D. 30 - On the impediment of error

After the Master has shown that matrimonial consent is impeded by compulsion, here he shows that it is impeded by error; and this distinction is divided into three parts: in the first, he considers the impediment of error; in the second, the consent that existed in the Blessed Virgin’s marriage, at: to what was said earlier must be added something; (Sententiae IV, 30.2 (178). 1.) in the third part, the final cause of matrimony, at: after expounding what the efficient cause of marriage is, it remains to show the cause for which marriage is or ought to be contracted. (Sent. IV, 30.3 (180). 1.)

About this he does three things. First, he shows which error impedes marriage; second, he objects to the contrary, at: but an objection is made concerning Jacob, etc.; (Sent. IV, 30.3 (179). 1.) third, he resolves it, at: but what was done in that case is not improperly said to have been carried out as a mystery. (Sent. IV, 30.1 (178). 3.)

To what was said earlier must be added something. Here he considers the consent that existed in the marriage of the Blessed Virgin; and concerning this he does two things: first, he shows what kind of consent that was; second, he shows that the marriage was complete, at: and between them, as Augustine says, there was a perfect marriage. (Sent. IV, 30.2 (179). 3.)

After expounding what the efficient cause of marriage is, etc. Here he considers the final cause of marriage, and first, concerning the causes of marriage in general; second, the causes of the Blessed Virgin’s marriage, at: the marriage of Mary and Joseph also had some other special causes. (Sent. IV, 30. 4 (181). 2.)

Concerning the first he does two things: first, he sets forth the final causes of marriage, both principal and secondary; second, he excludes an error, at: nor are we to agree with those who say that it is not a marriage if it is contracted because of these less honorable causes. (Sent. IV, 30.3 (180). 3.)

There he does two things: first, he shows that an evil aim does not mean that there will not be a valid marriage; second, he shows that it does not mean that it will not be a good marriage, at: and even if marriage is contracted for an end which is not good, as when the beauty of the other party moves the spirit, yet marriage itself is good. (Sent. IV, 30.4 (181). 1.)

Here there are two questions. First, concerning marriage in general. Second, concerning the marriage of the Blessed Virgin.

Question 1

On the impediment of error

Concerning the first question, three questions arise:

first, whether error impedes marriage by its very nature;

• second, which errors impede marriage;
• third, about the final cause of matrimony.
• Article 1

Whether error impedes marriage by its very nature

Obj. 1: To the first question, we proceed thus. It seems that error should not be considered an impediment to marriage per se. For consent, which is the efficient cause of marriage, is impeded in the same way as the voluntary. But the voluntary, according to the Philosopher in the Ethics 3, is considered to be impeded by ignorance, which is not the same thing as error: (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 3, ch. 1.) since ignorance means no knowledge, while error does not: for error is to take false things for true, according to Augustine. (Augustine, Enchiridion de fide, spe et caritate (CCSL 46), chs. 6 and 7 (chs. 17 and 19 in older editions); cf. De Trinitate, Bk. 9, ch. 11.) Therefore, not error, but rather ignorance, should have been counted here as an impediment to marriage.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, what can impede marriage by its very nature is what is contrary to the goods of marriage. But error is not. Therefore, error does not of its own nature impede marriage.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, as consent is required for marriage, so also is intention required for baptism. But if someone baptizes John and believes that he baptizes Peter, nevertheless John is validly baptized. Therefore, error does not exclude marriage.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, between Leah and Jacob there was a valid marriage. But there was an error there. (See Genesis 29.) Therefore, error does not exclude marriage.

On the contrary (1), it says in the Digests: what is so contrary to consent as error? (Digests, Bk. 2, tit. 1, leg. 15, “Si per errorem.”) But consent is required for matrimony. Therefore, error impedes matrimony.

Furthermore (2), consent is called something voluntary. But error impedes the voluntary, since the voluntary, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 3, ch. 1 (1111a22).) and Gregory of Nyssa, (Cf. Nemesius, On the Nature of Man, ch. 32 (PG 40:728).) and John Damascene, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, Bk. 2, ch. 24 (PG 94:953).) is what has its principle in someone knowing particulars, for an action is about particulars. And this is not the case in someone who errs. Therefore, error impedes matrimony.

