D. 42 - On the impediment of a spiritual relationship

After the Master has examined the impediment of close physical relationship, here he examines the impediment of close spiritual relationship; and it is divided into two parts: in the first he shows how a spiritual relationship impedes marriage; in the second he inquires whether the second wedding is licit, where he says: it is also to be known, that not only the first and second marriages are lawful, but that also third and fourth ones are not to be condemned. (Sententiae IV, 42.7 (243). 1.)

The first is in two parts: in the first he distinguishes the close spiritual relationship from physical ones, which were treated above; in the second, he pursues close spiritual relationship, where he says: spiritual children are those whom we raise from the sacred [baptismal] font. (Sent. IV, 42.2 (238). 1.)

And this part is divided in two: in the first he shows where close spiritual relationship is contracted; in the second, he shows how it may impede marriage, where he says: that a godfather and godmother are not to join with each other . . . is taught by the council of Mainz. (Sent. IV, 42.2 (238). 3.)

And this is in two parts: in the first he shows how the spiritual close relationship that a person contracts directly, which is likened to consanguinity, does impede marriage; in the second how that relationship which indirectly reflects on the husband from the wife, or vice versa, in the mode of a certain affinity, impedes marriage, where he says: it is also usual to ask if someone may marry the godmother of his wife, after the latter’s death. (Sent. IV, 42.5 (241). 1.)

The first is in two parts: in the first he shows when spiritual relationship impedes marriage between the spiritual godfather and the natural mother, or vice versa; in the second he shows when it impedes marriage between spiritual and natural children, where he says: Pope Nicholas attests that spiritual or adopted children cannot join with natural ones. (Sent. IV, 42.3 (239). 1.)

The first is in two parts: in the first part he shows when spiritual relationship preceding marriage impedes it from being contracted, and invalidates the contract between godfather and godmother; but not if it follows the marriage; in the second, he objects to the contrary, and resolves it, where he says: but this seems to be contradicted by what Pope Deusdedit says. (Sent. IV, 42.2 (238). 7.)

Pope Nicholas attests that spiritual or adopted children cannot join with natural ones. Here he shows when marriage is impeded between the spiritual and natural children of one man; and concerning this he does two things: first he proves the proposition; second, he inquires whether this proof extends to natural brothers of spiritual children, namely that they may be united with the natural children of a spiritual father, where he says: but some people want to understand this [to apply] only to those children whose godfathers they have become. (Sent. IV, 42.4 (240). 1.)

It is also usual to ask if someone may marry the godmother of his wife, after the latter’s death. About this, he does two things. First he shows that spiritual relationship passes from a man to his wife. Second, he inquires whether they may spiritually be made parents of any children, where he says: it is also usual to ask whether the wife should raise a child from baptism together with her husband. (Sent. IV, 42.6 (242). 1.)

Here there are three questions. First, concerning spiritual relationship. Second, concerning legal relationship. Third, concerning second marriages.

Question 1

On spiritual relationship

About the first, three questions arise:

first, whether spiritual relationship impedes marriage;

• second, by what cause it is contracted;
• third, between whom it is contracted.
• Article 1

Whether a spiritual relationship impedes marriage

Obj. 1: To the first question, we proceed thus. (Parallel: Quodl. VI, q. 3, a. 2.) It seems that a spiritual relationship does not impede marriage. For nothing impedes marriage that is not opposed to some good of marriage. But a spiritual relationship is not opposed to any good of marriage. Therefore it does not impede marriage.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, a perpetual impediment to marriage cannot remain together with marriage. But spiritual relationship remains together with marriage sometimes, as is stated in the text, as when someone baptizes his own child in the case of necessity: for then he is joined to his own wife with a spiritual relationship, nor is the marriage then separated. Therefore, spiritual relationship does not impede marriage.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, a union of spirit does not pass over into the flesh. (See Gratian, Decretals, pt. 2, cause 30, q. 4, can. 5.) But marriage is a physical union. Therefore, since spiritual relationship is a union of spirit, it cannot cross over to impede marriage.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, contraries do not have the same effects. But a spiritual relationship seems to be contrary to disparity of cult; since spiritual relationship is a close relationship deriving from the bestowal of a sacrament, or the intention of the same; (See Raymond of Peñafort, Summa, Bk. 4, tit. 7, sec. 1 (492b); Albert the Great, In IV Sent., d. 42, a. 2 (BO 30:470); Bonaventure, In IV Sent., d. 42, a. 1, praenotata (QR 4:868).) but disparity of cult consists in lacking the sacraments, as was said earlier, in Distinction 39, Question 1, Article 1. Since, therefore, disparity of cult impedes marriage, it seems that spiritual relationship does not have this effect.

On the contrary (1), the holier a certain bond is, the more it must be guarded. But the spiritual bond is holier than the bodily one. Therefore, since the bond of a bodily close relationship impedes marriage, it seems that a spiritual relationship also does the same thing.

Furthermore (2), the union of souls in marriage is more important than the union of bodies, for it precedes it. Therefore, a spiritual relationship can impede marriage much more strongly than a physical one.

I answer that, just as by the propagation of the flesh a man receives the being of nature, so also by the sacraments he receives the being of spiritual grace. Therefore, just as the bond that is contracted by the propagation of the flesh is natural to man, inasmuch as he is a thing of a certain nature, so also the bond that is contracted by the reception of a sacrament is in a certain way natural to a person, inasmuch as he is a member of the Church. And thus, just as physical relationship impedes marriage, so also does a spiritual one by the statute of the Church. (See Gratian, Decretals, pt. 2, cause 30 (in toto); Gregory IX, Decretals, Bk. 4, tit. 11, chs. 1, 3–6, and 8.)

