D. 38 - On religious vows

After the Master has considered the impediment of orders, here he considers the impediment of religious vows; and this is divided into two parts: in the first, he shows how someone is impeded from contracting marriage through a vow by which he obliges himself to God; in the second, how a marriage is impeded by another marriage already contracted, by which a man has obliged himself to a wife, where he states: when a husband and wife are lawfully united, etc. (Sententiae IV, 38.2 (215). 10.)

The first part is divided into three: first, he shows what a vow is; in the second, he distinguishes many kinds of vows, where he states: but it is to be known that one kind of vow is common, another singular; (Sent. IV, 38.2 (215). 1.) in the third, he shows which vow impedes marriage and how, where he says: those who make a private vow of continence must not contract marriage. (Sent. IV, 38.2 (215). 2.)

And this part is divided into two parts: in the first, he shows that a vow of continence impedes marriage; in the second, he shows what is to be done with those who marry after such a vow, at: “concerning virgins not [yet] veiled, if they should change their purpose, we have a decree . . .” (Sent. IV, 38.2 (215). 5, Cf. Benedict the Levite, Capitularia, where this text is found amoung the responses of Pope Stephen II; Innocent I, Epistola 2 (ad Victricium, Rothomagensem episcopum), c14 n16.)

And concerning this he does three things: first, he shows that they should do penance; second, he objects to the contrary, at: nor ought we to omit here what Innocent decreed concerning widows and girls. (Sent. IV, 38.2 (215). 8.)

When a husband and wife are lawfully united. Here he addresses the other impediment to marriage, which was called above ‘previous ties’. And this is divided into two parts: in the first he shows that while a preceding marriage stands, it impedes another marriage from being contracted; in the second, he shows how even with a marriage as yet standing, the union of a second marriage can exist without sin, although it is not a valid marriage, at: here it is asked concerning those women who, believing that their husbands have been killed in captivity or will never be freed from an iniquitous domination, have passed on to other marriages. (Sent. IV, 38.3 (216). 1.)

And he sets forth these things in two parts according to two cases. The second part begins at: but if a man, who has left his wife in his own country, goes to a far region and marries another, etc. (Sent. IV, 38.3 (216). 4.)

Here there are two questions: first, concerning the vow; second, concerning scandal, which is connected with some vows, as it states in the text. To ask about the impediment of previous ties is the same as to ask about multiple wives, and about the indissolubility of matrimony, which was discussed in Distinction 33.

Question 1

On religious vows

Concerning the first question, five questions arise:

first, concerning the vow in itself;

• second, concerning the division of vows;
• third, concerning the obligation of a vow;
• fourth, concerning dispensation from a vow;
• fifth, on the veiling of virgins, which is done as a certain sign of the vow.
• Article 1

Concerning the vow in itself

Quaestiuncula 1

Obj. 1: To the first question, we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST II-II, q. 88, a. 1.) It seems that the vow is unfittingly defined in the text. For a vow, by reason of its own name, conveys a certain fixed purpose of will without any promise. For those deeds are said to be vowed which are done voluntarily, which is also clear from another definition given for a vow: a vow is the conception of a good intended with confirmed deliberation, by which someone obliges himself before God to doing something or not doing something. (William of Auxerre, Summa Aurea, pt. 3, tr. 22, ch. 1, q. 1 (230va).) Therefore, the text should not have included a promise in the definition of a vow.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, to promise proceeds from the mind, just as to believe does. But there can be no belief but willing belief. Therefore, neither can there be a promise that is unwilling. And thus it is unnecessary to add, of one’s own will.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, a promise is not the same thing as bearing witness to a promise. But a vow is a certain promise, as is evident from the definition of Hugh of St. Victor, who says that a vow is a voluntary pledge of the mind. (It would seem that this definition does not appear in Hugh of St. Victor, as noted in the Parma ed.) Therefore, the Master says incorrectly that a vow is bearing witness to a promise.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, what is included in the definition should belong to the thing defined universally. But not every vow is made to God, for vows are also made to the saints. Therefore, it is unfittingly included in the definition of the vow that it should be made to God.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, jurists define a vow thus: a vow is the promise of some good, made with deliberation. (It is not certain where this definition comes from, or that given in the next objection; Thomas does not cite either of them in any of his later works.) But not every good concerns those things that pertain to God; rather, some pertain to one’s neighbor. Therefore, it should not be included in the definition of a vow, that it concerns those things which pertain to God.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, deliberation of mind is required for a vow, as is evident from a certain definition of the vow given by the teachers, which is thus: a vow is the promise of a better good, confirmed by deliberation. Since, therefore, in the definition which is set forth in the text, no mention is made of deliberation, it seems insufficient.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that a vow does not only concern a better good. (Parallel: ST II-II, q. 88, a. 2.) For what is of necessity, is not considered a better good, but a common good. But a vow can be made about what is of necessity, as Jacob vowed that the Lord would be his God (Gen 28:20). Therefore, it is not necessary that it concern a better good.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, certain vows are made about indifferent matters, as women are especially wont to vow that they will not comb their hair on such and such a day. But indifferent matters are not included among better goods. Therefore, a vow does not always have to do with a better good.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, what is illicit is not good, so neither can it be better. But one can make a vow about something illicit, as is clear in the case of Jephthah, who because of his vow killed his innocent daughter, (See Judges 11.) and who, as Jerome says, is counted among the saints; for his soul pleased God by making the vow. (The Parma ed. notes that Jerome nowhere says in his writings that Jephthah is numbered among the saints; but in the Commentary on Jeremiah, ch. 7, Jerome does say that Jephthah’s will in offering was pleasing, but not the sacrifice he offered.) Therefore, a vow does not always have to do with a better good.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, better goods seem to be those which are counseled. But those things that can place a person in danger are not counseled. Yet some men vow such things, like that they will abstain from food for two or three days, which cannot be endured without danger to one’s person. Therefore, a vow does not always concern a better good.

On the contrary, there is the definition of a vow set forth above, namely: a vow is a promise of a better good, strengthened by deliberation.

Quaestiuncula 3

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems also that he who is not sui juris would be able to vow something. (ST II-II, q. 88, a. 9; q. 189, a. 5; Contra retrahentes, chs. 11–13.) For an obligation that is made to someone inferior cannot impede the service owed to a superior master. But by a vow someone obligates himself to the service of God. Therefore, the obligation by which a slave is bound to his master, who is nevertheless a man, cannot prevent him from making a vow.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the son of a family is in the power of his father. But he can make a vow even against his father’s wishes; for it happens every day that young people enter religious life against their parents’ will. Therefore, someone who is not sui juris can take a vow.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, no one is more under the power of another than a monk who has vowed obedience. But a monk can make a vow, as it seems, since in certain things he is arbiter of his own will. For he is not bound to obey his superior in all things, as Bernard says, but only in those things that pertain to religious life. (See St. Bernard, Epistle 7, to Adam the monk.) Therefore, etc.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, a wife is also under the power of her husband, as is evident in Genesis 3. But a wife can vow certain things without the consent of her husband. Therefore, etc.

On the contrary (1), it is not permitted to offer a sacrifice to God out of the possessions of another. But the person who makes a vow offers a kind of sacrifice to God. Therefore, if he is in the power of another, he cannot make a vow.

Furthermore (2), a vow, since it is characterized as a promise given of one’s own will, requires liberty. But he who is in the power of another, does not have liberty. Therefore, he cannot make a vow.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

I answer that, a vow, by its very name, expresses a certain obligation assumed by one’s own will. And since a person cannot be bound in his will to anyone but the searcher of the will, who is God alone, for this reason, it both results in an obligation assumed toward God and, as a result, it concerns those things that have to do with God, since a person’s obligation assumed toward someone about things that do not have to do with God would be nothing. However, an obligation is made to a man through words expressed externally; which is why it says in Proverbs 6:2: you are entrapped by the words of your mouth. And therefore, it is fitting that a voluntary obligation made to him who looks into the heart, be done by an interior word; and therefore it must be made by an act of that power to which it belongs to enunciate the interior word, namely by an act of reason. And therefore, the act of reason itself, which is the promise, is the essence of the vow. For that a promise is an act of reason is clear, both from the fact that it is a kind of enunciation, and from the fact that anyone who makes a promise orders the thing promised to another, while every act of ordering belong to reason.

Yet a promise made outwardly is sometimes called ‘a naked promise,’ when it does not have something added that confirms the obligation; and then it does not have full binding force. Likewise, in order that an inward promise made to God have full binding force, it is necessary that it not be a naked promise, but that it have something that confirms it; and this confirmation takes place through three steps. First, by the simple deliberation; second, by the intention of binding oneself under a certain penalty; third, by the fact that the witness of men is summoned for the inner promise. And thus many definitions are given for a vow, according to the various different things that are required for a vow being included in those definitions; and many more could be given still. However, the definition which the Master establishes seems to be the most complete, since he includes the promise, which is the essence of the vow; and he touches on the will, which is the cause of the obligation, in the fact that he says, of one’s own will; and the final confirmation of the promise, which he includes elsewhere, by the fact that he says, a bearing-witness; as well as the end of the vow, since it is an act toward another, in the fact that he says, which must be done for God; as well as the matter, in the fact that he says that it concerns things which are of God.

Reply Obj. 1: To will something is not to vow, and therefore, an intention is not a vow, but only the announcement of that intention in the mode of a promise; and since an interior announcement is called the conception of the heart, consequently that definition includes that a vow is the conception of a good intended. If a vow were said to be an intention simply speaking, though, this would be to name it from its cause, since an intention is the principle of the vow; just as sometimes a desire itself is called a prayer, as was said above in Distinction 15.

Reply Obj. 2: A promise is sometimes made by the mouth and not by the heart, and such a thing is not a vow to God; and for this reason, it is fitting to add of one’s own will. And furthermore, although nothing is sufficient to compel a man to make a promise, simply speaking, he can nevertheless be compelled to make the external promise by a certain subtle pressure, just as he can be compelled to other external works of the will; but he cannot be compelled to make the interior promise, just as no one can be forced to faith. However, the Master is defining the vow that is pronounced externally, because it can impede marriage. For this is the vow he means here; and this vow is the evidence of an interior promise, not the interior promise itself.

And by this, the answer to the third is clear.

Reply Obj. 4: A vow is only made to saints according as they are the mediators between us and God by their intercession, in the same way in which prayer is made to the saints; and therefore every vow is principally directed to God, even as is prayer.

Reply Obj. 5: That definition of the jurists is to be understood not as referring to any good whatsoever, but to that good which belongs to the religious life of piety; and this is of God, whether it be done toward one’s neighbor, as the closest matter, or toward oneself, or toward God.

Reply Obj. 6: Deliberation is included in bearing witness, as was said.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it must be said that, as was already mentioned, there can be no vow unless it concerns some good pertaining to the worship of God in some way or another; and therefore, on the part of Him to whom the obligation is made, any evil goes against a vow; but on the part of the will, from which such an obligation proceeds, any necessity goes against a vow in some way.

Now, there are two kinds of necessity. One is absolute necessity, and this kind of necessity entirely excludes vowing; as if, for example, someone were to vow never to die, or things which were not at all in his power, the vow would be worthless. The other kind of necessity is conditional for the attainment of an end, and this is how we have a necessity of doing those things without which we cannot attain salvation, like there are commands that we are otherwise bound to follow. And the second necessity does not prevent every kind of vow, for sometimes, taking ‘vow’ in a broad sense, a vow is found to concern things that are under this kind of necessity; but this kind of necessity does exclude a vow, properly so called. And therefore if ‘vow’ is taken according to its own definition, it properly concerns those goods that not all men are bound to, which are supererogatory. And therefore they are called ‘better goods,’ since they are super-added to those goods without which there is no salvation; and therefore, a vow, taken properly, is said to be about a better good.

Reply Obj. 1: That promise of Jacob was more a certain recognition of an obligation rather than the cause of the obligation; and therefore it cannot be called a vow properly, but only in a broad sense. Or it could be said that the vow of Jacob was not concerning something that was of necessity, but rather it concerned worship in a special way by the construction of an altar; (See Genesis 28:18–22.) and therefore, it had to do with a better good.

Reply Obj. 2: These kinds of promises made by women are more superstitions than vows, for they are a certain relic of idolatry, in the way that days and months were observed. And therefore they are not to be taken for vows, and the people vowing such things sin by doing so, since, as Jerome says, we should not even have words in common with infidels. (See Glossa ordin., on Hosea 2:16; cf. Peter Lombard, Sent. IV, d. 13, ch. 2 (QR II:818).)

Reply Obj. 3: A vow, if it be about something that is simply evil, is only a vow equivocally speaking, and thus in no way does it bind. However, if it concerns something which could turn out good in one case and evil in another, if the vow is intended no matter what the outcome then it is imprudent; if, however, the one vowing intends it only as regards a good outcome, then it is prudent, and it would not oblige if there were an evil outcome. Thus, the vow of Jephthah was about something that in a certain case could have turned out well, namely if he were to encounter an animal for the sacrifice, and in another case it would not have been good, namely if he encountered an animal that was not for sacrificing. And since he vowed to do it in any event, the vow lacked discretion. Therefore, in his vow, as far as the taking of the vow goes, there is something praiseworthy, namely devotion, and faith by which he hoped for victory from God, and in this way it is said to be motivated by the Holy Spirit; but the specification of the vow was imprudent, and as for its execution, that deed was cruel, though it was a figure of something laudable. And thus, although the vow was in one way praiseworthy, the man himself is not excused from sin, since he was stupid in vowing it, and wicked in fulfilling it, as Jerome says. (See Jerome, Commentary on the Minor Prophets, Micah 2:6 (CCSL 76); Against Jovinian, Bk. 1, par. 5 (PL 23:226) and par. 23 (PL 23:253).) Nevertheless, he is counted in the canon of saints because of the victory that he obtained from God, as is the case with other saints.