I answer that, whatever impedes a cause, of its very nature likewise impedes the effect. But consent is the cause of matrimony, as was said; and therefore, whatever does away with consent does away with marriage. But consent is an act of the will, which presupposes the act of the intellect. Now when the first is lacking, the second will necessarily not happen. Therefore, when error impedes knowledge, a defect of consent results as well, and consequently, a defect in the marriage. And therefore, by natural law, error can nullify a marriage.

Reply Obj. 1: Ignorance differs, simply speaking, from error: for ignorance by its very nature does not imply any act of the intellect, but error indicates a skewed judgment of reason about something. However, where impediments to willing are concerned, it does not matter whether it is called ignorance or error, for no ignorance can impede willing unless it has error attached to it, inasmuch as the act of the will presupposes estimation or judgment of something it is directed toward. Therefore, if there is ignorance, there is necessarily error: and for this reason error is also counted as a proximate cause.

Reply Obj. 2: Although error is not in itself contrary to marriage, it is contrary to marriage as regards its cause.

Reply Obj. 3: The baptismal character is not caused directly by the intention of the one baptizing, but by the material element being outwardly applied. The intention, moreover, works only as directing the material element to the proper effect. But the conjugal bond is caused directly by consent; and therefore it is not similar.

Reply Obj. 4: As the Master says in the text, the marriage that was between Leah and Jacob was not completed by the fact that they slept together through an error, but by the consent that was supplied afterward. However, both parties were excused from sin, as is clear from the text.

Article 2

Which errors impede marriage

Obj. 1: To the second article we proceed thus. It seems that every error impedes matrimony, and not only error of condition or of person, as is stated in the text. For what applies to something by its very nature applies in its entire extent. But error by its very nature impedes marriage, as was said. Therefore, every error impedes marriage.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, if error impedes marriage because of the kind of thing it is, then a greater error should impede more greatly. But the error of faith, which is in heretics who do not believe in this sacrament, is greater than the error of the person. Therefore, it should impede more than an error about the person.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, error does not void marriage except insofar as it takes away the voluntary. But ignorance of any circumstance whatsoever destroys the voluntary, as is evident in the Ethics 3. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 3, ch. 1.) Therefore, not only the errors of person or of condition impede matrimony.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, just as the condition of slavery is accidental to a person, so also is the quality of the body or of the soul. But the error of condition impedes marriage. Therefore, by the same reasoning, so does an error about a quality or fortune.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, just as slavery or liberty belongs to the condition of the person, so also nobility or ignobility, or dignity of status and its absence. But error concerning the condition of liberty or slavery impedes marriage; so an error concerning the other things mentioned does also.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, just as the condition of slavery impedes marriage, so also disparity of worship, and inability to have intercourse, as will be said later. Therefore, just as an error of condition is counted as an impediment to marriage, so also should an error about other things of this kind be counted as an impediment to marriage.

On the contrary (7), it seems that neither does an error of person impede marriage. For just as a purchase is a certain contract, so also is marriage. But in buying and selling if one is given gold equivalent to some other gold, it does not impede the sale. Therefore, neither is marriage impeded if in place of one woman another is received.

Furthermore (8), it can happen that two people may be detained for many years by one such error, and they may have sons and daughters together. But it would be harsh to say then that they should separate. Therefore, an error in the beginning should not thwart marriage.

Furthermore (9), it can happen that the brother of the man to whom a woman believes she has consented presents himself to her in his brother’s place, and joins sexually with her. Therefore, it seems that she could not return to the one to whom she believed she had consented, but should remain with his brother; and thus the error of the person does not impede marriage.