Nevertheless, a distinction should be made about spiritual relationship. For either it precedes marriage, or it follows it. If it preceded, it impedes marriage from being contracted, and invalidates the contract; if it follows, then it does not nullify the bond of marriage. But as to the act of marriage, a distinction must be made. For either a spiritual relationship is introduced in a case of necessity, as when a father baptizes his child in danger of death, and then it does not impede the marital act on either side; or else, it is introduced outside of the case of necessity, yet out of ignorance, and then if that person by whose act it is introduced exercised due diligence, the argument is the same as with the first; or else, on purpose and outside the case of necessity, and then that person by whom it was introduced loses his right to seek the debt; but nevertheless, he should render it, for there should not be anything troublesome brought upon the other spouse by his fault.

Reply Obj. 1: Although spiritual relationship does not impede any of the principal ends of marriage, nevertheless it impedes one of the secondary goods, which is the multiplication of friendship: for spiritual relationship is a sufficient reason for friendship in itself; therefore it is fitting that familiarity and friendship with others be sought through marriage.

Reply Obj. 2: Marriage is a perpetual bond, and thus no subsequent impediment can nullify it; and thus sometimes it happens that marriage and an impediment to marriage exist together; but not if the impediment precedes it.

Reply Obj. 3: In marriage there is not only a bodily union, but also a spiritual one; and thus the close relationship of the spirit poses an impediment to it without the spiritual close relationship having to cross over into a physical one.

Reply Obj. 4: It is not unfitting that two contraries be opposed to the same thing, as the great and the small are both opposed to the equal. And this is how disparity of cult and spiritual relationship are both opposed to marriage: for in one there is a greater distance and in the other a greater closeness than what marriage requires; and thus marriage is impeded from both sides.

Article 2

By what cause it is contracted

Obj. 1: To the second question, we proceed thus. (Parallel: Quodl. XII, q. 12, a. un.) It seems that only by baptism is a close spiritual relationship contracted. For just as a bodily family connection is related to bodily generation, so spiritual relationship is related to spiritual generation. But only baptism is called spiritual generation. Therefore, a spiritual relationship is contracted by baptism alone, just as a physical family relation by physical generation alone.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, just as in confirmation a character is imprinted, so also in holy orders. But a spiritual relationship does not follow from the reception of holy orders. Therefore, neither does one follow from confirmation, and so only from baptism.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the sacraments are more noble than sacramentals. But a spiritual relationship does not result from some sacraments, as is clear in extreme unction. Therefore, much less from catechizing, as certain people say.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, among the sacramentals of baptism, many others are numbered besides catechism, as is clear above in Distinction 6. (See also Glossa ordin. in Decretum, pt. 2, cause 30, q. 1, can. 1, ‘Pervenit.’) Therefore by catechism a spiritual relationship is not contracted more than from the others.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, prayer is not less efficacious for leading someone to the good than instruction or catechizing. But a spiritual relationship is not contracted by prayer. Therefore, neither is it contracted by catechizing.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, the instruction that is given to the baptized by preaching is not worth less than what is given to those not yet baptized. But no spiritual relationship is contracted by preaching. Therefore, neither by catechizing.

On the contrary (7), 1 Corinthians 4:15 says: I became your father in Christ Jesus through the Gospel. But spiritual generation causes a spiritual relationship. Therefore, a spiritual relationship happens from preaching the Gospel and instruction, and not only from baptism.

Furthermore (8), just as by baptism original sin is taken away, so also by actual penance. Therefore just as baptism causes a spiritual relationship, so too does penance.

Furthermore (9), ‘father’ is the name of a family relationship. But by penance and teaching and pastoral care and many other things like this someone is called the spiritual father of another. Therefore, by many other things besides baptism and confirmation a spiritual relationship is contracted.

I answer that, concerning this there are three opinions.

For some people say that just as the grace of the Holy Spirit is given in seven forms, so also spiritual regeneration happens by seven acts, beginning from the first feeding of salt of the sacrament up to the confirmation done by the bishop, and by any one of these seven a spiritual relationship is contracted. But that does not seem reasonable: for blood relationship is not contracted except by the completion of the act of generation, which is why affinity is also not contracted unless the union of seeds has happened, from which physical generation can result. But spiritual generation is only completed by a sacrament. And thus it is unfitting that spiritual relationship be contracted, except by a sacrament.

And thus others say that spiritual relationship is only contracted by three sacraments, namely: catechism, baptism, and confirmation. But those people do not seem to hear themselves speaking: for catechism is not a sacrament, but a sacramental.

And thus others say that it happens only by two sacraments, namely by baptism and confirmation; and this opinion is more common. Nevertheless, certain of these people say concerning catechism that it is a weak impediment that impedes the contracting of marriage, but does not invalidate the marriage contracted. (See Gregory IX, Decretals, Bk. 4, tit. 11, ch. 5, ‘Contracto.’)

Reply Obj. 1: There are two phases of physical birth. First in the uterus, where what has come to be at that point is so fragile that it could not be exposed without danger; and the generation by baptism resembles this beginning, in which someone is regenerated, yet as though he is still being fostered in the womb of the Church. The second is the birth out of the womb, when what had come to be in the womb is now so strengthened that without danger it can be exposed to the outside, which is such as to corrupt it; and this is compared to confirmation, by which a man is strengthened to be exposed in public to confess the name of Christ. And thus by both of these sacraments a spiritual relationship is appropriately contracted.

Reply Obj. 2: By the sacrament of holy orders no regeneration happens, but a certain advancement of power, and this is why a woman does not receive holy orders. And so it raises no impediment of this kind to marriage, and consequently such relationships are not counted.

