D. 33 - On the development of marriage

After the Master has considered the goods of marriage, here he shows how these goods existed in the marriage of the ancients. And this is divided into two parts: in the first part, he shows how they existed in the marriage of the patriarchs before the Law; in the second part, how they existed in marriage celebrated in the time of the Law, where he says in Distinction 32: but in the time of the Law, Moses forbade carnal joining with one’s mother, etc. (Sententiae IV, 32.3 (196). 1.)

The first of these is in two parts: in the first, he shows that before the Law the patriarchs licitly had several wives; in the second, he inquires how the good of fidelity was preserved with multiple wives, here in Distinction 33: if anyone objects that those Fathers did not preserve the faith of the marriage bed, we say, etc. (Sent. IV, 33.2 (195). 3.)

Concerning the first, he does three things. First he raises the question; second, he determines it, at: to which we say, etc.; (Sent. IV, 33.1 (194). 1.) third, he confirms the solution by authority, at: concerning this, Augustine speaks as follows, etc. (Sent. IV, 33.1 (194). 4.)

And concerning the latter he does two things: first he cites the authority for proving the main proposition, namely that the unions of those people who had many wives were licit; second, he shows that they even merited as much as virginity does in our time, at: but that virginal chastity is not to be preferred in merit to the conjugal chastity of Abraham in merit, Augustine shows. (Sent. IV, 33.2 (195). 1.)

But in the time of the Law, Moses forbade carnal joining with one’s mother. Here he considers the marriage celebrated in the time of the Law; and concerning this he does three things: first he shows how marriage was determined by the Law of Moses both regarding the determination of eligible persons and regarding separation. Second, he inquires whether in the time of the Law it was licit to have several wives, where he says: but was it really lawful, under the Law, to have several wives? Third, he considers virginity from what follows: for virginity of mind is better than that of the flesh. (Sent. IV, 33.4 (197). 3.)

Here there are three questions. First, concerning the plurality of wives. Second, about the writ of divorce. Third, about virginity.

Question 1

Polygamy

Concerning the first, three questions arise:

first, whether having multiple wives is against the law of nature;

• second, whether it was licit;
• third, whether having a concubine is against the law of nature.
• Article 1

Whether having multiple wives is against the law of nature

Obj. 1: To the first question, we proceed thus. (Parallels: Super Isaiam 4; SCG III, ch. 124; Super I Cor. 7, lec. 1.) It seems that having several wives is not against the law of nature. For custom does not overturn natural right. But having several wives was not a sin when it was a custom, as Augustine holds in the text. (Lombard refers to Augustine’s On the Good of Virginity, but in fact it is from On the Good of Marriage, ch. 25, n. 33.) Therefore, having several wives is not against the law of nature.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, whoever acts against the natural law acts against a precept. For just as the written law has its own precepts, so does the natural law. But Augustine says that having several wives was not against a precept, for it had not been prohibited by any law. (Ibid.) Therefore, having several wives is not against the natural law.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, marriage is principally ordered to the procreation of children. But one man can receive children from many women, by making many of them pregnant. Therefore, it is not against natural law to have many wives.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, natural law is what nature has taught all animals, as is stated at the beginning of the Digests. (This defintion, from Ulpian, is found both in Justinian’s Digest (Bk. I, tit. 1, leg. 1) and in the Institutes (I, ii).) But nature has not taught all animals this, that there should be one female to one male. For among many animals, one male mates with several females. Therefore, it is not against the law of nature to have many wives.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher in Book 1 of On the Generation of Animals, in the generation of offspring the male relates to the female as active to passive, and craftsman to material. (See Aristotle, Generation of Animals, Bk. 1, chs. 20–21.) But it is not against the order of nature that one active principle should act upon several passive elements, or that one craftsman should work with diverse materials. Therefore, it is also not against the law of nature that one male should have several wives.

On the contrary (6), whatever was put into human beings in the very institution of human nature seems particularly to be of natural law. But it was instilled in the human being at the very institution of human nature that one woman should belong to one man, as is clear from Genesis 2:24*: they shall be two in one flesh*. Therefore, it is of natural law.

Furthermore (7), it is against the law of nature that man should oblige himself to the impossible, as, for example, that what was given to one should be given to another. But a man contracting with one wife hands over to her the power over his body, so that it is necessary to render the debt to her whenever she requests it. Therefore, it is against the law of nature if afterward he should hand over to another the power over his body; for he could not render the debt at the same time to both, if they should request it at the same time.

Furthermore (8), it is of natural law that what you do not wish to be done to yourself, you shall not do to another. But a man would never will that his wife should have another husband. Therefore, he would act against the law of nature if he took an additional wife.

Furthermore (9), whatever is against natural desire is against natural law. But the jealousy of the husband for his wife, and of the wife for her husband, is natural, for it is found among all people. Since this jealousy, therefore, is a love that does not tolerate the sharing of the beloved, it seems that it is against natural law that many wives should have one husband.

I answer that, in all things there exist naturally certain principles by which they can not only carry out their proper activities, but also render those activities suitable to their end. These actions may either follow from the nature of a thing’s genus, or they may follow from the nature of its species, as it belongs to a magnet to be borne downwards from the nature of its genus, and to attract iron from the nature of its species. Now, among things acting from the necessity of their nature, their very forms are the principles of their actions, from which their activities proceed in a manner befitting their end; in the same way, among those things that participate in reason, the principles of acting are cognition and appetite. For this reason, it is necessary that in the cognitive power there be a natural concept, and in the natural appetite a natural inclination, by which an activity befitting the genus or the species is rendered proportionate to its end.

But among all the other animals, man grasps the notion of an end, and the relation between an activity and its end, and for this reason the natural concept placed in him, by which he is directed to operate fittingly, is called natural law or natural right; in the rest of the animals it is called natural instinct. For brutes are more impelled toward appropriate actions by the power of nature than they are guided as though acting from their own judgment. Therefore, the natural law is nothing other than a concept naturally bestowed on man, by which he is directed toward acting fittingly in his proper actions, either those appropriate to him by the nature of his genus, like generation, eating, and other things of this kind; or by the nature of his species, like reasoning and the like.

Now anything that renders an action unfit for the end that nature intends from a certain work is said to be against the natural law. But an action can be unsuited either to the principal end or to the secondary end; and whether the former or the latter, it can happen in two ways. In one way, when something impedes the end entirely: as excessive over-indulgence or failure to eat impedes the health of the body as the principal end of eating; and it impedes the ability to manage one’s affairs well, which is a secondary end of eating. In the other way, when something makes the attainment of the principal or secondary end difficult or less becoming, like inordinate eating at an inappropriate time. So if an action were unsuited to the end by entirely preventing the principal end, then natural law prohibits it directly in the first precepts of natural law, which are related to practical matters as general concepts are related to speculative matters. On the other hand, if it were unsuited to the secondary end in any way, or simply made the attainment of the principal end difficult or less apt, then it is prohibited not indeed by the first precepts of natural law, but by the secondary ones, which are derived from the first, as conclusions in speculative matters have credibility from the principles known per se.

And this is how the action mentioned is said to be against the law of nature. For marriage has as its principal end the procreation and education of children. And this end, indeed, applies to man according to the nature of his genus, which is why it is also common to other animals, as is stated in the Ethics 8: *(Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 8, ch. 12 (1162a15ff.))*and this is how children are considered a good of matrimony. But as the Philosopher says, among humans alone marriage has as its secondary end the sharing of those works that are necessary in life, as was said above; (Ibid.) and in keeping with this the two owe fidelity to each other, which is one of the goods of matrimony. Inasmuch as it occurs between two members of the faithful, marriage has another further end, namely, the signification of Christ and his Church. And this is how sacrament is said to be a good of matrimony. Thus the first end corresponds to the marriage of man as an animal; the second, as a human; the third, as a member of the faithful.

Therefore, a plurality of wives neither totally removes nor otherwise impedes the first end, since one man suffices to make several wives fruitful and to educate the children born of them. But even if it does not totally destroy the second end, nevertheless it impedes it greatly, by the fact that it is not easy for peace to exist in a family where many wives are joined to one husband, since one man cannot be sufficient to satisfy all the wishes of many wives; and because the sharing of many in one office causes contention, as potters quarrel with each other, (Aristotle, Rhetoric, Bk. 2, ch. 4 (1381b17); cf. Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 8, ch. 1.) and it would be the same way among the many wives of one man. However, it completely destroys the third end of marriage, because as Christ is one man, so is the Church one bride. And therefore it is clear from what has been said that a plurality of wives is in a certain way against the law of nature, and in another way, not.

Reply Obj. 1: Custom does not overturn the law of nature as far as its first precepts, which are like the general concepts of the mind in speculative things. But custom reinforces and likewise diminishes what is drawn from these precepts as conclusions; and the precept of natural law that there should be one wife is this kind of thing.

Reply Obj. 2: As Cicero says*, religion and the strength of laws have sanctioned those things perfected by nature and approved by custom*. (Cicero, De inventione, Bk. 2, ch. 53, par. 160 (Teubner/Stroebel, 148): “postea res et ab natura profectas et ab consuetudine probatas legum metus et religio sanxit.”) Thus it is clear that those things that natural law dictates as derived from the first principles of natural law do not have compelling force in the mode of a precept absolutely, unless they have subsequently been sanctioned by divine and human law. And this is how Augustine says that they were not acting against a precept, since it had not been prohibited by any law.

The solution to the third objection is evident from what has been said.

Reply Obj. 4: Natural law is taken many ways. First, indeed, a certain law is called natural from its principle, since it is implanted by nature; and thus Cicero defines it in Book II of his Rhetoric, saying: natural law is what was not born of opinion, but a certain innate power instilled. (Ibid.; the exact phrasing is: “naturae ius est, quod non opinio genuit, sed quaedam in natura vis insevit, ut religionem, pietatem, gratiam, vindicationem, observantiam, veritatem.”) And also in natural things certain movements are called natural, not because they were from an intrinsic principle, but because they are from a superior moving principle, as the motions that are in the elements because of the influence of heavenly bodies are called natural (as the Commentator says in Book 3 of On Heaven and Earth). (Averroes, commentary on Aristotle’s de Caelo, Bk. 3, comment 20.) Therefore, those things that are from divine law are said to be from natural law, since they are from the impression and infusion of a superior principle, namely, God. And this is how it is taken by Isidore, who says that natural law is what is contained in the Law and in the Gospel. (The Vives edition refers this quotation to the prologue of Gratian’s Decretals (PL 187:29); cf. Isidore, Etymologiarum (OCT, ed. Lindsay), Bk. 5, ch. 4, par. 1.) Third, natural law is so called not only from its principle, but from its own nature, since it is about natural things. And since nature is divided against reason, by which man is man, then taking natural law in the strictest sense, those things that belong to men alone, even if they were the dictates of natural reason, are not said to be of natural law, but only those things that natural reason dictates about things that are common to man and others. And thus the definition stated is given, namely: natural law is what nature has taught all animals. Therefore, plurality of wives, although it may not be against natural law taken in the third way, is nevertheless against natural law taken in the second way, since it is prohibited by divine law; and also against natural law taken in the first way, as is clear from what has been said, because nature dictates to any animal according to the mode befitting its species. This is why also certain animals, in which the concern of both male and female is required for the education of the young, preserve by natural instinct the union of one to another, as is evident in the case of the turtledove and the dove, and others.

