D. 32 - The marital debt

After the Master has considered the goods of the union by which the marital act is excused, here he considers the act itself according as it takes on the character of something owed through the goods of the union; and this is divided into two parts: in the first he shows that both of the spouses are bound to render the debt to each other; and in the second he shows that requesting the debt is impeded by a solemn time, at: and although the debt is always to be satisfied to one asking for it, yet it is not lawful to ask every day. (Sententiae IV, 32.3 (192). 1.)

The first part is divided into two: in the first part he shows that husband and wife are equals in the rendering of the debt; second, he proves a certain thing which had been supposed, at: that the husband may not practice continence without the wife’s consent is proved by the testimonies below. (Sent. IV, 32.2 (191). 1.)

And although the debt is always to be satisfied to one asking for it, yet it is not lawful to ask every day. Here he considers the times in which the marital act is forbidden, and regarding this he does two things: first, he shows that a certain time impedes the requesting of the debt; second, he shows that something may also impede the celebration of marriage, at: times are to be observed not only with regard to the work of the flesh, but also in the celebration of nuptials. (Sent. IV, 32.4 (193). 1.)

About the first he does two things: first, he shows the truth; second, he excludes a certain objection, at: as for what was said earlier, that to render the debt is not a sin, it seems to be contradicted by what Jerome says. (Sent. IV, 32.3 (192). 2.)

Question 1

The marital debt

Here five questions arise:

first, whether both spouses are always bound to render the debt to each other by the necessity of a precept;

• second, whether one should sometimes not render to the one asking;
• third, whether in rendering the debt husband and wife are equals;
• fourth, whether one party without consent of the other could take a vow by which rendering of the debt would be impeded;
• fifth, whether a time impedes the rendering of the debt.
• Article 1 Whether both spouses are always bound to render the debt to each other by the necessity of a precept

Obj. 1: To the first question, we proceed thus. (Parallel: below, a. 4; Super I Cor. 7, lec. 1.) Proceeding to the first, it seems that one spouse is not bound to pay the debt to the other spouse by the necessity of a precept. For no one is prohibited from partaking of the Eucharist on account of having fulfilled a precept. But he who pays the debt to his wife is not permitted to eat the flesh of the Lamb, as Jerome says in the text. (Jerome, De exodo, in vigilia Paschae (CCSL 78:540).) Therefore, to pay the debt is not of the necessity of precept.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, anyone can licitly abstain from those things that are harmful to his person. But sometimes, to render the debt to the one asking might be injurious to the person, either by reason of infirmity, or by reason of payment already made. Therefore, it seems that the debt may licitly be denied to the one asking.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, anyone who makes himself powerless to do what he is bound to do by a precept, sins. If, therefore, someone were bound to pay the debt by necessity of a precept, it seems that he would sin if, due to fasting or any other weakening of his body, he rendered himself powerless to pay the debt; which does not seem to be true.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, marriage, according to the Philosopher, is ordained to the procreation and education of children, as well as to a shared life. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 8, ch. 12 (1162a15ff.).) But leprosy is contrary to both ends of marriage, because, since it is a contagious disease, a woman is not bound to live together with a leper; and similarly, too, that disease is frequently transmitted to children. Therefore, it seems that a wife is not bound to pay the debt to a leprous husband.

On the contrary (1), as a slave is in the power of his master, so also is one spouse in the power of the other, as is clear from 1 Corinthians 7. But a slave is bound by the necessity of a precept to render any debt of servitude to his master, as is clear from Romans 13:7: render your debts to all men: tribute to whom tribute is due. Therefore one spouse is also bound by the necessity of a precept to render the debt to the other.

Furthermore (2), marriage is ordained to the avoidance of fornication, as is clear from 1 Corinthians 7. But this could not happen through marriage if one spouse were not bound to render the debt to the other when the other is attacked by concupiscence. Therefore, to render the debt is of the necessity of a precept.