I answer that, just as the error makes something excuses from sin because it makes it involuntary, so error may impede matrimony for the same reason. However, error does not excuse from sin, unless it is the error of a circumstance whose presence or absence makes the difference between licit or illicit in the act. For if someone strikes his father with an iron rod, which he believes to be wooden, he is not excused completely, although perhaps somewhat; but if someone believes he strikes his son for the sake of discipline, and he strikes instead his father, he is excused from all, if all due reasonable care has been taken. Thus the error that impedes marriage must be an error of what belongs to the essence of matrimony. Now, marriage itself is contained in two things: namely, the persons who are joined and the mutual power over each other, in which the marriage consists. The first, however, is taken away by an error in the person, the second by the error of condition, since a slave cannot transfer power over his own body to another without the consent of his master. This is why these two errors impede marriage, and not others.

Reply Obj. 1: Error does not impede marriage from the nature of its genus, but from the nature of an added difference, namely, according as it is an error concerning something which is of the essence of marriage.

Reply Obj. 2: The error of an unbeliever about marriage has to do with things that follow on marriage, such as whether it is a sacrament, or if it is licit; and therefore this kind of error does not impede marriage, just as neither does an error about baptism impede the reception of the character, provided that someone intends to do or to receive what the Church gives, however much he believes it to be nothing.

Reply Obj. 3: Not all kinds of ignorance of circumstance cause that involuntariness that excuses from sin, as was said above; and because of this, the argument does not follow.

Reply Obj. 4: A difference of fortune does not change anything that belongs to the essence of marriage, nor does a difference of quality, in the way that the condition of servitude does; and therefore the argument does not follow.

Reply Obj. 5: An error about nobility as such does not nullify marriage for the same reason that an error about a quality does not. But if the error about nobility or dignity amounts to an error about the person, then it does impede marriage. Thus if the consent of the woman is intended directly to that person, an error about his nobility does not impede the marriage. But if she directly intends to consent to the son of the king, whoever that might be, and then if someone other than the son of the king should be presented to her, it is an error of the person and it would impede the marriage.

Reply Obj. 6: An error concerning those impediments to marriage that make persons ineligible also impedes marriage. But he does not mention errors concerning those things, because they impede marriage whether there be an error or not. For example, if someone contracts with a subdeacon, there is no marriage, whether she knows it or not. But the condition of slavery does not impede, if the slavery is known, and therefore there is no comparison.

Reply Obj. 7: Money is received in contracts as the measure of other things, and not as if it were sought for its own sake, as is clear from the Ethics 5. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 5, ch. 5 (1133a19).) And therefore, if that money which is owed is not given, but rather some equivalent thing, nothing stands in the way of the contract. But if there were an error about something sought for itself, it would impede the contract, as if, for example, a donkey were sold in place of a horse. And it is likewise in the case proposed.

Reply Obj. 8: No matter how long he may have been with her, unless he wants to consent anew, there is no marriage.

Reply Obj. 9: If beforehand she had not consented to his brother, she can keep the one whom she received by error. Nor can she return to his brother, especially if she has been carnally known by the one whom she received. If, however, she had consented to the first man in words of the present, she cannot have the second while the first is living; but she can either leave secular life, or return to the first, and ignorance of the deed excuses the sin, just as it would also be excused after the marriage, if she were fraudulently known by someone related to her husband, since the fraud of another should not prejudice one’s own rights.

Article 3

About the final cause of matrimony

Obj. 1: To the third question, we proceed thus. It seems that marriage cannot exist by someone’s giving consent for dishonorable reasons. For there is only one account of one thing. But marriage is one sacrament. Therefore, it cannot happen by the intention of an end other than that end for which God has instituted it, namely, the procreation of children.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the union of marriage is from God, as is clear from Matthew 19:6: whom God has joined, let no man put asunder. But the marital union that is made for base reasons is not from God. Therefore, it is not a marriage.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, in other sacraments, if the intention of the Church is not preserved, it is not a valid sacrament. But the intention of the Church in the sacrament of marriage is not directed to any base motive. Therefore, if marriage is contracted for some base reason, it will not be true marriage.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, according to Boethius, what has a good end is itself good. (Boethius, De topicis differentiis, Bk. 2, ch. 7, par. 25 (ed. Nikitas, p. 35; or PL 64:1189).) Therefore, it is not marriage if it is entered for an evil end.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, marriage signifies the union of Christ and the Church. But no baseness exists there. Therefore, neither can marriage be contracted for a base reason.