Reply Obj. 4: A vow which endangers the person is not a vow to be kept, since no one can vow something that endangers his own person, and therefore it is safer that in such matters the dispensation of the superior is sought; and if he should not give it, and the danger is imminent, a person should break the vow without compunction. Now a danger could be imminent either from infirmity or from poverty, as when someone does not have enough to eat except what he has vowed to abstain from.

Response to Quaestiuncula 3

To the third question, it must be answered that it is clear from what has already been said that a vow cannot be made by anyone except about those things that are subject to his will; and therefore, that man who is constituted under the power of someone else cannot make a vow about the matters in which he is subject, since they are not subject to his own will. And likewise, those who do not have the use of their free will, just as those who are not of sound mind cannot make a vow, as neither can children before the age of puberty.

Reply Obj. 1: By the very fact that a man serves his carnal lord, he serve his spiritual Lord; for which reason the Apostle teaches them to continue to serve for conscience’s sake. (See Ephesians 6:6, Colossians 3:22, Romans 13:5.) And since this is of necessity, it cannot be impeded by what is not of necessity, just as neither can what falls under a command be removed by what falls under counsel.

Reply Obj. 2: By the fact that a man attains the age of puberty, he is not under the power of another as concerns what regards his own person, if he be of free condition. And therefore, just as such a person can contract marriage against his parents’ will, so also can he make a religious profession against their wishes; but as concerns domestic matters he cannot vow anything without the consent of his father.

Reply Obj. 3: Although a religious is not bound to obedience in all things that may be commanded of him, nevertheless he is bound to obedience at all times concerning those things that can be commanded of him, just as a slave is not exempt at any time from the service of his master; and therefore, they have no free time in which they may do whatever they like. And since every vow is to be completed in some amount of time, therefore just as a slave cannot take any vow, so neither may a religious take a vow without the consent of his superior.

Reply Obj. 4: In those matters in which a wife is bound to her husband, and vice versa, neither can make a vow without mutual consent, as is evident with the vow of continence. But since in the management of the household and in the management of daily life the wife is subject to the husband and not vice versa, the man can vow certain things without the consent of the wife, but not the reverse.

Article 2

Concerning the division of vows

Quaestiuncula 1

Obj. 1: To the second question, we proceed thus. It seems that vows are unfittingly divided into common and singular. For the thing divided should be predicated of its subdivisions according to the same account. But ‘vow’ is not said in the same way of common and singular vows; for a vow is properly speaking singular, and not common, as is clear from what has been said. Therefore, this is an inadequate division.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, singular is not divided against common, but more properly against universal. Therefore a vow should also be divided here into singular and universal.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, every vow incurs a particular sin by its transgression. But a common vow does not incur any particular sin when it is broken, for thus a man would sin twice by any sin after baptism. Therefore, a vow is not anything common.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, that man who does not have the use of his free will cannot take a vow. But baptism may be received by someone who does not have the use of his free will. Therefore, in baptism no vow is made that should be called common.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that vows are not fittingly divided into private and solemn. For there is a certain kind of public vow which is neither solemn nor private. Therefore, the aforementioned division is not sufficient.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, things should be divided by what is essential to them. But ‘private’ and ‘solemn’ do not divide vows according to something essential to them, since a vow is essentially a certain obligation assumed toward God, and as far as God is concerned, the obligation does not differ whether it be assumed in secret or before many. Therefore, the stated division is inadequate.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, when something is divided by a common essential division, it is necessary that the species divided differ from each other. But private vows and solemn vows do not differ in species; since thus no private vow could be solemnized, since species cannot cross over into each other. Therefore, the division stated concerning vows is inadequately given.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, just as a vow has certain things that pertain to its solemnity, so also has marriage, and the other sacraments. But in marriage simple marriage is not distinguished from solemn marriage. Therefore, neither should this distinction be made in vows.

Quaestiuncula 3

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that a vow is not solemnized by the profession of an established rule, and by the reception of holy orders, as certain people say. (Parallel: ST II-II, q. 88, a. 7; Quodl. III, q. 7, a. 1.) For solemnity is set forth as a difference of vows commonly said. But some vows do not come under an established rule, nor are they joined to holy orders, like the vow of a pilgrimage. Therefore, those two things do not suffice for making the solemnity of a vow.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, it is also said by some that a vow is solemnized by the reception of the religious habit. But sometimes the religious habit is received without profession or reception of orders. Therefore, etc.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, before the constitution of approved rules, a vow could also be solemnized without the reception of holy orders. But men are no less capable of obliging themselves to God than before. Therefore, even now the solemnity of a vow can be without profession of an established rule.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, profession of an established rule can be done in private. But here solemn vows are divided against private ones. Therefore, profession of an established rule is not sufficient for the solemnization of a vow.

On the contrary, the proper effect of a solemn vow is to invalidate the marriage contract. But only the vow that is attached to holy orders and under an established rule invalidates the marriage contract. Therefore, only in these ways is a vow solemnized.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

I answer that, the division by which vows are divided into singular and common is a division of something analogous which is predicated of its subdivisions principally and secondarily, as being is predicated of substance and accidents. For since a vow is an obligation made of one’s own volition, but necessity excludes the voluntary, that vow that contains nothing of necessity is called a vow principally, as though possessing the complete notion of a vow; and this is the singular vow, because it concerns things to which we are not bound. Yet the vow that contains something of necessity has the character of vow incompletely, and therefore it is called a vow secondarily; and this is called a common vow, because it is about things to which all men are bound, whose necessity is conditional, not absolute, as is evident from what has been said.

Reply Obj. 1: That argument follows concerning a division of the univocal; and this is not such a division.

Reply Obj. 2: A common vow is a certain singular act, and made by a singular person, and this is why it could not fittingly be called universal; but it is called common because of those things that it deals with, to which all men are bound.

Reply Obj. 3: The transgression of a common vow does not constitute a special sin, but it adds a special deformity to a sin: for a baptized person sins more greatly than a non-baptized in the same kind of sin, as is evident in Hebrews 10:29: how much worse punishment do you think will be deserved by the man who has spurned the Son of God, and profaned the blood of the covenant by which he was sanctified, and outraged the Spirit of grace? And therefore, it is not taken without reason, since it adds a certain obligation, as the written law adds a certain obligation above that of the natural law; and thus it does not constitute another sin, but it adds a new deformity.

Reply Obj. 4: That reasoning proceeds from vows about things that not all men are bound to. But by the fact that on behalf of the child the godfather takes a common vow, nothing is lost by the child, since he would be obliged to the same thing otherwise; nor is it a problem that it is a major obligation, since for him it is outweighed by the magnitude of benefits that it brings with it. For a child is caused no injury by someone accepting a benefit for him from another, to whom the child is afterward bound in service or in thanks when he himself arrives at the years of discretion.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that the division of vows into private and solemn is a division of a potestative whole (A potestative whole is a whole whose notion is found completely in one of its parts, and by a participation in the other parts. See Book IV, D. 24, Q. 2, A. 1, Quaes. 3, ad. 2; ST 1.77.1, ad 1.) into its parts: its perfect power is in one of its parts, while in the others there is a certain participation of it, as the soul is divided into rational, sensible, and vegetative. Yet the power of a vow is the obligation: which virtue, indeed, exists completely in the solemn vow, whose obligation can in no case be voided; but it exists incompletely in the private vow, whose obligation can be cancelled in certain cases, as will be said.

Reply Obj. 1: A vow can be said to be public in two ways. In one way, per se, if it involves something that should come out in public, as for example when someone receives holy orders, through which he is constituted a minister of the Church for the public service of God. In another way, a vow can be public per accidens, as for example when it comes to the attention of many people. And since the judgment of a thing does not vary according to what is accidental to it, but according to what is per se, a vow that is public in the second way is considered the same as a private vow. But a vow that is public in the first way is distinguished from private vows; and this is a solemn vow.

Reply Obj. 2: The division described is taken from those things that are essential to a vow. For what is essential to a vow is what gives it the power of obligating. Therefore, it is not true that they oblige equally in every way, neither before God, nor before men; but they do oblige equally in a certain way, as will be said.

Reply Obj. 3: The progress from imperfect to perfect is a natural order, for which reason a progress is also made from one part to another in potestative wholes, as an embryo has a vegetative soul in a certain way before the sensible soul, and a sensible soul before a rational one; and similarly, it is not unfitting that the same vow should be first private, and public afterwards.

Reply Obj. 4: Marriage and the other sacraments have their full effect even when those things that pertain to the solemnity of the sacrament are omitted, because they have efficacy from divine power, not human institution. But because a vow obligates through that which is from man, it does not have the perfect force of obligating unless the due solemnity is employed. Therefore, a vow is distinguished as solemn and not solemn, but this is not true of marriage or any other sacrament.

Response to Quaestiuncula 3

To the third question, it should be said that a vow, as was said, is called solemn by the fact that it has the complete force of obligating. For those things are said to pertain to the solemnity of a thing which confer on it its complete existence. Now a vow, since it is essentially a promise, receives the full complement of its own power in the same way that a promise does; and the obligation of a promise is only complete at the moment when the one promising something actually gives it, in some way placing it in the physical possession of the one to whom it was promised, so that he can have it. For example, if someone promised the fruit of a field, and by promising gave the field; and similarly, if he promised some service, and gave himself as a slave. And therefore, a vow is only said to be solemnized when someone gives himself to God by binding himself before him as a slave for divine service. And indeed, this is what is done by the reception of holy orders, and by the profession of an established rule made in the due manner—that is, given into the hand of the one who should receive this profession, and observing all the other circumstances determined by law. Otherwise it would not be a solemn vow, no matter how much one professed, since by such a profession he would not place himself under the power of those who are the heads of the religious order.

Reply Obj. 1: Since the solemnity of the vow comes from the fact that the thing itself is given, by which the promise is fulfilled, when something to be accomplished temporally is promised it cannot be a solemn vow, like the vow to make a pilgrimage or something like this. Nor is it a problem that solemnity is considered a difference of vows taken commonly; for the rational soul, in which the account of life exists perfectly, is not in every living thing, even though ‘rational’ is considered a difference of ‘animal’ simply speaking.

Reply Obj. 2: There are two kinds of religious habits: one kind is given to unprofessed religious, and another is given to professed religious. And if in certain religious orders the same habit is given to both, nevertheless it is customary for the habit to be blessed in formal profession; and a habit blessed in this way is considered as if it were a different thing altogether. Therefore, the first habit does not suffice for solemnizing the vow, even a vow already taken; but the reception of the second habit solemnizes the vow, since there is a certain profession presumed; against which presumption no evidence is admitted, if the due circumstances are observed (e.g., the habit is given by someone who may give it, and before a multitude of brethren). For if someone in his own house received such a habit, he would not because of that be presumed to have solemnized his vow; and therefore, the reception of the habit should not be considered another cause of solemnity, since it does not solemnize a vow except insofar as his profession is presumed with certainty.

Reply Obj. 3: Before those rules that now exist, there was some mode of living approved by the Church, by which some people obligated themselves to those things which are supererogatory; and in those days the obligation of living in another way for a certain time was made in the same way as now the obligation is made according to a certain rule.

Reply Obj. 4: That vow is called private not because it comes under the notice of few people, but because it does not involve anything that would necessitate its being brought out in public. But if a person who makes his profession in secret, for example, makes his vow in his own home to the one who could receive his profession, then he does make a vow that must be brought out in public since he must leave his secular life and live in the cloister with the others of his order.

Article 3

Concerning the obligation of a vow

Quaestiuncula 1

Obj. 1: To the third question, we proceed thus. (Parallels: in this question, qa. 3, ad 1; ST II-II, q. 189, a. 3; Quodl. III, q. 5, a. 2.) It seems that a vow does not oblige in such a way that it should always be observed. For nothing can oblige one to the impossible. But it is sometimes impossible to fulfill a vow, as is clear in the case of a woman who vows her virginity and is deflowered. Therefore, it is not of necessity to keep a vow.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, an effect cannot be stronger than its cause. But the cause giving strength to a vow is deliberation, as is evident from the definition posited above in Question 1, Article 1. Therefore, since human deliberation does not have the necessary firmness, for the thoughts of men are fearful and our providence uncertain, as it says in Wisdom 9:14, it seems that a vow does not oblige one to fulfill it as a matter of necessity.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, an oath obliges more strictly than a vow: for divine truth, from which an oath gets its obligation, is more efficacious than human deliberation, from which a vow’s obligation derives. But an oath does not oblige such that it must be observed of necessity; for sometimes an oath can be broken without sin, as when it would lead to a worse result. Therefore, neither does a vow oblige in such a way that it is always necessary that it be fulfilled.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, a vow is sometimes made under certain conditions, like Jacob’s vow in Genesis 28:20: if my God is with me . . . the Lord will be my God. But such a vow does not oblige if the condition does not stand. Therefore, not every vow obliges of necessity.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, someone who remains in the religious life beyond the trial period determined, even if he does not make his profession in words, is said to have made an implicit vow. But it seems that this vow is not necessary to fulfill, since the person has promised nothing: nor does he seem to be always held to those things which are contained in the vow of profession, since sometimes in the trial period the statutes of the rule do not seem to be observed, and he himself does not intend to enter the monastery, unless it be in order to live as the others live. Therefore, it seems that not every vow obliges such that it must necessarily be kept.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, no one is obliged to something that depends upon the will of another person, as when someone vows to enter a certain religious cloister; for it is in the power of others to accept him or not. Therefore, if those others do not wish it, it does not seem that he is obliged to fulfill his vow.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, whoever is bound to something without a determined time in which to accomplish it is bound to do it immediately. Therefore, if a vow could obligate, whoever made the vow and did not specify the time for its fulfilment would be obliged to fulfill it right away, which does not seem to be true.