I answer that, marriage was principally instituted as an office of nature, and therefore in its act the movement of nature must be considered, by which the nutritive gives to the generative only what is not needed for the conservation of the individual. For this is the natural order, that first something should be perfected in itself, and afterward communicate its perfection to another. The order of charity is also characterized by this, that it perfects nature. Therefore, since a wife does not have power over a husband except as to the faculty of generation, but not as to those things which are ordained to the conservation of the individual, the man is bound to render to his wife what he owes in all that regards the generation of children, although preserving first the safety of his person.

Reply Obj. 1: Someone fulfilling a certain precept can be rendered incapable of carrying out a certain sacred office, as a judge who condemns a man to death is made irregular by fulfilling a precept. Likewise too that man who, fulfilling a precept, pays the debt, is made unfit for executing the divine office; not because that act is a sin, but by reason of the carnality of the act. (The text refers to married priests of the Eastern rites of the Church, who are required to abstain from conjugal relations the night before they consecrate the Eucharist.) Thus, as the Master says, Jerome speaks only about the ministers of the Church, but not about others who are to be left to their own judgment: for they can either forego out of devotion, or consume the body of Christ without sin.

Reply Obj. 2: The wife’s power over the body of the man does not extend to the endangerment of his person, as was said. For this reason if she should make demands beyond this, it is not a requesting of a debt, but an unjust exaction from him, and for this reason, the man is not bound to satisfy her.

Reply Obj. 3: If someone should be rendered incapable of paying the debt because of something following upon marriage, for instance, when the debt is rendered beforehand, and he is incapable of paying it further, the woman does not have the right to ask for it again, and she shows herself to be more of a harlot than a wife in asking for it further. If, though, he is rendered incapable by another cause, and it is a licit one, then again he is not bound, nor can the woman demand it. If it is not licit, then he sins, and the sin of his wife, if she should lapse into sexual sin because of it, in some way would be imputed to him, and therefore he should take pains as much as he can so that his wife may remain in continence.

Reply Obj. 4: Leprosy dissolves a betrothal, but not a marriage; and for this reason, even the wife of a leprous man is bound to render the debt to her husband, though she is not bound to cohabit with him; for one is not so quickly infected by intercourse as by frequent cohabitation, and although a sickly child may be generated, nevertheless it is better for it to exist diseased like this than not to exist at all.

Article 2

Whether one should sometimes not render to the one asking

Quaestiuncula 1

Obj. 1: To the second question, we proceed thus. It seems that a man is not bound to render the debt to a wife who does not ask for it. For an affirmative precept does not oblige except at a determined time. But the time determined for the payment of the debt can only be when it is asked for. Therefore, one is not otherwise bound to pay it.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, we should presume the best of anyone. But it is even better for spouses to restrain themselves than to make use of matrimony. Therefore, unless she should expressly request her due, the man should presume that she would rather be continent, and thus he is not bound to render the debt to her.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the wife has power over the husband as a master over his slave. But a slave is not bound to serve his master except when the master commands. Therefore, neither is the husband bound to render the debt to his wife except when required by her.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, a man can sometimes turn aside his demanding wife with entreaties that she not demand. Therefore, even more can he not render if she does not demand.

On the contrary (1), by rendering the debt, the husband offers the wife a medicine against her concupiscence. But a doctor to whom someone sick has been committed is bound to relieve his sickness, even if the invalid does not ask. Therefore, the man is bound to render the debt to the wife who does not ask.

Furthermore (2), a prelate is bound to apply the remedy of correction against the sin of those placed under him, even if they oppose it. But the rendering of the debt by a husband is ordained against the sins of his wife. Therefore, the man is bound to render the debt sometimes even if she does not request it.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that it is licit for a menstruating woman to request the debt. For under the Old Law, just as a menstruating woman was unclean, so also was a man suffering an outflowing of semen. (See, e.g., Leviticus 15.) But a man suffering in this way can request the debt. Therefore, by the same reasoning, during menstruation a woman can as well.

Obj. 2: Again, leprosy is a greater infirmity than suffering a menstrual period. And it seems that it causes a greater corruption in the child. But a leper may request the debt. Therefore, etc.

Obj. 3: Again, if a menstruating woman is not permitted to request the debt, this is only because of a defect that is feared in the child. But if the woman were barren, such a defect would not be feared. Therefore, it seems that at least a barren woman may request the debt during menstruation.

