intercourse is not integral to marriage.

Furthermore (2), a sacrament, by its very name, implies sanctification. But marriage is holier without physical intercourse, as is said in the text. Therefore, physical intercourse is not necessary to the sacrament.

I answer that, there are two kinds of integrity. One kind is found according to the first perfection, which consists in the very being of a thing; another is attendant upon the second perfection, which consists in activity. Since therefore physical intercourse is a certain activity or use of marriage, which gives the faculty for this use, physical intercourse will be of the second integrity of marriage, and not of the first.

Reply Obj. 1: Adam was speaking of the integrity of marriage as regards both perfections, for a thing is recognized by its act.

Reply Obj. 2: The signification of a reality contained is necessary to the sacrament, and physical intercourse does not pertain to this signification, but to the reality not contained, as is clear from what has been said.

Reply Obj. 3: A thing does not arrive at its end except by its proper act; and so the fact that the end of marriage is not achived without physical intercourse, shows that it belongs to its second integrity, and not to its first.

Reply Obj. 4: Before physical intercourse happens, marriage is a remedy by the grace that is given in it, although not by the act which belongs to its second integrity.

Exposition of the Text

While the other sacraments took their origin after sin and because of sin, we read that the sacrament of marriage was instituted by the Lord even before sin. (Senteniae IV, 26.1 (157). 1.) It seems that he should have examined matrimony before holy orders: for what is animal is before what is spiritual, as it says in 1 Corinthians 15. And it must be said that although it is first in the way of generation, nevertheless, in the way of perfection and sanctification it is last; and thus that sacrament which has a minimum of spirituality should be ordered last among the sacraments.

One of his ribs had been taken, woman formed from it. (Sent. IV, 26.1 (157). 1.) This was spoken of in Book II, Distinction 18.

Said prophetically: (Sent. IV, 26.1 (157). 1.) so that the prophecy refers to the mystery of Christ and the Church, which he foresaw, not to the enjoyment of the woman which could be perceived by natural reason with sense alone. Nor does it follow that if he foresaw the mystery of the Incarnation, he foreknew his own fall, even supposing that Christ would not have become incarnate if man had not sinned: for in many areas one thing does not exist without another, although one can be understood without the other.

It has a remedy, not a reward, (Sent. IV, 26.3 (159). 1.) namely, the accidental one such as virginity has; that is, the golden crown. (Aquinas uses aureola, “little crown,” to express an added honor or distinction awarded to some of the blessed in addition to the aurea, “halo,” which represents the essential prize of heavenly beatitude. See the more thorough explanation at Dist. 49, q. 5.)