To the fifth objection the resolution is clear from what has been said.

Reply Obj. 6: But since the reasons adduced to the contrary seem to show that multiple wives are against the first principles of the law of nature, they should therefore be answered. And so it should be said to the sixth objection that human nature was established without any defect; and so there were implanted in it not only those things without which the principal end of marriage cannot be had, but also those things without which the secondary end of marriage cannot be had without difficulty; and in this way it was provided for man in his very creation to have one wife, as was said.

Reply Obj. 7: By marriage a man does not give his wife power over his body in all things, but only those things that marriage requires. However, marriage does not require that at every moment a man should render the debt to a wife who is asking, unless as regards what marriage was chiefly instituted for, namely the good of children, and as much as is necessary for conception. However, inasmuch as marriage was instituted as a remedy, which is its secondary end, it does require that one render the debt at whatever moment one’s spouse asks for it. And thus it is clear that a man taking many wives does not obligate himself to the impossible where the principal end of marriage is considered; and therefore a plurality of wives is not against the first precepts of natural law.

Reply Obj. 8: This precept of the law of nature, what you do not wish to be done to you, do not do to another, should be understood when the same relation is preserved. For if a prelate does not wish to be opposed by a subordinate, it is not that he himself must not oppose the subordinate. And therefore, it is not necessary by the force of that precept that if a man does not wish for his own wife to have other husbands, he himself may not have other wives: for one man having several wives is not against the first precepts of the law of nature, as was said. But for one wife to have several husbands is against the first precepts of the law of nature, by the fact that by this the good of children, which is the principal end of marriage, is in a certain respect totally taken away and in a certain respect impeded. For in the good of children is understood not only procreation, but also education, as was said. For the procreation of children itself, even if it is not totally destroyed (since it happens sometimes after the first impregnation that the woman is again impregnated, as it says in Book 7 of the History of Animals), (Aristotle, History of Animals, Bk. 7, ch. 4 (585a8).) is nevertheless much impeded, for it can scarcely happen without damage happening either to one fetus or to both. But the education of offspring is completely destroyed, for from the fact that one wife has several husbands there would result an incertitude of the children about their father, whose care is necessary in their education. Therefore, by no law or custom is it permitted for one wife to have many husbands, as it is with the reverse.

Reply Obj. 9: Natural inclination in the appetitive power follows the natural concept in cognition; and since it is not so much against the natural concept that a man have many wives as it is that a woman have many husbands, a wife’s feeling does not so oppose the sharing of her husband as in the opposite situation. Therefore, as much among men as among animals a greater jealousy is found in the male for the female than the reverse.

Article 2

Whether it was licit

Obj. 1: To the second question, we proceed thus. (Parallels: SCG III, ch. 124; SCG IV, ch. 78.) It seems that to have several wives could not have been licit at one time. For, according to the Philosopher in the Ethics 5, natural law has the same power always and everywhere. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 5, ch. 7 (1134b18ff.).) But a plurality of wives is prohibited by natural law, as is clear from what has been said. Therefore, as it is not licit now, so it was never licit.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, if it were allowed at one time, this would not be unless either it were licit per se, or allowed because of some dispensation. If in the first way, then it would also be licit now. But if in the second way, this cannot be: for according to Augustine, since God is the founder of nature, he does not do anything against the reasons that he implanted in nature. (Augustine, Contra Faustum, Bk. 26, par. 3: “Deus autem creator et conditor omnium naturarum nihil contra naturam facit; id enim erit cuique rei naturale, quod ille fecerit, a quo est omnis modus, numerus, ordo naturae” (CSEL 25:731).) Since, therefore, God established that one woman should be for one man, as was said, it seems that he himself would never have given a dispensation from this.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, if something is permitted by a dispensation, it is only permitted to those men who receive the dispensation. But no general dispensation is found in the Old Law given to everyone. Therefore, since in the Old Testament everyone who wanted several wives took them indiscriminately, nor were they reprimanded for this in the Law or by the prophets, it seems that it was not permitted through a dispensation.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, where there is the same reason for dispensation, the same dispensation should be made. But no other cause of the dispensation can be proposed than the multiplication of children for the worship of God, which is also necessary now. Therefore, the dispensation mentioned should have endured even until now, especially since it is not written that it has been revoked.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, in a dispensation a greater good should not be omitted for the sake of a lesser good. But fidelity and sacrament, which do not seem to be preserved in a marriage in which one man is joined to many wives, are greater things than the multiplication of children. Therefore, the dispensation mentioned could not have been in consideration of this multiplication.

On the contrary (1), Galatians 3 says that the Law was written because of wrongdoers precisely so that it might prohibit them. But the Old Law made mention of the plurality of wives without anything about its prohibition, as is clear from Deuteronomy 21:15*: if a man have two wives*. Therefore, they did not become wrongdoers by having two wives, and thus it was allowed.

Furthermore (2), this same thing is seen by the example of the holy patriarchs, who, we read, had many wives, although they were most acceptable to God, like Jacob, (See Genesis 29:16 and 35:23.) David, (See 2 Samuel 5:13.) and many others. (For example, Abraham (Gen 16:3 and 25:6); Elkanah (1 Sam 1:2); Joash (2 Chron 24:3).) Therefore, it was permitted at one time.

I answer that, as is clear from what has been said, a plurality of wives is said to be against the natural law, not as to its first precepts, but as to its second precepts, which are derived like conclusions from the first ones. But since human acts must be varied according to diverse conditions of persons and times, as well as other circumstances, these conclusions do not proceed from the first precepts of natural law as having efficacy always, but only for the most part. For such is the whole matter of morals, as is evident from the Philosopher in his book of the Ethics. (Aristotle says this several times; see, e.g., Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 1, ch. 3 (entire); ch. 7 (1098a20-b8); Bk. 2, ch. 2 (1104a1–11).) And therefore, where they lack efficacy, these things can be licitly overlooked.

But since it is not easy to determine when a variance is acceptable, therefore, it is reserved to the one whose authority gives the law efficacy, that he may grant permission to set aside the law in those cases that the law’s efficacy does not extend to; and this kind of permission is called a ‘dispensation’. Now the law of monogamy is not humanly ordained, but divinely instituted, not by word or writing handed down, but impressed on the heart, like those things that belong in any way to the law of nature. Therefore, in this matter, a dispensation could only have been made by God through interior inspiration, which indeed happened mainly to the holy patriarchs, and by their example it was concluded by others at that time that it was fitting for this precept of nature to be overlooked, so that the multiplication of children to be raised for the worship of God might be greater. For always the more principal end is more to be preserved than the secondary one. Therefore, since the good of children is the principal end of marriage, where the multiplication of offspring was necessary the impediment that might be caused to the secondary ends had to be ignored for a time. And the precept prohibiting a plurality of wives was ordered to removing this impediment, as is clear from what has been said.

Reply Obj. 1: Natural law has the same power always and everywhere, considered in itself. But in an incidental way it can be varied at certain times and places because of some impediment, as the Philosopher gives examples from other natural things in the same text. For always and everywhere the right hand is better than the left according to nature, but in an incidental way it befits some men to be ambidextrous, since our nature is variable. And it is similar with the naturally just, as the Philosopher says in the same place.

Reply Obj. 2: In the Decretals it says about divorce that it was never permitted to anyone to have several wives without a dispensation received by divine inspiration. (Gregory IX, Decretals, Bk. 4, tit. 19, ch. 8, “Gaudemus in Domino.”) Nor is such a dispensation given against the reasons that God instilled in nature, but over and above them. For those reasons are not ordained for always but rather for most cases, as was said, just as also it is not against nature when something miraculous happens among natural things over and above what normally happens.

Reply Obj. 3: However the law is, so should be the dispensation from the law. And since the natural law is not written in letters but impressed in hearts, it was not fitting for the dispensation of those things which belong to natural law to be given through a written law, but rather to be made through interior inspiration.

Reply Obj. 4: With the coming of Christ came the time of the fullness of the grace of Christ, through which the worship of God was diffused in all nations by spiritual propagation; and therefore there is not the same reason for a dispensation that there was before Christ, when the worship of God was increased and preserved through carnal propagation.

Reply Obj. 5: The good of matrimony that is offspring, includes remaining faithful to God. For children are only considered a good of marriage according as they are hoped for in order to be raised to the worship of God. Moreover, remaining faithful to God is more important than remaining faithful to one’s wife, which is another good of matrimony, and more important than the signification that belongs to the sacrament, for this signification is ordered to the understanding of the faith. Therefore, it is not unfitting if, for the sake of the good of offspring, something is taken away from the other two goods. Nor indeed are these goods destroyed entirely, for fidelity can also remain toward several women, and sacrament in a certain way, since although the union of Christ and his Church is not signified in there being one bride, still the distinction of levels of the Church is signified by the plurality of wives. And this distinction indeed not only exists in the Church Militant, but also in the Church Triumphant. Therefore, the marriages of those men signified in a certain way the union of Christ and the Church, not only the Militant Church, as certain people say, but also the Triumphant Church, in which there are many mansions.

Article 3

Whether having a concubine is against the law of nature

Quaestiuncula 1

Obj. 1: To the third question, we proceed thus. (Parallel: below, q. 2, a. 2, qa. 1, ad 2; ST II-II, q. 154, a. 2; SCG III, ch. 122; De malo, q. 15, a. 1.) It seems that to have a concubine is not against the law of nature. For ceremonial matters of law are not of natural law. But the prohibition of fornication is included with the other ceremonials of the law which were imposed for a time on believers who had come from the Gentiles in Acts 15. (See verses 20 and 29.) Therefore, simple fornication, which means approaching a concubine, is not against the law of nature.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, positive law is a development from natural law, as Cicero states. (Cicero, De inventione, Bk. 2, ch. 53, par. 160 (Teubner/Stroebel, 148).) But according to positive law, simple fornication is not prohibited, but rather to the contrary, according to the ancient laws women were condemned to be handed over to brothels as a punishment. (A footnote in the Editiones Paulinae Summa theologiae (at Suppl. q. 65, a. 3, obj. 2) says: “Christian virgins, when they refused to sacrifice to the gods, were de facto condemned to the brothels; e.g., Agnes—see Acta Sanctorum, January 21, Life of St. Agnes by St. Ambrose, ch. 2 (BL II, 716a); cf. Pseudo-Ambrose, Epist. 1, To Holy Virgins (PL 17:816); also Acta Sanctorum, Of SS. Didymus and Theodora, n. 2 (BL XII, 579c), where special legislation is alluded to.”) Therefore, to have a concubine is not against the law of nature.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, natural law does not prohibit that what is given simply may be given for a time and under a certain respect. But an unbound woman could give an unbound man power over her body for always, so that he could avail himself of her licitly, if she wanted. Therefore it is not against the law of nature if she gives him power over her body for an hour.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, whoever makes use of his own things as he wishes injures no one. But a slave-girl is the possession of her master. Therefore, if the master makes use of her at will, he does not injure anyone. And thus to have a concubine is not against the law of nature.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, anyone can give to another what is his own. But a wife has power over the body of her husband, as is clear from 1 Corinthians 7:4. Therefore, if the wife wished, the man could be joined with other women without sin.