On the contrary (1), Leviticus 18:19 says*: you shall not approach a woman . . . while she is in her menstrual uncleanness*. To which Augustine adds, although he had sufficiently prohibited it, here again he repeats, so that it would not perhaps seem to be taken figuratively about higher things. (This is not how Augustine words it, but the thought is the same: see Augustine, Quaestionum in heptateuchum (CCSL 33), Bk. 3, Quaest. Levitici, q. 64.)

Again (2), according to Isaiah 64:6: all of your justices are like the rags of a menstruous woman. About which Jerome says: during that period men were supposed to abstain from their wives, because the children conceived are damaged in their members—blind, lame, leprous; so that since the parents were not ashamed to commingle in their chamber, their sins might be evident to all, and that they might be more openly rebuked in their little ones. (See the Glossa ordinaria, PL 113:1308. A text like this is found in Jerome on Ezekiel: see PL 25:173.) And thus the same conclusion as above.

Quaestiuncula 3

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that a menstruating wife should not render the debt to a husband who asks. In Leviticus 20:18, it says that if someone approaches a menstruating woman, both are to be punished by death. Therefore, it seems that a woman rendering the debt sins mortally as much as the one demanding the debt.

Obj. 2: Again, Romans 1:32 says: not only they that do them, but they also who consent to them that do them, deserve to die. But someone who knowingly demands the debt of a menstruating woman sins mortally. Therefore also, the woman consenting to him in the rendering of the debt.

Obj. 3: Again, a sword is not to be given to someone who is insane, lest he kill himself or someone else. Therefore, by the same reasoning neither should a woman expose her body to her husband in the time of menstruation, lest he should spiritually kill himself.

On the contrary (1), 1 Corinthians 7:4 says: the woman does not rule over her own body, but the man does. Therefore, the woman must render the debt to her husband requesting it even during the time of menstruation.

Again (2), a menstruating woman must not be an occasion of sin for her husband. But if the husband should ask for his rights and she should not render the debt even in the time of her menstruation, she would be an occasion of sin to her husband, for perhaps he would fall into fornication. Therefore, etc.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

I answer that, there are two ways of requesting the debt. In one way, explicitly, as when the two ask each other in words. In another way, the requesting of the debt can be understood when, for example, the man perceives by certain signs that the wife wishes the debt to be rendered to her, but because of modesty she is silent. And in that case even if she did not explicitly request the debt in words, her husband is still bound to render it to her, when express signs appear in his wife of her will to have the debt rendered.

Reply Obj. 1: The time is not only determined by when it is requested, but whenever there are signs of that danger to be feared which rendering the debt is ordered toward avoiding, and which might occur if it is not rendered at that time.

Reply Obj. 2: A man can make this assumption about his wife when he does not see in her signs to the contrary. But when he does see them, it would be a stupid assumption.

Reply Obj. 3: A master is not so embarrassed to ask from a slave what is due from his servitude as a wife is to ask her husband for the conjugal debt. If, however, the master did not ask because of ignorance or another cause, nevertheless the servant would be bound to fulfill it, if danger were imminent: for this would be ‘not to serve the eye,’ which the Apostle commands to slaves. (See Ephesians 6:6 and Colossians 3:22.)

Reply Obj. 4: A man should not turn aside his wife when she requests the debt, unless for some good reason; and then he should not turn her aside with much insistence, on account of the dangers that threaten.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that to approach a menstruating woman was prohibited under the Law for two reasons: both because of uncleanness as well as because of the harm which frequently resulted in the children from this kind of commingling. And so as to the first, this precept was ceremonial, but as to the second, it was moral; for since marriage is principally ordered to the good of children, that use of marriage is ordered which promotes the good of children; and therefore, this precept also obliges under the New Law because of the second reason, even if not for the first.

