D. 31 - On the goods of marriage and the marital act

After the Master has determined the causes by which marriage itself is constituted, here he examines the reasons for its dignity, namely, the goods of the union, by which the marital act is dignified. And this is divided into two parts: in the first, he determines the goods of marriage as regards marriage, and this is what we are now discussing; in the second part, he shows how these goods existed in the marriages of the patriarchs, in Distinction 33, at: here it is asked concerning the ancient Fathers. (Sententiae IV, 33.1 (194). 1.)

The first part is divided into two: first, he determines the goods of the union for which the marital act is excused. Second, he considers the marital act itself, which is excused through the aforementioned goods, according as it also has the nature of something owed, in Distinction 32, at: it is also to be known that even though in all other things the husband is above the wife . . . yet they are equal in satisfying the debt of the flesh. (Sent. IV, 32.1 (190). 1.)

The first of these points is divided in two: first, he determines how the goods of the union are found in marriage; second, he shows when the conjugal act may be excused for their sake: and so, when these three goods occur together in any marriage, they serve to excuse carnal joining. (Sent. IV, 31.5 (186). 1.)

The first has two parts: in the first, he shows what the three goods of the union are; in the second, how they are related to marriage: and it is to be known that a marriage is at times contracted by some people which is not accompanied by these three goods. (Sent. IV, 31.2 (183). 4.)

And regarding this he does two things: first, he shows that one of the goods mentioned is found in every marriage, namely, the sacrament, although not the other two—that is, fidelity and offspring—which at times are absent from a marriage in actuality. Second he considers the marriage in which the intention of those two things is not preserved: it is usual to ask: when a man and a woman, who are not the husband and wife of anyone else, join together, not for the procreation of children, but for the sake of sexual intercourse alone on account of incontinence, etc. (Sent. IV, 31.2 (183). 5, Augustine, De bono coniugali, c5 n5.)

And regarding this he does three things: first, he considers the marriage in which the good of children is not intended; second, one in which it is not only not intended, but even impeded: as for those who procure poisons [to induce] sterility, they are not marriage partners but fornicators; (Sent. IV, 30.3 (184). 1.) third, he considers a certain related question*: here it is usual to ask about those who procure an abortion*. (Sent. IV, 31.4 (185). 1.)

And so, when these three goods occur together in any marriage, they serve to excuse carnal joining. Here he shows how the conjugal act is excused by the aforementioned goods, and concerning this he does two things: first, he determines the truth; second, he poses objections to the contrary, at: but if the intercourse which is done for the sake of offspring lacks fault, what is it that the Apostle allows according to indulgence? (Sent. IV, 31.6 (187). 1.)

And regarding this he does two things: First, he objects to the excusing of the matrimonial act, showing that marriage does not need an excuse; second, he shows that it cannot be excused, if it is free of sin, at: “perhaps someone will say, etc.” (Sent. IV, 31.6 (187). 3, gloss by Peter Lombard on 1 Cor. 7, 6, attributed to Augustine.)

And regarding this he does two things: first, he objects through reasoning; second, through authority: but blessed Gregory seems to feel otherwise; (Sent. IV, 31.8 (189). 2.) and each of these is divided into objection and resolution, as is clear from the text.

Here there are two questions. First, concerning the goods of marriage. Second, excusing the marital acts by the goods mentioned.

Question 1

The three goods of marriage

Regarding the first, three questions arise:

first, whether certain goods should excuse marriage;

• second, what and how many they might be;
• third, how they are related to marriage.
• Article 1