Reply Obj. 3: A certain profession of future baptism is made in catechism, as in a betrothal a certain pledge of future wedding is made. Thus, just as in betrothal a certain kind of close relationship is contracted, so also in catechism, at least preventing the contracting as certain people say; but not in the other sacraments.

Reply Obj. 4: Such a profession of faith is not made in the other sacramentals of baptism, as it is in catechism; and thus the reason is not the same.

Reply Obj. 5 & 6: And the same thing should be said to the fifth, about prayer, and the sixth, about preaching.

Reply Obj. 7: The Apostle instructed those people in the faith by the mode of catechism, and so in a certain way such instruction had an order to spiritual relationship.

Reply Obj. 8: By the sacrament of penance, properly speaking, no spiritual family relationship is contracted; and for this reason the son of a priest can contract with someone whom the priest has heard in confession: otherwise the son of a priest would not find in the whole parish a woman with whom he might contract. Nor is it a problem that by penance actual sin is taken away: for this is not in the mode of generation, but more in the mode of healing. But nevertheless, by penance a certain bond is contracted between the priest and the woman confessing, similar to a spiritual family relationship, so that by knowing her carnally he would sin as if she were his own spiritual daughter, and this is because the greatest familiarity exists between a priest and the one who confesses to him, and that is why that prohibition was introduced, so that the occasion of sin might be removed.

Reply Obj. 9: A spiritual father is named by his likeness to a physical father. But a bodily father, as the Philosopher states in the Ethics 8, gives three things: being, nourishment, and instruction; (See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 8, ch. 11 (1161a16); ch. 12 (1162a6).) and thus someone is called spiritual father to someone else by reason of one of these three things. Nevertheless, the fact that someone is a spiritual father, does not necessarily mean he has a spiritual family relationship, unless he resembles a father in a generation through which a being exists. And the eighth objection can also be resolved in this way.

Article 3

Between whom it is contracted

Quaestiuncula 1

Obj. 1: To the third question, we proceed thus. It seems that spiritual relationship is not contracted between the one receiving the sacrament of baptism and the one raising him from the sacred font. For in physical generation a close relationship is contracted only on the part of the one by whose seed offspring is generated, but not on the part of the one who receives the child when he is born. Therefore, neither is a spiritual family relationship contracted between the one who receives the child from the holy font and the one who is received.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, that person who lifts the child from the holy font is called anadochus by Dionysius, (Pseudo-Dionysius, Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, ch. 2, p. 2, n. 7 (PG 3:396); ch. 7, p. 3, n. 11 (PG 3:568).) and it falls to his duty to instruct the child. But instruction is not a sufficient cause of spiritual relationship, as was said. (In the preceding article, ad 9.) Therefore, no relationship is contracted between him and the one who is lifted from the holy font.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, it can happen that someone who has not yet been baptized himself raises someone else from the holy font. But by this, no spiritual relationship is contracted, for the person who is not baptized is not capable of any spirituality. Therefore, to lift someone from the holy font does not suffice to contract a spiritual relationship.

On the contrary, there is the definition of spiritual relationship introduced above, (See article 1, above.) and the authorities set forth in the text.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that spiritual relationship does not pass from a man to his wife. For spiritual and bodily unions are disparate things, and of different genera. Therefore, a spiritual relationship is not transferred through the medium of the physical union that exists between a man and his wife.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, a spiritual father and mother share more in spiritual generation, which is the cause of spiritual family relationship, than the man who is a spiritual father shares with his wife. But a spiritual father and mother contract no spiritual relationship from this. Therefore, neither does a wife contract any spiritual relationship by the fact that her husband is a spiritual father to someone.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, it can happen that a man is baptized and his wife is not, as when one is converted from unbelief without the conversion of the other spouse. But spiritual relationship cannot extend to the non-baptized. Therefore, it does not always pass from a man to his wife.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, a man and his wife can lift someone from the sacred font together. (See Gratian, Decretals, pt. 2, cause 30, q. 4, can. 6.) Therefore, if a spiritual relationship passes from a man to his wife, it follows that each spouse would be twice father or mother to the same person, which is unfitting.

On the contrary, spiritual goods are more capable of multiplication than physical goods. But the physical consanguinity of a man passes to his wife by affinity. Therefore, much more does spiritual relationship.

Quaestiuncula 3

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that it does not pass to the physical children of a spiritual father. For degrees are not assigned to spiritual relationships, but there would be degrees, if it passed from a father to his son; for a person generated changes degrees, as was said above in Distinction 40, Article 2. Therefore, it does not pass to the physical children of a spiritual father.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, a father is related to a son in the same degree as also a brother is to a brother. If, therefore, spiritual relationship passes from a father to a son, by the same reasoning it would pass from brother to brother, which is false.

On the contrary, it is proved in the text by equal authority.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

I answer that, as in physical generation someone is born of a father and a mother, so also in spiritual generation someone is reborn a son of God as his father, and of the Church as his mother. But just as the one who confers the sacrament bears the persona of God, whose instrument and minister he is, so the one who receives the baptized from the holy font, or who holds the one to be confirmed, bears the persona of the Church; therefore a spiritual relationship is contracted to both.

Reply Obj. 1: The father by whose seed the child is generated is not the only one to have a blood relationship to the one born, but so does the mother, who bestows the matter and in whose womb he is generated; and in the same way the anadochus who offers and receives the baptized in the place of the whole Church, and who holds the one to be confirmed, contracts a spiritual relationship.

Reply Obj. 2: He contracts a spiritual family relationship, not by reason of the instruction due, but by reason of the spiritual generation with which it cooperates.