On the contrary (1), it says in Deuteronomy 23:21: when you have vowed a vow to the Lord your God, do not delay to render it.

Furthermore (2), Augustine says that to vow is voluntary, but to render is of necessity. (This line is not found in the writings of Augustine. Thomas, as if recognizing that fact, does not attribute it to anyone in ST II-II, q. 10, a. 8, ad 3.)

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that by the obligation of a simple vow, the matrimonial contract should be invalidated. (Parallels: Quodl. VIII, q. 5, a. 3; Quodl. X, q. 5, a. 3, ad 1; Quodl. III, q. 7, a. 1.) For a stronger bond prejudices a weaker one. But the bond of a vow is stronger than the bond of marriage, since the latter is made to man, and the former to God. Therefore, the bond of a vow prejudices the bond of matrimony.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, God’s command is not less than the Church’s command. But the command of the Church obliges someone to this extent, that if marriage is contracted against it, it is nullified, as is evident with those who contract in some degree of consanguinity prohibited by the Church. Therefore, since keeping a vow is a divine precept, it seems that when someone contracts marriage against a divine vow, the marriage would be nullified by this fact.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, in marriage a man may enjoy physical intimacy without sin. But that man who makes a simple vow can never commingle sexually with his wife without sin. Therefore, a simple vow invalidates matrimony. Proof of the middle: it is clear that this man who contracts marriage after a simple vow of continence sins mortally; for according to Jerome, for those vowing continence, not only marriage but even the wish to marry is blameable. (This is not a statement of Jerome’s but of Augustine’s: see On the Good of Widowhood, ch. 9. The same is cited in Gratian, Decretals, pt. 1, d. 27, can. 4, and pt. 2, cause 17, q. 1, can. 2.) But the marriage contract is not opposed to a vow of continence except by reason of physical intimacy. Therefore, when he first commingles sexually with his wife, he sins mortally, and by the same reasoning every other time, for a sin committed in the beginning cannot excuse one from subsequent sins.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, a man and a woman should be equals in marriage, particularly with regard to physical intimacy. (See Gratian, Decretals, pt. 2, cause 32, q. 5, can. 20; q. 1, can. 4, with the Glossa ordin. in Decretum on this canon (II, 1490a).) But a man who makes a simple vow of continence can never request the marriage debt without sin, since it is expressly against the willing of continence, to which he is bound by his vow. Therefore, neither can he render the debt without sin.

On the contrary, Pope Clement says that a simple vow impedes marriage from being contracted, but it does not invalidate a marriage once contracted. (Better, Celestine III, Decreta, ’De cognatione spirituali’; see Gregory IX, Decretals, Bk. 4, tit. 6, ch. 6, ‘Rursus quidam’.)

Quaestiuncula 3

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that a solemn vow would also not annul a marriage contract. (Parallels: Quodl. VIII, q. 5, a. 3; Quodl. X, q. 5, a. 3, ad 1; Quodl. III, q. 7, a. 1.) For as the Decretals state, (Gregory IX, Decretals, Bk. 4, tit. 6, ch. 6, ‘Rursus’.) in the sight of God a simple vow does not obligate less than a solemn vow. But marriage stands or is annulled by divine recognition. Therefore, since a simple vow does not annul a marriage, neither could a solemn vow annul it.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, a solemn vow does not add such powerful strength above a simple vow as an oath does. But a simple vow, even with an oath added to it, does not nullify the marriage contract. Therefore, neither does a solemn vow.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, a solemn vow does not possess anything that a simple vow could not have: for a simple vow might create scandal, since it could be made public, as is the case with a solemn vow. Likewise, the Church could and should legislate that a simple vow annuls a marriage contract in order that many sins might be avoided. Therefore, by the same reasoning that a simple vow does not annul marriage, neither should a solemn vow.

On the contrary (1), the man who makes a solemn vow contracts a spiritual marriage with God, which is much nobler than material marriage. But a material marriage contracted first invalidates a marriage contracted afterward. Therefore, so does a solemn vow.

Furthermore (2), this can also be proved by the many authorities set forth in the text.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

I answer that, a vow, as is clear from what has been said, is a certain contract of a promise between God and man. And so, since a contract made between men in good faith obliges someone to necessary observance, much more strongly does a vow in which a man promises something to God, in those matters to which the vow is extended. In those things, however, to which the vow is not extended, the obligation of the vow does not have any place; and therefore, whoever breaks a vow properly made sins mortally, since he has broken the trust that he entered upon with God.

Reply Obj. 1: Anything that would impede a vow from being made if it were present, also removes the obligation from a vow that has been made. So, since there cannot be a vow concerning the impossible, as was said, if something which previously had been possible becomes impossible after the vow has been made, the obligation of the vow is removed as far as that thing is concerned. For example, if someone rich vowed to build a church, which afterward he could not accomplish because he fell into poverty, he would not be obliged to fulfill this vow. But nonetheless, in this matter two distinctions must be made. In one way, since either he has become unable to fulfill the vow at all, and then he is simply not bound to what he vowed; or else he has become unable to complete it in its entirety, but not incapable of completing a part of it; and then he remains obliged to do what he can. In another way it must be distinguished whether he incurred this incapacity by his own fault, for then it would be necessary for him to make up for it by penance; or if not by his own fault, and then he is not bound to any reparation. Therefore, if a woman who vowed virginity loses her virginity, although she cannot offer her virginity, yet she can offer continence; and she remains obliged to this, and beyond this, to grieving in penance, by which she atones to God for her lost virginity: because, indeed, even if it is not worth the same, simply speaking, it is nevertheless equivalent according to the consideration of God, who does not demand from anyone beyond what he can do.

Reply Obj. 2: Although deliberation may be a variable cause, nonetheless the rectitude of the natural law, which dictates that what is promised to God must be kept, is invariable; and this gives to the vow the necessary obligation.

Reply Obj. 3: Just as an oath which tends toward a worse result is not to be kept, so neither is a vow. For this reason Isidore says: in a base vow change your resolution; (Isidore, Synonyms, Bk. 2, n. 58; quoted in Lombard, Sentences, Bk. 3, d. 39, ch. 9.) for a vow does not extend to illicit things, or even to less good things, as has been said. Nor does it matter whether it was illicit when the vow was taken, or whether it became so afterward.

Reply Obj. 4: What is vowed under a certain condition is not vowed simply; and therefore it does not oblige unless that condition stands.

Reply Obj. 5: An implicit vow obliges just as a spoken vow does. Therefore if someone remained in a monastery after a trial period, he would be obliged by an implicit vow; unless perhaps for some reason it was extended a year for him, or they were accustomed to extend it for others. For then he does not make an implicit vow beyond the current year; and such a person who made an implicit vow is bound to the three principal vows of religious life in every case. But as to the other observances, whose transgression is caused by the dissembling of prelates, who seem to give permission when they see but do not correct, the one who made an implicit vow does not seem to be obliged, and particularly if he is a simple person, who does not know how to discern such things adequately.

Reply Obj. 6: The obligation of a vow is caused by one’s own will; and so, if in vowing one has first thought about entering religious life, and afterward he has chosen this religious order or that place, he is obliged to religious life, simply. Therefore, if he is unable to be received into those places that he has chosen, he should seek another. If though, first and principally, he thought about this order or that place, then this condition of whether they want to receive him is understood in his vow, otherwise it would be an imprudent vow. Then if the condition is not fulfilled, he is not obliged. If, however, he is unsure of how he stands with vowing, then he should choose the safer way, lest he commit himself to his own peril.

Reply Obj. 7: When someone has vowed, for example, that he would enter religious life, if he intended to oblige himself to it immediately, or to the judgment of another, he cannot longer defer even because of outstanding debts; but the one who receives him is bound to settle them. However, if in vowing he was thinking about his debts, it can be probably presumed that he did not intend to oblige himself before he had disposed of his affairs. However, when he has a reasonable fear that the impediment will be perpetual, he is not bound to defer further.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it must be said that something ceases to be in the power of someone by the fact that it passes into the dominion of another, but the promise of a certain thing does not transfer it into the dominion of the one to whom it is promised. And therefore it is not because a person promises a certain thing that it ceases to be in his own power. Since, therefore, in the simple vow there is nothing but a simple promise made to God of preserving continence in one’s own body, after the simple vow a man still remains the master of his own body. Consequently, he can give it to another, namely a wife; and the sacrament of marriage, which is indissoluble, consists in this giving. And because of this, although a simple vow might impede a marriage from being contracted, since a person sins who contracts marriage after a simple vow of continence, nevertheless, since it is a valid contract, the marriage cannot be rendered invalid by this.

Reply Obj. 1: A vow is a stronger bond than marriage in both the one to whom it is made and what it binds to, since by marriage a man is bound to his wife for the rendering of the debt, but by a vow he is bound to God in continence. However, as to the mode of binding, marriage is a stronger bond than a simple vow, since in marriage a man is actually handed over to the power of his wife, but not in a simple vow, as was said. For the claim of the one in possession is always stronger. (See Digests, Bk. 50, tit. 17, leg. 126, ‘Nemo praedo.’) But as far as the manner of binding is concerned, a simple vow obligates in a similar way as a betrothal, which is why a betrothal is invalidated by a simple vow.

Reply Obj. 2: The impediment of consanguinity does not have the effect of invalidating marriage from the fact that it is a command of God or of the Church, but from the fact that the body of one blood relative cannot pass into the power of another. However, the command prohibiting marriage after a simple vow does not do this, as is clear from what has been said; and therefore, the argument does not follow, for it cites as the cause what is not a cause.

Reply Obj. 3: The person who contracts marriage by words of the present after taking a simple vow cannot know his wife carnally without mortal sin; for the possibility of fulfilling his vow of continence still remains to him before the consummation of the marriage, as is clear from what has been said above, Distinction 27, Question 2, Article 3, Quaestiuncula 2. But after the marriage has already been consummated, it becomes illicit for him not to render the debt to his wife when she demands it, although by his own fault; and therefore the obligation of the vow does not extend to this, as is clear from what was said above; nevertheless, grieving in repentance should make up for the continence that was not preserved.

Reply Obj. 4: When someone has not been rendered unable to preserve his vow of continence, he is obliged to observe it even after the marriage contract; on account of which he is bound to be totally continent at the death of his wife; and since he is not obliged by the marriage bond to request the debt, therefore he cannot request the debt without sin, although he could render the debt to a spouse who demands it without sin, after he is obliged to this by the preceding physical intimacy. However, one must take into account whether the wife requests expressly or implicitly, as when the woman is bashful, and the man senses her wish for the rendering of the debt, for then he can render the debt without sin, and particularly if he fears a danger to her chastity. Nor is it a problem that they are not then equals in the matrimonial act, for anyone can renounce what is his own. Nevertheless, certain people say that he can both request and render, lest a marriage be made exceedingly burdensome for the wife who is always having to demand the debt. But if it is looked at correctly, this is to demand implicitly.

Response to Quaestiuncula 3

To the third question, it must be said that everyone says that just as a solemn vow impedes a marriage from being contracted, so also it renders a contracted marriage invalid. However, certain people assign scandal as the cause of this. But this is nothing; for even a simple vow sometimes carries scandal, whenever it is in some way public. And furthermore the indissolubility of marriage concerns the truth of life, which is not abandoned because of scandal. And therefore others say that it is because of a statute of the Church. But this also is insufficient, for according to this the Church could legislate the opposite, which does not seem true.

And therefore it must be said with others that a solemn vow by its own nature contains what would render a marriage contract invalid, inasmuch as through it a man has lost power over his own body, by handing it over to God in perpetual continence, as is clear from what has been said. And therefore he cannot hand himself over into the power of a wife for contracting marriage. And since the marriage which follows such a vow is null, this is why such a vow is said to render a marriage contract invalid.

Reply Obj. 1: With respect to God a simple vow is said to obligate one not less than a solemn vow in those matters which regard God, as separation from God is mortal sin; for he sins mortally who breaks a simple vow, just as he who breaks a solemn one, although it may be a more serious sin to break a solemn one, so that in this way the comparison is taken generically, not by a specific amount of culpability (reatus). But as concerns marriage, through which a human is obliged to a human, it is not fitting that there be equal obligation also generically; for a solemn vow obliges one to certain things, not a simple one.