On the contrary (1), whoever baptizes someone with the intention of making money, baptizes truly. Therefore also someone who contracts with someone else with the intention of making money, has a true marriage.

Furthermore (2), the same idea is proved by the examples and authorities who are cited in the text.

I answer that, the final cause of marriage can be taken in two ways: namely per se and per accidens. Indeed, the cause of marriage per se is what marriage is ordained to in itself, and this is always good; namely the procreation of children, and the avoidance of fornication. But its final cause per accidens is what the contracting parties intend from this marriage. And since what is intended from a marriage follows upon a marriage, and prior things are not changed by what comes later, but rather the reverse, this is why the marriage does not receive goodness or badness from that cause. But the contractants themselves do, since it is their end per se. And since per accidens causes are infinite, such causes of marriage can be infinite, some of them being honorable and others dishonorable.

Reply Obj. 1: That is true of a per se and principal cause, but what has one per se and principal end can have many secondary per se ends and infinite accidental ends.

Reply Obj. 2: ‘Union’ can be taken for the relation itself which is marriage, and as such it is always from God, and it is good no matter what the reason for which it was made; or it can be taken for the act of those who are joined, and in this way it is sometimes evil, and is not from God, simply speaking. Neither is it unfitting that some effect be from God, of which the cause is evil, like children who are conceived through adultery. For the effect is not from that cause insofar as it is evil, but insofar as it has something of good, according as it is from God, even though it is not from God simply speaking.

Reply Obj. 3: The intention of the Church which intends to give the sacrament is necessary to any sacrament, so that nothing happens in the sacraments when it is not observed; but the intention of the Church which intends the benefit coming from the sacrament has to do with the sacrament being done well and not with what is necessary to it. And so, if this is not observed, there is nevertheless a valid sacrament—but the one neglecting this intention sins, just as if in baptism one did not intend the health of the soul, which the Church intends. Likewise, someone who intends to contract marriage, regardless of whether he directs his marriage to the end that the Church intends, nevertheless contracts a valid marriage.

Reply Obj. 4: That evil intent is not the end of marriage, but of those contracting the marriage.

Reply Obj. 5: The union itself is the sign of the union of Christ and his Church, and not the action of the ones uniting; therefore, the argument does not follow.

Question 2

The marriage of the Blessed Virgin

Next the marriage of the Blessed Virgin Mary is inquired into, and about this, three questions arise:

first, concerning the Blessed Virgin’s vow and marriage;

• second, whether this marriage was complete;
• third, whether it was ever consummated, as Helvidius said.
• Article 1

Concerning the Blessed Virgin’s vow and marriage

Quaestiuncula 1

Obj. 1: To the first question, we proceed thus. (Parallel: ST III, q. 28, a. 4.) It seems that the Blessed Virgin should not have vowed virginity. For in the law a curse was due to those who do not leave any of their seed upon the earth, as is clear from Deuteronomy 7. But when she made that vow, the age of the law was still ongoing. Therefore, she should not have vowed virginity.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the vow of virginity belongs to the counsels of perfection. (The counsels of perfection, or evangelical counsels, are the vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience, as counseled by Christ in Matt 19:21. “Counsel” is here distinguished from precept.) But such perfection should have been begun by Christ, who came to complete the Law with the counsels. Therefore, before the coming of Christ she should not have vowed virginity.