Whether certain goods should excuse marriage

Obj. 1: To the first question, we proceed thus. It seems that marriage should not be excused by certain goods. For nature intends the conservation of the individual, which occurs by what pertains to nutrition, just as it intends the conservation of the species, which occurs through marriage; and much more, as the good of the species is much better and more godlike than the good of one individual. (See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 1, ch. 2: “for the good of the city is more godlike than the good of one man” (1094b7–11); cf. On the Soul, Bk. 2, ch. 4 (415a25-b7).) But no one needs to be excused from the act of nourishing himself. Therefore, neither from marriage.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher in the Ethics 8, the friendship between a husband and wife is natural, and includes in itself the honorable, the useful, and the pleasurable. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 8, ch. 12 (1162a15–29).) But what is honorable in itself does not require any excuse. Therefore, neither should excusing goods be attributed to marriage.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, marriage was instituted as a remedy and an office of nature, as was said above in Distinction 23, Question 2, Articles 1 and 2. But insofar as it is an office, it does not require any excusing, for then it would also have needed excusing in Paradise, which is false: for there marriage was honorable, and the bridal-bed was immaculate, as Augustine says. (Augustine, On the Literal Meaning of Genesis, Bk. 9, ch. 3 (CSEL 28.1:271).) Likewise, neither as a remedy does it require an excuse, for neither do the other sacraments, which were instituted as remedies for sin. Therefore, marriage does not need excuses like this.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the virtues direct us toward all things that can be done honorably. If therefore marriage can be dignified by certain goods, it requires no other dignifying qualities than virtues of the soul. And thus no other goods should be ascribed to marriage by which it may be dignified, just as they are not ascribed to other things that virtues direct us in.

On the contrary (1), wherever an indulgence is given, there is necessarily some character of excuse. But marriage is conceded to the state of our weakness as an indulgence, as is evident from 1 Corinthians 7. Therefore, it is necessary for it to be excused by certain goods.

Furthermore (2), marital intercourse and fornication are of the same species as regards the natural species of the act. But fornication is disgraceful in itself. Therefore, for marital intercourse not to be disgraceful, it is necessary that something be added to it that pertains to honorableness, and draws it into another species of moral act.

I answer that, no wise man should endure any forfeiture except for the recompense of some equal or better good; and so choosing something that has some loss attached to it requires the recompense of some good, to order and dignify it. Now, in the union of a man and a woman, the forfeiture of reason occurs: both because at the moment of extreme pleasure reason is eclipsed, so that it cannot understand anything while the pleasure lasts, as the Philosopher says; (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 7, ch. 11 (1152b18).) and because of the tribulation of the flesh, that people must maintain out of concern for temporal things, as is clear from 1 Corinthians 7. And therefore, the choice of such a union cannot be ordered, unless through the recompense of certain things by which the union is said to be dignified. And these things are the goods which excuse marriage, and render it honorable.

Reply Obj. 1: In the act of eating there is not so intense a pleasure that it eclipses reason, as in this pleasure, both because the generative power, through which original sin is transmitted, is infectious and corrupt, while the nutritive power, by which it is not transmitted, is corrupt but not infectious; and because anyone senses more a lack in himself as an individual than the lack of the species. This is why, to stimulate someone to eat, which remedies a lack in the individual, the feeling of that very lack is enough. But to induce someone to the act that remedies the lack of the species, divine providence has attached pleasure to that act, which also moves other animals that have no infection of original sin. And therefore, it is not the same.

Reply Obj. 2: Those goods that dignify marriage belong to the nature of marriage; and therefore it does not need them like some sort of exterior things that dignify it, but like things within it causing that dignity that arises from its own nature.

Reply Obj. 3: Marriage, by the very fact that it is both office and remedy, has the account of the useful and the dignified; but both of these belong to it because it has goods of some kind, by which it becomes both an office and a remedy against concupiscence.

Reply Obj. 4: An act of virtue is dignified both by virtue as by an inducing principle, and by circumstances as by its formal principles. Now this is how these goods are related to marriage: as circumstances are related to an act of virtue, because of which the act can be an act of virtue.