On the contrary (1), according to all laws, children who are born of concubines are looked down upon. (See Gratian, Decretals, pt. 2, cause 32, q. 4, can. 15 “Liberi dicti.”) But this would not be the case unless the intercourse from which they arose were naturally shameful. Therefore, to have a concubine is against the law of nature.

Furthermore (2), as was said above in Distinction 26, marriage is natural. But this would not be true if without prejudice to natural law a man could be joined with a woman outside of marriage. Therefore, it is against the law of nature to have a concubine.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that to approach a concubine is not a mortal sin. (Parallels: ST II-II, q. 154, a. 2; SCG III, ch. 122; De malo, q. 15, a. 2.) For to tell a lie is a greater sin than simple fornication: which is evident from the fact that Judah, who was not loath to fornicate with Tamar, balked at telling a lie, saying, he will certainly not be able to charge us with lying (Gen 38:23). But to lie is not always a mortal sin. Therefore, neither is simple fornication.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, mortal sin should be punished by death. But the Old Law did not punish lying with a concubine by death, except in a certain case, as is clear from Deuteronomy 22:20–21. Therefore, it is not a mortal sin.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, according to Gregory, carnal sins are blamed less than spiritual sins. (Vives refers to Gregory, Moralia in Iob, Bk. 31, ch. 45 (PL 76:620); Parma refers to Moralia, Bk. 31, ch. 28; and the same passage cited in the Supplement is referred to Moralia, Bk. 33, ch. 12, n. 25 (PL 76:688).) But not every instance of pride or avarice is a mortal sin; and these are spiritual sins. Therefore, neither is all fornication, which is a carnal sin, mortal.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, where there is greater incitement, there is less of a sin: for that man sins more gravely who is overcome by a lesser temptation, as was said in Distinction 10. But concupiscence most greatly incites one to sexual things. Therefore, just as an act of gluttony is not always a mortal sin, neither will simple fornication always be a mortal sin.

On the contrary (1), nothing is excluded from the kingdom of God except mortal sin. But fornicators are excluded from the kingdom of God, as is clear from 1 Corinthians 6:9–10. Therefore, simple fornication is a mortal sin.

Furthermore (2), only mortal sins are crimes. But all fornication is a crime, as is evident in Tobit 4:13: refrain from all fornication, and beyond your wife never endure to know crime.

Quaestiuncula 3

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that at one time it was licit to have a concubine. (Parallels: below, q. 2, a. 2, qa. 1, ad 2; SCG III, ch. 125.) For just as having one wife belongs to the law of nature, so also having no concubine. But at one time it was permitted to have many wives. Therefore, it was also permitted to have a concubine.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, no woman can be at the same time wife and slave-girl; which is why, according to the Law, a slave-girl was rendered free by the very fact that she was taken in marriage. (See Deuteronomy 21:10.) But some of God’s most favored are said to have approached their slave-girls, like Abraham and Jacob. (See Genesis 16:3, 25:6, and 34:23.) Therefore, these women were not wives, and so at one time it was permitted to have concubines.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the woman who is taken in marriage cannot be sent away, and her son should take part in the inheritance. But Abraham sent away Hagar, and her son was not an heir. (See Genesis 21:10.) Therefore, Hagar was not Abraham’s wife.

On the contrary (1), those things that are against the precepts of the Decalogue were never allowed. But to have a concubine is against a precept of the Decalogue, namely: thou shalt not commit adultery. (Exodus 20:14.) Therefore, never was it permitted.

Furthermore (2), Ambrose says in the book on the patriarchs: what is not permitted to a wife is not permitted to a husband. (Ambrose, On Abraham, Bk. 1, ch. 4, par. 25: “omne stuprum adulterium est, nec uiro licet quod mulieri non licet (CSEL 32.1:519).) But it was never permitted for a woman to approach another man, after having sent away her own husband. Therefore, neither was it ever allowed to have a concubine.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

I answer that, as is clear from what has been said above, an action is said to be against natural law when it is not suited to the due end, either because it is not directed to it by the action of the agent, or because it is per se disproportionate to that end. However, the end that nature intends from sleeping together is the procreation and education of children. And so that this good might be sought, nature has built pleasure into intercourse, as Constantinus says. (The Vives edition gives the author as “Constantinus,” with further details in the Editiones Paulinae Summa at Suppl. q. 65, a. 3: Constantinus Africanus Cassinensis, De Coitu, in Opera Conquisita Undique magno Studio (Basel: H. Petrum, 1536), 299–307; here, 299; cf. Albertus Magnus, De Animal., Bk. 22, tr. 1, ch. 1 (BO XII:366). The Parma edition reads “Augustinus” and cites On Marriage and Concupiscence, Bk. 1, ch. 8, from which the same view can be elicited.)

Therefore, whoever makes use of intercourse because of the pleasure that is in it, without referring it to the end intended by nature, acts against nature; and also if the intercourse be such that it could not fittingly be ordered to that end. And since things are commonly named from their ends as from what is best in them, the union of matrimony takes its name from the good of offspring, which principally is sought through marriage, and in the same way the name of concubine expresses a union in which only sleeping together for its own sake is sought. And even if someone should seek children at some time from this kind of sleeping together, it is still not appropriate to the good of children, which is understood not only as procreation, in which a child is conceived, but also education and instruction, which includes nourishment and discipline from the parents. In these three things parents are bound to their children, according to the Philosopher in the Ethics 8. (See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 8, ch. 11 (1161a16) and ch. 12 (1162a6).)

Since, however, education and instruction are owed to the children by their parents for a long period of time, the law of nature requires that father and mother remain together for a long time for the shared care of the children. This is also the reason that birds that nourish their chicks together are not separated from the shared partnership which began with their mating, until the nurturing of the young has been completed. But this obligation of husband and wife remaining together is what makes matrimony. And therefore it is evident that to approach a woman not joined to oneself in marriage, which is called concubinage, is against the law of nature.

Reply Obj. 1: Among the gentiles, the law of nature was obscured regarding many things. For this reason, they did not consider it bad to approach a concubine, but they employed fornication far and wide like something licit, along with other things that were against the ceremonies of the Jews, although they were not against the law of nature. And therefore the apostles included the prohibition of fornication with ceremonials, because of the different judgments that existed about both matters among Jews and gentiles.

Reply Obj. 2: That law arose not from the instinct of the law of nature, but from the darkness into which the gentiles had fallen, not rendering the due glory to God, as it says in Romans 1:21. For this reason, when the Christian religion prevailed, that law was extirpated.

Reply Obj. 3: In some matters, when nothing unfitting follows if someone hands over completely to someone else a certain thing that is in his power, it would also not be unfitting if he handed it over for a time. So neither of these is against the law of nature. However, it is not like that in this matter. Therefore, the reasoning does not follow.

Reply Obj. 4: Injury is opposed to justice. However, natural law does not only prohibit injustice, but also those things opposed to any virtue, just as it is against natural law that someone eat immoderately, even though such a person using his own things does injury to no one. And furthermore, although a slave-girl is the possession of her lord as far as service goes, she is nevertheless not his possession as far as intercourse goes; and again, how someone uses his own belongings is important. Such a person also does injury to the children to be conceived, to whose good such a union is not sufficiently ordered, as was said in the response.

Reply Obj. 5: A woman has power over the body of her husband not simply-speaking with regard to all things, but only regarding the use of matrimony. Therefore, she cannot provide the body of her husband to another woman against the good of matrimony.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said, as was said in the body of Book II, Distinction 42, Question 1, Article 4, those acts that violate the covenant of friendship between man and God and man and man, are mortal sins by their genus. For these things are against the two precepts of charity, which is the life of the soul; therefore, since fornication destroys the due order of parent to child, which nature intends from intercourse, there is no doubt that simple fornication is by its own nature a mortal sin, even if there were not a written law.

Reply Obj. 1: Frequently a man who does not avoid mortal sin avoids some venial sin, toward which he does not have so much incitement; and this is the way that Judah avoided lying, without avoiding fornication, although that lie would have been pernicious, as having injury joined to it, if he had not fulfilled his promise. (See Genesis 38:17.)

Reply Obj. 2: A sin is not called ‘mortal’ because it is punished by temporal death, but because it is punished by eternal death. This is also why theft, which is a mortal sin, and many other things are sometimes not punished by temporal death under the laws; and the case is similar with fornication.

Reply Obj. 3: Just as not every movement of pride is a mortal sin, so neither is every movement of lust. For the first movements of lust and what accompanies them are venial sins, even marital intercourse. Sometimes, however, certain acts of lust are mortal sins, while certain movements of pride are venial. For in the words cited from Gregory a comparison is understood between vices according to genus, and not as regards single acts.

Reply Obj. 4: As was said above, in Distinction 16, Question 3, Article 2, Quaestiuncula 2, a circumstance that comes closer to the species of sin does more to make a sin worse. Therefore, although fornication may be mitigated by the amount of incitement, nonetheless, because of the matter that it deals with, it is more serious than inordinate eating, since it deals with fostering the bond of human society, as was said. Therefore, the argument does not follow.

Response to Quaestiuncula 3

To the third question, it should be said that Rabbi Moses says that before the time of the law fornication was not a sin, which he proves from the fact that Judah lay together with Tamar. (See Moses Maimonides, Guide for the Perplexed, pt. 3, ch. 49.) But this argument is not compelling. For it is not necessary to excuse the sons of Jacob from mortal sin, since they had been accused to their father of a most wicked crime (Gen. 37:2), and they had consented to the murder of Joseph or his sale into slavery. Thus it must be said that since it is against natural law to have a concubine not joined to one in marriage, as has been said, at no time was it permitted in itself, nor even by a dispensation. For as is evident from what has been said, to lie with someone to whom one is not married is not an act suitable to the good of children, which is the principal end of matrimony. And thus it is against the first precepts of natural law, which cannot receive a dispensation.

For this reason, wherever it is read in the Old Testament that someone who must be excused from mortal sin had concubines, we have to think of these women as joined in marriage, even though they are called concubines, for they have something of the character of wives, and something of the character of concubines. For inasmuch as marriage is ordained to its own principal end, which is the good of children, a wife is joined to her husband with an indissoluble union, or at least a long-lasting one, as is clear from what has been said; and against this there is no dispensation. But according to the second end, which is the management of the family and the sharing of labor, the wife is joined as a partner; and this would have been lacking in those who were called concubines, for in this there could have been a dispensation, since it is a secondary end of marriage; and in that regard they resembled concubines, by reason of which they were called concubines.