The menstrual flow can, however, be natural or unnatural. It is natural when women suffer it at the regular times, when they are healthy. However, it is unnatural when they suffer a flow of blood inordinately and almost incessantly because of some infirmity. Therefore, in an unnatural menstrual flow it is not prohibited to approach the menstruating woman under the New Law: both because of the infirmity, since a woman cannot conceive in such a state, and also since such an issue of blood is perpetual and long-lasting, and thus it would be necessary for her husband to abstain perpetually. But when the woman naturally undergoes the menstrual flow, she can conceive; and again such a period lasts only a short while. Thus it is prohibited to approach a woman in this state, and likewise it is prohibited for the woman in such a period to request the debt.

Reply Obj. 1: The flow of semen in a man proceeds from an infirmity, and semen flowing like that is not suitable for generation. Furthermore, such a condition is long-lasting or perpetual, like leprosy; so there is no similar argument.

And by this the answer the second objection is also resolved.

Reply Obj. 3: As long as a woman undergoes menstruation, one cannot be certain that she is barren. Certain women are barren in their youth, who become fertile by the process of time, and vice versa, as is stated in Book 10 of the History of Animals. (See Aristotle, History of Animals, Bk. 10, ch. 5.)

Response to Quaestiuncula 3

To the third question, it should be said that on this matter some have said that the menstruating woman should not render the debt, just as she should not request it. For just as she is not bound to render it if she has an infirmity in her own person, from the fact that it would be dangerous to her, she is likewise not bound to render it if avoiding danger to the offspring. But this opinion detracts from matrimony, by which complete power is given to the man over the body of his wife with respect to the marital act. Nor is endangering the body of the offspring similar to endangering one’s own body; for if the woman is unwell, it is most certain that the sexual act would be dangerous to her; but it is not so certain about children, who perhaps will not even follow.

And therefore, others say that the menstruating woman is never allowed to request the debt. If, however, her husband should ask, either he asks knowingly, and then she should turn him aside by entreaties and warnings, yet not so categorically that it might be an occasion to him for other condemnable seductions, if he is believed to be prone to that. Otherwise he asks ignorantly, and the woman can give some pretext, or say that she is unwell, so as not to render the debt, unless danger is feared for her husband. However, ultimately, if the man does not cease to request it, she should render the debt when he asks. But it is not safe for her to indicate her own situation lest perhaps the man should conceive a loathing for her because of it, unless she can presume that he will be prudent.

Reply Obj. 1: This is to be understood when both consent voluntarily; not, however, if the woman should render the debt involuntarily and, as it were, compelled.

Reply Obj. 2: Since consent only comes from the will, a woman is not understood to consent to the sin of her husband unless she renders the debt voluntarily: for when it is involuntary, she endures it rather than consenting.

Reply Obj. 3: A sword should be given even to an insane man when greater danger is feared if it were not given; and it is similar in this case.

Article 3

Whether in rendering the debt husband and wife are equals

Obj. 1: To the third question, we proceed thus. (Parallel: In IV Sent. d. 15, q. 2, a. 5, qa. 1, ad 1; d. 36, a. 3, ad 3; Super I Cor. 7, lec. 1.) It seems that man and woman are not equals in the marital act. For what is active is nobler than what is acted upon, as Augustine says, in Book 12 of On the Literal Meaning of Genesis, Chapter 16. (Augustine, On the Literal Meaning of Genesis, Bk. 12, par. 16 (CSEL 28.1:401–2).) But in the conjugal act the man is related as the active party, and the woman as the passive. (See Aristotle, Generation of Animals, Bk. 1, chs. 20–21.) Therefore, they are not equals in the conjugal act.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the wife is not bound to render the debt to the husband unless he asks; the husband on the other hand is bound to render it to the wife, as was said. Therefore, they are not equals in the marital act.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, in matrimony the woman was made for the sake of the man, as is evident from Gen. 2:18: let us make him a helper similar to himself. But when something is for the sake of something else, the latter is always more principal. Therefore, etc.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, marriage is principally ordained to the conjugal act. But in matrimony the man is the head of the woman, as is clear from 1 Corinthians 11:3. Therefore, they are not equals in this act.

On the contrary (1), it says in 1 Corinthians 7:4: the man does not have power over his own body, and the same thing is said of the wife. Therefore, they are equals in the marital act.

