Lecture 2 — Legal Justice

Since it was said that the lawless person is unjust and the law-abiding person just, obviously lawful acts are in some measure just acts. Likewise, what is determined by the positive law is lawful, and we say that such a determination is just. [900]

But laws aim to touch on everything that contributes to the benefit of all, or of the best, or of the rulers, on account of either virtues or something else. Therefore, for one such reason, we call those laws just that bring about and preserve happiness and the things that make for happiness in the civic community. [902]

A law commands deeds of bravery, such as that a soldier should not leave the battle line or throw away his arms. It commands things belonging to temperance, such as that no one should commit adultery, and that no one should be guilty of outrage. It commands things that pertain to meekness: no one should strike another; no one should contend with another. It is the same with other virtues and vices: the law ordering the former and forbidding the latter. In accord with this, a law rightly drafted will be excellent, but one insufficiently considered will be bad. [904]

Justice itself, then, is a perfect virtue, not in itself but in relation to another. For this reason, justice seems to be the most excellent among the virtues. Hence, we have the proverb that neither evening star nor morning star is so wonderful as justice. [906]

But, under justice, every virtue is included at the same time, and it is especially the perfect virtue because it is the exercise of perfect virtue. [907]

Legal justice is perfect because the person who has this virtue can exercise it in relation to another and not in relation to himself alone. Some people can apply virtue to their own affairs but not to affairs pertaining to others. Because of this, the saying of Bias seems to be commendable that authority tests a man, for the prince is already engaged in communication with others. Therefore, justice alone among the virtues seems to be another’s good, because it refers to another. It produces goods useful to another, namely, the prince or the common good. Consequently, the man who practices vice in regard to himself and his friends is most wicked. On the other hand, the man who practices virtue in regard to himself and toward others—a difficult thing to do—is most honorable. [908]

This virtue, therefore, is not a particular but a general virtue. Likewise, the opposite injustice is not a particular vice but a general one. [911]

How virtue and justice differ from one another is evident from what has been said, for they are the same in substance but different in concept. Virtue as related to another is justice; as this kind of habit, it is virtue without qualification. [912]

900. Since it was said that the lawless person. After the Philosopher has given the division of justice, he now considers legal justice.

First he treats the legally just itself, which is the object of legal justice.

Second, at justice itself, then (1129b25; [906]), he considers legal justice.

He discusses the first point in a twofold manner.

He first shows that the legally just is determined by law.

Second, at but laws aim (1129b14; [902]), he explains the nature of legal enactments.

He affirms first that, since it was said above [895–6, 899] that the lawless man is unjust and the law-abiding man just, it clearly follows that all lawful acts are just in some measure.

901. He says in some measure because every law is determined in relation to some state. Now, not every state possesses what is simply just, but some states have only what is partially just, as is evident in Politics 3. (Politics 3.9.1281a10; see Aquinas, In III pol., lec. 7, n. 413.) In a democratic state, where all the people govern, what is partially just is observed, but not what is simply just, such that, because all the citizens are equal in one respect (namely, in liberty), therefore they are considered equal in every respect. Consequently, acts that are prescribed by law in a democracy are not simply just, but only in some measure. But Aristotle says that those enactments are lawful that have been fixed and determined by positive law, which is within the competence of legislators, and that each enactment so decreed is said to be just in some way.

902. Next, at but laws aim (1129b14), he explains with what the decrees of law are concerned.

He considers this point from two aspects.

First, he shows for whose sake a law is enacted.

Second, at a law commands (1129b19; [904]), he shows on what matters laws are made.

He says first that laws touch on everything that can be of any possible utility for the community (as in the ideal states where the common good is kept in mind), or for the utility of the best (that is, certain elders of the state who govern it and are called nobles), or for the utility of the rulers (as happens in states ruled by kings and tyrants). In the framing of laws, attention is always given to what is useful to the affair of chief importance in the city.

903. Some may be considered as best or as ruling either because of virtue (as in an aristocratic state, where certain ones rule on account of virtue), or for the sake of something else (as in an oligarchy, where the few rule on account of riches or power). Since human utility of every kind is finally ordered to happiness, obviously the legal enactments that bring about happiness and the means to it (that is, the things that are ordered to happiness either principally, like the virtues, or instrumentally, like riches and other external goods of this kind) are called “just” in some fashion. This is by comparison with the civic community to which the framing of a law is directed.