On the contrary, every perfection should have been in the mother of Christ. But a vow of virginity is one of the greatest perfections. Therefore, it should not have been lacking from her.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that she should not have been joined in matrimony, since, for those vowing virginity, not only marrying but even wishing to marry is blamable, as Jerome (The Vives edition notes that this statement is not from Jerome but rather from Augustine, On the Good of Widowhood, ch. 9, par. 12: “in coniugali quippe uinculo si pudicitia conseruatur, damnatio non timetur; sed in uiduali et uirginali continentia excellentia muneris amplioris expetitur: qua expetita et electa et uoti debito oblata iam non solum capessere nuptias, sed etiamsi non nubatur, nubere uelle damnabile est” (CSEL 41:317).) says. (Parallel: ST III, q. 29, a. 1; Super Matt. 1.) But nothing blamable should have been in the Blessed Virgin. Therefore, after she vowed virginity, she should not have married.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, vowing virginity would expose one to danger, if one were to hand oneself over to the power of a man. But this is a sin. Therefore, the Blessed Virgin should not have handed herself over to the power of another in marriage; therefore, neither should she have married.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, whoever consents in marriage, consents in some way to physical intimacy, at least implicitly. But consenting to physical intimacy diminishes in some degree the purity of virginity, at least as regards the spirit of virginity. Since then, such purity was due to the Mother of God that greater purity beneath God could not be conceived, as Anselm says, (Anselm, De conceptu virginali, ch. 18: “Nempe decens erat ut ea puritate, qua maior sub deo nequit intelligi” (Opera omnia, ed. Schmitt, 2:159).) it seems that she should not have married.

On the contrary (1), it says in Matthew 1:18: when Mary, the mother of Jesus, was espoused to Joseph, in the text and in the gloss.

Furthermore (2), Christ by his birth had to make virginity commendable in such a way that he did not detract from marriage. He could not, however, have better affirmed both than by being born to a married virgin. Therefore, etc.

Quaestiuncula 3

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the reasons given for her marriage in the text are not fitting. (Parallel: ST III, q. 29, a. 1; Super Matt. 1.) For the devil, since he had natural lucidity, could understand more things by natural understanding than man. But even man can know through his senses whether someone is a virgin. Therefore, much more powerfully was the devil able to know this.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the devil knows well that that girl is a virgin who has never been united with a man. But the devil could have known that Joseph never had been united with her carnally. Therefore, the Mother of God’s virginity was not hidden from him by the fact that she was married.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the mystery of the divinity of Christ was shown by miracles no less than by the virginity of his mother. But the devil saw those miracles. Therefore, it was not necessary that the mystery of the Incarnation be concealed from him by the marriage of Christ’s mother.

Obj. 4: Besides, if she were not married, she could not be stoned as an adulteress on account of suspected fornication. Therefore, it seems that it was not because of this that it was necessary for her to marry.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, from the fact that she had married, the Jews who discovered the Scripture, behold, a virgin shall conceive (Is 7:14), were more fortified against belief; and thus the virginity of the mother should not have been hidden.

Obj. 6: Besides, Christ came so that he might endure our toils, and by this fact take them away. Therefore, it was not fitting that his mother should have a husband for his service.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

I answer that, everything belonging to perfection ought to have been displayed in the Blessed Virgin. At the time, however, marriage was preferred to virginity (although in itself the best) because of the expectation of the blessed seed (That is, Christ the promised savior.) coming by way of generation. Therefore, the Blessed Virgin vowed virginity as the most excellent thing and the thing most acceptable to herself, yet not simply speaking, but under the most honorable condition—that is, unless God should will otherwise. Nor was that condition added as though she were unsure whether she wanted to remain a virgin, but whether she ought; and this is what Augustine says in the text, that she proposed that she would persevere as a virgin, unless God should arrange otherwise. (See Gratian, Decretum, ch. 27, q. 2, c. 3; cf. Augustine, De sancta virginitate, ch. 4, n. 4; Homily 225, ch. 2; Homily 291, n. 5.)

Reply Obj. 1: The Blessed Virgin was the threshold between the Old Law and the New, as dawn is between night and day; and thus in her vow she resembled the New Law, inasmuch as she vowed virginity, as well as the old, inasmuch as she attached conditions to it.

Reply Obj. 2: The perfection of the counsels as regards their consummation had to have been begun by Christ. But as regards a certain inchoation, it was fittingly begun by his mother.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that it was fitting for the mother of Christ to be joined in marriage because of the reasons given in the text, and also for other reasons, the first of which is to signify the Church, which is virgin and bride. Second, so that the genealogy of Mary might be woven through Joseph: for it was not the custom of the Hebrews to reckon the genealogy from the side of the woman. Third, so that the excuse might be taken away from virgins, if they were disgraced by fornication. Fourth, so that Christ might affirm marriage by his birth. Fifth, so that the greater perfection of virginity might be displayed in the Blessed Virgin, since she remained a virgin even in matrimony.