Furthermore (2), marriage is an equal-sided relationship, since it is a union, as was said. Therefore, husband and wife are equals in the marital act.

I answer that, there are two kinds of equality: namely, of quantity and of proportion. Equality of quantity is what is found between two quantities of the same measure, like two things that are each a bicubit long. But equality of proportion is what is found between two proportions of the same species, like a double and a double. Therefore, speaking of the first equality, a man and woman are not equals in matrimony, neither with respect to the conjugal act, in which what is nobler is due the man, nor as regards the management of the home, in which the woman is ruled and the man rules. But as regards the second kind of equality, they are equals in both things. For just as the man is bound to the woman in the conjugal act and in the management of the home in what pertains to a husband, so the wife is bound to the man in those things that pertain to a wife. And in keeping with this it says in the text that they are equals in rendering and requesting the debt.

Reply Obj. 1: Although to act is more noble than to be acted upon, nevertheless the proportion of the passive to being acted upon is the same as the proportion of the agent to acting. And according to this there is an equality of proportion.

Reply Obj. 2: This is accidental. For since the man has the nobler part in the conjugal act, naturally he is not so embarrassed to request the debt as his wife; and this is the reason that the wife is not so bound to render the debt to a husband who does not request it, as a husband is to his wife.

Reply Obj. 3: This fact shows that they are not absolute equals, but not that they are not equals according to proportion.

Reply Obj. 4: Although the head is the chief among the members of the body, yet as the members are bound to the head in their functions, so is the head bound to the members in its functions; and that is how an equality of proportion exists here.

Article 4

Whether one party without consent of the other could take a vow by which rendering of the debt would be impeded

Obj. 1: To the fourth question, we proceed thus. (Parallel: below, d. 38, q. 1, a. 1, qa. 3, ad 4.) It seems that a husband and wife may take a vow against the marital debt without each other’s consent. For the husband and wife are equally obligated to the payment of the debt, as was said. But it is permissible for the man, even with his wife forbidding it, to undertake a crusade in the defense of the Holy Land. Therefore, this is also permitted to the wife, and thus since by this vow the rendering of the debt would be impeded, either spouse may take the vow mentioned without the consent of the other.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, no vow should depend upon the consent of someone who cannot dissent without sin. But one of the spouses cannot dissent without sin if the other should vow continence, either simply or for a time. For to impede spiritual progress is a sin against the Holy Spirit. Therefore, one can vow a vow of continence simply or for a time without the consent of the other.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, in the marital act just as the rendering of the debt is required, so also the requesting of the debt. But one can without the consent of the other vow that he will not request the debt, since this is in his power. Therefore, by the same reasoning, he may vow that he will not render the debt.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, no one can be forced by the command of a superior to do what he would not be allowed to vow or to do for himself. For illicit things do not fall under obedience. But the superior prelate may command a man and a woman not to render the debt by imposing upon him some service. Therefore, a man may himself vow something that may impede the rendering of the debt.

On the contrary (1), it says in 1 Corinthians 7:5: do not refuse each other, except perhaps by agreement, that you may devote yourselves to prayer.

Furthermore (2), no one can make a vow about what belongs to another. But the man does not have power over his own body, but the wife does. Therefore, without her consent he cannot make a vow of continence, either simply, or for a time.

I answer that, vowing belongs to the will, as even the word itself shows. For this reason a vow can only be made about those goods that are subject to one’s will, which are not those matters in which one is bound to another. And therefore, in such things no one can profess a vow without the consent of the one to whom he is bound. And so, since spouses are bound to each other in the rendering of the debt, as was said, continence is prevented by this fact. One cannot vow continence without the consent of the other, and if he does vow it, he sins; nor should he keep this vow, but should do penance for having made a wicked vow.

Reply Obj. 1: It is probable enough that a wife ought to will continence for a time to assist a need of the general Church. Therefore, in consideration of the trouble that a crusade means, it was established that a man may undertake a crusade without the consent of his wife, just as also he may join the army without the consent of the earthly lord from whom he holds a fief.