Reply Obj. 3: A non-baptized person cannot raise anyone from the holy font, (See Gratian, Decretals, pt. 3, d. 4, can. 102, ‘In baptismate.’) since he is not a member of the Church, whose type is born by the one who receives the newly baptized; yet he can baptize, for he is a creation of God, whose type the baptizer bears. Nor, however, can he contract any spiritual family relationship; for he has no part in the spiritual life, into which a man is born first by baptism.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that someone can become compater to another in two ways. In one way, by the act of the other person baptizing, or receiving one’s child in baptism; and in this way the spiritual family relationship does not pass from the husband to his wife, (See Gratian, Decretals, pt. 2, cause 30, q. 4, can. 4, ‘Qui spiritualem,’ with Glossa ordin. in Decretum on that text (II, 1469a).) unless perhaps that child is the son of his wife; for then the wife directly contracts a spiritual family relationship, as well as her husband.

In another way, by his own act, as when he lifts the son of another from the holy font; and in this way the spiritual family relationship passes to the wife whom he has already known carnally; (See Gregory IX, Decretals, Bk. 4, tit. 11, ch. 4, ‘Martinus.’) but not if the marriage has not yet been consummated, (See Glossa ordin. in Decretum, pt. 2, cause 30, q. 4, can. 5, ‘Post uxoris.’) for then they have not yet been made one flesh; and this is by the mode of a certain affinity.

Therefore, by equal reasoning it also seems to pass to the woman who has already been known carnally, although she is not a wife; which is the reason the verse says: whoever lifted the baby to me from the font, or the one whom my wife raised from the font, this is my commater; she cannot become my wife. If anyone raised up from the font the child of my wife, not by me, I am not forbidden to have her after the death of my own wife. (See Raymond of Peñafort, Summa, Bk. 4, tit. 7, sec. 2 (494a); Albert the Great, In IV Sent., d. 42, a. 6 (BO 30:478); Bonaventure, In IV Sent., d. 42, a. 1, q. 3 (QR 4:872).)

Reply Obj. 1: By the fact that spiritual union and bodily union are of different genera, it can be concluded that one is not the other, but not that one cannot be the cause of the other; for of those things that are in different genera, sometimes one is the cause of the other either per se or per accidens.

Reply Obj. 2: A spiritual father and spiritual mother of the same person are not joined in spiritual generation, except incidentally, for one person would suffice for this in himself. Therefore it is not necessary that by this any spiritual family relationship should come about between them, so that there could not be a marriage between them, which is why the verse says: one of the compaters will always be spiritual, the other physical: (See Raymond of Peñafort, Summa, Bk. 4, tit. 7, sec. 1 (492b); Albert the Great, In IV Sent., d. 42, a. 4 (BO 30:473).) nor does such a rule fail. But by marriage, a husband and wife are made one flesh, speaking per se; and therefore, it is not the same.

Reply Obj. 3: I say that if the wife is not baptized, a spiritual family relationship does not extend to her because she does not have the capacity, not because a spiritual family relationship could not be transferred by marriage from the husband to the wife.

Reply Obj. 4: By the fact that no spiritual family relationship is contracted between a spiritual father and mother, nothing prohibits that a husband and wife should lift someone from the holy font together; nor is it unfitting that the wife is made twice the spiritual mother of someone by different causes; just as it can also be that she has an affinity and is consanguineous to the same person by close biological relationship.

Response to Quaestiuncula 3

To the third question, it should be said that a son is something of his father, and not vice versa, as is said in the Ethics 8; (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 8, ch. 12 (1161b18).) and thus a spiritual family relationship passes from the father to the son, but not vice versa, and so it is clear that there are three spiritual family relations. One is called spiritual paternity, which is between a spiritual father and his spiritual child. (See above, q. 1, a. 2.) Another, which is called compaternity, is between the spiritual father and the biological father of the same person. (See above, q. 1, a. 3, qa. 2.) But the third is called spiritual fraternity which is between the spiritual child and the biological children of the same father. (See Gratian, Decretals, pt. 2, cause 30, q. 3, can. 2, can. 3, and can. 5; Gregory IX, Decretals, Bk. 4, tit. 11, ch. 7, ‘Tua nos’; ch. 8, ‘Ex litteris.’) And any one of these impedes the contracting of marriage, and invalidates the contract.

Reply Obj. 1: The person added by propagation of the flesh makes a degree with respect to that person who is related to him in the same genus, but not with respect to the one who is related in another genus; as a son is related in the same degree to the wife of his father as he is to his father, although in another genus of kinship. But a spiritual family relationship is another genus than a biological one; and thus a spiritual child is not related in the same degree to a natural child of his spiritual father, by means of which spiritual family relationship passes; and so it is not necessary that spiritual family relationship have degrees.

Reply Obj. 2: A brother is not something belonging to his brother, as a child is something belonging to his father; but a wife is something that belongs to her husband, with whom she was made one flesh; and thus it does not pass from brother to brother, whether he was begotten before or after the spiritual brotherhood.

Question 2

Adoptive relationship

Now we must examine legal family relationship, which is by adoption. And concerning this, three questions arise:

first, about adoption;

• second, whether by adoption any bond is contracted that impedes marriage;
• third, between which persons it may be contracted.
• Article 1