Reply Obj. 1: To have several wives is not against the law of nature in its first precepts, as to have a concubine is, as is clear from what has been said; therefore, the argument does not follow.

Reply Obj. 2: By the dispensation through which the patriarchs had many wives, they approached their slave-girls with the affection due to a wife. For they were wives as far as the principal and primary end of matrimony was concerned, but not as concerns that union which has to do with the secondary end, to which the condition of servitude is opposed, since they could not be at the same time partner and slave-girl.

Reply Obj. 3: As in the law of Moses it was permitted by a dispensation to give a writ of divorce in order to avoid wife-murder, as will be said, so by the same dispensation Abraham was permitted to send away Hagar for the signification of that mystery which the Apostle explains in Galatians 4. And also the fact that that son was not an heir belongs to the mystery, as is evident in the same place; just as also it pertains to the mystery that Esau, a free son, was not heir, (See Genesis 27.) as is clear from Romans 9. In the same way, because of the mystery it happened that the sons of Jacob born of his slave-girls and of free women were heirs, (See Genesis 49.) as Augustine says: for in baptism they are born in Christ, sons and heirs, both through good ministers, whom the free women signify, as well as through bad ministers, who are signified by the slave-girls. (Augustine, On Baptism, Against the Donatists, Bk. 1, ch. 10 (CSEL 51:160) and ch. 16 (169); Parma and Vives cite In Iohannis euangelium tractatus, Tract. 11, n. 8.)

Question 2

Divorce among the patriarchs

Next we inquire about the writ of divorce; and concerning this, three questions arise:

first, whether the indissolubility of marriage is of natural law;

• second, whether to divorce one’s wife was permitted at any time;
• third, the reasons for the writ of divorce permitted by the law, and its writing.
• Article 1

Whether the indissolubility of marriage is of natural law

Obj. 1: To the first question, we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST II-II, q. 154, a. 2; SCG III, ch. 123.) It seems that inseparability from one’s wife is not from natural law. For the law of nature is common to all. But no law has prohibited divorcing one’s wife apart from the law of Christ. Therefore, inseparability from one’s wife is not of the law of nature.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, sacraments are not of the law of nature. But the indissolubility of matrimony belongs to the good of sacrament. Therefore, it is not of natural law.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the union of man and woman in marriage is ordained principally to the generation, raising, and instruction of children, as was said. But all these things are completed at some certain time. Therefore, after that time it is permissible to send away one’s wife without any prejudice to the law of nature.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the good principally sought through matrimony is the good of offspring. But the indissolubility of matrimony is against the good of children; since, as the philosophers tell us, a certain man cannot receive children through a certain woman, even though he may be able to conceive through another woman, and she also might be able to be impregnated by another man. Therefore, the indissolubility of marriage is more against the law of nature than from it.

On the contrary (1), something is particularly of the law of nature which nature received well-embedded in its beginning. But the indissolubility of matrimony is this kind of thing, as is evident from Matthew 19. Therefore, it is of the law of nature.

Furthermore (2), it is by natural law that man does not go against God. But man would go against God in a certain way, if he separated what God had joined. Since then, this is the source of matrimony’s indissolubility (Matthew 19:6), it seems that it is from natural law.

I answer that, matrimony by the intention of nature is ordered to the education of children, not only for a certain time, but for the entire life of the children. For this reason it is from natural law that parents store up their treasure for their children, and children are the heirs of their parents. (See 2 Corinthians 12:14 and Romans 8:17.) Therefore, since children are a good shared by the husband and the wife, it is necessary for their association to remain undivided forever according to the dictates of the law of nature. Thus the indissolubility of marriage is of the law of nature.

Reply Obj. 1: Only the law of Christ brought the human genus to perfection, returning it to the state of newness of nature; for this reason, both in the law of Moses and in human laws what was against natural law could not entirely be erased: for this was reserved to the law of the Spirit and life alone.

Reply Obj. 2: Indissolubility belongs to matrimony both as it is a sign of the perpetual union of Christ and the Church, and as it is ordained in the office of nature for the good of children, as was said. But since the dissolution of a marriage is more directly repugnant to the signification of marriage than to the good of children, to which it is repugnant in its consequences, as was said, indissolubility of marriage is conveyed more by the good of the sacrament than by the good of children, although it can be conveyed by both. And as it belongs to the good of children it will belong to the law of nature; but not as it pertains to the good of sacrament.

The solution to the third objection is evident from what has been said.

Reply Obj. 4: Marriage is principally ordained to the common good by reason of its principal end, which is the good of offspring; although by reason of its secondary end it is ordained to the good of those contracting marriage, as it is per se a remedy for concupiscence. Therefore, marriage laws pay more attention to what will be helpful to all than to what may suit one person. Therefore, although the indissolubility of marriage may impede the good of children for a certain person, nevertheless, it is fitting to the good of offspring simply speaking, and for this reason the argument does not follow.

Article 2

Whether to divorce one’s wife was permitted at any time

Quaestiuncula 1

Obj. 1: To the second question, we proceed thus. It seems that to divorce one’s wife could never have been allowed through a dispensation. For what is against the good of offspring in marriage is against the first precepts of natural law, which do not admit of dispensation. But divorcing a wife is this kind of thing, as is clear from what has been said. Therefore, etc.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, a concubine differs from a wife precisely in the fact that she is not inseparably joined to the man. But to have concubines was not open to dispensation. Therefore, neither was divorcing one’s wife.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, men are now as capable of receiving dispensations as they were in former days. But nowadays a man cannot receive a dispensation in order to divorce his wife. Therefore, neither could he in ancient times.

On the contrary, Hagar was known by Abraham with uxorious affection, like a wife, as was said. But he himself sent her away by divine command, (See Genesis 21:10.) and he did not sin. Therefore, it could have been made licit through a dispensation that a man divorce his wife.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that under the law of Moses it was permitted to divorce one’s wife. (Parallels: Super Matt. 5 and 19; SCG III, ch. 123; Quodl. II, q. 5, a. 2, ad 1; Super I Cor. 7, lec. 1.) For one mode of consenting is to not prohibit when you could prohibit. But to consent to the illicit is illicit. Therefore, since Moses did not prohibit the divorce of one’s wife, (See Deuteronomy 24:1.) nor did he sin—for the law is holy, as is said in Romans 7:12—it seems that divorce was allowed at one time.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the prophets spoke inspired by the Holy Spirit, as is clear in 2 Peter 1:21. But Malachi 2:16 states: if you hate her, put her away. Therefore, since what the Holy Spirit inspires is not illicit, it seems that divorce of one’s wife was not always illicit.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, Chrysostom (Pseudo-Chrysostom, Opus Imperfectum in Matthaeum, Hom. 32, on Matthew 19:8 (PG 56:801).) says that as the Apostles permitted second marriages, (See 1 Corinthians 7:39.) so Moses permitted the writ of divorce. (Deuteronomy 24:1.) But second marriages are not a sin. Therefore, neither is the divorce of one’s wife under the law of Moses.

On the contrary (4), the Lord says that the writ of divorce was given by Moses to the Jews because of the hardness of their hearts. (Matthew 19:8.) But the hardness of their hearts did not excuse them from sin. Therefore, neither did the law concerning the writ of divorce.

Furthermore (5), Chrysostom comments on Matthew that Moses did not show the righteousness of God in giving the writ of divorce, because by the Law sin did not seem to be sin to those who did it. (In the passage from Pseudo-Chrysostom cited above.)

Quaestiuncula 3

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that it would be permissible for a divorced woman to have another husband. (Parallels: Super Matt. 5 and 19; Super I Cor. 7, lec. 3.) For in divorce the iniquity of the man divorcing her was greater than that of the woman divorced. But the man could take another woman as his wife without sin. Therefore, the woman could take another husband without sin.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, Augustine says about two wives that when it was the custom, it was not a sin. (See Augustine, Contra Faustum, Bk. 22, par. 47: “quando enim mos erat, crimen non erat; et nunc propterea crimen est, quia mos non est” (CSEL 25:639); cf. De doctrina Christiana, Bk. 3, ch. 12.) But in the time of the law, the custom was such that a divorced woman would take another husband, as is clear from Deuteronomy 24:2: and when, having departed, the woman takes another husband. Therefore, the woman was not sinning by joining herself to another.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, in Matthew 5, the Lord reveals the justice of the New Testament to be superabundant by comparison with the justice of the Old Testament. But he says that it belongs to the justice of the New Testament through its superabundance that a divorced woman does not take another husband. Therefore, it was allowed in the Old Testament.

On the contrary (4), it says in Matthew 19:9: whoever takes a divorced woman in marriage commits adultery. (Cf. Matthew 5:32.) But adultery was never permitted in the Old Testament. Therefore, neither was it permitted for a divorced woman to take another husband.

Furthermore (5), in Deuteronomy 24:4 it says that a divorced woman who has taken another husband has been defiled, made abominable before the Lord. Therefore, she sinned by taking another husband.

Quaestiuncula 4

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that it was permitted for a man to take back the wife he had divorced. (Parallel: Super I Cor. 7, lec. 3.) For it is permitted to correct what was wrongly done. But it was wrong that the man divorced his wife. Therefore, he was permitted to correct this by taking her back.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, it was always permitted to forgive sinners, since it is a moral precept, which remains in every law. But the man who took back his repudiated wife was forgiving her for having sinned. Therefore it was allowed.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, Deuteronomy 24:4 gives as the reason that she cannot be taken again for she is defiled. But a divorced woman is not defiled unless she takes another husband. Therefore, at least before she had taken another husband, it was permitted to take her back.

On the contrary, it says in Deuteronomy 24:4: the first husband cannot take her back.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

I answer that, giving a dispensation from a precept, especially those that come in some way from the law of nature, is like changing the course of a natural thing. Now the course of natural things can be changed in two ways. In one way, by some natural cause, by which another natural cause is impeded in its course, as it is in all those things in nature that occur by chance and infrequently. But this way of changing does not vary the course of those natural things that always happen, but only of those things that usually happen. In another way, natural things can be changed by an entirely supernatural cause, as occurs in miracles; and in this way not only can the natural course be changed that is ordained to happen usually, but even what is ordained to happen always, as is seen in the immobility of the sun at the time of Joshua, and its back-tracking at the time of Ezechiel, and of the miraculous eclipse at the time of the Passion of Christ. (See Joshua 10:12; Isaiah 38:8; Matthew 27:45, Mark 15:33, Luke 23:44.)

Now, the reason for dispensation from the precepts of natural law sometimes derives from lower causes. When it happens this way, the dispensation can deal with the second precepts of natural law, but not the first: for those are like things that always remain, as we said when discussing the plurality of wives and such matters. (Cf. ST I-II, q. 94, a. 5.) At other times, however, the dispensation derives only from superior causes, and then a dispensation can be divinely given even from the first precepts of natural law, by reason of some divine mystery of signifying or of showing, as was the case in the dispensation in the command made to Abraham of slaying his innocent son. (See Genesis 22:2.) But these dispensations are not given universally to all men, but to certain particular persons, as also happens with miracles.