Reply Obj. 1: After the vow of virginity made absolutely, a person cannot consent to marriage without sinning; for if it were solemnly vowed, it would not be a valid marriage. If, however, it were a simple vow, a valid marriage is what would follow, although those contracting it would sin. Yet the vow of the Blessed Virgin was not made solemnly, but simply expressed in her heart; neither was it absolute, but under condition, as is clear from the text; and therefore, she could consent to marriage without sinning by the special counsel of the Holy Spirit, to whose disposition her vow was conditionally subject.

Reply Obj. 2: Before the Blessed Virgin contracted with Joseph, she was assured by divine inspiration that Joseph had intended the same course of action, and therefore she did not expose herself to danger by marrying him. Nor was any of the truth of the marriage lost on this account, since that intention was not added to the consent as a condition, for such a condition, since it would be against one of the goods of matrimony, namely the procreation of children, would invalidate the marriage.

Reply Obj. 3: Physical intimacy was included implicitly in the consent of the Blessed Virgin, just as act is implicitly contained in a power, as is evident from what was said above, in Distinction 28, Question 1, Article 4. The power for physical intimacy, however, is not contrary to virginity, nor does it diminish anything of purity except by reason of the act itself, which was certainly never in the design of the Blessed Virgin, since she was already assured that the act would never occur.

Response to Quaestiuncula 3

To the third question, it should be said that the reasons set forth in the text are fitting. The first is taken on the part of the one conceived, namely, that the birth be concealed from the devil; the second on the part of the mother, namely, that she not be stoned; and the third reason is on the part of Joseph, that he might serve the mother and the child, and furnish testimony of her virginity.

Reply Obj. 1: By his natural understanding, the devil could perceive well the virginity of the Mother of God despite the fact that she had married, unless he was prevented by divine power from the accurate examination of her circumstances.

And the answer to the second objection is similar.

Reply Obj. 3: Even through the other miracles, he could not manifestly recognize Jesus as the Son of God, since he saw in him signs of weakness and of strength at the same time. Therefore, if sometimes he confessed something of his divinity, it proceeded more from presumption than from certitude. But this virginal birth, because of the preceding prophecy, would have been the most certain sign of the Son of the living God.

Reply Obj. 4: This is to be understood of the stoning of disrepute; (See Deuteronomy 22:21.) or, because she was of priestly lineage on her mother’s side (which is clear from the fact that Elizabeth, who was of the daughters of Aaron, is said to have been related to her, in Luke 1:36), and the daughter of a priest, apprehended in unchastity, even if unmarried, was to be burned, as is clear from Leviticus 21:9. (That is, if Mary’s descent from a priestly family is considered, the penalty of stoning would not have applied to her, but rather, burning.) But on her father’s side, she was of the line of David. For the daughters of Aaron were able to be joined in marriage with those of the royal tribe or also with any of the other tribes, by the fact that they did not receive an inheritance separate from the other tribes, and so from this fact no confusion could have arisen over the inheritance, which was the reason for the prohibition against contracting marriage between members of different tribes.

Reply Obj. 5: The Lord preferred to permit the Jews to be uncertain of his own divinity rather than of the chastity of his mother, for he knew that the reputation of virginity is fragile, as Ambrose says. (Ambrose, Exposition on the Gospel of Luke (CCSL 14), Bk. 2, line 15.)

Reply Obj. 6: Christ did not of necessity have to refuse comfort, since this is more an act of perversity than of humility.

Article 2

Whether this marriage was complete

Obj. 1: To the second question, we proceed thus. (Parallel: ST III, q. 29, a. 2; Super Matt. 1.) It seems that the marriage described was not complete. For a complete marriage proceeds from absolute consent. But the Blessed Virgin does not seem to have consented absolutely in matrimony, as neither did she vow absolutely, since in both she committed herself to divine governance, as is said in the text. Therefore, it was not a complete marriage.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the signification belongs to the essence of marriage, inasmuch as it is a sacrament. But that marriage was not complete in its signification, as it says in the text. Therefore, it was not a perfect sacrament.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, where the final consummation is lacking, there is no true completion. But the marriage of the Blessed Virgin was never consummated. Therefore, it was not truly completed.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, a marriage is said to be complete from the fact that it possesses the good of offspring. But that marriage did not have the good of offspring, since the child who was brought up in that marriage was not the effect of that marriage, just as neither is an adoptive son called a good of marriage. Therefore, it was not a complete marriage.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, after a marriage is complete, one is not allowed to send away one’s spouse. But Joseph, although he was a just man, wanted to send Mary away secretly, as it says in Matthew 1:19. Therefore, the marriage was not yet complete.