Reply Obj. 2: An oath obliges more than a vow on the part of the one by whom the obligation is made; but a solemn vow obliges more as concerns the mode of obligating, inasmuch as it actually hands over what is promised, which is not done through an oath; and therefore the argument does not follow.

Reply Obj. 3: A solemn vow carries the actual handing over of one’s own body, which a simple vow does not carry, as is clear from what has been said; and therefore this argument proceeds on insufficient grounds.

Article 4

Concerning dispensation from a vow

Quaestiuncula 1

Obj. 1: To the fourth question, we proceed thus. (Parallel: ST II-II, q. 88, a. 10.) It seems that a dispensation could not be made for a vow. For a common vow possesses less of the account of a vow. But in the case of a common vow, no one can give a dispensation. Therefore, also not in a singular vow.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, to fulfill a vow is a matter of natural law, since whoever does not fulfill it lies, which is against natural law. But no one can give a dispensation permitting lying, or anything else which belongs to natural law. Therefore, no one can give a dispensation in the case of a vow.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, through a dispensation a greater good should not be neglected in favor of a lesser good. But nothing outweighs the worth of continence of the soul, as is said in Sirach 26:20; (This verse is present in the Vulgate, but not in some modern versions, such as the RSV.) for the part of contemplatives, which is symbolized by Mary of Bethany, is the best, for she has chosen the best part, as it says in Luke 10:42. Therefore, at least for the vow of continence, which belongs to the state of contemplation, a dispensation cannot be given.

On the contrary (4), no vow is licit which places a person in danger. But it can happen that preserving continence places a person in danger. Therefore, at least in that case a vow of continence can be dispensed.

Furthermore (5), just as monks are bound to continence, so also to poverty and obedience. But they can be dispensed from their vows of obedience and poverty, as is clear from the case of those who are elevated to the prelature. Therefore, it is also possible for the vow of continence.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that any prelate can give a dispensation from a vow. (Parallel: ST II-II, q. 88, a. 12.) For every prelate is appointed for the sake of providing for the benefit of his subjects. Therefore, if the benefit of his subjects should require it, he can give a dispensation.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the reason someone can give a dispensation from a vow is that he has been appointed a steward of the mysteries of God. (See 1 Corinthians 4:1.) But this belongs to every prelate. Therefore, etc.

On the contrary, in the human body there are certain actions which are only suited to the principal members, and other actions suited to the head alone. But in the Church the Pope holds the office of head, and the greater prelates hold the office of principal members, as bishops. Therefore, there are some dispensations which only the Pope can give.

Quaestiuncula 3

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that no vow can be commuted: the animal which can be sacrificed to the Lord can be changed neither for a better nor for a worse (Lev 27:10). (Parallel: ST II-II, q. 88, a. 10.) Therefore, if it be a licit vow, it cannot be changed.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, if it could be changed, it could especially be changed for the better. But this cannot be, for Bernard says of well-ordered monasteries: by my counsel, no one will depart in the desire of a stricter life without permission of the superior. (Bernard of Clairvaux, Liber de praecepto et dispensatione, ch. 16, par. 45 (ed. Leclerq and Rochais, 3:284): “Sane de religiosis ac bene ordinatis monasteriis nullus professorum, meo consilio, ne arctioris quidem vitae desiderio, sine licentia sui senioris egreditur.”) Therefore, etc.

On the contrary, it is always permitted to make progress. Therefore, a vow can also be changed into something better.

Quaestiuncula 4

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that someone can commute a vow by his own authority. (Parallel: ST II-II, q. 88, a. 12.) For if, after vowing to go to the Holy Land, someone vows to enter religious life, he is freed if he fulfills the second vow, as the Decretals say. (Gregory IX, Decretals, Bk. 3, tit. 34, ch. 4, ‘Scripturae’.) But he can by his own authority vow religious life. Therefore, by his own authority he can also commute his vow.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, that man who makes a vow in secular life does not seem to be bound to it after he has entered the cloister, as certain people say. But the cloister can be entered by one’s own authority. Therefore, etc.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, a temporal vow is superceded by a perpetual vow in its duration alone. But by his own authority someone can commute the temporal vow of a pilgrimage into a perpetual vow of religious life, as was said. Therefore, by the same reasoning he can change a vow of lesser duration into a vow of greater duration by his own authority, such as a lesser pilgrimage into a greater one.

On the contrary, a commuting is a certain dispensation. But no one can dispense himself from his own vow by his own authority. Therefore, neither can he commute it.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

I answer that, concerning this there are diverse opinions.

For some say that any vow can have a dispensation from the prelates of the Church at the pleasure of the prelate: for, as they say, in any vow is conditionally understood the will of the superior prelate, namely the Pope, to whose dispensation the acts of all his subjects belong. And therefore, if he willed it, that highest prelate could relax the obligation of a vow, so that one was not bound to fulfill the vow, since this condition is not existing. But this does not seem to be well said: for there are certain things in which man is so free in himself that he can do them even against the precept of the Pope; like being continent, and observing the other divine counsels; and thus he can vow other things absolutely and without the condition of the will of any prelate.

And therefore, others say that no vow receives a dispensation as a relaxation of the law, but rather as it is a declaration of law: for the Pope can declare this law, that when recompense is made of a greater good, a lesser good to which someone obliged himself can be omitted. But this also does not seem true: for declaring a law is not making a new law, but rather manifesting what was in the law. Therefore according to this, the dispensation of a vow never made anything not against the law that formerly was against the law, but only what seemed to be against the law, and was not.

And therefore one should say otherwise, that a vow can be dispensed for some legitimate reason, also as a dispensation is a relaxation of the law. For since a vow cannot be about something illicit, and it is not licit to take away from someone what is owed him, therefore someone’s vow cannot turn out to his prelate’s detriment; rather, he should submit to his commands, whenever it is appropriate. And so if the prelate sees that for some reasonable cause it is expedient that a person not keep his vow, either for his own sake, or for the sake of others, he can release that person from keeping his vow who otherwise was obliged by law to keep it.

Reply Obj. 1: A person is obliged to those things that fall under a common vow not only by the vow, but also by natural law, and by divine precept; and consequently in this regard it cannot have a dispensation like other vows.

Reply Obj. 2: To keep a vow while the obligation of the vow endures belongs to natural law; but when the obligation of the vow ceases, keeping it is not of natural law. But this obligation ceases either on its own, as when keeping it tends toward a worse outcome, and then if there is an opportunity to ask a superior then by his declaration the observance of the vow should be foregone; or else the obligation ceases by the authority of a superior, who judges something else more necessary, and gives a dispensation from the vow. Nor in this is a man guilty of lying who does not keep a vow in such a case: for a man should have worthy conditions added concerning the future, either explicitly or implicitly, as is evident from James 5. (Better, James 4:15: “For that you should say: If the Lord will, and if we shall live, we will do this or that.”)

Reply Obj. 3: Concerning the vow of continence there are two opinions. (For a full list of the many authors Thomas may have in mind, see the Editiones Paulinae Summa theologiae, at ST II-II, q. 88, a. 11.)

For some say that no one can give a dispensation from it; but different reasons for this are given by different people. For some say that this is the case because a vow of continence cannot be abandoned without someone sinking into the opposite of the vow, which is never allowed. But a vow of poverty can be allowed to pass in some way that is not directly against the vow, as when someone has money not of his own, but in the name of the Church. But this amounts to nothing: for thus a vow of abstaining from meat on a certain day, or the vow of a pilgrimage, would not receive a dispensation, which is absurd.

And so others assign another reason, saying that this is fitting, for a vow of continence cannot be replaced with something better, by the fact that nothing outweighs the value of continence for the soul: either because by continence a man wins triumph over an interior enemy, as certain people say, or because by the religious life a man is perfectly conformed to Christ. Thus, because the vow of continence is included in the vow of religious life, like the other vows essential to religious life, a dispensation cannot be given, as certain people say. But even this does not seem to be sufficiently said: for the common good is much better than a private good, and sometimes for its sake a man is even removed from the garden of holy contemplation—which is the best part, by the judgment of the Lord (Luke 10:42)—so that he may be free for the common benefit of his neighbors.

And therefore others say more probably that if the common benefit of the whole Church or of one kingdom or province required it, both a vow of continence and a vow of religious life could be dispensed, no matter whether it has been solemnized: for by a vow a man cannot disoblige himself from that in which he is bound to another, as was said. And so, because of a pressing need it could be justly forbidden for someone to vow either continence or religious life; and if the same necessity remained, he could also be dispensed from a vow he had already made.

Reply Obj. 4: But since the reasons given to the contrary do not proceed rightly, therefore it should be said to the fourth objection that the good of continence is much nobler than bodily health; and therefore the danger of bodily death is not a sufficient reason for giving a dispensation from a vow of continence. And this is also why a person does not sin who finds himself in such a case that his vowed continence endangers his person, especially when he could avoid that danger by other remedies; just as he does not sin who because of some work of virtue exposes himself to the danger of death.

Reply Obj. 5: With those who are promoted from the state of religious life to the state of the prelature a dispensation is not given from the principal vows of religious life: for those things which they are said to possess, they possess not in their own name but in the name of the Church, so nothing in their vow of poverty is prejudiced by this. Likewise also not in the vow of obedience, since obedience is directed to the state of prelature in another whom one is bound to obey. And therefore, if the man who ceases to be under a prelate is not bound to obey anyone, it is not because the obligation of the vow is lacking on his part, but because there is no longer any prelate for him to obey. Thus if a monk who promises obedience to an abbot is himself made abbot, he is not bound to obey another abbot, since he no longer has an abbot.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that the fullness of power in granting dispensations resides in the possession of the Supreme Pontiff; however, others participate in this power to the degree that it is delegated to them, so that, since all cannot have recourse to one man, they might receive a dispensation through those beneath him. And so for those vows that receive a dispensation neither easily nor frequently, but rarely, like the vow of religious life and other perpetual vows like it, only the Pope can give a dispensation; but for other temporal vows, like a vow of pilgrimage or fasting or other things of this kind, bishops too can give dispensations, unless the Pope has reserved some of these to himself, like a dispensation from the vow of the Holy Land.

Reply Obj. 1: Not everything that is beneficial to a subject can be applied to him by any prelate, but the greater things are reserved to the greater ones; just as not every doctor can cure every sickness, but in the more dangerous illnesses, more experienced doctors are required.

Reply Obj. 2: Although all are dispensers of the mysteries of God, yet they are not all equally so; and therefore it is not fitting that all should be able to give dispensations in all things.

Response to Quaestiuncula 3

To the third question, it should be said that there is a distinction between the commutation of a vow and the dispensation: when a vow is commuted, the one vowing is absolved from one thing and bound to another; but when a dispensation from a vow is given, he is simply absolved from the vow without being bound to something else. For this reason a commutation of a vow conveys less than a dispensation; and therefore when a vow can be dispensed for a reasonable cause, it can also be commuted, either because it is commuted into something better or because it is less dangerous.

Reply Obj. 1: The animal of sacrifice was designated by the vow itself for the worship of God; and therefore it was somehow already sacred, and because of this it could not be reduced to common uses. And likewise, if someone now vows to enter religious life, he cannot put someone else into religious life in his place; and similarly, if he vows to go to the Holy Land, he cannot send someone else in his place, except by the dispensation of his superior. However, it is otherwise in other vows, in which a specific person is not designated for a special act of worship of God.

Reply Obj. 2: Bernard speaks as one giving counsel: since sometimes because of the lightness of their souls certain people pass into another state under the appearance of a life of greater strictness; and therefore it is safer that it be done by counsel and permission of the superior prelate—particularly if he does not believe that his superior would unreasonably present an impediment.

Response to Quaestiuncula 4

To the fourth question, it should be said that there is a kind of contract in a commutation, which cannot be completed without the consent of both parties; thus when a man obliges himself to God by a vow, the vow can only be changed with the consent of the one who wields God’s power on earth—namely, the prelate; except perhaps if one vow should be included in another. And since a vow of religious life includes all other vows both by reason of its perpetuity, and by reason of obedience, in which a man hands over to God his own will by which he can be master of himself and all things, therefore a person who has made some temporal vow can enter religious life without requiring a dispensation from a prelate, in spite of a previous vow that might impede his entrance into religious life, like the vow of a pilgrimage or something like this. But if he vows two temporal things, both of which are possible at the same time, he should keep both, unless perhaps by the authority of his superior an earlier lesser vow were commuted into a subsequent greater one. If, however, it were entirely impossible to accomplish both vows, he should keep the greater one and make satisfaction for the lesser according to the judgment of his prelate.

Reply Obj. 1: The vow to go to the Holy Land obliges a man to the service of God temporally, and concerns a determined time; but the vow of religious life concerns all things, and according to all time, and therefore it is in a certain way more an enlargement of the vow rather than a commutation.

Reply Obj. 2: Since by entering religious life a man dies to his prior life, he is not bound to discharge those unfulfilled vows that he vowed in secular life, by the fact that he enters religion, and particularly since singularity among religious is dangerous, and the burden of religious life makes it more difficult to keep the vow than when he was in secular life. However, certain people say that he should explain to his prelate, and the prelate could give a dispensation once he has considered the conditions of the person and of the vow. But according to others this is not required, since by the very force of the vow of religious life he is absolved from his prior vows, for the reasons stated.

Reply Obj. 3: A perpetual vow regards all time, and therefore there does not remain some time after its fulfillment in which another temporal vow could be completed, as time remains for fulfilling a vow of greater duration after a vow of lesser duration; and because of this, it is not the same.