Therefore, if the indissolubility of matrimony is contained among the first precepts of the law of nature, it only falls under dispensation according to this second way. If, however, it is among the second precepts of the law of nature, it could also fall under dispensation according to the first way. But it seems rather to be contained among the second precepts of natural law. For the indissolubility of matrimony is ordained to the good of offspring, which is the principal good of marriage, only in the fact that the things necessary for life should be provided for the children throughout their lives by the parents’ duly obtaining them. However, the acquisition of things like this is not nature’s first intention, according to which all things are in common. And therefore divorcing one’s wife does not seem to be against the first intention of nature; and as a result, neither is it against the first precepts, but against the second precepts of nature. For this reason, it also seems possible for it to fall under the first kind of dispensation.

Reply Obj. 1: As it belongs to nature’s first intention, the good of offspring means procreation, as well as nourishment and instruction until the children attain their majority. But what may be provided to them afterward through an inheritance and the discharge of other goods seems to belong to the second intention of natural law.

Reply Obj. 2: To have a concubine is against the good of offspring as concerns what nature intends for them by her first intention, namely, their rearing and instruction, which requires that their parents remain together for a long time; this does not occur with a concubine, who is taken up for a time; and therefore it is not the same. Nevertheless, as far as concerns the second dispensation, even to have a concubine can fall under dispensation, as is clear in Hosea 1:2.

Reply Obj. 3: Indissolubility, although it is a secondary aim of matrimony as it exists in the office of nature, nevertheless does relate to its primary aim insofar as it is a sacrament of the Church. And so as an instituted sacrament of the Church it cannot receive a dispensation while it remains such an institution, unless perhaps the second kind of dispensation.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it is to be said that there are two opinions about this. For some say that whoever sent away their wives under the Law by giving a writ of divorce were not excused from sin, although they might be excused from the punishment inflicted according to the laws; and for this reason Moses is said to have allowed the writ of divorce. And so they argue four ways of allowing it: first, through the lack of a precept, as when a greater good is not commanded, the lesser good is said to be permitted by God, for example, as the Apostle permitted matrimony by not commanding virginity in 1 Corinthians 7. Second, through the lack of a prohibition; as venial things are said to be permitted, since they were not prohibited. Third, through the lack of restraints; and in this way common sins are said to be allowed by God, inasmuch as he does not prevent them, when he could. Fourth, through the lack of punishment; and in this way the writ of divorce was permitted by the Law, not indeed because of any greater good to follow, as was the case with the dispensation for multiple wives, but because of the greater evil to be prevented, namely, the murder of the wife, which the Jews were prone to because of their corruption of irascibility, as also they were permitted to lend money to outsiders because of a certain corruption in concupiscibility, so that they would not commit usury against their own brethren. (See Deuteronomy 23:19.) And in the same way, because of the corruption of suspicion in their reason, a sacrifice of jealousy was permitted, (Numbers 5:12.) so that suspicion alone would not corrupt their judgment.

But since the Old Law, although not conferring grace, was in fact given for the sake of revealing sin, as the saints commonly say, (See, inter alia, John Chrysostom, On John, Hom. 10 (PG 60:478); Ambrosiaster, On Romans 5:20 (PL 17:103); Augustine, Propositions from the Letter to the Romans, Prop. 30 (PL 35:2068).) for this reason it seems to other people that if they had sinned in divorcing their wives, this at least should have been indicated to them by the law or the prophets; Isaiah 58:1: declare to my people . . . their sins. Otherwise it would seem to be extreme neglect, if those things that are necessary to salvation, which they did not know, were never announced to them; and we cannot say this, because the righteousness observed in the time of the Law merited eternal life. And because of this they say that although to divorce one’s wife is bad per se, still it was made licit by divine permission. And they confirm this by the authority of Chrysostom, who says that the divine legislator took away the blame from that sin when he permitted divorce. (In the passage from Pseudo-Chrysostom cited above.) And although this view is probable, nevertheless the first opinion is more commonly held; therefore, we must answer both arguments.

Reply Obj. 1: Someone who is able to prohibit an evil does not sin if he refrains from prohibiting it because he does not hope for any correction but rather judges that that the prohibition will occasion a greater evil. This was the case with Moses; and this is why, relying on divine authority, he did not prohibit the writ of divorce.

Reply Obj. 2: The prophets inspired by the Holy Spirit did not speak of sending away one’s wife as if it were the command of the Holy Spirit, but as being permitted so that greater evils would not happen.

Reply Obj. 3: One should not understand these permissions as similar in every respect, but as having the same cause, since both permissions were given in order to avoid baseness.

Reply Obj. 4: Although hardness of heart would not excuse sin, nonetheless, the permission given due to hardness of heart does excuse. For certain things are prohibited to the healthy which are not prohibited to the sick in body; nor do the sick sin by taking advantage of the permission granted them.

Reply Obj. 5: Something good can be omitted in two ways. In one way, because some greater good will result; and then the omission of that good receives its rectitude by its order to the greater good, as when Jacob justly departed from monogamy for the sake of the good of offspring. (See Genesis 30:1, 35:22.) In another way, something is omitted in order to avoid a greater evil. And then if it is done by the authority of him who has the ability to give a dispensation, the omission of such a good is not culpable, but neither does it acquire rectitude; and in this way the Law of Moses overlooked the indissolubility of marriage in order to avoid a greater evil, namely, wife-murder: and this is why Chrysostom says, as quoted above, that from the sin he removed the guilt. For even though some disorder remained in divorce, from which it is called a sin, nevertheless, it did not incur liability to a penalty, either temporal or perpetual, since it occurred by divine dispensation, and so guilt was removed from it. And this is why Chrysostom also says in the same place that divorce was allowed, not as an evil, but as something licit. Those who are of the first opinion explain this as meaning that it was only liable to a temporal penalty.

Response to Quaestiuncula 3

To the third question, it should be said that according to the first opinion the wife sinned when she joined herself with another man after her divorce, for her first marriage had still not been dissolved. For while the woman lives, she is bound by law to her husband, as is seen in Romans 7:2. Nor could she have had several husbands at the same time. But according to the other opinion, as it was permitted by a divine dispensation for a man to divorce his wife, so also a woman could have taken another husband. For the indissolubility of marriage was removed by reason of the divine dispensation, and the Apostle’s words are understood as applying to the case where inseparability is still in force.

Reply Obj. 1: Therefore, so that we may respond to both arguments, it must be said to the first that a man was permitted many wives at the same time according to a divine dispensation; and therefore, having sent away one wife, even if the marriage were not dissolved, he could take another. But never was a wife permitted to have multiple husbands, and therefore it is not the same.

Reply Obj. 2: In these words of Augustine, mores are not taken as ‘customs,’ but rather as ‘just acts,’ according as from mores one is said to be law-abiding or morigeratus, because he is of good morals, or as from mores moral philosophy is named. (See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 2, ch. 1 (1103a14).)

Reply Obj. 3: In Matthew 5 the Lord shows that the New Law exceeds the Old by its counsels, not only as concerns those things which the Old Law made licit, but also with respect to the things which were illicit in the Old Law, but were considered licit by many because of the incorrect exposition of the precepts, as is clear in the case of hatred of enemies; (Matthew 5:43.) and thus it is also with divorce.

Reply Obj. 4: These words of the Lord are understood as regards the time of the New Law in which the permission mentioned was taken away; and in this way also are understood the words of Chrysostom, (Pseudo-Chrysostom, Opus Imperfectum in Matthaeum, Hom. 12, on Matthew 5:32.) who says that whoever sends away his wife according to the law, commits four iniquities: for in this he appears as a killer before God, inasmuch as he intends to kill his wife unless he sends her away; and since he sends away someone who is not a fornicator, which is the only case in which the law of the Gospel allows someone to send away his wife; and similarly because he makes of her an adulterer, as well as the man with whom she has relations.

Reply Obj. 5: A certain interlinear gloss on Deuteronomy 24 says, she has been defiled and is abominable, namely, in the judgment of the one who first sent her away as though defiled. (See Glossa interl., on Deuteronomy 24:4 (I, 358v); cf. Rabanus Maurus, On Deuteronomy, Bk. 3, ch. 13, on the same verse.) And thus it is not necessary that she be defiled simply speaking. Or she is called defiled in the way that someone was called unclean if he touched a corpse or a leper: (See Numbers 19:11 and 19:22; Leviticus 13:48.) not the uncleanliness of guilt, but of a certain legal irregularity; for which reason it was also not permitted for a priest to take a widow or a divorced woman as his wife. (Leviticus 21:14.)

Response to Quaestiuncula 4

To the fourth question, it should be said that in the law regarding the writ of divorce two things were allowed: namely, to send away one’s wife and for the divorced wife to be joined with another; and two things were commanded: namely, the writing of writs of divorce, and that the divorcing husband could not take his wife back again, which, indeed, according to those who hold to the first opinion, was done to punish the woman who married another, and in this sin, she was defiled. But according to others, it was so that a man could not lightly divorce his wife, whom afterward he would in no way be able to recover.

Reply Obj. 1: In order to impede that evil which a man committed by divorcing his wife, it was ordained that a man could not remarry the wife he had divorced, as is clear from what has been said. And therefore this was divinely ordained.

Reply Obj. 2: It was always permissible to forgive a sinner as far as concerns the bitterness of heart, but not as concerns the penalty divinely exacted.

Reply Obj. 3: In this there are two opinions. For certain people say that it was allowed for a man to be reconciled with the wife he had divorced, unless she had been joined in marriage with another: for then because of the adultery to which the woman had voluntarily subjected herself, she was given the penalty that she could not return to her first husband. But since the Law universally prohibits it, therefore others say that even before she married another, she could not be taken back, because of the fact that she was divorced: for this defilement is not understood as guilt, but as was explained above.

Article 3

The reasons for the writ of divorce permitted by the law, and its writing

Quaestiuncula 1

Obj. 1: To the third question, we proceed thus. It seems that hatred of one’s wife was a reason for divorce, according to what is said in Malachi 2:16*: if you hate her, send her away*.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, in Deuteronomy 24:1 is said*: since she has not found grace in his eyes because of some foulness, he shall write a writ of divorce*. Therefore, the same as before.

On the contrary (3), barrenness and fornication are more opposed to matrimony than hatred. Therefore, they should have been the cause of divorce rather than hatred.

Furthermore (4), hatred can be engendered because of the virtue of the one who is hated. If therefore, hatred is a sufficient cause, then the woman could be divorced because of her own virtue; which is absurd.

Furthermore (5), in Deuteronomy 22 it says*: if a man has taken his own wife, and afterward has hatred for her*, and has charged her with unchastity or carnal union, if he fails to prove it, he will be flogged, and he will be fined a hundred shekels of silver, and he will not be able to send her away all the days of his life. Therefore, hatred is not a sufficient cause of divorce.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the causes of the divorce should have been recorded in the writ. (Parallel: Super Matt. 5.) For by the writ of divorce the husband was absolved from the penalty of the law. But this seems unjust in every way, unless sufficient causes for the divorce were specified. Therefore, it was necessary to write them in the writ.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, it seems that what was written was only helpful for displaying the causes of the divorce. Therefore, if they were not written, that writ was served in vain.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the Master says this in the text.