Article 2

What and how many they might be

Obj. 1: To the second question, we proceed thus. (Parallels: below, d. 33, q. 1, a. 1; SCG IV, ch. 78; Super I Cor. 7, lec. 1.) It seems that the goods of marriage—namely, fidelity, children, and sacrament—are inadequately ennumerated in the text. For marriage does not only occur among men for the procreation and nurturing of children; but also for the fellowship of a shared life for the sake of sharing the labors, as is stated in the Ethics 8. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 8, ch. 12 (1162a15ff.).) Therefore, just as offspring are counted as a good of marriage, so also the sharing of labors should be.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the union of Christ and the Church, which marriage signifies, is accomplished by charity. Therefore, among the goods of marriage, charity should be counted rather than faith.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, in marriage, just as it is required that neither spouse approach the bed of someone else, so it is also required that each one render the marital debt to the other. But the first requirement belongs to fidelity, as is stated in the text. Therefore, justice should also be counted among the goods of marriage because of the rendering of the debt.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, just as indissolubility is required in marriage insofar as it signifies the union of Christ and the Church, so also unity, which signifies that one woman be for one man. But the sacrament that is counted among the three goods of marriage refers to indissolubility. Therefore, there should be something else which refers to unity.

On the contrary (5), it seems that this ennumeration is excessive. For a single virtue suffices for dignifying a single act. But fidelity is a certain virtue. Therefore, it was not necessary to add the other two in order to dignify marriage.

Furthermore (6), something does not receive the account of ‘useful’ and ‘noble’ from the same thing, since useful and noble are divided against each other in the genus of ‘good’. But marriage receives the nature of ‘useful’ from offspring. Therefore, offspring should not be counted among the goods which dignify marriage.

Furthermore (7), nothing should be set forth as a property or condition of itself. But these goods are considered certain conditions of marriage. Therefore, since marriage is a sacrament, the sacrament should not be considered among the goods of marriage.

I answer that, marriage is an office of nature as well as a sacrament of the Church. Therefore, insofar as it is an office of nature, it is ordered by two things, like any other act of virtue: one of these is required on the part of the agent himself, and this is the intention of the due end, and this is how offspring are counted as a good of marriage. The other is required on the part of the act itself, which is good in its genus by the fact that it deals with its due matter; and this is how it has fidelity, by which a man approaches his own wife, and no other. But in addition, it has a certain goodness from the fact that it is a sacrament, and this is signified by the very name of sacrament.

Reply Obj. 1: In the good of offspring not only the procreation of children is understood, but also their education, to which all sharing of work between a man and a woman insofar as they are joined in marriage is ordered as to an end, for fathers naturally store up treasure for their sons, as is evident from 2 Corinthians 12:14. And thus in the procreation of children another end is included, as a secondary end in a principal end.

Reply Obj. 2: Fidelity is not taken here as the theological virtue of faith, but as a part of justice, according to which it is named fidelity from the fact that the things that were said are done in the observation of promises. For since marriage is a kind of contract, there is a promise in it, by which a certain man is determined to a certain woman.

Reply Obj. 3: Just as it is contained in the promise of marriage that neither party may approach the bed of someone else, so also that both must render the debt to each other, and this is even more central, since it follows directly from the mutual power given by each to the other. And thus both matters belong to fidelity, but in the text is stated what is less manifest.

Reply Obj. 4: In the good of sacrament, not only is indissolubility to be understood, but all those things which follow upon marriage being a sign of the union of Christ and the Church. Or it could be said that the unity that the objection touches upon belongs to the good of fidelity in the same way that indissolubility belongs to the sacrament.

Reply Obj. 5: Fidelity is not here taken as a particular virtue, but as a certain condition of virtue, from which fidelity is named, which is counted as a part of justice.

Reply Obj. 6: Just as the due use of a useful good receives the account of ‘noble’, not indeed from the usefulness, but from reason making the right use of it, so also the ordering toward some useful good can make the goodness of nobility by the power of reason ordering it duly. And in this way, by the fact that marriage is ordained to the procreation of children, it is useful; and nonetheless it is noble, inasmuch as it is duly ordered.