About adoption

Obj. 1: To the first question, we proceed thus. It seems that adoption is defined unfittingly: adoption is the legal assumption of a stranger as a son or grandson, and so forth. (See Aulus Gellius, Noctes Atticae, Bk. 5, ch. 19; Justinian, Institutes, Bk. 1, tit. 11, sec. 1, ‘Adoptio autem’ and sec. 5, ‘Licet autem’; Isidore, Etymologies, Bk. 9, ch. 5; Bernard de Bottone, Glossa ordin. in Decretal. Gregor. IX, Bk. 4, tit. 12, prol. (1165b); Raymond of Peñafort, Summa, Bk. 4, tit. 8, n. 1 (496b); Henricus Hostiensis, Summa, Bk. 4, rubr. ‘De cognatione legale,’ sec. 2 (483ra).) For a son should be subject to his father. But sometimes the one who is adopted does not pass into the power of his adoptive father. Therefore, someone is not always assumed as a son by adoption.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, parents ought to lay up treasure for their children, as said in 2 Corinthians 12:14. But it is not necessary that an adoptive father always save up for his adopted child; for sometimes the adopted one does not inherit the goods of the one adopting. Therefore, adoption is not the assumption of someone as a child.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, adoption by which someone is assumed as a son is likened to natural generation, by which a son is naturally produced. Therefore, anyone who is suited for the natural generation of a son is suited for the adoption of a son. But this is false; for a person who is not sui juris, (Digests, Bk. 1, tit. 7, leg. 2, ‘Generalis’; cf. Institutes, Bk. 1, tit. 11, sec. 1, ‘Adoptio.’) and someone who is less than twenty-five years old, (Digests, Bk. 1, tit. 7, leg. 17, ‘Nec ei.’) and a woman, (Institutes, Bk. 1, tit. 11, sec. 10, ‘Foeminae quoque.’) cannot adopt, though they can generate children naturally. And therefore adoption is not properly called assumption of someone as a son.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, assumption of an outsider as a son seems to be necessary for supplying a lack of natural sons. But that person who cannot beget, for example, a eunuch or impotent man, suffers the most from the lack of natural children. Therefore, it would be most befitting to him to assume someone as his son. But it is not befitting to him to adopt. (See Raymond of Peñafort, Summa, Bk. 4, tit. 8, sec. 1 (496b).) Therefore, adoption is not the assumption of someone as son.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, in spiritual family relationship, where someone is assumed as a son without propagation of the flesh, it does not matter if someone who has reached the age of majority is made father of a minor, or vice versa; for a young man can baptize an old man, and vice versa. If, therefore, by adoption someone is assumed as a son without propagation of the flesh, likewise it would not matter if an older man adopted a younger, or a younger adopts an older; which is not true. (Digests, Bk. 1, tit. 7, leg. 15, ‘Si paterfamilias’; leg. 16, ‘Adoptio enim’; leg. 40, ‘Adrogato patrefamilias’; Institutes, Bk. 1, tit. 11, sec. 4, ‘Minorem natu.’) And thus, the same as before.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, the one adopted does not differ according to any degree from the one adopting. Therefore, whoever is adopted is adopted as a son; and thus it is unfittingly said that someone is adopted as a grandson.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, adoption proceeds from love, which is why God is also said to have adopted us as his sons by charity. (Romans 8:15; Galatians 4:5; Ephesians 1:5.) But one should have greater charity toward one nearby than toward outsiders. Therefore, adoption should not be of an outsider, but rather of a related person.

I answer that, art imitates nature, and supplies nature’s lack in those things in which nature fails; and so, just as someone produces a child by natural generation, so too, by positive law, which is the art of the equal and good, a person can assume to himself a son in likeness of a natural son and to supply his lack of children, which was the chief reason adoption was introduced. And since assumption implies a starting terminus, because of the fact that the one assuming is not the one assumed, as was said in Book III, Distinction 5, Question 1, Article 1, Quaestiuncula 3, it is necessary that the one who is assumed as a son be an outsider. Therefore, just as natural generation has an ending terminus, namely the form that is the end of generation, and a starting terminus, namely the contrary form; so legal generation has an ending terminus, a son or a grandson, and starting terminus, an outsider. And so it is clear that the designation given comprehends the genus of adoption, since it is called a legal assumption, and the starting terminus, since it says, stranger; and the ending terminus, since it says, as a son or grandson.

Reply Obj. 1: The sonship of adoption is a kind of imitation of natural sonship, and thus there are two species of adoption. One species perfectly imitates natural sonship, and this is called adrogation, (Adrogation is the act of adopting a son as an adult, homo sui juris, as opposed to in potestate parentis.) by which the adopted one is reduced to the power of the one adopting, (See Institutes, Bk. 1, tit. 11, sec. 1, ‘Adoptio autem.’) and thus the adopted one inherits from his father without a will having been drawn up, (See Codex, Bk. 8, tit. 47, leg. 10, ‘Cum in adoptivis.’ “Intestate” means having made no will.) and the father cannot deprive him of a quarter part of his inheritance without blame. (See Codex, Bk. 8, tit. 47, leg. 2, ‘Impuberem.’) But to be adopted in this way cannot happen unless the one adopted is sui juris, namely one who after he is adopted does not have a master, or if he has, he is emancipated; and this adoption is only done by the authority of the prince. (See Institutes, Bk. 1, tit. 11, sec. 1, ‘Adoptio autem’; Digests, Bk. 1, tit. 7, leg. 2, ‘Generalis.’) The other adoption, which imitates natural sonship imperfectly, is called simple adoption, by which the one adopted does not pass into the power of the one adopting. (Institutes, Bk. 1, tit. 11, sec. 2, ‘Sed hodie.’) For this reason it is like a disposition to perfect adoption, rather than a perfect adoption: and according to this, someone can also be adopted who is not sui juris; and without the authority of the prince, by the authority of the magistrate; (Digests, Bk. 1, tit. 7, leg. 2, ‘Generalis’; Institutes, Bk. 1, tit. 11, sec. 1, ‘Adoptio autem.’) and this kind of adopted child does not inherit the goods of his adoptive parent, nor is the one adopting bound to leave him any of his goods in his will, unless he wishes. (See Codex, Bk. 8, tit. 42, leg. 10, ‘Cum in adoptivis.’)

And by this, the answer to the second objection is apparent.