On the contrary, the causes of the divorce were either sufficient or not. If sufficient, they prevented the woman from seeking a second marriage, which was conceded to her according to the law. If, though, they were insufficient, the divorce was shown to be unjust, and so the divorce could not happen. Therefore, in no way were the causes of the divorce to be detailed in the writ.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

I answer that, the reason for the permission to divorce one’s wife was the avoidance of wife-murder, as the saints commonly say. (See John Chrysostom, On Virginity, ch. 41 (PG 48:563); Jerome, On Matthew, Bk. 3, on Matthew 19:8; Augustine, On the Good of Marriage, ch. 8 (PL 40:379).) However, the proximate cause of homicide is hatred; and therefore the proximate cause of divorce is hatred. But hatred stems from some cause, just as love does; and therefore also it is necessary to state certain other remote causes, which were the reason for the hatred. However, Augustine says in the Gloss on Deuteronomy 24: many were the reasons in the law for sending away one’s wife: Christ excepted only fornication; he commands other troubles to be endured for the sake of the fidelity and chastity of the union. (Glossa ordin. (I, 358 F); cf. Augustine, On the Lord’s Sermon on the Mount, Bk. 1, ch. 14 (PL 34:1248).) And these reasons are understood as foulness in the body, like infirmity or some observable stain; or in the soul, like fornication, or something of this kind, which makes for dishonor in morals. But certain people restrict these reasons more, saying more probably that it was not permitted to divorce one’s wife except for some reason arising after marriage; nor for any reason whatsoever, but only on account of things that can impede the good of offspring, either in the body, as sterility or leprosy or something like that, or in the soul, as for example if she were of bad morals, which her sons might imitate from spending time with her. But a certain gloss on that verse of Deuteronomy 22:1: when she has not found grace, etc., seems more strict, namely, for sin, when he says there, by foulness is understood offense. (Glossa interl. (I, 358v); cf. Glossa ordin. (I, 358 E).) But the offense the gloss names is not only in the habits of the soul, but also in the nature of the body.

Therefore, we concede the first two points.

Reply Obj. 3: Sterility and other things of this kind are causes of hatred; and thus they are remote causes.

Reply Obj. 4: No one is worthy of hatred because of his virtue, speaking per se, for goodness is a cause of love; and thus the argument does not follow.

Reply Obj. 5: That a man could never send away his wife was given to him as punishment, as also in another case when a man had deflowered a girl. (Deuteronomy 22:28.)

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that the reasons for the divorce were not recorded in the writ in particular, but in general, so that the divorce might be shown to be just. But according to Josephus, (Josephus, Antiquities, Bk. 4, ch. 8, n. 23; cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa, pt. 3, q. 46, m. 2, a. 5 (III, 168vb).) it was so that a woman having a written writ of divorce might marry another: for otherwise, it would not have been given to her; thus, according to him, the writing was thus: I promise to you that I will never come together with you. (Ibid.) But according to Augustine, the writ was written for this reason, that in the period of time intervening, and by the dissuading advice of the scribes, the man might desist from his plan of divorcing. (Augustine, Contra Faustum, Bk. 19, ch. 26 (CSEL 25:527).)

And by this the solution to the objections is evident.

Question 3

Virginity

Next we will inquire about virginity, and regarding this, three questions arise:

first, what virginity is;

• second, whether it is a virtue;
• third, its comparison with the other virtues.
• Article 1

What virginity is

Obj. 1: To the first question, we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST II-II, q. 152, a. 1; Quodl. VI, q. 10, a. 1.) It seems that virginity is not a perpetual meditation of incorruption in corruptible flesh, as Augustine says in his book On Marriage and Concupiscence. (Not this work of Augustine’s, but rather, On Virginity, ch. 13, par. 12: “uirginalis autem integritas et per piam continentiam ab omni concubitu inmunitas angelica portio est et in carne corruptibili incorruptionis perpetuae meditatio” (CSEL 41:245).) For after the resurrection the holy virgins will not lose their virginity. But at that time they will not be in corruptible flesh. Therefore, the corruptibility of the flesh should not be included in the definition of virginity.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, virginity is counted as a part of continence, which can be traced back to temperance. But meditation is not an act of temperance, but rather of intellectual virtue. Therefore, it should not be set down as the genus of virginity.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, virginity is not a stronger good than charity or other virtues, but on the contrary, a more fragile one. But perpetuity does not belong to the nature of charity: otherwise charity once possessed would not be lost; which was disproved in Book III, Distinction 31, Question 1, Article 1. Therefore, neither should perpetuity be placed in the definition of virginity.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the perpetual meditation of incorruption is destroyed by corruption of mind, about which it says in Matthew 5:28: whoever has looked upon a woman with lust has already committed adultery with her in his heart. But this does not take away virginity, for such a corruption can be repaired, while virginity cannot, as it says in the text. Therefore, virginity is not the perpetual meditation of incorruption.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, the perpetual meditation of incorruption is lost without sleeping together, not only in the mind, but also in the flesh, as is seen in those sins which are against nature. But virginity is not lost without sleeping together, for as Augustine says in the book On Virginity: virginity is abstinence from any sleeping together by a faithful continence. (This statement is from the same passage cited just above.) Therefore, the same as above.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, Ambrose states in his book On Virginity that virginity is an integrity that has no share in contagion. (Ambrose, On Virginity, Bk. 1, ch. 5, par. 21 (Biblioteca Ambrosiana, 14.1; PL 16:205).) But the body is contaminated by nocturnal emissions. Therefore, virginity is lost by this, but the perpetual meditation of incorruption is not; therefore, etc.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, virginity can be destroyed by violence: otherwise, the man who contracts marriage with someone who has been deflowered by another through violence would not be made irregular. But such an event would not affect the perpetual meditation of incorruption. Therefore, the same as before.

I answer that, virginity, as is clear from the words of Ambrose, is a certain integrity; for which reason it is named from the absence of the corruption that occurs in the act of generation, where there are three kinds of corruption. First, a merely bodily corruption, in the fact that the hymen is broken. Another is both spiritual and physical, from the fact that the release and movement of semen generates pleasure in the senses. The third is spiritual alone, from the fact that reason subjects itself to this pleasure, in which it loses integrity as far as its own act goes, since in that act it is impossible to understand anything, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 7. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 7, ch. 11 (1152b18).) For this reason, the very absorption of reason is called a corruption. However, this third corruption is not an act of reason, but a certain passion, coming to it per accidens from the passion of the inferior parts, just as by sleep or madness or other bodily passions it happens that the act of reason is impeded per accidens.

Since, therefore, virtue and vice arise from reason’s act of consenting and dissenting, sufficient reason for virtue or vice is not found in any of the corruptions mentioned above, but it is necessary to add the consent or dissent of reason. And because virginity in the genus of moral acts belongs to virtue, St. Lucy said that the body is not defiled without consent of the mind, (See Jacobus de Voragine, Golden Legend, ch. 4 (Ryan, 1:28); cf. Mombritius, Sanctuarium, Passio S. Luciae virginis et martyris (II, 108.38).) namely, by that defilement which is opposed to the purity of virginity. Therefore, the first corruption, which is only bodily, is not a matter of virtue or vice, unless per accidens by some mediating passion of the soul; for which reason, if the hymen were ruptured by some incision, there would not be in this a greater detriment to virginity than if a foot or hand were cut off by a sword. But the second and third kinds of corruption are matters of virginity and its opposite, as also other passions of the soul are matters of moral virtue and the opposed vices. But the defilement that virginity opposes, and consequently virginity itself, are finally completed in reason’s act of choosing or repudiating the corruptions mentioned. This is why Augustine included in the definition above that it is rooted in the reason: namely, meditation, as the genus of virginity, taking the act in place of the habit, as is often done; and he included incorruption as the object or matter; but he adds a determinate subject by saying in corruptible flesh; for privation and possession are such as to happen in the same thing.

Reply Obj. 1: Although after the resurrection, the saints may not have corruption of the flesh, still they will have the nature of the flesh, which was corruptible. This is why virginity will be able to exist in them as in a subject, but not in the angels, who are not such as to suffer the corruption that virginity opposes. And this is enough especially for the notion of virginity, which not only concerns what is present, but what is past. For someone is not a virgin simply by the fact that he is not corrupted, but also by the fact that he never was corrupted.

Reply Obj. 2: Although an act of moral virtue is completed in the will, nonetheless reason puts the form of virtue in it, as is said in the Ethics 6; indeed, this is why the Socratics called all the virtues ‘knowledge.’ (See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 6, ch. 13; Bk. 7, ch. 2.) And Augustine uses this way of speaking here by setting down meditation in place of choice.

Reply Obj. 3: In the act of virtue not only is discernment required on the part of reason, but also a certain firmness from a habit tending toward the act after the manner of nature. And just as natural causes, in and of themselves, are immovably ordained to their proper effects, by reason of which we can say that a stone always descends downward, even though this can sometimes be impeded; so also the habit of virtue, in and of itself, is immovably ordained to its proper act, although sometimes the one having it performs a contrary act. And by reason of this lasting immovability, permanence is usually included in the definitions of virtues, as is stated in the beginning of the Digests, that justice is a constant and perpetual will. (Justinian, Institutes, Bk. 1, title 1.) And this is also how Augustine includes perpetuity in the definition of virginity, even though sometimes those who have virginity lose it; as also in the definition the discretion of choice, which the act of virginity has as far as it belongs to the genus of morals, is understood by meditation, but immobility is understood from perpetuity.

Reply Obj. 4: There are two kinds of corruption of the mind, as can be gathered from what has been said. One corruption is like a passion of the mind, when the mind is subject to the pleasure which usually occurs in intercourse. And since this pleasure is completed in the release of semen, such a corruption of mind cannot happen without a corruption of the flesh, which is said to occur by the release of semen. However, there is another corruption of mind, which is its act: namely, the consent to or the choice of the corruption described above. But since the inferior powers follow the movement of the superior ones, it sometimes happens that by the act of the mind thinking about the corruption of the flesh, and intending to experience its pleasure, heat is excited in the body, semen is released, and pleasure is caused in which the mind is suffocated just as in intercourse. And then, without a doubt, virginity is lost. If, though, the corruption remains in the mind’s act of consenting, virginity is indeed lost according to what is formally held in the mind, but not by reason of what is materially in it. For this reason such a person can only be called a virgin materially. And therefore, this loss of virginity can be restored, but not that loss of virginity in which also what is material is taken away. For virginity on the part of its act has to do only with the present or the future, as it is in any other virtue. For choice has to do with the present or the future, but not past. But on the part of the matter, it does not just have to do with the present, but also the past. For someone is called a virgin who has chosen incorruption, which is the matter in virginity, which he has never lost and does possess and intends to preserve. But it is not required that he had never made the opposite choice, but that he never had the opposite corruption. For this reason, lost virginity can never be restored, since what transpired in the past cannot be recovered.