Reply Obj. 7: As the Master says in the text, the good of sacrament does not here refer to marriage itself, but to its indissolubility, which is a sign of the same thing of which marriage is the sign. Or it may be said that although marriage is a sacrament, nonetheless, it is one thing for marriage to be marriage, and something else for it to be a sacrament: for it was not only instituted in order to be a sign of a holy thing, but also that it might be an office of nature; and therefore the nature of a sacrament is a certain condition added onto marriage considered in itself, from which it also has dignity; and therefore its sacramentality, as I will say later, is counted among the goods dignifying marriage: and according to this, in the third good of marriage (namely, sacrament) is not only to be understood indissolubility, but also all those things which belong to its signification.

Article 3

How they are related to marriage

Obj. 1: To the third question, we proceed thus. It seems that sacrament is not the principal good among the goods of marriage. For the end is most important in anything. But the procreation of children is the end of marriage. Therefore, the procreation of children is foremost among the goods of marriage.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the difference of species, which completes the species, is more important to the account than the genus, just as form is more important than matter in the constitution of a natural thing. But sacrament belongs to marriage under the notion of its genus; while offspring and fidelity belong to it under the notion of difference, insofar as it is this kind of sacrament. Therefore, the other two are more principal things in marriage than sacrament is.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, just as marriage is found without children or fidelity, so also it is found without indissolubility, as is evident whenever one spouse enters religious life before the consummation of the marriage. Therefore, neither for this reason is sacrament foremost among the goods of marriage.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the effect cannot be more important than its cause. But consent, which is the cause of marriage, is frequently changed. Therefore, marriage also can be dissolved; and thus indissolubility does not always accompany marriage.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, sacraments that have perpetual effects imprint a character. But in marriage, no character is imprinted. Therefore, it has no perpetual indissolubility, and thus, just as there can be marriage without children, so there can also be marriage without sacrament; and so the same as was said above.

On the contrary (1), what is included in the definition of a thing is the most essential to that thing. But indissolubility, which belongs to the sacrament, is included in the definition given above of marriage, whereas offspring and fidelity are not. Therefore, among these things the sacrament is more essential to marriage.

Furthermore (2), divine power, which works in the sacraments, is more efficacious than human power. But offspring and fidelity belong to marriage according as it is an office of human nature, while sacrament belongs to it according as it is divinely instituted. Therefore, sacrament is more important in marriage than the other two.

I answer that, there are two ways that one thing is said to be in a certain thing more principally than something else: either because it is more essential, or because it is more worthy. If because it is more worthy, then in every way sacrament is more principal among the three goods of the marital union, since it belongs to marriage inasmuch as it is a sacrament of grace, while the other two belong to it inasmuch as it is a certain office of nature. Moreover, the perfection of grace is more noble than the perfection of nature. If, on the other hand, what is more essential is said to be more principal, then a distinction should be drawn: for fidelity and offspring can be considered in two ways. In one way, in themselves, and thus they belong to the use of marriage, by which children are produced and the conjugal pact is preserved. But indissolubility, which the sacrament brings with it, belongs to marriage in itself. For from the very fact that in their conjugal pact the spouses hand themselves over to each other in perpetuity, it follows that they may not be separated, and for this reason marriage is never found without indissolubility.

However, marriage is found without fidelity and children, since the being of a thing does not depend upon its use. And according to this the sacrament is more essential to marriage than fidelity and offspring. In another way fidelity and children can be considered according as they exist in their own principles, as the intention of having children may be taken in place of the actual children, and in place of fidelity, the obligation of keeping fidelity, for marriage cannot exist without these things, since they are caused in marriage by the conjugal pact itself. So that if something contrary to these should be expressed in the consent that causes marriage, it would not be a valid marriage. So, taking fidelity and offspring in this way, procreation of children is most essential in marriage, and second is fidelity, and third is sacrament; as also for a man the being of nature is more essential than the being of grace, even though the being of grace is more worthy.

Reply Obj. 1: The end according to intention is first in a thing, but according to attainment, it is last; and this is how children stand among the goods of marriage. Therefore in one way this is the more principal good, and in another way not.