Article 5

On the veiling of virgins, which is done as a certain sign of the vow

Obj. 1: To the fifth question, we proceed thus. It seems that there should not be a special veil for virgins who vow continence as compared with others who have vowed continence and are not virgins. For both virginity and the vow of continence are common to men and women. But to men who vow continence while still virgins, nothing else is given than is given to others who have lost their virginity. Therefore, neither should virgins receive a special veil by comparison with others.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, signs in the New Law are not empty but fruitful, since the sacraments of the New Law confer grace. But the virginal veil does not seem fruitful, since grace is not conferred in it; otherwise it would be a sacrament, and it should be given to the corrupted women who also need the help of grace for preserving their continence. Therefore, it seems that there should not be a special veil for virgins as opposed to others.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the consecration which is applied to men in the reception of holy orders is greater than the one applied to women in taking the veil. But the consecration of holy orders does not require virginity in the one consecrated. Therefore, neither should the veiling of a woman.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, no one should be punished again for a pain that she has undergone. But sometimes loss of virginity is inflicted on a woman as a painful suffering, as is evident in those who have been corrupted by any kind of violence. Therefore, at least such as these should not be denied the virginal veil.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, if ever a virginal veil is denied to a woman who is not a virgin, scandal results for those in attendance, and danger of homicide, if she was secretly corrupted. Therefore, it seems that at least in such a case a virginal veil should be given to others besides virgins.

On the contrary (1), in an office of the church it is not seemly that there be any falsity. But in the entire office in which virgins are veiled, mention is made of bodily integrity, as is evident to anyone who pays attention. Therefore, the virginal veil should not be given to those who have been corrupted.

Furthermore (2), by taking the veil a woman is in a certain way espoused to Christ, who is worthier than any high priest of the Old Law. But in the Old Law the high priest was not allowed to marry anyone but a virgin. (Leviticus 21:13.) Therefore, no one should be veiled unless she is a virgin.

I answer that, those things that are done physically in the Church are spiritual signs. But since a physical sign cannot sufficiently represent the spiritual thing it represents, it is sometimes necessary that several corporeal signs be used for signifying the same spiritual thing. Therefore, the spiritual marriage of Christ and the Church has both fecundity, by which we are regenerated as sons of God, and incorruption, since Christ chose for himself the Church as having no spot or wrinkle of any kind, as is stated in Ephesians 5:27. And this is why it says in 2 Corinthians 11:2: for I have espoused you to one husband that I may present a chaste virgin to Christ. But a bodily fecundity does not allow the integrity of the flesh; and thus it is necessary that the spiritual union of Christ and the Church be represented by different signs as to its fecundity and as to its integrity. Therefore, as spiritual marriage is represented by carnal marriage as to its fecundity, so it is necessary for there to be something that represents the spiritual marriage as to its integrity; and this is done in the veiling of virgins, as is shown by all the things that are brought forth and done there. And because of this only a bishop, to whom the care of the Church is commited, espouses the virgins, by veiling them not for himself but for Christ, like a friend and attendant of the bridegroom. (See John 3:29.) And since the signification of integrity can exist fully in virginal continence, but in the continence of widows it is partial, on this account another veil is given to widows, though not with that solemnity with which it is given to virgins.

Reply Obj. 1: The Church stands in the spiritual marriage as a bride, but Christ as the Bridegroom; yet by the vow of continence the soul is espoused to Christ, and this is why it is not fitting that this espousal be signified in a man, but only in a woman.

Reply Obj. 2: In the consecration of virgins, as in the anointing of kings and in other benedictions of this kind, grace is given, unless there be an impediment on the part of the one receiving; but nevertheless things of this kind are not said to be sacraments, since they were not instituted for curing the disease of sin, like the other sacraments.

Reply Obj. 3: In the reception of Holy Orders someone is not consecrated as a bridegroom, but as the minister of the bridegroom; and so virginity is not required for signifying the integrity of spiritual matrimony, as it is required in the veiling of the woman who is consecrated as the bride.

Reply Obj. 4: Those women who are corrupted through violence, if they do not consent in any way, do not lose the glory of virginity in the sight of God. But since it is extremely difficult that in such pleasure some impulse of enjoyment does not surge forth, therefore the Church, which cannot judge interior matters, does not veil a woman among virgins when she has been externally corrupted. For which reason Pope Leo says: those servants of God who have lost the integrity of their chastity by barbaric oppression will be more greatly praiseworthy in their humility and modesty, if they do not dare to unite themselves with uncontaminated virgins. (Leo the Great, Epistle 86, ch. 5.)

Reply Obj. 5: Those women who have been corrupted secretly, whether by men, or in another way, are in no way to be veiled; for the sacraments or sacramentals of the Church should not be changed for the sake of avoiding scandal. But as some people say, some caution can be employed for avoiding scandal, that namely those things may be done which are not of the substance of virginal veiling (like the lighting of candles, and other things like this), with those things that are of the substance of virginal veiling being secretly changed, for instance, the word ‘virginity’ being changed into ‘chastity.’

Question 2

On scandal

Next we inquire about scandal; and concerning this, four questions arise:

first, what it is;

• second, whether it is a sin;
• third, to whom it pertains;
• fourth, what things should be omitted for the sake of scandal.
• Article 1

What it is

Obj. 1: To the first question, we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST II-II, q. 43, a. 1; Super Matt. 15; Quodl. IV, q. 12, a. 1, ad 3; Super Rom. 7, lec. 2, and ibid. 14, lec. 2.) It seems that the definition of scandal is unfittingly assigned, which is taken from the interlinear gloss on Matthew 18:8: woe to the world from scandals, that is: scandal is something not quite right that is said or done which presents an occasion of ruin to others. For scandal is divided into active and passive. But this definition cannot include passive scandal. Therefore, it is not convertible with the thing defined; and thus it is insufficient.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, it says about Numbers 31:2: avenge first the children of Israel, etc., that scandal is when a deceit is put forth to someone walking rightly, for his ruin. (See Origen, Homilies on Numbers, hom. 25.) But not everything said or done not quite rightly is a deceit. Therefore, the definition of scandal is insufficiently assigned.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, just as a sin of the mouth and of deed can present an occasion of ruin to another, so also can a sin of the heart, especially when, by its external signs, it comes to the notice of others. But in the definition given the sin of the mouth and the sin of deed are touched upon, but not the sin of the heart. Therefore, it is unfittingly assigned.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, ‘occasion’ signifies an incidental cause. But even good things are sometimes the cause of bad things incidentally. Therefore, not only saying or doing something not quite right may present to another the occasion of ruin, but even if it is right it should be called scandal.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, it says of Christ in Isaiah 8:14: he shall be for a stone or a rock of scandal. But in Christ there was not anything not quite right. Therefore, it is not of the definition of scandal that it is something not quite right.

I answer that, ‘scandal’ is a Greek word, and in Latin means ‘a stumbling against’; which is used in its proper sense indeed in physical matters, but by extension in spiritual ones. Thus it is fitting that spiritual scandal, which we are discussing, is expressed by a likeness to a physical stumbling. Now, physical falling does not happen unless something is thrown into the path of someone walking that may be the occasion of his falling, even if he does not actually fall. But nothing done by another is naturally such as to make someone fall if he is walking in the way of God, unless it is something not quite right, either in word or in deed, that comes to his attention. And therefore, saying or doing something not quite right is what causes a spiritual blow, and gives occasion of ruin to another, and in this the notion of scandal consists.

Reply Obj. 1: In a corporeal stumbling there are two things to consider, namely, the very stumbling of the one who falls or of the one who is disposed to fall, and the thing on which he stumbles, which is called a stumbling-block. So it is also in spiritual matters. And both of these things are called ‘scandal,’ but not univocally, just as faith is said of both the very thing believed and of the act of believing. Therefore, the spiritual stumbling by which someone is disposed to fall is called passive scandal. But the spiritual stumbling-block which occasions the stumbling is called active scandal. And this is the way scandal is defined here, for by a word or a deed that is not quite right, someone is disposed to ruin.

Reply Obj. 2: A person commits a certain sin, speaking per se, when he acts intentionally, and not when a sin happens without his intention, as is clear in accidental homicide; and therefore a person commits scandal, properly speaking, when he intends to bring about the ruin of his neighbor. But whoever is led into sinning is deceived: for every wicked man is ignorant, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 3. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 3, ch. 1 (1110b28–29).) And therefore wherever there is scandal, speaking per se, the word or deed that is not quite right is a kind of deception, which is put before someone walking, for his ruin. Or it may be said that it is called a deception inasmuch as it is the occasion or the cause of deception: for everyone sinning is deceived, as was said.

Reply Obj. 3: A spiritual stumbling block, which is called scandal, must be thrown into the path of the one walking, which happens when it comes to his notice. However, the sin of the heart can only come to the notice of another by some sign, which is reducible to a sin of mouth or of deed; and thus in the definition of scandal is included only saying or doing something not quite right, and no mention is made of the sin of the heart.

Reply Obj. 4: ‘Occasion’ does not always mean cause, but sometimes it means a cause that is insufficient in itself; and this is how it is taken in the foregoing definition. For a sin, because it is voluntary, cannot have any sufficient cause from outside. But it can have some inducing cause: and this cause indeed is sometimes per se such as to incline to sin either by its own genus or by the intention of the one who sets it forth in order to induce someone to sin; and then it is said to give an occasion of ruin. But when a person is inclined to sin by something incidental, which in itself is not such as to incline to it, as it also happens in physical things that someone stumbles on a flat road and falls; then that person is said to have taken up an occasion of ruin, though no occasion was given to him from outside. But such a cause of ruin cannot be named scandal; for although the names of a cause are sometimes allotted by its essential effects, they are never customarily taken from things that result accidentally.

Reply Obj. 5: Christ is not said to be a rock of scandal as though he were per se a cause of scandal, for he himself did not give anyone an occasion of scandal; but he is said to be a rock of scandal in such a way that the proposition conveys not an order of causality but a consequence; for from the things that Christ did, the scandalizing of the Jews did result.

Article 2

Whether scandal is a sin

Quaestiuncula 1

Obj. 1: To the second question, we proceed thus. (Parallels: ST II-II, q. 43, a. 2; Super Rom. 14, lec. 2.) It seems that scandal is not always a sin. For nothing necessary is a sin. But it is necessary that scandals come, as it says in Matthew 18:7. Therefore, scandal is not a sin.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, every sin arises from the incitement of the Devil, not from the affection of piety. But in Matthew 16:23 where it is said to Peter, get behind me, Satan; you are a scandal for me, the Gloss says: the error of the apostle comes rather from the emotion of piety than from the incitement of the Devil. (The Gloss is taken from Jerome, On Matthew, Bk. 3, on 16:23 (PL 26:124). Thomas attributes this statement to Jerome at ST II-II, q. 43, a. 2, obj. 2.) Therefore, not every scandal is a sin.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, Jerome says: being scandalized is not so distant in vice from scandalizing. (See the aforementioned Gloss.) But passive scandal, it seems, can be without sin, just as also a physical stumbling sometimes happens without a fall. Therefore, active scandal too can be without sin.

On the contrary (1), everything said or done not quite right is a sin. But this is what scandal is. Therefore, etc.

Furthermore (2), it says in the Gloss on Numbers 31: it is a far more serious sin to give the cause of sin, than to sin. (See the passage from Origen noted just above.) But whoever scandalizes gives the cause of sinning. Therefore, he sins.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that it is not a specific sin. For according to the Philosopher in the Ethics 5: every special act of injustice is sometimes found separate from all other acts of injustice. (See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 5, ch. 2 (1130a17ff.).) But scandal is not found separate from other sins, for it is always something said or done not quite right. Therefore, it is not a specific sin.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, one can say or do something not quite right that offers an occasion of ruin via any kind of sin whatsoever. But this is the definition of scandal. Therefore, scandal is not a specific sin.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, whoever sins in the presence of another gives scandal. But to sin in the presence of another does not add any specific difference above sinning simply speaking, but rather it adds a certain circumstance, just like sinning in secret. Therefore, scandal is not a specific sin.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the acting force is proportionate to what is acted upon. But passive scandal is not a special sin: for whenever someone falls into sin by the example of another, he is said to suffer scandal. Therefore, neither is active scandal a special sin.

On the contrary (1), one can sin against oneself, against God, and against one’s neighbor. But scandal is a sin against one’s neighbor. Therefore, it is in a specific genus of sin.

Furthermore (2), something is called evil because it harms, according to Augustine. (Augustine, On the Morals of the Catholic Church and the Manichaeans, Bk. 2, ch. 3: “percunctor uos iterum quid sit malum? si dixeritis, id quod nocet; neque hic mentiemini” (PL 32:1346).) But scandal has a specific rationale for why it harms. Therefore, it is a specific sin.

Quaestiuncula 3

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that scandal is always a mortal sin. For the Gloss on Matthew 18:7, woe to the world because of scandals! says: overflowing eternal damnation threatens because of scandal. But eternal damnation is only due because of mortal sin. Therefore, scandal is always a mortal sin.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, spiritual life is more noble than bodily life. But someone who takes away the bodily life of another sins mortally. Therefore, someone who scandalizes does also, since he takes away spiritual life by leading another to his ruin.