Reply Obj. 5: As for those who corrupt themselves without sleeping together, there is no doubt that they lose their virginity, even as concerns what is material in it. For even if sleeping together does not take place, still the pleasure is present that causes the corruption of virginity in sleeping together. If, however, lust contrary to nature occurs before adulthood is reached, since there is no release of semen, and as a result neither does complete pleasure suffocate the mind, virginity is not lost as to what is material in it.

Reply Obj. 6: The passions of the sensitive part cannot be the matter of virtue unless according as they are ordered by reason establishing a mean in them, just as the concupiscible appetite and the irascible appetite obey reason. And therefore the pleasure that occurs during sleep with the release of semen is not a matter of virtue, and because of this neither does such corruption destroy the incorruption that is the matter of virginity; and therefore such pollution does not cause the loss of virginity. And the same reasoning holds true of women who, while sleeping and drunk or senseless, are known by men, unless perhaps they went to sleep with this intention, that they should be known by a man.

Reply Obj. 7: Something whose principle is completely outside it is not orderable by reason; and thus, by the same token, neither do those women lose their virginity who are corrupted through violence either by a man, or by an incubus, if they resist as much as they can, so that they keep their bodies free from corruption, or at least their minds opposed to consenting. Nonetheless, because the fact that something external is done matters more in the signification of the sacraments than that something happens interiorly, a man who took a violently deflowered virgin as his wife would incur that irregularity caused by a defect in the signification of the sacrament. And this is particularly the case because it is most difficult to dissent from such pleasure in that state, because reason is suffocated due to the extreme pleasure of that act; and therefore the presumption seems to be that she consented.

Article 2

Whether it is a virtue

Obj. 1: To the second question, we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST I-II, q. 64, a. 1, ad 3; II-II, q. 152, aa. 2–3; In IV Sent. d. 26, q. 1, a. 2; SCG III, ch. 136; Super Eth. 2, lec. 2; De malo, q. 15, a. 2, ad 13; De virt. in comm., a. 13, ad 6; De virt. card., a. 2, ad 7.) It seems that virginity is not a virtue. For all virtue consists in a mean. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 2, ch. 2 (1104a10–26).) But virginity does not consist in a mean, but precisely in an extreme. For it consists in abstaining from everything delectable, which chastity governs. Therefore, it is not a virtue.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the use of a virtue, since it is from natural law, was allowed in every age. But in the state of created nature it was not permitted to keep one’s virginity, for that was against the precept, as Genesis 1:28 has it: increase and multiply; likewise, neither in the time of the law of Moses, when whoever did not leave behind on the earth any of his progeny was subject to the curse of the law. (It is hard to find a particular passage in the Mosaic law that curses one who does not leave behind progeny; perhaps Thomas is thinking of the law that prescribes that a brother must raise up offspring for his brother (Deut 25:5–10; cf. Gen 38:8), or of the fact that offspring are frequently stated to be a blessing (e.g., Deut 30:9), which makes the lack of them seem to be a sign of accursedness (see Ex 23:26; Deut 7:14; 1 Kgs 14:10; 1 Kgs 21:21–22).) Therefore, virginity is not a virtue.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, there is no virtue which can be lost without sin, and which cannot be recovered by repentance. But virginity is lost without sin in the marital act, nor can it be restored by repentance. Therefore, it is not a virtue.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, every virtue is an acquired or infused habit. But virginity exists in those who have no acquired or infused habit, as in unbaptized children. Therefore, it is not a virtue.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, every virtue is ordained to some act. Virginity, however, is not, but implies rather the privation of an act. Therefore, it is not a virtue.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, whoever has one virtue has all virtues. But someone who lacks virginity sometimes has other virtues. Therefore, virginity is not a virtue.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, no one uses virtue badly. But some people use virginity badly, as is clear in the case of the foolish virgins in Matthew 25. Therefore, it is not a virtue.

Obj. 8: Furthermore, virginal continence is divided against marital continence and that of widows. But marriage is not considered a virtue, nor is widowhood. Therefore, neither is virginity a virtue.

On the contrary (1), it says in 1 Corinthians 7:7: each has his proper gift from God, and he is speaking of virginity. But the spiritual gifts of God are virtues. Therefore, virginity is a virtue.

Furthermore (2), Ambrose states in his book On Virginity: the love of virginity invites us to say something about virginity, lest as if by a certain omission, we should seem to pass by what is the chief virtue. (Ambrose, On Virginity, Bk. 1, ch. 3, par. 10: “Inuitat nunc integritatis amor et tu, soror sancta, uel mutis tacita moribus, ut aliquid de uirginitate dicamus, ne ueluti transitu quodam perstricta uideatur quae principalis est uirtus” (Biblioteca Ambrosiana, 14.1; PL 16:202).)

Furthermore (3), only a virtue merits a reward. But a reward is owed to virginity, namely the hundredfold fruit, as the saints say, (See the following texts of Jerome: Against Jovinian, Bk. 1, ch. 3 (PL 23:223); Epist. 123, Ad Ageruch. (PL 22:1052); On Matthew, Bk. 2, on 13:23 (PL 26:92), cited in the Glossa ordin. (V, 45 A) on the same passage; cf. Augustine, Quaestiones euangeliorum, Bk. 1, ch. 9, on Matthew 13:23 (CCSL 44B).) and the crown of distinction. (As Thomas explains elsewhere (e.g., In IV Sent., d. 49, q. 5, a. 1), the aurea or corona refers to the essential reward, beatitude itself, while the aureola refers to an added reward, a special distinction awarded to some of the blessed for special heroism, such as virginity or martyrdom.) Therefore, it is a virtue.

I answer that, just as giving and expenses are the matter of liberality, so are sexual pleasures the matter of chastity and continence. However, within the genus of giving, an abundance of expense requires a special virtue, which is called magnificence, because of its difficulty. And since temperance or chastity involves great difficulty in restraining pleasures, for this reason what particularly contains the most difficulty in this area, namely fortification against every corruption of carnal pleasure, requires a special virtue, which is called virginity. Therefore if virginity is taken for its complete notion, as was said, then virginity is a special virtue. For then it implies nothing else but the choice of preserving incorruption; and this choice, if it is carried out, must proceed from some habit of virtue. Nonetheless, virginity adds beyond this a state of the virtue, the state in which the habit can issue in its act. But it can only issue in the act of choosing to preserve one’s incorruption if one is incorrupt; for there is no choosing an impossible thing, and it is impossible to recover incorruption once lost. But it is possible to recover the matter of magnificence once lost, and in this regard magnificence and virginity are dissimilar. Others say, however, that virginity does not name a virtue, but a perfect state of virtue, and with this understanding the saints sometimes call it a virtue; and according to this opinion it is easy to answer the objections. However, maintaining the first opinion, we must reply to the objections.

Reply Obj. 1: Among theologians, some say that virtue is not always a mean. But those saying this do not know what the mean of virtue is. For since the mean of virtue is taken according to right reason, if something is not in the mean, it is not according to right reason. And thus it can be neither praiseworthy nor virtuous. And therefore it is to be said that virginity is in the mean of right reason, because indeed the mean is not always taken according to the quantity of whatever the virtue deals with, which quantity is between too much and too little. For certain virtues exist which attain the maximum quantity in their proper matter, as, for example, no one dignifies himself in greater ways than the magnanimous man, nor does anyone make greater expenditures than the magnificent man, as is evident from the Ethics 4. (See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 4, chs. 1 and 2.) But it is taken according to the proportion of all circumstances attending the act. And thus that man who gives the most gifts attains the mean by preserving moderation in giving to whom he should and what he should and for the correct reason; and there is excess in what is given where it should not be or for a reason for which it should not be, even if greater things were given. It is the same way also with virginity: although it lies at the extreme as far as what it deals with, since it abstains from every corrupting pleasure, yet it is in the mean inasmuch as it observes the other due circumstances in a moderate way; and it would be excess if someone wanted virginity when he should not, as in the time of the law of Moses, or for a reason for which he should not, as with the vestal virgins; and similarly according to the other circumstances.

Reply Obj. 2: As was said, the mean of virtue is taken according to the relation of circumstances to right reason. And since time is one of the circumstances, it is not unfitting that something is not allowed at one time, which is permitted or virtuous if it is done at another time. And therefore, if at the time when God wished men to pursue the increase of the human race or of divine worship by the conjugal act, someone preserved incorruption by his own idea, he would have been at the extreme of defect, for he would have abstained from pleasurable things when he should not have. But afterward, once the multiplication of the human race or of those worshiping God was sufficiently completed, he would not have sinned by keeping his virginity even under the law of Moses, or in the state of unfallen nature, if man had not sinned. Nor would he have acted against a precept, but above a precept, since multiplication could have occurred through others.

Reply Obj. 3: That state of a virtue in which a virtue can issue in its act can be lost, never to be recovered by penance, with or without sin indifferently. For example, the richest, most generous person can give all his belongings to the poor, and thus without any sin of his own, it happens to him that he will not be able to continue in an external act of this virtue. If, however, he consumes his own resources in base uses, this will involve sin; nor will he recover the first state by penance. And likewise virginity, which names that state of the virtue in which virtue can issue in its act, is lost both by sin in fornication, and without sin in the marital act; nor is it ever recovered by penance.

Reply Obj. 4: The matter of virginity can exist in those people who have no habit of virtue, as in children before baptism, in whom there is the first level of virginity which nature has given; and also in those who wish to preserve the aforesaid incorruption for a time, but with the design of marrying in its own time, who have the second level of virginity, though they are only called virgins materially. But the complete account of virginity, insofar as it is a virtue, only exists in those who have made a choice of preserving the integrity guarded thus far until the end, either with a vow or without a vow. And this choice cannot be perfect without a habit informing it. But if it be unformed, then it will be the kind of act of virtue that precedes virtue, just as also happens with other acts of virtue.

Reply Obj. 5: Temperance, as was stated in Book III, Distinction 33, Question 3, Article 2, Quaestiuncula 1, consists chiefly in controlling pleasures, for which reason it has as its principal intention a certain interior act, namely the choice of restraining concupiscence. But it does not have an external act as concerns what is principal in it, except incidentally and as a result, namely in the fact that it employs certain external acts to control pleasures, like turning away from the sight of concupiscible things, and these acts it commands more than it elicits. For enjoying pleasures according to the measure of reason belongs to the secondary intention of temperance. And since virginity is the chief virtue in temperance, it does not have an external act except as a consequence, but it restrains any use whatsoever of concupiscence.

Reply Obj. 6: That man who has one virtue has all of them in a certain way, but not as regards everything that is in a virtue; for example, someone who has liberality sometimes does not have magnificence as regards that state which could result in an external act. And likewise, not everyone who has temperance has the state that virginity signifies, because of an imperfection, although he may have what establishes the character of virtue in virginity; just as, on the other hand, because of his perfection, Christ has charity, but not faith, because of the state of imperfection that faith carries with it, even though he has whatever belongs to perfection and virtuousness in faith.