Reply Obj. 3: Natural generation is ordered to the species resulting, and thus anyone in whom the nature of the species is not impeded can generate naturally. But adoption is ordered to the succession to an inheritance, and thus it only applies to those who have the power of disposing of their inheritance. This is why someone who is not sui juris, or who is less than twenty-five, or who is a woman, cannot adopt anyone, unless by special concession of the prince. (Digests, Bk. 1, tit. 7, leg. 21, ‘Nam et foeminae.’)

Reply Obj. 4: An inheritance cannot pass on to descendents through someone who has a perpetual impediment to generating; and thus by this very fact the inheritance is already owed to those who must succeed him by right of being near relations, and for this reason he is not suited to adopt, just as neither is he to procreate. And moreover, the sorrow is greater over sons [who have been lost than over those] who were never had; and thus those having an impediment to generation do not need consolation for their lack of children, as do those who have had but have lost them; or even those who could have had them but do not because of some accidental impediment.

Reply Obj. 5: Spiritual family relationship is contracted by the sacrament in which the faithful are reborn in Christ, in which male does not differ from female, slave from free man, young man from old, and thus it does not matter who is made the spiritual father of the other; but adoption happens by succession of heredity, and by a certain subjection of the one adopted to the one adopting. But it is not fitting that an older man is subjected to a young one in the care of things, and thus a minor cannot adopt his senior; but it is necessary according to the laws (Digests, Bk. 1, tit. 7, leg. 16, ‘Adoptio enim.’) that the one adopted be young enough that he could be the natural son of the one adopting.

Reply Obj. 6: Just as it happens that children are lost, so also are grandchildren; and thus since adoption was instituted as a consolation for the loss of children, just as someone can be introduced into the place of a son by adoption, so also in the place of a grandson, and so in succession. (Digests, Bk. 1, tit. 7, leg. 2, ‘Generalis’; leg. 43, ‘Adoptiones’; Institutes, Bk. 1, tit. 11, sec. 1, ‘Adoptio autem.’)

Reply Obj. 7: A near relative must succeed by the law of propinquity, (See Digests, Bk. 38, tit. 16.) and thus it does not befit him to be displaced in the succession by adoption; and if someone closely related who is not a candidate for the hereditary succession should be adopted, he is not adopted as a near relative, but as someone outside the right of succession to the goods of the one adopting.

Article 2

Whether by adoption any bond is contracted that impedes marriage

Obj. 1: To the second question, we proceed thus. It seems that by adoption no bond impeding marriage is contracted. For spiritual care is more noble than bodily care. But by the fact that someone is subject to the spiritual care of another, no bond of close relation is contracted; otherwise, all those who live in a parish would be closely related to the priest, and could not contract with his son. Therefore, neither can adoption do this, which draws the one adopted into the care of the one adopting.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, by the fact that someone becomes benefactor to another, no bond of close relationship is contracted. But adoption is nothing other than the tie of a certain benefit. Therefore, by adoption, no bond of close relationship is made.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, a natural father principally provides for his son in three ways, as the Philosopher says, for from him he has being, nourishment, and teaching; (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 8, ch. 11 (1161a16); ch. 12 (1162a6).) but the hereditary succession comes after these. But by the fact that someone provides for someone else in nourishment and teaching, no bond of close relation is contracted; otherwise, wet nurses and schoolmasters and teachers would be close relatives, which is false. Therefore, neither by adoption, by which someone succeeds in the inheritance of another, is any close relation contracted.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the sacraments of the Church are not subject to human laws. But marriage is a sacrament of the Church. Therefore, since adoption is devised by human law, it seems that marriage cannot be impeded by any bond contracted by adoption.

On the contrary (1), family relationship impedes marriage. But a certain family relationship, namely a legal one, is caused by adoption, as is evident from its definition; for a legal family relationship is a certain closeness arising from adoption. (See Raymond of Peñafort, Summa, Bk. 4, tit. 8, sec. 1 (496b); Albert the Great, In IV Sent., d. 42, a. 13 (BO 30:485); Bonaventure, In IV Sent., d. 42, a. 2, praenotata (QR 4:872).) Therefore, adoption causes a bond by which marriage is impeded.

Furthermore (2), this same thing is held by the authorities cited in the text.

I answer that, divine law excludes especially those persons from marriage who must live together, lest, as Rabbi Moses says, (Moses Maimonides, Guide for the Perplexed, pt. 3, ch. 49.) if physical intimacy were permitted to them, it would easily open up a place for concupiscence, which is what marriage was established to repress. And since an adopted son frequents the house of his adoptive father as a natural son would, thus by human laws it is prohibited for marriage to be contracted between such as these, (Digests, Bk. 1, tit. 7, leg. 23, ‘Qui in adoptionem’; Bk. 23, tit. 2, leg. 14, ‘Adoptivus filius.’) and such a prohibition is approved by the Church; (See Gregory IX, Decretals, Bk. 4, tit. 12, ch. 1, ‘Si qua’; Gratian, Decretals, pt. 2, cause 30, q. 3, can. 1.) and for this reason it is held that legal family relationship impedes marriage.

And by this the answer to the first three is evident; for by none of those things introduce such a cohabitation as could present an incitement to concupiscence, and thus by these things no close relationship is caused that impedes marriage.

Reply Obj. 4: The prohibition of human law would not suffice for an impediment to marriage, unless the authority of the Church should intervene, which also forbids the same thing.