On the contrary (1), the works of God are complete (Deut 32:4). But that marriage was divinely inspired. Therefore, it was complete.

Furthermore (2), unless marriage is complete, the parties are not called spouses. But Mary was called Joseph’s spouse (Matt 1:24). Therefore, a complete marriage existed between them.

I answer that, there are two kinds of perfection for marriage. The first refers to its very being, which arises through consent expressed in words of the present. And with regard to this kind of perfection, that marriage was complete. The other perfection refers to activity, and in this regard that marriage was not complete, because the proper act of marriage is physical intimacy.

Reply Obj. 1: The Blessed Virgin consented absolutely to marriage, as confirmed by divine inspiration. But while consenting thus to marriage, she had entrusted her virginity to God, as it says in the text.

Reply Obj. 2: Not just any signification pertains to the essence of marriage, but only that signification by which the effect of the sacrament is signified; and therefore the argument does not follow.

Reply Obj. 3: This argument proceeds from the second kind of perfection, which is called the consummation of a marriage.

Reply Obj. 4: A child is not called the good of marriage only because he is generated through marriage, but also inasmuch as he is accepted and educated in marriage; and in this way the good of this marriage was a child, but not in the first way. Nor would a child be a good of marriage who is born of adultery, nor an adopted son who is educated in marriage; for marriage is not ordained to the education of those, as this marriage was specially ordained to this child’s being received into it and educated.

Reply Obj. 5: Joseph did not wish to send Mary away so that he could take another wife, or on account of any suspicion, but because he feared to cohabit with such holiness out of reverence; which is why it was said to him, do not fear to take Mary as your wife (Matt 1:20).

Article 3

Whether it was ever consummated

Obj. 1: To the third question, we proceed thus. (Parallels: generally, ST III, qq. 28–29; more specifically, q. 28, aa. 1 and 3.) It seems that this marriage was consummated at some time. For it says in Matthew 1:18: before they came together, she was found to be with child by the Holy Spirit. And in verse 25*, he did not know her until she had given birth to her firstborn son*. Therefore, it seems that afterward he did know her.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, ‘the first’ is said with respect to a second. But Christ is called the firstborn son of the Virgin by the authorities brought forth. Therefore, after the first child, she had another; and thus this marriage, at least after the birth of Christ, was consummated.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the words of the Gospel writers never failed in expressing their intention. But they never expressed that Joseph did not know his wife at all. Therefore, after the generation of Christ, the marriage was consummated.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, Joseph is called the father of Christ in many places in the Gospels, and Christ is also said to have brothers; but this would not be, if the marriage had never been consummated. Therefore, etc.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, two bodies cannot be in the same place at the same time. Therefore, Christ could not have exited the womb of his mother while leaving her virginity intact; and given this, it would not have been unfitting for the marriage to have been consummated.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, Abraham and other fathers who enjoyed marriage had the greatest of dignity. Therefore, nothing would have been lost to the mother of Christ, if she had consummated her marriage.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, Helvidius objects: if it is a base thing for Christ that his mother be known after his birth, how much more so for him to have been born through the genitals of a virgin? (See Jerome, Adversus Helvidium (PL 23:212).)

On the contrary (1), virginity is preferred to corruption. But the mother of Christ had to be in the most excellent state. Therefore, she had to be a virgin, and thus her marriage could not have been consummated.

Furthermore (2), it is not probable that Joseph would dare to approach the womb that he knew was a temple of God, as Jerome says. (Ibid., 190.)