Reply Obj. 7: Someone can employ badly the matter of virginity (which the foolish virgins can possess), but not virginity considered under its full account.

Reply Obj. 8: Widowhood and matrimony do not imply another level in the matter of temperance, as virginity does; and so the account is not similar.

Article 3

Its comparison with the other virtues

Obj. 1: To the third question, we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST II-II, q. 152, a. 5.) It seems that virginity is greater than all virtues. For beauty belongs to the notion of virtue. But the beauty of virginity is the greatest. Therefore, it is the greatest of the virtues. Proof of the middle term: Ambrose says in his book On Virginity: who can deem a greater comeliness than this beauty, namely that of a virgin, who is loved by the king, tried by the judge, dedicated to her lord, consecrated to God, always a bride, always untouched, so that neither will her love come to an end, nor her chastity to loss. Now there is nothing lacking from this true comeliness, which alone deserves to hear from the king: you are completely lovely, etc. (Ambrose, On Virginity, Bk. 1, ch. 7, par. 37 (Biblioteca Ambrosiana, 14.1; PL 16:210).)

Obj. 2: Furthermore, Cyprian states: now we must speak to the virgins; for whom we have the greater care, the more sublime is their glory. Their flower is that of the ecclesiastical seed, their splendor and adornment that of spiritual grace, their portion the more illustrious of the flock of Christ. (Cyprian, De habitu uirginum, ch. 3: “Nunc nobis ad uirgines sermo est, quarum quo sublimior gloria est maior et cura est. Flos est ille ecclesiastici germinis, decus adque ornamentum gratiae spiritalis, laeta indoles, laudis et honoris opus integrum adque incorruptum, Dei imago respondens ad sanctimoniam Domini, inlustrior portio gregis Christi” (CSEL 3.1:189).) Therefore, the same as above.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the greater prize is owed to the greater virtue. But to virginity is owed the greatest prize, namely the hundredfold fruit and the crown of distinction. (Aquinas uses aureola, “little crown,” to express an added honor or special distinction awarded to some of the blessed in addition to the aurea, “golden crown,” which represents the essential reward of heavenly beatitude.) Therefore, etc.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the greatest dignity of the virtues is that by them we are joined to God. But virginity joins one to God most closely; for incorruption brings one close to God, as is said in Wisdom 5. (Perhaps reference is intended to Wisdom 3:13–14.) And in the Book of Revelation it says that virgins follow the Lamb wheresoever he may go. (Revelation 14:3–4.) Therefore, it is the greatest of the virtues.

On the contrary (5), it says in the text that the celibacy of John is not preferred to the marriage of Abraham.

Furthermore (6), Bernard, in his homily on the Gospel of the Annunciation, says that the humility of Mary was more pleasing (to God, that is) than her virginity. (See Bernard, Homilies on the “Missus est” (also known as Sermons in Praise of the Virgin Mother), hom. 1, par. 5: “Pulchra permixtio virginitatis et humilitatis, nec mediocriter placet Deo illa anima, in qua et humilitas commendat virginitatem, et virginitas exornat humilitatem” (Bernardi opera, ed. Leclercq and Rochais, 4:17).) Therefore, virginity is not the greatest of virtues.

I answer that, one virtue, both as concerns its act and as concerns its habit, can be said to be more excellent than another in two ways: namely, per se and per accidens. Indeed, an act of virtue is measured per se by reason of its object, from which it has its species, but per accidens on the part of its subject, as an act is called better even in small things, if it is done with a more prompt will, or at a more opportune time, and so on infinitely in other ways, for per accidens causes are infinite. And because of this art does not deal with them.

Therefore, having omitted this comparison, it must be known that since spiritual good is nobler and better than the good of the body, those virtues that have as their object a spiritual good are simply speaking better than those that have something bodily or related to the body as their object. And thus intellectual and theological virtues are nobler than moral virtues, which in a certain way deal with physical acts and passions; and among moral virtues, that one is better, speaking per se, which approaches most closely to the intellectual virtues, and this closeness occurs in two different ways. In one way, as to the suitability of the subject, and thus justice, which is in the will, is the highest and most noble; and after this, fortitude, which is in the irascible appetite, which is like a kind of border between reason and sensuality, as was said in Book III, Distinction 26, Question 1, Article 1; and, lastly, temperance, which is in the concupiscible appetite. In another way the closeness of a moral virtue to intellectual virtue can be seen in the degree to which it is disposed to it. And thus among the other moral virtues, the closest is temperance, because by pleasures, which are its matter, reason is bound to be weakened the most; and among the parts of temperance, particularly chastity, because in the pleasures that it deals with, reason is completely overcome. For this reason the Commentator comments on Book 7 of the Physics (Averroes, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, Bk. 7, comment 20.) that chastity is worth the most to the speculative sciences, and in the genus of chastity, especially virginity. So, therefore, it must be said that virginity is not nobler than all the other virtues, but it is nobler in a certain way than all the moral virtues, and, per se and simply speaking, than all the other species of temperance.

Reply Obj. 1: Those pleasures that temperance is concerned with are the basest because they are shared by us and animals, as is clear in the Ethics 7. (Parma and Vives send us to Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 7, ch. 3, but the reference is surely to Bk. 3, ch. 10 (1118a24ff.).) This is why temperance, which controls them, especially assumes that beauty which is shared by all the virtues, as fortitude assumes difficulty, and justice rectitude. And because of this, virginity, which is the highest level of temperance, earns for itself the highest beauty; though it does not follow that it is the noblest virtue.

Reply Obj. 2: All the words of Cyprian cited above, which display the excellence of virginity, pertain to its beauty; thus they must be answered in the same way as the first objection. Or they should be addressed by saying that virgins have other virtues with virginity: but other people do not have virginity along with other virtues; and therefore there is not the same basis for comparing virginity and other virtues, and virgins and other people.

Reply Obj. 3: The crown of special distinction is an accidental prize, and so is the fruit. But an essential prize is nobler than an accidental one; therefore, simply speaking, those virtues are more powerful to which the greater essential prize is due. Yet the accidental prize does not have as much to do with the root of virtue as the state of virtue. And furthermore, the crown of distinction is not only due to virgins, but also to martyrs and doctors; but the fruit is only due to continence, in which virginity holds the highest place, because through continence those pleasures are repressed which most greatly impede the taste of spiritual sweetness, which the fruit implies by its name.

Reply Obj. 4: Incorruption makes something close to God in whom there is no corruption, by a certain resemblance of imitation. And since we are more able to be like God in our minds than in our flesh, therefore incorruption of the mind, which is opposed to all sin and exists through every virtue, makes someone to be like God. But virginity has both kinds of incorruption; and therefore with regard to many things, it makes us like God, namely in body and soul, by which reason it is said that it follows the Lamb wherever he may go; and Ambrose says that nothing is lacking from it. Nonetheless, it does not follow that virginity makes someone more like God than other virtues do, but like him according to more things.

Reply Obj. 5: In the text the marriage of Abraham is equated with the celibacy of John as far as personal merit is concerned, since Abraham merited as much in marital union as John did in virginity. For he served God with the same promptness according to the state of his time; and this comparison is made through things accidental to virtue.

Reply Obj. 6: Humility seems to be most closely related to the virtues, since by it man subjects himself to God out of reverence, and as a result, to others because of God. Therefore, simply speaking, humility surpasses virginity.

Exposition of the Text

The sterile woman was cursed who did not leave seed on the earth. (Sententiae IV, 33.1 (194). 3, Cf. Ex. 23, 26; Deut. 7, 14 and 25, 5–10.) This is not a curse of guilt, but of punishment, though not as to the defect of nature which virginity causes in the lack of children, but as to the disrepute, since it was held to be a reproach.

The immoderate use of marriage in our day nearly imitates the turpitude of fornication of that time. (Sent. IV, 33.1 (194). 3.) This is said as to the intention of those people nowadays who contract marriage mostly because they are sick with sensual desire, which is the same reason the ancients used to fornicate. Therefore, he adds, nearly, since all fornication was a mortal sin, but not every immoderate use of marriage is.

“They could and would have much more easily practiced continence,” (Sent. IV, 33.1 (194). 6. Augustine, De bono coniugali, c13 n15.) namely than we can, because of the greatness of virtue which was in them; or they could be joined in marriage, considering the force of decency which draws the just, so that it would be difficult for them to sin, or to decline from the perfect state of virtue in anything.

“The grace of a public duty excused a private fault.” (Sent. IV, 33.2 (194). 7, Ambrose, De Abraham patriarcha, c4 n24.) It should be known that although Lot is believed to have been protected from mortal sin, yet his daughters are not wholly excused from mortal sin, but they sinned less because of the piety of their intention. (See Genesis 19:31–36.) For they decided based upon a lightly-taken judgment. And furthermore, if they believed for certain that the entire human race had perished, they should have sought divine counsel and that of their father in such a horrible deed, which was against the first institution of matrimony, where union with father or mother is prohibited: because of this a man shall leave his father and mother (Gen 2:24).

“Yet if that delight is kept within bounds and reduced to its natural use by the restraint of temperance, it cannot be lust.” (Sent. IV, 33.1 (194). 7, Augustine, De bono congiugali, cc15–16 nn17–18.) This regulating does not have to do with the quantity of pleasure in the act, but with the due limiting of circumstances.

“John had continence in deed.” (Sent. IV, 33.2 (195). 1, Augustine, De bono coniugali, cc21–22 nn26–27.) Continence is taken here as the cessation from every sexual act whatsoever.

Scripture at times calls them ‘wives,’ and at times ‘concubines.’ (Sent. IV, 33.2 (195). 2.) Certain people say that they were not truly wives; but because they were joined to them by spousal affection and the intention of children, sometimes they are called wives. Others say that they were truly wives, but they are called concubines since they remained slave-girls, and their sons were born not in their name but in those of their mistresses; and this seems more true.

“To have several, but not to multiply many wives.” (Sent. IV, 33.4 (197). 1, Augustine, Quaestiones in Heptateuchum, bk5 q27.) They are said to be many when sexual intercourse cannot happen enough for conceiving without a weakening of his mind: for such great frequency of the act altogether weakens the mind.

“The flesh cannot be corrupted unless the mind has already been corrupted.” (Sent. IV, 33.4 (197). 3, Pseudo-Ambrose, De lapsu virginis consecratae, c4 n11.) This is understood in the sense of the corruption belonging to the genus of moral acts, which virginity excludes.

“It is more holy to die of hunger than to eat what has been offered to idols.” (Sent. IV, 33.4 (197). 5, Augustine, De bono coniugali, c16 n18.) Against this, see 1 Timothy 4:4: nothing is to be rejected which is received with thanksgiving. And it should be said that before eating what has been offered to an idol, it must be understood whether it is with a certain external profession of idolatry, as when it was demanded by a persecutor as a sign of breaking the Christian faith.