Reply Obj. 2: Sacrament, even considered as the third good of marriage, belongs to marriage in virtue of its difference. For it is called a ‘sacrament’ because of the signification of this determinate sacred thing, which marriage signifies.

Reply Obj. 3: Marriage, according to Augustine, is a good of mortals, (See Augustine, On the Good of Marriage (CSEL 41), ch. 2.) which is why in the resurrection they will not marry nor be given in marriage, as is said in Matthew 22:30, and therefore the bond of marriage does not extend beyond the life in which it is contracted. And thus it is called indissoluble, for it cannot be dissolved in this life, but it can be dissolved through death, either a physical death after physical union, or a spiritual death after a spiritual union alone.

Reply Obj. 4: Although the consent that causes marriage is not perpetual materially, i.e., as regards the substance of the act—for the act ceases and a contrary act can succeed it—yet, formally speaking, it is perpetual, for it regards the perpetuity of the bond, otherwise, it would not effect a marriage. For consent to a certain woman for a time does not bring about a marriage. And I say formally, according as the act receives its species from its object, and according to this, marriage receives indissolubility from consent.

Reply Obj. 5: In those sacraments that imprint a character, the power for spiritual acts is transmitted. But in marriage it is a power for physical acts. Thus, by reason of the power that the spouses receive over each other, marriage resembles those sacraments in which a character is imprinted, and from this it takes its indissolubility, as is stated in the text. But it differs from those sacraments insofar as this power is for physical acts, and because of this it does not imprint a spiritual character.

Question 2

The marital act

Next it should be asked how marriage may be excused by the aforementioned goods; and regarding this, three questions arise:

first, whether the goods mentioned excuse the marital act, so that it is not a sin at all;

• second, whether without these goods it might ever be excused from sin;
• third, whether when it is without them it is always a mortal sin.
• Article 1 Whether the goods mentioned excuse the marital act, so that it is not a sin at all

Obj. 1: To the first question, we proceed thus. (Parallels: In II Sent. d. 20, expos. text.; In IV Sent. d. 26, q. 1, a. 3, ad 4; Super I Cor. 7, lec. 1.) It seems that the marital act cannot be excused by the goods named, such that there is no sin at all. For anyone who endures the loss of a greater good because of a lesser good sins, for it is disordered to allow this. But the good of reason, which is injured in the conjugal act itself, is greater than these three goods of the conjugal union. Therefore, these goods do not suffice to excuse conjugal intercourse.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, if good is added to evil in the genus of moral acts, the whole is made evil, not good. For one bad circumstance makes an act evil, but one good circumstance does not make it good. But the conjugal act is evil in itself, otherwise it would not need to be excused. Therefore, the goods added to marriage cannot make it good.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, wherever there is immoderation in the passions, there is vice in moral acts. But the goods of marriage cannot make it so that the pleasure of the act is not immoderate. Therefore, they cannot excuse it from being a sin.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, there is no shame except about a disgraceful act, according to Damascene. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, Bk. 2, ch. 15 (PG 94:931).) But the goods of marriage do not remove embarrassment from that act. Therefore, they cannot excuse it.

On the contrary (1), conjugal intercourse only differs from fornication by the goods of marriage. If, therefore, they did not suffice to excuse it, then marriage would remain always illicit; which is against what is found above, in Distinction 26, Question 1, Article 3.

Furthermore (2), the goods of matrimony relate to its act as due circumstances, as was said. But such circumstances suffice to make an act not evil. Therefore, these goods can excuse marriage so that it is in no way a sin.