904. At a law commands (1129b19), he explains on what matters laws are made, saying that a law commands what belongs to individual virtues. It commands deeds of bravery, such as that a soldier should not leave the battle line or take flight or throw away his arms. Likewise, it commands things pertaining to temperance, such as that no one should commit adultery and that no one should dishonor the person of a woman. Also, it commands the things belonging to meekness: no one should strike another in anger, and no one should contend with another by insults. It is the same with other virtues whose acts the law commands and with other vices whose acts the law forbids.

905. If the law is rightly drafted according to this, it will be declared an excellent law. Otherwise it is called “aposchediasmenos” (from “a,” meaning “without,” “poschedias,” meaning “knowledge,” and “menos,” meaning “investigation”), as if the law was drafted without a thorough knowledge. Or the expression may come from “schedos,” signifying a decree published without being thoroughly scanned, from which we have “schediazo,” which means “I am doing something off-hand.” Hence, a law is said to be “aposchediasmenos” that lacks proper forethought.

906. Then, at justice itself, then (1129b25), he determines how legal justice is constituted.

About this, he does two things.

First, he shows the nature of legal justice;

second, at but under justice (1129b29; [907]), in what way it is related to the virtues.

He says first that justice itself is a certain perfect virtue not in terms of itself, but in relation to another. Since it is better to be perfect not only in oneself but also in relation to another, therefore it is often said that this justice is the most excellent among all virtues. This is the origin of the proverb that neither Hesperus nor Lucifer, the brightest of the morning and evening stars, shine with such brilliance as justice.

907. Next, at but under justice (1129b29), he shows from our discussion thus far how legal justice is related to the virtues.

He treats this point under three headings.

First, he sets forth his intention.

Second, at legal justice is perfect (1129b31; [908]), he explains his proposition.

Third, at how virtue and justice (1130a10; [912]), he settles a point that could be called into question by the present discussion.

He states first that justice itself comprehends every virtue at the same time, and is even the perfect virtue in a special way. The reason is that legal justice consists in the exercise of virtue having do with another and is in agreement with every virtue prescribed by the law.

908. At legal justice is perfect (1129b31), he explains what was set forth:

first, that legal justice is an especially perfect virtue;

second, at this virtue, therefore (1130a8; [911]), that it includes every virtue.

He says first that legal justice is a perfect virtue because a man who has this virtue can employ it in relation to another and not to himself only—something not characteristic of all virtuous people. Many can practice virtue in things pertaining to themselves but not in the things pertaining to others. To make clear the previous statements, he introduces two common sayings or proverbs.

909. Bias, one of the seven wise men, said that authority tests a man as to whether he is perfect or deficient. The man who rules is already engaged in communication with another because it is his business to arrange the things that are ordered to the common good. So, from this, we see that the perfection of virtue is indicated by the fact that one person is in touch with another. He proposes another saying to show that legal justice refers to another. For this reason, legal justice alone seems to be the good of another (that is, relates to our neighbor), inasmuch as it aims to perform actions useful to another, namely, to the community or the ruler of the community. But some virtues aim to achieve an individual’s good—for instance, temperance strives to quiet the disgraceful desires of the soul. The same is true of the other virtues.

910. He draws the conclusion that, as that man is most wicked who practices vice not only in regard to himself but also in regard to his friends, so also that man is most honorable who practices virtue in relation not only to himself but also to others. This is especially difficult. So, then, it is clear that the law-abiding just man is most virtuous and that legal justice is the most perfect of virtues.

911. Then, at this virtue, therefore (1130a8), he infers that legal justice embraces every virtue, for it pertains to legal justice to exercise virtue in regard to another. But a person can practice every virtue in his relation with another. Hence, legal justice is obviously not a particular virtue, but has a connection with virtue in general. Likewise, the opposite vice is not a particular vice, but a general vice, since in a similar way man can exercise every vice in his relations with his neighbor.

912. Next, at how justice and virtue (1130a10), he clarifies something that may be doubtful from the premises. He says that, from what has been said, it is clear the way in which virtue and legal justice differ, since they are the same in substance but different in concept. However, virtue in its relation to another is called justice, but precisely as it is a habit operative of such good, it is a virtue simply. This must be understood in regard to the act itself of justice and virtue, for an act identical in subject but diverse in concept is produced by legal justice and by virtue simply so called—for instance, not to commit adultery. But where a special formal aspect of an object exists even in general matter, there a special habit must be found. For this reason, it follows that legal justice is a definite virtue taking its species from the fact that it tends to the common good.