Article 3

Between which persons it may be contracted

Obj. 1: To the third question, we proceed thus. It seems that such a family relationship is only contracted between the adoptive father and the adopted son. For mostly it would seem that it should be contracted between the adoptive father and the natural mother of the adopted, just as happens in spiritual family relationship. But between people such as these there is no legal family relationship. Therefore, neither is there between other persons beyond the adoptive person and the adopted.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, a family relationship impeding marriage is a perpetual impediment. But between the adopted son and the natural daughter of the one adopting there is not a perpetual impediment; for once the adoption is dissolved by the death of the one adopting or by the emancipation of the one adopted, he can contract with her. (See Digests, Bk. 23, tit. 2, leg. 17, ‘Per adoptionem’; Institutes, Bk. 1, tit. 10, sec. 2, ‘Inter eas’; Gratian, Decretals, pt. 2, cause 30, q. 3, can. 6, ‘Per adoptionem.’) Therefore, he did not have any family relationship with her that would impede marriage.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, spiritual family relationship does not extend to someone who could not give the sacrament or receive it, and so it does not affect the non-baptized. But a woman cannot adopt, as is clear from what has been said. (See above, article 1, arg. 3.) Therefore, a legal family relationship does not pass from a husband to his wife.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, a spiritual family relationship is stronger than a legal one. But a spiritual family relationship does not pass to a grandson. Therefore, neither does a legal one.

On the contrary, a legal family relationship has more to do with the union or propagation of the flesh than the spiritual one does. But the spiritual family relationship passes to the other person in the way explained, as was said. (See above, q. 1, a. 3, qa. 1.) Therefore, so does a legal one.

I answer that, there are three kinds of legal family relationship. The first is that of descendants, which is contracted between an adoptive father and his adopted son, and the son of the adoptive son, and the grandson, and so on in succession. (See Institutes, Bk. 1, tit. 10, sec. 1, ‘Ergo non omnes’; sec. 2, ‘Inter eas.’) The second is what exists between the adopted child and the natural child. (See Gratian, Decretals, pt. 2, cause 30, q. 3, can. 6, ‘Per adoptionem’; Digests, Bk. 23, tit. 2, leg. 17, ‘Per adoptionem.’) The third is by the mode of a kind of affinity, that exists between the adoptive father and the wife of the adopted son, or conversely between the adopted son and the wife of his adoptive father. (Digests, Bk. 23, tit. 2, leg. 14, ‘Adoptivus filius.’) Therefore, the first relationship and the third impede marriage perpetually, but the second, only so long as he remains in the power of his adoptive father; and so, when the father is dead, or the son is emancipated, marriage can be contracted between them.

Reply Obj. 1: By spiritual generation, a son is not drawn outside the power of his father, as is done by adoption, and so the spiritual child remains the child of both at the same time, but the adoptive child does not; and thus no close relationship is contracted between the adoptive father and the natural mother or father, as was the case in spiritual relationship.

Reply Obj. 2: Legal family relationship impedes marriage because of cohabitation; and thus when the necessity of living together is dissolved, it is not unfitting if the bond spoken of does not remain, as was the case before he was under that same father’s power. But an adoptive father and his wife always retain a certain authority over the adopted son and his wife, and because of this, the bond remains between them.

Reply Obj. 3: A woman can also adopt by concession of the prince; (Digests, Bk. 1, tit. 7, leg. 21, ‘Nam et foeminae’; Institutes, Bk. 1, tit. 11, sec. 10, ‘Foeminae quoque.’) for which reason the legal family relationship can also pass into her. And furthermore, the reason that spiritual family relationship does not pass to the non-baptized is not because they cannot hold to the sacrament, but because they do not have the capacity for any spirituality.

Reply Obj. 4: By a spiritual family relationship, a son is not established in the power and care of his spiritual father, as in legal family relationships. For whatever is in the power of the son must pass into the power of the adoptive father; which is why, when a father is adopted, the sons and the grandsons who are in the power of the one adopted are also adopted. (Digests, Bk. 1, tit. 7, leg. 2, ‘Generalis enim’; leg. 15, ‘Si paterfamilias.’)

Question 3

On second marriages

Now second marriages are to be considered; and concerning this two questions arise:

first, whether they are licit;

• second, whether they are sacramental.
• Article 1

Whether they are licit

Obj. 1: To the first question, we proceed thus. It seems that second weddings are not licit. For the judgment of a thing should be according to the truth. But Chrysostom says that to take a second husband is, according to the truth, fornication: (Pseudo-Chrysostom, Homilies on Matthew, hom. 32, on Matthew 19:8 (PG 56:801). See Gratian, Decretals, pt. 2, cause 31, q. 1, can. 9, ‘Hac ratione.’) which is not licit. Therefore, neither is a second marriage.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, everything that is not good is not licit. But Ambrose says that a twofold marriage is not good. (In fact, Jerome, Against Jovinian, Bk. 1 (PL 23:243); see Gratian, Decretals, pt. 2, cause 31, q. 1, can. 10.) Therefore, it is not licit.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, no one should be barred from taking part in what is decent and licit. But priests are barred from engaging in second marriages, as is evident from the text. Therefore, they are not licit.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, no one incurs a penalty except for guilt. But for a second marriage, a person incurs the penalty of irregularity. (See Gratian, Decretals, pt 1, d. 34, can. 14; Gregory IX, Decretals, Bk. 1, tit. 21, ch. 1, ‘Ut bigami’; ch. 2, ‘Super eo’; ch. 3, ‘De bigamis.’) Therefore, they are not licit.

On the contrary (1), Abraham is read to have contracted a second marriage in Genesis 25:1.

Furthermore (2), in 1 Timothy 5:14, the Apostle says: but I would have the younger ones, that is, widows*, marry, to bear children*. Therefore, second marriages are licit.

I answer that, the matrimonial bond only lasts up until death, as is clear from Romans 7:2–3, and thus when one spouse dies, the matrimonial bond ceases. Therefore, once the first spouse is dead, a person is not impeded from a second marriage, and not only a second, but a third, and so forth, are licit marriages.