I answer that, an act is said to be excused in two ways. In one way on the part of the one doing it, so that however evil it may be, guilt is not imputed to the doer, or at least not so much guilt; for example, as ignorance is said to excuse sin in whole or in part. In another way, an act is said to be excused on the part of itself, so that it is not evil; and this is how the goods of marriage are said to excuse the marital act. Now the reason that accounts for a moral act not being evil is the same reason that makes it good: for no particular act is indifferent, as was said in Book II, Distinction 40, Article 5. However, a human act is called good in two ways. In one way, by the goodness of virtue, and thus an act is made good by those things which place it in the mean; and fidelity and the procreation of children do this in the marital act, as is clear from what has been said. In another way, by the goodness of a sacrament, according to which the act is not only called good but also holy; and the marital act has this goodness from the indissolubility of the union, according to which it designates the union of Christ and his Church. And thus it is clear that the aforementioned goods sufficiently excuse the marital act.

Reply Obj. 1: By the marital act a man does not incur the loss of reason habitually, but only in the act. Nor is it unfitting that sometimes a certain act, better according to its own genus, is interrupted by a certain act of lesser good. For this can be done without sin, as is evident in someone who ceases contemplation so that he may be available for action for a while.

Reply Obj. 2: That argument would hold if the evil that inseparably accompanies intercourse were the evil of guilt. In this case, however, it is not the evil of guilt, but only of punishment, which is the disobedience of concupiscence to reason. And therefore the argument does not follow.

Reply Obj. 3: The overflow of passion that causes vice does not depend on its quantitative intensity, but its relation to reason. This is why passion is only considered immoderate when it exceeds the limits of reason. However, the pleasure that occurs in the marital act, no matter how intense it may be according to quantity, nonetheless does not exceed the limits fixed for it by reason before its beginning, regardless of how incapable reason may be to establish those limits during the pleasure itself.

Reply Obj. 4: That baseness which is always present in the marital act and causes embarrassment is the baseness of punishment, not guilt. For man is naturally embarrassed by any defect.

Article 2

Whether without these goods it might ever be excused from sin

Obj. 1: To the second question, we proceed thus. (Parallel: De malo, q. 15, a. 1.) It seems that the marital act may be excused even without the goods of matrimony. For whoever is moved to the marital act by nature alone does not seem to intend any good, since the goods of matrimony pertain to grace or virtue. But when someone is moved to the aforementioned act by natural appetite alone, it does not seem to be a sin. For nothing natural is bad, since evil is contrary to nature and contrary to order, as Dionysius says. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4 (PG 3:713).) Therefore, the marital act can be excused even without the goods of marriage.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the man who avails himself of his wife in order to avoid fornication does not seem to intend any good of marriage. But such a man does not sin, as it seems, since marriage was granted to human weakness for this purpose, that fornication might be avoided (1 Corinthians 7). Therefore even without the goods of marriage this act may be excused.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the man who uses at will what is his does not do anything against justice, and thus, he does not sin, as it seems. But through marriage the wife becomes the husband’s, and vice versa. Therefore, if they avail themselves of each other at will when sensual desire moves them, it does not seem to be a sin. And thus, the same as was said before.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, something that is made good by its genus is not made bad unless done with an evil intention. But the marital act, in which someone knows his own wife, is good by its genus. Therefore, it cannot be bad unless done with a bad intention. But it can be done with a good intention even if one does not intend any of the goods of matrimony, for instance, when someone intends to preserve or pursue physical health by it. Therefore, it seems that even without the goods of marriage, that act can be excused.

On the contrary (1), when a cause is removed, its effect is removed. But the marital goods are the cause of the dignity of the marital act. Therefore, without them the marital act cannot be excused.

Furthermore (2), the act in question only differs from the act of fornication by the goods named. But fornication is always evil. Therefore, if it is not excused by the goods mentioned, the marital act will also always be evil.

I answer that, according as the goods of matrimony are habitual, they make marriage dignified and holy. Likewise, according as they exist in actual intention, they make the marital act dignified with regard to those two goods that have to do with the act itself. Thus, when spouses come together for the sake of the procreation of children, or so that they might render the debt to one another, which belongs to fidelity, they are totally excused from sin. But the third good does not pertain to the use of marriage, but rather to its very essence, as was said; and so it makes marriage itself dignified, but not its act in such a way that through it the act may be made sinless because they come together for the sake of a certain signification. And therefore, only in these two ways do spouses come together without any sin whatsoever, namely, for the sake of the procreation of children, and for rendering the debt. Otherwise, however, it is always a sin, at least venially.