Nor, however, is all the woman’s right taken away from her in this, for the wife can follow him. Nor is a wife’s obligation to her husband the same as his obligation to her, for since the husband should rule the wife, and not vice versa, the wife is more bound to follow her husband than vice versa. Furthermore, the wife would incur much greater danger to her chastity in traveling through the land than the husband would, and with less benefit to the Church. And therefore, the wife cannot make this kind of vow without the consent of the husband.

Reply Obj. 2: The spouse who dissents from the other’s vow of continence does not dissent in order to impede that person’s good, but so as not to work to his own detriment.

Reply Obj. 3: There are two opinions about this. For some say that one person may vow not to request the debt without the consent of the other, though not that he will not render it, for in the first instance, both spouses are within their rights, but not in the second instance. But if one spouse were never to request the debt, it would make the marriage onerous to the other, who would then always have to undergo the embarrassment of requesting the debt. For this reason, others say more probably that one person cannot vow either thing without the consent of the other.

Reply Obj. 4: Just as the woman receives power over the body of the man, except in what the man owes to his own body, so also is excepted what he owes to another master. Therefore, just as the wife cannot request the debt from her husband against the health of his own body, so neither can she impede what he owes to his lord. But beyond this a master or lord cannot prohibit someone from rendering the debt.

Article 5

Whether a time impedes the rendering of the debt

Quaestiuncula 1

Obj. 1: To the fifth question, we proceed thus. It seems that in sacred times no one should be prevented from requesting the debt. For a sick man is to be cared for during these times if he is ailing. But it is possible that on a holy day someone might be afflicted with concupiscence. Therefore, one should care for him through the requesting of the debt.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, there is no other reason why the debt is not to be requested on holy days except that they are set aside for prayer. But on these days there are determined hours for prayer. Therefore, at other hours it is permissible to request the debt.

On the contrary, just as some places are sacred, for they are set aside for sacred things, so also some times are sacred for the same reason. But in a sacred place it is not permitted to request the debt. Therefore, neither is it permissible at a sacred time.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that someone who requests the debt during sacred times sins mortally. For Gregory says in Book 1 of the Dialogues that that woman who was known by her husband during the night, was seized by the devil when she joined the Church procession in the morning. (Gregory the Great, Dialogues (SChr 260), Bk. 1, ch. 10.) But this would not have happened unless she had sinned mortally. Therefore, etc.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, whoever does something against a divine precept sins mortally. But the Lord commanded in Exodus 19:15, when they were about to receive the law: do not approach your wives. Therefore, much more do they sin mortally if, at the time intended for the sacraments of the New Law, men should commingle with their wives.

On the contrary, no circumstance makes things infinitely worse. But an undue time is a certain circumstance. Therefore, it does not worsen a sin infinitely, making mortal what would otherwise be venial.

Quaestiuncula 3

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that one is not bound to render the debt during holy days. For sinners and those who consent to their sins are punished equally, as is evident from Romans 1:32. But the one who renders the debt consents to the one requesting, who sins. Therefore, he too sins.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, we are obliged to pray by an affirmative precept, and also at certain determined times. But at that time in which someone is bound to pray, he should not render the debt, just as neither at that time in which he is bound to some special service for a temporal lord.

On the contrary, it says in 1 Corinthians 7:5: do not refuse one another, except perhaps by agreement for a season, that you may devote yourselves to prayer. Therefore, when someone asks, it is to be rendered to him.

Quaestiuncula 4

Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that weddings are not forbidden during the times spelled out in the text. For matrimony is a sacrament. But in those times the celebration of the other sacraments is not forbidden. Therefore, neither should the celebration of matrimony be.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the requesting of the debt is more unsuited to holy days than a wedding celebration. But the marital debt can be requested on those days. Therefore, so can weddings be celebrated.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, marriages that happen against the statutes of the Church should be dissolved. But they are not dissolved if the wedding happens during such periods. Therefore, neither should they be prohibited by the statutes of the Church.

On the contrary, it says in Ecclesiastes 3:5*: a time to embrace, and a time to refrain from embracing*.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

I answer that, although the marital act is free from sin, nevertheless, since it brings down reason because of the physical pleasure, it renders man unfit for spiritual things. Therefore, on the days in which one is particularly to give oneself to spiritual things, it is not permitted to request the marital debt.