I answer that, the mother of Christ remained a virgin before the birth, and in the birth, and after the birth for all eternity. But the Jews and the Ebionites detract from her virginity before the birth, saying that Christ was born from the seed of Joseph. The philosophers, on the other hand, dispute her virginity during the birth, saying that two bodies cannot be in the same place. But Helvidius, a certain idiot and priest, dared to calumniate her virginity after the birth; for, believing garrulousness to be eloquence, and having found a subject to disagree about, he began with blasphemies against the Mother of God, saying that she had been known by Joseph after the birth of Christ. And against him, Jerome composed a book. (Namely, Adversus Helvidium de Mariae virginitate perpetua (PL 23:193–216).)

Reply Obj. 1: ‘Before’ does not always denote an order to what is in the future according to the truth of the matter, but sometimes it is said regarding what is expected in the future according to the usual course of things—as in, “before he had reached twenty years of age, he was dead.” And so it is in the case at hand. And likewise with ‘until,’ for sometimes it means that what preceded will be terminated by this coming thing that is expected, as when it is said, “Sit here, until I come.” But sometimes not like this, as when it says in 1 Corinthians 15:25: he must reign until he has put all his enemies under his feet—not that the time of his reign will be finished at the subjection of his enemies, but rather, the subjection of the enemies is included in the time of the reign.

Reply Obj. 2: ‘Firstborn’ is said of the one before whom there is no one, notwithstanding there may not be another after him. Otherwise, only-begotten sons would not have had the right of primogeniture, and they would not have had to be offered to God according to the law, which is false.

Reply Obj. 3: The Gospel writers left what is more believable to be understood from what is less believable. It is less believable that a virgin should conceive (which the Gospel writers said), than that after the birth she should have been preserved a virgin; and therefore, they did not take the trouble to say it.

Reply Obj. 4: Joseph is called the ‘foster father’ of Christ, as is evident from Luke 3:23. And again, Christ was made his adopted son, as certain people say. Others, though, were called the ‘brothers’ of Jesus by reason of family relation, since they were of the same family: since neither did Mary have another son, nor did Joseph, who was also a virgin, as it is said. (Thomas might also have noted here, as he does elsewhere (ST III, q. 28, a. 3, ad 5), that Scripture uses the term “brethren” in a broad sense.)

Reply Obj. 5: This is true according to nature; but by a miracle it can happen that two bodies are in the same place at the same time (as will be shown in Distinction 44)—and that birth and conception were entirely miraculous. Indeed, some say that Christ assumed the gift of subtlety at that time; yet the first account is better.

Reply Obj. 6: However good might be the state of consummated marriage, nonetheless the state of virginity is much higher. And this befitted the Mother of God.

Reply Obj. 7: According to Jerome, the more humiliating things he suffered for me, the more I owe him, (Jerome, Adversus Helvidium (PL 23:202).) provided that nothing in these things detracts from the perfection of his virtue. But the privation of virginity would take away from the perfection of his mother as regards the virtue of her soul.

Exposition of the Text

If the devil, transforming himself into an angel of light, is believed to be good, it is not a dangerous error. (Sententiae IV, 30.2 (178). 4.) This should be understood, when it does not proceed to the point of adoration, or, if it should, only under the supposition that it was Christ; otherwise, it would pose the danger of idolatry.

If some heretic, in the name of Augustine or Ambrose should present himself to a Catholic, and invite him to imitate his faith, if the Catholic should assent, to whose definition of faith would he be said to have assented? (Sent. IV, 30.1 (178). 4.) This is true when it has not proceeded to the point of the expression of some error; otherwise, there would have been the danger of infidelity, if someone assented to him.

She consented to carnal union, (Sent. IV, 30.2 (179). 2.) not explicitly but implicitly, as was said.

Jacob . . . who loved Rachel of the beautiful face and shapely aspect. (Sent. IV, 30.3 (180). 3, Gen. 29:17.) It should be known that comeliness of face was not a principal reason, but a secondary one; and this can exist perfectly well without sin, and sometimes even without venial sin. However, if sensual desire for her beauty were the principal cause, he would not have been excused from mortal sin, if it were unbridled sensual desire.