On the contrary, scandal is saying or doing something not quite right which presents an occasion of ruin to another. But even venial sin is sometimes this kind of thing. Therefore, sometimes scandal is a venial sin.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

I answer that, there are two kinds of scandal, namely active and passive, as is clear from what has been said. Passive scandal is always a sin; for a person suffers scandal who either is thrown off the way of God, or at least is hindered on the way, which cannot happen without mortal or venial sin. Active scandal is also always a sin, for active scandal is always something that in itself is bound to lead another to sin; and such a thing always contains some disordering either by the genus of the act, or at least from the circumstances of the person, place, or time; and thus it is always a sin. But sometimes active scandal can exist without anyone falling into sin—when, for example, someone as he is in himself gives the occasion of ruin, but the other person is not ruined. Also, sometimes conversely there is passive scandal without sin on the part of the one scandalizing, as when someone takes to himself the occasion of ruin from something that is not done inordinately by another.

Reply Obj. 1: There are two kinds of necessity. One necessity is absolute: either something is necessary in itself, as it is necessary for God to exist; or by the force of some external cause, as something violent is called necessary, and in this way it is not necessary that scandals happen. The other is conditional necessity, which is not opposed to the voluntary; and in this way it is necessary for scandals to come by conditional necessity, for three reasons. First, by divine foreknowledge and predestination itself, as we say, “It is necessary for this to be, if God foresaw it.” And such necessity is not opposed to the freedom of the will. Therefore Chrysostom says about that text, although it is called ‘necessary,’ it does not destroy the spontaneity of the power, nor the freedom of choosing. His prediction does not therefore introduce scandals, nor does this happen because he predicted it; but he predicted it because it was to be. (Pseudo-Chrysostom, Homilies on Matthew, hom. 60.) Second, by the inclination of the fomes, as also we say that sinning venially is necessary, although it may be possible to avoid each particular venial sin. Third, by consequent usefulness, which God draws out of scandals, as all useful things are called necessary.

Reply Obj. 2: According to that Gloss it seems that Peter did not sin in wanting to prevent the Passion of Christ: for it was possible for someone to be laudibly pleased and displeased by the Passion of Christ according to different aspects; and there scandal is taken broadly for any impediment presented to someone on any path that he intends to follow.

Reply Obj. 3: Speaking per se, active scandal is a greater sin than passive, for in any genus, a cause is more powerful than its effect. Nevertheless, sometimes the passive thing can be greater than the active, when someone takes more occasion for ruin than is given to him; just as also sometimes there is passive sin without the sin of an agent. But what Jerome says is to be understood as to the genus of sin, and not as to the amount of culpability. And yet the other proposition is false, that passive scandal is not a sin: for that spiritual stumbling itself is a certain sin, inasmuch as it is a holding back from the way of God; and although it may be called passive scandal, nevertheless it is not passive in every way, but somewhat active. For a sufficient cause for sinning cannot be given to another from outside, as though forcing him to sin; the one who is scandalized cooperates with the one acting, and thus he sins.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that a given act is determined to a moral species in two ways. In one way, on the part of the object, as fornication is from the fact that it is about pleasures of touch; and this determination is material, and regards the habit eliciting the act. In another way, on the part of the end; and this is the formal specification, and regards the commanding habit. However, sometimes it happens that an act is determined to the same species on both counts, as when some act is commanded and elicited by the same habit, for example, when someone fornicates for the sake of pleasure. Sometimes, though, it is determined by either part but to diverse species, as when an act is elicited by one habit, and commanded by another, as when someone fornicates for the sake of money; for that is determined to a species of lust by its object, but to a species of avarice by its end. (See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 5, ch. 2 (1130a24–28).) Nevertheless, there are not two sins there, but one two-sided sin, since it is one act. Sometimes it even happens that some act is not determined to a certain species on the part of the object, but on the part of the end, by the fact that it has a particular habit that commands it, but has no habit that elicits it; for example, edifying one’s neighbor, which is an act that charity does not elicit, since it only elicits interior acts, and edifying one’s neighbor is not one of these. But it commands the act of edification, and it is materially elicited by the other virtues, not determinately by any particular one, but by all, because charity can command all the others.

And since active scandal is the sin opposed to the edification of one’s neighbors, thus materially speaking, on the part of the matter and the habits eliciting, it is not a special sin; but only speaking formally, on the part of the end and habit commanding, which is the habit opposed to charity, that is, the vice of hatred. And therefore when someone says or does something not quite right, intending to present an occasion of ruin to his neighbor, he commits the specific sin of scandal. But if it happens outside his own intention, there will not be the specific sin of active scandal; nevertheless, there will be a certain circumstance of sin, by the fact that, just as any act of virtue has an order to the end of charity, even if an act is not ordered to that end, it also has an aptitude to be commanded by charity; in the same way any sin, considered in itself, has an order to the contrary end, even if that end is not intended by the one acting.

Reply Obj. 1: The sin of active scandal is found sometimes separate from every other species of sin, because it consists in an external act; so that when an external act would not be a sin in itself, except, inasmuch as it has a certain likeness to a sin, it is bound to give the occasion of ruin if it is done publicly, like eating the food of idols. (See 1 Corinthians 8; Romans 14:13; Revelation 2:14.) And for this reason it does not also say in the definition of scandal, saying or doing something evil, but rather not quite right. And thus it is clear that the objection proceeds from false premises.

Reply Obj. 2: That argument arises from the side of the habits eliciting, not the habit commanding.

Reply Obj. 3: This circumstance in the presence of another does not add to a sin a new species by its own nature, but by the end to which it is orderable by such a circumstance. Therefore also, to sin in secret does not draw the sin into another species, since by this it does not receive an order to another end.

Reply Obj. 4: The one who is scandalized both acts and is acted upon, but his action does not pertain to the genus of scandal, but to some other genus; only his being acted upon pertains to the genus of scandal. And since no one sins in what he suffers, but only in what he does, for this reason passive scandal is not counted as a specific sin, like active scandal, which belongs to the genus of scandal by the action itself.

Response to Quaestiuncula 3

To the third question, it should be said that there are two kinds of scandal, as was said: active and passive. And either of these is sometimes a venial, sometimes a mortal sin. Indeed, passive scandal is a mortal sin when someone tumbles into mortal sin by the sin of another, whether the deed of the one acting is good, or indifferent, or an evil deed of mortal or venial sin. But it is a venial sin when a person is not ruined by the deed of another, but is disposed to ruin, in any way; as whoever stumbles is disposed to fall, even if he does not fall. For this reason the interlineal Gloss on Romans 14 says, scandal is the name for afflicting.

But active scandal can be taken in two ways. In one way, formally: namely, when it is a specific sin, by the fact that someone intends to scandalize another; and in this way if he intends to lead his neighbor into mortal sin, he sins mortally, but if he intends to lead him into something venial, he sins venially, as far as the notion of scandal goes. For if he intended to lead someone into venial sin by an act of mortal sin, he would sin mortally, but this would be incidental to the scandal. In another way, materially: when it is a circumstance of the sin, because he did not intend to hurt his neighbor; and then the judgment is the same of the scandal and of the act by which the person gives scandal—it is sometimes venial, sometimes a mortal sin. Unless perhaps it were venial or indifferent but having the likeness of a mortal sin, for then the active scandal would be a mortal sin, since by some concurrent circumstances it could be probably guessed that the weak ones watching would sin mortally.

Reply Obj. 1: The Lord speaks of active scandal, which is a mortal sin.

Reply Obj. 2: The one who gives scandal does not always take away spiritual life, for sometimes his deed is not in itself such as to lead anyone into mortal sin, even if someone happens to tumble into mortal sin from it by his own fault. And furthermore, whoever takes away bodily life gives sufficient cause of natural death, but someone who gives scandal does not give sufficient cause for spiritual death, as was said.

Article 3

To whom scandal pertains

Quaestiuncula 1

Obj. 1: To the third question, we proceed thus. It seems that passive scandal is not only of ‘little ones.’ For Christ was not little, but most perfect. But Christ suffered scandal from Peter, as he said, you are a stumbling-block to me (Matt 16:23). Therefore, etc.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, no one can love without someone being loved; nor can anyone give scandal unless someone is scandalized. But the one who sins in the presence of perfect men cannot scandalize anyone but those watching. Therefore, the perfect would be scandalized, and not only little ones.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, even the perfect sometimes sin venially. But sometimes a venial sin is a scandal. Therefore, even the perfect are scandalized.

On the contrary (1), the Lord, in Matthew 18 where he speaks of scandal, makes no mention of any scandal but the scandal of little ones. Therefore, they alone are scandalized.

Furthermore (2), the Apostle says of those scandalized, that their conscience, since it is weak, is defiled (1 Cor 8:7). But the perfect do not have a weak conscience. Therefore, etc.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that active scandal also applies to the perfect. For Christ was the most perfect. But he himself gave scandal, for he was set for the ruin of many, as is said in Luke 2:34, and the Pharisees were scandalized when they heard his words, as it says in Matthew 15:12. Therefore, active scandal applies to the perfect.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, Peter was perfect after he was strengthened by the Holy Spirit. (That is, on the day of Pentecost.) But he gave scandal, for by his own act he compelled the gentiles to become Jews. (See Galatians 2:11–14.) Therefore, etc.

On the contrary, to set an example of good and to give scandal do not pertain to the same person. But the perfect do the first, as is clear from Matthew 5:16: so let your light shine before men that they may see your good works. Therefore, they do not give scandal.

Questiuncula 3

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that only the perfect can give scandal. For contrary things must correspond to contraries. But passive scandal is divided against active. Since, therefore, passive scandal only applies to ‘little ones,’ active scandal can apply only to the perfect.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, only the man who provokes another to sin by his example scandalizes. But this only occurs with those whose life is set forth as an example to others—namely, prelates and religious. Therefore, active scandal belongs to them alone.

On the contrary, Peter before the Passion was not yet in the state of perfection; for the heavens (that is, the apostles) were not yet strengthened by the Word of God and the Spirit of his mouth. (See Psalm 32:6, which Thomas seems to be paraphrasing here: “verbo Domini caeli firmati sunt et spiritu oris eius omnis virtus eorum.”) But he, as far as in him lay, gave scandal, for it is said to him: you are a stumbling-block for me (Matt 16:23). Therefore, active scandal does not belong only to the perfect.

Response to Questiuncula 1

I answer that, a person suffers passive scandal in two ways. In one way, by his own choice, as when a person sees another sin and chooses to follow him in sinning; and in this way passive scandal does not belong to the perfect, for they follow chiefly the example of Christ, and the precepts of God, and the good of reason. And so they follow no one’s example contrary to these things. In another way, without choice, as when, by the deed of another, some emotion of concupiscence arises in someone, or else of sadness, or anger, or something like that. And in this way passive scandal can affect anyone who is perfect according to his state of life. But since choice is the principal thing in a moral act, as the Philosopher says, it is commonly said that passive scandal does not happen among the perfect.

Reply Obj. 1: Christ said to Peter: you are a stumbling-block to me, not because he had been scandalized by his deed, but because Peter, as far as in him lay, gave scandal to him in some way.

Reply Obj. 2: Speaking grammatically, every active corresponds to a passive, for the grammarian does not consider the substance of the action, but its mode of signifying. And every active verb signifies an action as crossing over into something else. But considering the substance of the action, sometimes the action goes out from the agent, and does not extend to a ‘patient’—because it has the ability to receive the effect of the agent or not to receive it, or because of some impediment interfering. Therefore, speaking with regard to reality, the active does not correspond to a passive in all actions that terminate in something outside the agent, such as are striking, killing, scandalizing, and such things. But to love and to know are interior acts of the soul, which do not go out to an outside reality except as it exists somehow within the agent himself; and thus in such things, even speaking with regard to reality, the active does always correspond to a passive.

Reply Obj. 3: Although a perfect man sometimes may commit some venial sin even by choice, or deliberately; nevertheless, he does not choose to follow someone into even venial sin, for that is an extremely light reason for sinning. But sometimes, moved by another cause, he commits a venial sin.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that active scandal is sometimes a venial, sometimes a mortal sin, as is clear from what has been said. Therefore, according as it is a mortal sin, it does not apply to the perfect in any way, just as neither does sinning mortally. But according as it is a venial sin, it does sometimes affect even the perfect, just as venial sin does too, inasmuch as some weakness does remain in them.

Reply Obj. 1: Because some people took the occasion of ruin from the deeds or sayings of Christ, he is said to be for their ruin and scandal, not because he gave any even slight occasion of ruin; and this is why we do not read that Christ scandalized others, but that some people were scandalized by his deeds and words.

Reply Obj. 2: According to Augustine, in the truth of the matter Peter was to be blamed for that deed, not because he acted wickedly, but because he acted unwisely; and thus according to this view it is not unfitting to say that he sinned venially in scandalizing. (Augustine and Jerome debated this point: see Augustine, Epistle 28, to Jerome, ch. 3 (PL 33:113); Epistle 40, to Jerome (PL 33:156); Epistle 82, to Jerome (PL 33:277).) But how Jerome excuses Peter even from venial sin was said above. (dist. 1, qu. 1, art. 1, qc. 3.)

Response to Quaestiuncula 3

To the third question, it should be said that the imperfect can also give others an occasion of ruin by their words or deeds, either indirectly by setting an example, or directly by inciting to evil by persuasive words or disturbing deeds; and thus there is no doubt that someone imperfect can scandalize.