Reply Obj. 1: At such a time, other things can be applied for the repression of concupiscence, like prayer, and many other things like it, which those who are bound to perpetual continence also make use of.

Reply Obj. 2: Although no one is bound to pray at every hour, nonetheless one is bound to keep oneself fit for prayer for the whole day.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that to seek the marital debt on a holy day is not a circumstance amounting to another species of sin; and so, it cannot become infinitely more grave. Therefore, neither the husband nor the wife sin mortally, if either requests the debt on a holy day. But nevertheless the sin is graver if it is sought only for the sake of pleasure, than if someone should seek the marital debt because he fears for himself due to the frailty of the flesh.

Reply Obj. 1: That woman was not punished because she rendered the debt, but because afterward she rashly approached the divine things against her conscience.

Reply Obj. 2: From that text it cannot be proved that this is a mortal sin, but only that it is unfitting. For many more things pertaining to the cleanliness of the flesh were required by necessity of precept in the Old Law, which was given for carnal men, that are not required in the New Law, which is the law of the Spirit.

Response to Quaestiuncula 3

To the third question, it should be said that since the woman has power over the body of her husband as far as concerns the act of generation, and vice versa, one is bound to render the debt to the other at any time whatsoever and at any hour whatsoever, preserving the due decency required in such things. For it is not fitting that it be rendered immediately in a public place.

Reply Obj. 1: That person, as he is in himself, does not consent, but what is required from him he renders reluctantly and with sorrow. For, because of the frailty of the flesh, it is divinely ordained that one may always render the debt to the one asking, so that no occasion of sin will be given.

Reply Obj. 2: There is no determined hour for praying which cannot be compensated for in other hours, and therefore this objection does not compel.

Response to Quaestiuncula 4

To the fourth question, it should be said that when new brides are given to their husbands, the souls of the spouses are more greatly occupied by physical things because of this very newness, and that is why one typically sees many signs of unbridled rejoicing at weddings. And because of this, it is prohibited for weddings to be celebrated at those times when people should particularly elevate themselves to spiritual things. Now this is from Advent until Epiphany because of the reception of communion, which, according to the ancient canons, customarily and appropriately happens during the period of the Nativity; and from Septuagesima until the octave of Easter, because of the Easter communion; and from three days before the Ascension until the octave of Pentecost, because of preparation for consuming communion at that time. (The Synod of Agde in 506 stipulated that the faithful were to receive communion three times a year: at Christmas, Easter, and Pentecost. See Ian Christopher Levy, “The Eucharist and Canon Law in the High Middle Ages,” in A Companion to the Eucharist in the Middle Ages, ed. Ian Levy et al. (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 399–445, at 407.)

Reply Obj. 1: The celebration of matrimony has something of worldly and carnal rejoicing joined to it, which is present not in the other sacraments. Therefore, it is not the same.

Reply Obj. 2: Such great distraction of souls does not occur in the rendering or requesting of the debt as in the celebration of a wedding, and therefore it is not similar.

Reply Obj. 3: Since time is not of the essence of matrimony, if it is contracted at an improper time, nevertheless it is a valid sacrament; nor are the contractants separated simply, but for a time, that they may do penance for having transgressed the statutes of the Church; and this is how what the Master says should be understood.

Exposition of the Text

If he should first allow and then forbid. (Sententiae IV, 32.2 (191). 4, Cf. Num. 30, 16.) It seems from this that the man may call his wife back to himself, even if, of his own freedom, he has vowed chastity. And the words of Augustine are understood as applying to the case when the man has dissembled before full deliberation, which dissimulation indeed seems to be a kind of consent. If, however, he had expressly consented, he may not revoke the vow. This is why he speaks about the judgment of the Church, when the promise cannot be proved. Therefore, because of this danger, such secret vows are not approved.

“Nor eat the flesh of the Lamb.” (Sent. IV, 32.3 (192). 2, Jerome, De exodo, in vigilia Paschae.) On the impediment to the consumption of the Eucharist because of carnal pleasure in sleep, see above, Distinction 9.