Reply Obj. 1: Chrysostom is speaking about the cause that sometimes is wont to incite someone to a second marriage, namely concupiscence, which also incites to fornication.

Reply Obj. 2: The second marriage is said not to be good, not because it is illicit, but because it lacks that honor of signification that is in the first marriage, that there might be one woman for one man, as it is in Christ and the Church. (See Gregory IX, Decretals, Bk. 1, tit. 21, ch. 5, ‘Debitum pastorale.’)

Reply Obj. 3: Men dedicated to divine things are not only barred from illicit things, but even from things which have some aspect of baseness; and thus also they are barred from second marriages, which lack the dignity that there was in the first one.

Reply Obj. 4: Irregularity, as was said above in Distinction 29, Question 3, Article 1, is not always introduced because of fault, but because of a defect of sacrament; and thus the argument is not to the point.

Article 2

Whether they are sacramental

Obj. 1: To the second question, we proceed thus. It seems that a second marriage is not a sacrament. For whoever repeats a sacrament does harm to it. But injury is done to no sacrament. Therefore, if a second marriage were a sacrament, in no way could marriage be repeated.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, in every sacrament some blessing is applied. Yet in a second marriage it is not applied, as is said in the text. Therefore, no sacrament happens there.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, signification belongs to the essence of the sacrament. But in a second marriage, the signification of marriage is not preserved; for there is not one woman for one man, like Christ and the Church. (Ibid.) Therefore, there is no sacrament.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, one sacrament does not impede the reception of another. But a second marriage impedes the reception of holy orders. Therefore, it is not a sacrament.

On the contrary (1), intercourse in the second marriage is excused from sin, as also in the first. But matrimonial intercourse is excused by the three goods of the marital union, which are fidelity, offspring, and sacrament. Therefore, a second marriage is a sacrament.

Furthermore (2), as is evident from the case of fornication, no irregularity is contracted by the second non-sacramental union of a man to a woman. (Gregory IX, Decretals, Bk. 1, tit. 21, ch. 6, ‘Quia circa.’) But in the second marriage irregularity is contracted. (See Gratian, Decretals, pt. 1, d. 34, can. 14; Gregory IX, Decretals, Bk. 1, tit. 21, chs. 1–3.) Therefore, it is sacramental.

I answer that, wherever the things that belong to the essence of a sacrament are found, there is a valid sacrament. And in a second marriage everything that belongs to the essence of the sacrament is found: both the due matter, constituted by the presence of eligible persons, and the due form, namely the expression of interior consent through words. Therefore it is clear that the second marriage is also a sacrament like the first.

Reply Obj. 1: This is understood as applying in the case where sacrament brings about a perpetual effect; for then if the sacrament is repeated, one is given to understand that the first was not efficacious, and thus injury is done to the first, as is clear in all the sacraments that imprint a character. But those sacraments that do not have a perpetual effect can be repeated without injury to the sacrament, as is evident in the case of penance. And since a matrimonial bond is removed by death, no injury is done to the sacrament if the woman marries again after the death of her husband.

Reply Obj. 2: The second marriage, although it is a perfect sacrament considered in itself, yet considered in order to the first has something of a defect of sacrament, for it does not have the full signification, since it is not one woman for one man, as is the case in the marriage of Christ and the Church; and due to this defect, a blessing is taken away from the second marriage. But this is to be understood as applying when the second marriage is second on the part of the man and on the part of the woman, or on the part of the woman alone. For if a virgin contracts with a man who has had another wife, nevertheless the marriage is blessed, (See Bernard de Bottone, Glossa ordin. in Decretal. Gregor. IX, Bk. 4, tit. 21, ch. 3, ‘Vir autem’ (1115a).) for the signification is preserved in a certain mode even in its order to the first marriage; for Christ, even if he had one Church as his bride, still had many persons espoused in the one Church; but the soul cannot be the bride of anyone other than Christ, for with a demon it fornicates, nor is there a spiritual marriage; and because of this when a woman marries a second time, the marriage is not blessed, due to the defect of the sacrament.

Reply Obj. 3: The complete signification is found in the second marriage considered in itself, but not if it is considered in order to the preceding marriage; and in this way it has a defect of sacrament.

Reply Obj. 4: The second marriage impedes the sacrament of holy orders as regards its defect of sacrament, not as regards its being a sacrament.

Exposition of the Text

“All those whom we receive in penance are as much our spiritual children as those whom the water of baptism regenerated as we received them:” (Sententiae IV, 42.2 (238). 2, attributed to Pope Symmachus.) not by reason of some family relationship, but because of the danger to be avoided, as was said.

But Paschal II forbids the union of children born after the godfatherhood. (Sent. IV, 42. 4 (240). 3, citing Paschal II, Epistola 414.) That prohibition is not now in force, for it was more for the sake of a certain propriety than because of any bond.

“If one has taken in marriage the daughter of his spiritual mother by a fortuitous and contingent cause, after more mature reflection, let him keep her.” (Sent. IV, 42. 4 (240). 4, citing Council of Tribur (895), ch. 48.) This is said, therefore, because spiritual family relationship to a spiritual child passes from the father to a natural child, for all the natural children of a spiritual father are spiritual brothers to him; but not in respect of the father, for a father’s spiritual sons do not become natural sons of the mother, or vice versa.

“But since a man who married two godmothers or sisters has commited a sinful disgrace, a great penance is to be enjoined upon him.” (Sent. IV, 42.6 (242). 1, Urban II, Epistola 271.) This is to be understood when one of these women is made commater of the other, after have become his wife in consummated marriage, and through the proper act; otherwise, it is prohibited, as was said.