Reply Obj. 1: In perfect men there is some disposition preventing passive scandal in themselves, but in imperfect men there is nothing to prevent active scandal. And therefore the argument does not follow.

Reply Obj. 2: Active scandal does not consist only in provoking another to sin by example, but in giving an occasion of ruin to another in any way. But it is evident that any imperfect person can give the occasion of ruin to another either by persuasive words or by provoking him to impatience by unjust persecutions. And thus there is no doubt that an imperfect man can scandalize. But the claim that an imperfect man does not scandalize by the mode of example is also false: for God has committed to each man the care of his neighbor, as is clear from Sirach 17:12; and thus everyone is obliged to edify his neighbor by his example. Also, we know from experience that many are enticed to sin by the example of those who are not in the state of perfection: for not only the examples of the great, but even those of one’s equals and lessers are apt to move one.

Article 4

What things should be omitted for the sake of scandal

Quaestiuncula 1

Obj. 1: To the fourth question, we proceed thus. (Parallel: ST II-II, q. 43, a. 7; ST III, q. 42, a. 2; Super Matt. 15; Super Rom. 14, lec. 3.) It seems that truth should be set aside on account of scandal. In the parable of the weeds, the Gloss of Augustine says: when a multitude is at stake, or their leader, strictness must be lessened. But this is only because of scandal. Therefore, the truth of justice is to be set aside because of scandal.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the avoidance of any sin whatsoever pertains to the truth of life. But a man can commit a venial sin to avoid scandalizing his neighbor, for he should rather watch out for the eternal damnation of his neighbor, which he will suffer for the mortal sin in which he was scandalized, than his own temporal loss, which he will suffer for his venial sin. Therefore, the truth of life is to be set aside because of scandal.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, sometimes preaching is taken away because of general scandal. But preaching pertains to the truth of doctrine. Therefore, the truth of doctrine should also be set aside because of scandal.

On the contrary (1), Gregory says: if scandal is taken about the truth, it is more useful to allow scandal to arise than to abandon truth. (Gregory the Great, Homilies on Ezekiel (CCSL 142), Bk. 1, hom. 7.) Therefore, truth should not be set aside on account of scandal.

Furthermore (2), a man should not sin in order to avert the sin of his neighbor. But the man who foregoes truth sins. Therefore, someone should not forego truth because of the scandal to another.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the counsels (The “counsels” here referred to are the evangelical counsels of perfection—voluntary vowed poverty, chastity, obedience, as counseled by Christ in Matt 19:21.) should be set aside because of scandal. (Parallels: see preceding quaestiuncula.) For the rule of Jerome is that everything that can be held or not held, save the Threefold Truth, is to be set aside because of scandal. (This statement is not found in Jerome, although it is attributed to him also by Alexander of Hales, Summa theologica, IIaIIi, n. 862 (QR III, 821). Similar phrases are found in William of Auxerre, Summa aurea, pt. 3, tr. 24, q. 4 (236 vb) and Hugh of St. Cher, In Matthaeum, on Matthew 18:7.) But the counsels are this kind of thing. Therefore, they are to be set aside because of scandal.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the vow of religious life is a certain counsel. But a man can forego his entrance into religious life because of the scandal to his parents, lest due honor be taken away from them: for the precept is honor your parents (Ex 20:12). Therefore, counsels should be set aside because of scandal.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the works of mercy are sometimes set aside because of scandal, lest others believe that they are done for the sake of vain praise. But the works of mercy are both under counsel and under precept: nor are they to be set aside according as they are in the precept, for there they pertain to the truth of life. Therefore, they are to be set aside because of scandal according as they are in counsel.

On the contrary (4), scandal is doing or saying something not quite right. But a counsel does not have to do with not quite right things, but with greater goods. Therefore, the observation of the counsels is not to be set aside because of scandal.

Furthermore (5), Jerome says to Heliodorus: let your little grandson hang on your neck, let your mother show her breast with hair disheveled and garments rent, let your father lie across the threshold: step over him and go ahead, rush forth with dry eyes to the banner of the cross. To be cruel is the only kind of piety there is in this matter. (Jerome, Epistle 14 (CSEL 54:46).) But he is speaking about taking up religious life. Therefore, the counsels are not to be set aside even because of scandal to one’s relatives, and so much less because of scandal to others.

Quaestiuncula 3

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that temporal things are to be set aside because of scandal. (Parallels: ST II-II, q. 43, a. 8; Contra impugnantes, ch. 15; Super Rom. 14, lec. 3.) For temporal things were owed to the Apostle, who was sowing spiritual things. But the Apostle did not make use of this power, lest he might give a cause of offense to the Gospel of Christ, as is clear from 1 Corinthians 9. Therefore, we also should reject temporal things for the sake of avoiding scandal.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, someone is bound to give his own property to someone in dire need in order to avert his temporal death. But we should do more to avert the spiritual death of our neighbor than his bodily death. Therefore, we should rather abandon temporal goods than abandon him to fall into spiritual death by scandal.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, among all temporal goods food is the most necessary thing for the body. But food is to be set aside because of scandal, for it says in 1 Corinthians 13:13: if food scandalizes my brother, I will never eat meat. (In fact, 1 Corinthians 8:13.) Therefore, much more firmly are other temporal things to be set aside because of scandal.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the Apostle says in 1 Corinthians 6:7: already there is a fault among you that you have lawsuits one with another. Why do you not rather accept injury? But he only says this because of the scandal that was resulting from it. Therefore, because of scandal man should forego temporal things, and should not claim them in a lawsuit.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, the tithes attached to temporal things are counted among spiritual things. But in order to avoid a scandal, the Church does not require tithes. Therefore, much more should other temporal things be set aside because of scandal.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, in the order of charity we should set the spiritual good of our neighbor ahead of our own temporal good, just as we should prefer his soul to our own body. Therefore, we should forego our temporal goods rather than let our neighbors suffer loss in spiritual things by scandal.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, a man can forego temporal things or not, excepting the three kinds of truth. Therefore, according to Jerome, temporal things should be abandoned because of scandal.

On the contrary (1), blessed Thomas of Canterbury demanded back the Church’s goods to the scandal of the king. (See Jacobus de Voragine, Golden Legend, ch. 11, nn. 1–2 (Ryan ed., 1:60); cf. John of Salisbury, Life of St. Thomas (PL 190:200).) Therefore, it is also permitted to us to seek our temporal goods amid the scandal of others.

Furthermore (2), no one should reap advantage from his own sin. But this would happen if the one who had fallen into scandal were allowed to keep someone else’s belongings. Therefore, temporal things are not to be abandoned to someone possessing them unjustly for the sake of averting his scandal.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

I answer that, active scandal never happens without sin on the part of the one doing it, as is clear from what has been said. But for no reason should someone be given an inclination to sin; thus he should forego all things rather than commit active scandal. Nor can truth ever be set aside for the sake of avoiding active scandal: for whoever follows the truth does not actively scandalize, since active scandal is doing or saying something not quite right. Therefore, when it is asked whether truth should be set aside for the sake of scandal, the question is not to be understood as concerning active scandal, but passive, which sometimes happens without sin on the part of the one who does the deed from which the occasion of scandal is taken, even though it never happens without sin on the part of him who is scandalized, as is clear from what has been said.

And so when we ask what should be set aside because of passive scandal, nothing else is to be sought than what a man should set aside lest someone else should sin. But since by the order of charity man is bound to love himself more than his neighbor in spiritual goods, in no way should someone sin so as to avert the sin of another. But anyone who abandons truth sins. However, the truth of which we are speaking consists in the fact that man conforms himself in his sayings and deeds to the rectitude of the divine rule or law, to which indeed man should be conformed both in those things that pertain to knowledge, and this pertains to the truth of doctrine; and in those things that regard action, whether someone should do them for their own sake, which pertains to the truth of life, or whether he should promulgate to others the things to be observed, which belongs to the truth of justice that consists in rectitude of judgment. But not everyone who sets aside something in which he can conform himself to the divine law is said to set aside the truth, for the truth can still remain after that is removed; but someone is said to set aside the truth when he foregoes or does something such that, once it has been omitted or done, truth does not remain, and this cannot be done without sin. And thus in no way is truth to be set aside because of another’s passive scandal.

Reply Obj. 1: The act of justice is to render to each one what is his. But rendering to each one what is his happens in two ways. In one way when what is given to him is directly useful to him, like money or something like that, which cannot be denied to someone without sin; for which reason, no matter how much scandal should follow, the judge must act so that his right is rendered to him. In another way when the work of justice, which is rendered at the asking of another, does not result directly in the good of the one asking, but rather in the good of the state, as is clear in the imposition of fines, by which peace in the state is preserved through the repression of malefactors. For this reason if the judge who bears the care of the state sees that greater detriment to the state will come forth from the infliction of a penalty, he can either forego the penalty or mitigate it. Nor does he do injury to anyone by this; for he bears the person of the state, and he also must do this because he is bound by his office to provide for the public welfare. But this happens especially when a leader or some multitude is involved in the case, or someone from whose punishment it is feared a schism will follow, and then Augustine says that with a multitude of sinners, warning is better than threatening; (Augustine, Epistle 22 (CSEL 34.1:58): “non ergo aspere, quantum existimo, non duriter, non modo imperioso ista tolluntur, magis docendo quam iubendo, magis monendo quam minando.”) but severity should be exercised in the sin of the few. But this is to be understood as applying when a greater danger is not feared in the dissembling of the sin of the leader or even of the multitude than would occur from their punishment. For this reason, if by the impunity of the leader or of the multitude, faith and the truth of doctrine and good morals are corrupted, neither the leader nor the multitude should be spared; for it happens particularly when the ones sinning strive to defend their sin by their authority or power. Therefore Isidore says, those who are not reformed from their vice of corruption, and even attempt to vindicate that very crime that they commit by a certain unreasoning authority, may receive neither the degree of honor nor the grace of communion. (Isidore, Epistle 4, Ad Massonam Episcopum (PL 83:899).)

Reply Obj. 2: The man who commits some venial sin so that another does not sin mortally, is not obliged to, nor does he do well by committing it. For we are not inclined to avoid sin chiefly to avoid harm to ourselves, for this would be to stop sinning from fear of punishment; but we are inclined to avoid sin lest we should offend God, who is offended even by venial sin, although not as greatly as by mortal sin. But no one should offend God a little so that another will not offend him a lot, for man should love God infinitely more than his neighbor; and thus no one should commit a venial sin to avoid scandal, so long as the act done for this reason remains a venial sin. For there is a contradiction in what is suggested, if it is said that someone ought to sin or does well by sinning. Yet an an act done for such a reason can turn out not to be a venial sin, which otherwise would be venial, such as saying an idle word; for now it would not be idle, since it would not lack a reason of pious usefulness.

Reply Obj. 3: In doctrine there are two things to consider: namely, the act of the one teaching, and the thing that is taught. Now, the act of the one teaching pertains to the truth of life, just as also any other act of mercy; for doctrine is spiritual alms, as was said above. (dist. 15, q. 2, a. 3, qa. 2.) Therefore, the judgment is the same about it as about the other acts of mercy, of which we will speak later, that sometimes because of scandal they can be deferred. But the thing itself that is taught is what pertains to the truth of doctrine. Nor is the truth of doctrine foregone when some true thing goes unsaid, but when damage is produced to the truth of that thing, either by a contrary teaching or by other people keeping silent; and in such a case the truth of doctrine should never be abandaoned for the sake of avoiding scandal.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that all works of perfection which are not commanded by a precept are called counsels; therefore they can be passed over as long as the three kinds of truth are preserved. But sometimes they fall under a precept, either because of a vow or by some other circumstance; and then they cannot be set aside without damage to the truth of life. And this is not the case we are considering now, but only when it remains in our power to do them or not. Therefore, speaking in this way, we must distinguish between kinds of passive scandal. For sometimes it arises from the malice of people who hate the truth, who are troubled and trouble others because of the works of light, like sons of darkness. And this is the scandal of the Pharisees, as Bernard says; (See Bernard of Clairvaux, Liber de praecepto et dispensatione, ch. 9 (Bernardi Opera, ed. Leclerq and Rochais, 3:259).) and in no way are the counsels to be set aside because of this passive scandal, for then the wicked would be given a chance to impede the works of perfection whenever they wanted. For this reason in Matthew 15:14 the Lord said of the Pharisees, who out of malice were being scandalized by his deeds and sayings, leave them alone; they are blind and leaders of the blind.

But sometimes it arises out of ignorance or weakness, and according to Bernard this is called the scandal of the little ones who do not know the truth, and because of this they are disturbed by the works of truth; and the Lord cautions about this scandal in Matthew 17:26, where he says to Peter: but that we may not scandalize them, go to the sea, etc., and he taught them to take precautions in Matthew 18. For this reason, because of this kind of passive scandal, counsels are to be suspended for a time or done in secret, but not to be set aside entirely; for a man should provide for himself more than for his neighbor in spiritual matters; and ignorance, if it lasts a long time, changes into malice through obstinacy. Still, the amount of scandal should be taken into account, and the amount of good that occurs by keeping the counsel; and according to this at some times the counsels are to be passed over because of the scandal of little ones, while at other times one should be heedless of scandal for the sake of the counsels.