Reply Obj. 1: Offspring, considered as a good of the sacrament, adds something beyond offspring as the intention of nature. For nature intends children according as the good of the species is preserved in them. But in offspring as a good of the sacrament of matrimony, it is understood that, beyond the preservation of the species, the children received are directed to God. Therefore, it is necessary that nature’s intention, by which she intends children, be referred actually or habitually to the intention of children as a good of the sacrament; otherwise it would be stuck at the level of creation, which cannot happen without sin. Therefore, when nature alone moves someone to the marital act, he is not excused from all sin, except to the extent that the movement of nature is further ordered actually or habitually to children as a good of the sacrament. Though it also does not follow that the impulse of nature is evil, but that it is imperfect, unless ordered further, to some good of matrimony.

Reply Obj. 2: If someone intended by the marital act to avoid fornication in his spouse, (That is, to prevent the spouse from fornicating.) this is not a sin; for this is an example of rendering the debt, which belongs to the good of fidelity. But if he intended to avoid fornication in himself, then there is here a certain superfluity, and accordingly it is a venial sin; nor was marriage instituted for this purpose, except according to the forbearance that concerns venial sins.

Reply Obj. 3: One due circumstance does not suffice for an act to be good; and therefore it is not necessary that any use of one’s things be good, but rather, when one uses it as he should, in keeping with all the circumstances.

Reply Obj. 4: Although to intend the conservation of health is not bad in itself, still this intention becomes evil if one intends to conserve health through something which is not of itself ordained to it, for example, if someone sought only bodily well-being from the sacrament of baptism. And it is the same way with the situation proposed regarding the marital act.

Article 3

Whether when it is without them it is always a mortal sin

Obj. 1: To the third question, we proceed thus. (Parallels: above, d. 26, q. 1, aa. 3–4; Super I Thess. 4, lec. 1; SCG IV, ch. 83; De malo, q. 15, a. 2; Super I Cor. 7, lec. 1.) It seems that whenever someone knows his wife without intending any good of marriage, but only pleasure, he sins mortally. For Jerome says, and the text quotes him: pleasures that are taken from the embraces of prostitutes are condemned in a wife. (Jerome, Commentarii in iv epistulas Paulinas, Ad Ephesios, Bk. 3 (PL 26:566).) But something is not said to be condemned unless it is a mortal sin. Therefore, to know one’s wife for the sake of sensuality alone is always a mortal sin.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, consenting to pleasure is a mortal sin, as was stated in Book II, Distinction 23, Question 2, Article 2. But whoever knows his wife for the sake of pleasure consents to pleasure. Therefore, he sins mortally.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, whoever does not refer the use of creation to God enjoys the creation, which is a mortal sin. But whoever avails himself of his wife for the sake of pleasure alone, does not refer this use to God. Therefore, he sins mortally.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, no one should be excommunicated except for mortal sin. But someone who knows his wife out of sexual desire alone is prevented from entering the Church as if he were excommunicated, as is said in the text. Therefore, anyone like this sins mortally.

On the contrary (1), according to Augustine, such intercourse is counted among daily sins, for which one may say a Pater Noster, as the text has it. (See Augustine, fragment of a Sermo de bono nuptiarum (PL 39:1732).) But that kind of sin is not a mortal sin. Therefore, etc.

Furthermore (2), someone who uses food for pleasure alone does not sin mortally. Therefore, the same reasoning applies to someone who avails himself of his wife only out of sensual desire.

I answer that, certain people say that whenever sensual desire principally moves someone to the conjugal act, it is a mortal sin. But when it is a side motive, then it is a venial sin. However, when someone rejects the pleasure altogether, and it displeases him, then it is without any venial sin at all. So in this way, to seek pleasure in the act would be mortal sin, to accept the pleasure offered would be venial sin, but to hate it would belong to perfection.