Reply Obj. 1: The truth of life includes not only those things that are of necessity for salvation, but also those that are of the perfection of salvation; thus, although in some way the truth of life can be saved even when the counsels are omitted, nevertheless the perfection of the truth of life cannot; and this is why the words of Jerome are to be referred to things indifferent by their genus rather than to counsels.

Reply Obj. 2: In someone who wishes to enter religious life, something must be distinguished. For either he fears an imminent threat to his own salvation if he remains in the world, and then he should counteract the danger to his life by every means, regardless of scandal. But if, on the other hand, no danger was imminent, and he is not obliged by a vow, he should—in order to avoid the just scandal of his parents, whom he is bound to take care of—suspend his plan of perfection for a time, so that he might fulfill the precept of honoring his parents at its own time, and afterwards fulfill the counsel at a more suitable time. But if the scandal of relatives or of others is unreasonable, then it verges toward the scandal of the Pharisees; and then he should not put off his good intention because of scandal. But if he were obligated by a vow, then the doing of the counsel is commanded; and therefore in no way should it be set aside because of scandal, for this would be to do injury to the truth of life.

Reply Obj. 3: The works of mercy, be they spiritual alms or corporal works of mercy, like the counsels too, should be suspended for a time because of the scandal of little ones, except in that case where they fall under a precept, for then one cannot omit them while preserving the truth of life.

Reply Obj. 4: That definition is given about active scandal; but leaving that aside, even for the sake of passive scandal now and then a good work is to be set aside, or even suspended.

Reply Obj. 5: Jerome is speaking of the unreasonable scandal of relatives.

Response to Quaestiuncula 3

To the third question, it should be said that to cast off temporal things or to set them aside happens in two ways. In one way when someone gives what he has in his own possession; in another way when he does not seek the things that are owed to him; and of these two things the judgment is pretty much the same. For one must know that sometimes someone who does not give his own belongings to another scandalizes actively, either because he is bound to give them, or because he refuses in a wicked manner; and in this situation no one is allowed to keep what he possesses amid active scandal.

But sometimes passive scandal follows from the fact that someone does not give his temporal belongings; and in this situation a distinction must be made. For sometimes he cannot give without sin, either because he knows that the one to whom he gives would put the things to evil use; or because he cannot give temporal things to one person without prejudice to another, like if those who have care of a community give away something whose removal makes the condition of that community worse. And in that case one should not give temporal belongings, in order to avoid scandal, for this would be to act against the truth of justice or the truth of life.

But sometimes one can give without sin; and then we have to distinguish between kinds of passive scandal. For sometimes it proceeds from malice, and then a man is not bound to give his own belongings to someone maliciously asking; otherwise a man would have no chance to use his own things, and then the common good would perish. Nevertheless, he can give them as though by a counsel, not by a precept, unless perhaps it were believed that by giving he made himself worse; for example, if he were incited by this to seek other things wickedly, and to harrass others by these kinds of requests; for then he would sin by giving. But sometimes passive scandal proceeds from ignorance; and then he can give as if by the counsel, but he is not bound to as though by a precept; for he can drive away the one asking by instructing him, and sometimes this benefits him more, for example when such ignorance verges on injuring the truth of doctrine, than if temporal things were given to him. For by this the man would be encouraged in his error, as is clear from those heretics who say that everyone should give his own goods to the poor who ask, even outside the case of extreme necessity. Something similar should also be said about pursuing one’s own things, for no one should commit active scandal by demanding back his own temporal goods, nor by seeking things that are not owed him, nor by pursuing them inordinately in a lawsuit, or outside of court.

But as to relinquishing a just claim for temporal goods, a distinction must be made. For sometimes one cannot licitly relinquish a claim without injury to another, as when someone has care of another’s goods, whether of the community, or of some private person; and then he would sin by dropping his suit, unless by the consent of whomever he is responsible to, or unless he feared a greater danger than the loss of that person’s goods. But sometimes he can forego his suit without injury to another, and in that case if passive scandal were to proceed from malice, he is not bound to abandon his claim on his own things for the sake of such scandal; otherwise an opportunity would be given to banditry, and it would destroy the good of justice. But he can licitly forego his suit to avoid such scandal, unless by giving it up the one keeping his things unjustly is believed to become worse, or in another way to go uncorrected for such a sin. Therefore, Gregory says in Book 31 of the Morals, chapter 8: those who carry off only temporal goods are to be tolerated, but they are to be prevented while preserving charity, though not only from concern that they take away our things, but lest while plundering what is not theirs, they should lose their very selves. (Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob (CCSL 143B), Bk. 31, ch. 13.) But if passive scandal proceeds from weakness or ignorance, one should defer his claim on his own goods, or induce the other not to be scandalized. Because if he is still scandalized, now he becomes malicious through obstinacy; and therefore the judgment is the same of this kind of scandal as of that which arises from malice.

Nevertheless, certain people say that it is permitted to the imperfect to claim their own things in spite of scandal, but not to the perfect. But this is nothing; for if they speak of the perfect as being those in the state of perfection, then the same judgment is made of them as of others, except to the extent that they are obliged by a vow to have no personal property. And thus a monk can claim in court temporal things in the name of his chapter by the same right as a secular person in his own name. But if they are speaking of the perfect according to the state of charity, then that very perfection of charity will lead them to keep the counsels, not because they are bound to do it, nor would they sin if they did not do it, but because some damage might be done to their perfection, and this is how that Gloss on 1 Corinthians 6:7, why do you not rather suffer yourselves to be defrauded? should be understood: it is permitted to the perfect to claim their own things simply, that is, without a lawsuit, without quarreling, without a trial, but it does not befit them to argue their suit before a judge.

For this cannot be understood of the perfect according to state, like religious, since such as these do not have private property; so it would be meaningless to say that they could claim their own things simply. But those things that are held in common belong either to the chapter or to the poor; and so they could claim them in the lawcourts, for in that case they are responsible for someone else’s belongings. Therefore what is said in the Gloss is to be understood according to the levels of charity; for although they may not sin by seeking their own things in the lawcourt, nevertheless, it detracts from their perfection; thus the Gloss does not say that it is not permitted to such as these, but that it does not befit them.

It should be known, though, that in five instances it is also permitted to the perfect to claim their own things and to contend in court, even without detriment to their perfection. The first is when a question arises about a spiritual matter; this is why in Acts 15, when the question had arisen of the observation of legal matters, Paul deferred to the judgment of the Apostles, because of certain false brethren (cf. Galatians 2). Second, when a question arises concerning something that can tend to the detriment of a spiritual good; and thus in Acts 25:11, Paul called upon Caesar for his liberation, since by his death the fruit of his preaching would be impeded; but he, for his part, desired to be dissolved and be with Christ (Philippians 1:23). Third, when it is a contention concerning something that affects the temporal loss of another, most especially the poor (Sirach 34:24): he that offers sacrifice out of the goods of the poor, is as one that sacrifices the son in the presence of his father. Fourth, when the contention concerns what affects the spiritual loss of someone who unjustly seizes spiritual goods, concerning which the authority of Gregory is cited above, speaking on Job 39:16: she has labored in vain, no fear constraining her. Fifth, when it tends to the corruption of many by the example of banditry, Ecclesiastes 8:11: for because sentence is not speedily pronounced against the evil, the children of men commit evils without any fear.

Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle could licitly have accepted his expenses from those to whom he was preaching the Gospel; but he refrained out of his perfection in charity, so as to avoid the scandal of those who were greedy, and so that he could convince them more freely, and so that he might take away from false apostles the chance to plunder.

Reply Obj. 2: The man who is in extreme necessity does not have it in his power whether to meet with bodily death or not; rather, he necessarily incurs it because of his lack of temporal goods, and thus the man who refused to give him his own things is directly the cause of his death. But the man who is scandalized is able to avoid his own scandal, and therefore it is not the same situation.

Reply Obj. 3: The eating of certain foods has in itself a certain likeness to evil, for example, the eating of food sacrificed to idols; and therefore whoever eats this in the presence of the weak actively scandalizes them, which is more evil than bodily death; for it is preferable to die of hunger than to eat food offered to idols, that is, amidst scandal; for the first is the evil of punishment, but the second is the evil of guilt. Nevertheless, someone should not allow himself to die of hunger sooner than eat of food sacrificed to idols amid scandal; for he would lay violent hands on himself, and then the evil of guilt would be joined with the evil of punishment. But when eating some food does not have any appearance of evil, then the judgment is the same of abstaining from such eating and of releasing the temporal belongings of another. And so what the Apostle says pertains to the counsel of perfection, not to the necessity of a precept.

Reply Obj. 4: The Apostle is speaking of suing amid active scandal. And what the Lord says, of him that taketh away thy goods, ask them not again (Luke 6:30), is rather a counsel than a precept.

Reply Obj. 5: Because of general scandal a man should refrain from demanding back his own things, when he can licitly, unless by doing so a greater damage will be done to the truth than the public scandal which sometimes arises from the malice of certain people inciting others; and in this way Blessed Thomas of Canterbury endured the public scandal so that he could confront the greater danger, which was the loss of ecclesiastical liberty.

Reply Obj. 6: If a man loved his own temporal belongings more than the salvation of his neighbor, he would sin; but sometimes when we demand our own things, we are thinking more of the salvation of our neighbors than of our own salvation; this is why Gregory says, in the text mentioned above: we should fear more about those bandits themselves than be so eagerly demanding our temporal belongings.

Reply Obj. 7: Although, saving the three kinds of truth, in this particular case someone might sometimes not sue for his own things in order to avoid scandal, nevertheless it could not be without damage to the public truth if it were not permitted to sue; for peace and justice would perish.

Exposition of the Text

Because whatever is done in secret cannot be proven. (Sententiae IV, 38.2 (215). 2.) This is not a sufficient reason that a marriage not be impeded simply speaking, for a lack of proof does not excuse the conscience from sin; but rather this is why there is no impediment in the sight of the Church.

You have sought our advice regarding widows who have withdrawn from the purpose of widowhood; I believe you know that, unless they are converted, they were once condemned by St. Paul. (Sent. IV, 38. 2 (215). 4, quotation attributed to Gregory.) He is speaking of a purpose confirmed by a vow.

“What sin is graver than adultery?” (Sent. IV, 38.2 (215). 10, Pseudo-Clement, Epsitola I ( ad Iacobum).) This is understood according to the gravity of the punishment which according to the Law is inflicted for adultery, namely, the stoning of both parties; no punishment is graver than this. This is said according to the place it holds in the penalties: for according to the Law, stoning is reserved only for blasphemers and adulterers, and disobedient children. But blasphemy here names those aberrant from God, and the disobedient are counted in the same genus, for it is like the crime of soothsaying to refuse to obey, as is clear from 1 Samuel 15:23.

“This is execrable when done with a harlot, but even more execrable in the case of a wife.” (Sent. IV, 38.2 (215). 10, Augustine, De bono coniugali, c8 n8 and c11 n12.) Here the comparison is to be understood as dealing with the use against nature; but concerning the use according to nature, it is the reverse.

“We must believe that the pacts of lawful marriage must be restored.” (Sent. IV, 38.3 (216). 2, Leo I, Epistola 159 ( ad Nicetam, Aquileiensem episcopum), c1–4.) This is to be understood as applying when both parties are still alive. But it seems that also if one should die, and afterward should be miraculously resuscitated, the marriage would be renewed, by the fact that Hebrews 11:35 says*, women received their dead raised to life again*.

Furthermore, a resuscitated man could seek out his former possessions. Therefore, he could also seek out his wife.

Furthermore, if it were necessary for him to contract again with the same wife, he might be considered a bigamist because of contracting two marriages.

And it must be said, according to Augustine, that marriage is a good of mortals, (See Augustine, On the Good of Marriage (CSEL 41), ch. 2.) and thus the matrimonial bond is finished with this life; and this is what is said in Romans 7:2, about a woman: if her husband is dead, she is released from the law of her husband. And thus if he should be resuscitated, he could not seek his own wife again; but he could contract with her again, unless she has married another, for then the marriage contract could not be dissolved.

To the first, it must be said that this is understood of children, not of spouses.

To the second, it must be said that possessions are subject to the power of their owner simply, which is why a dying man can also make a will. But a wife is not subject to the power of her husband like a slave girl; rather there is a certain partnership between man and wife, which is terminated by the death of one of them, so that a dying man cannot leave his wife to another in his will. And so it is clear that one cannot reason about wives as about possessions.

To the third, it must be said that one would not be a bigamist by this, for neither spouse is dividing his or her flesh among many people.

If they lack the shamefulness of an evil will. (Sent. IV, 38.3 (216). 3.) That indeed is when the woman has contracted with another, not by a light presumption, but by holding some sure judgment of the husband’s death. But if afterward some doubt should arise about the first husband’s life, from some cause that could give certainty, she should neither render nor request the debt. But if that reason causes a probable doubt, she should render the debt but not request it. But if it were a light suspicion, she can do both licitly; for she should ignore that reason rather than form her conscience according to it.

But from the moment when, wishing fruitlessly to return to his first wife, he is compelled by the Church’s discipline to retain the second, he begins to be excused by his obedience and fear. (Sent. IV, 38.3 (216). 5.) Here the Master speaks falsely, since a man ought rather to die excommunicated than be joined to someone who is not his wife; for this would be against the truth of life, which is not to be covered up because of scandal.