But this cannot be: for according to the Philosopher in the Ethics 10, the judgment of a pleasure and an activity is the same: for the pleasure of a good activity is good, and a bad activity carries bad pleasure. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 10, ch. 5 (1175b24–29).) Consequently, since the marital act is not evil per se, neither will seeking its pleasure always be a mortal sin. And therefore it should be said that if pleasure were sought outside the dignity of marriage, such that, for example, someone did not turn to his wife because she was his wife, but only because she was a woman, prepared to do the same with her as if she were not his wife, that is a mortal sin. And such a man is called a too ardent lover of his wife, (The expression “ardentior amator uxoris,” also cited by Thomas at ST II-II, q. 154, a. 8, has been attributed to Sixtus Pythagoricus; see, e.g., La Comedia Thebaida, ed. G. D. Trotter and Keith Whinnom (London: Tamesis Books, 1969), p. 52, fn. 13.) for in fact that ardor is borne outside the goods of marriage. If, on the other hand, pleasure were sought within the limits of marriage, namely so that such pleasure were not sought in any woman but one’s wife, then it would be a venial sin.

Reply Obj. 1: A man seeks a harlot’s pleasures in his own wife whenever he sees nothing else in her than what he might look for in a prostitute.

Reply Obj. 2: Consenting to pleasure in the kind of intercourse that is a mortal sin, is a mortal sin. However, the pleasure of the marital act is not so.

Reply Obj. 3: Although he does not refer this pleasure to God in act, nevertheless, he does not place in it the final end of his will; otherwise he would seek it indifferently wherever he could find it. Therefore, he does not necessarily rest in the enjoyment of a created thing, but in act he uses a created thing for himself—and himself habitually, if not actually, for God’s sake.

Reply Obj. 4: This is not said because a man deserves excommunication for this sin, but because he renders himself unfit for spiritual things, by the fact that in this act a man is made to be entirely flesh.

Exposition of the Text

It is usual to ask: when a man and a woman, who are not the husband and wife of anyone else, join together . . . for the sake of sexual intercourse alone on account of incontinence. (Sententiae IV, 31.2 (183). 5.) This was discussed in the preceding distinction, since a bad end does not remove the goodness of marriage.

As for those who procure poisons to induce sterility, they are not marriage partners, but fornicators. (Sent. IV, 31.3 (184). 1.) Although this sin is grave, and to be counted among wicked deeds, and against nature (for even beasts desire offspring), nevertheless it is less grave than murder, since a child conceived could be prevented in another way. Nor is such a person to be judged irregular, unless he should now procure an abortion for the child about to be born.

“The seeds are gradually formed in the womb.” (Sent. IV, 31.4 (185). 3, Jerome, Epistola 121, c4.) There is discussion of this in Book III, Distinction 3.

“Men . . . should at least imitate animals, and not destroy their offspring, once the wife’s womb has become swollen.” (Sent. IV, 31.5 (186). 2, Jerome, Adversus Iovinianum, bk 1 n49.) For although the womb is closed after impregnation, yet it is moved and opened by sensual pleasure, as Avicenna says, and because of this there is a danger of miscarriage. And this is why Jerome censures a man’s approaching his pregnant wife. Not, however, that such a thing would always be a mortal sin, unless perhaps when there is fear of a probable danger of miscarriage.

“And it does not become the kind of practice which is against nature.” (Sent. IV, 31.7 (188). 2, Augustine, De bono congiugali, c10 n11.) The use of one’s wife against nature is when one neglects the right aperture, or the right mode instituted by nature as to the position. And in the first case it is always a mortal sin, for children cannot possibly follow, and so the intention of nature is totally thwarted. But in the second instance it is not always a mortal sin, as certain men say, but it can be a sign of mortal concupiscence. Sometimes it can even be without sin, when the disposition of the body does not permit another mode. Otherwise it becomes more serious, the more one recedes from the natural mode.