Lecture 1 — Justice

We must give our attention to justice and injustice so as to determine what is the nature of the actions done, [885]

what is the mean of justice and the just, [886]

and between what extremes the just action is a mean. [886]

It is our intention to proceed according to the same method we used with the virtues just studied. [887]

We see everyone wants to call justice that habit by which men are disposed to just works, and by which they actually perform and will just deeds. We must speak in a similar way about injustice, namely, that it is a habit by which men are disposed to unjust deeds and by which they do and will unjust actions. For that reason, we must presuppose what is said here in outline. [888]

Likewise, the same is not true in regard to sciences and potencies as in regard to habits, for contraries belong to the same potency and the same science, but with a habit contrary things are not referred to it. We see, for example, that things contrary to health do not proceed from health, but only things in keeping with it. Thus, we say that a man walks in a healthy way when he walks like a healthy man. [890]

Oftentimes, then, one contrary habit is known by another, and oftentimes by its subject. If a healthy condition is known, then an unhealthy condition also becomes known. But, from the things that make a man healthy, a healthy condition is known, and the things themselves from the condition. If firmness of flesh is a sign of good condition, then flabbiness is necessarily a sign of bad condition. Likewise, what makes a man healthy necessarily makes his flesh firm. [892]

It follows in most instances that, if one of opposites is spoken of in various ways, then the other also can be, as is the case with what is just and unjust. [893]

Justice and injustice can be spoken of in various ways, but the different meanings lending themselves to equivocation are not immediately apparent and are not so evident as in the things that are widely separated. In these there is a great difference in concept, for instance, the name “key” is used equivocally both for the clavicle in the shoulder of animals and for the instrument that locks doors. [894]

The unjust man should be understood in as many ways as he is designated. He is spoken of as law-breaking, as covetous, and as unfair. It is clear, then, that the just man will be taken as law-abiding and fair. Hence, what is just is according to law and fair, but what is unjust is contrary to law and unfair. [895]

Since the unjust man is covetous, he will be concerned not about all goods, but about whatever pertains to fortune and misfortune. Goods of this kind are always good in themselves, but not always for a particular man. They are objects of his prayers and pursuits. This ought not to be so, but a man should pray that the things that are good in themselves become good for him, and should choose such as are good for him. [897]

But the unjust man does not always choose too much—rather, sometimes too little—of the things burdensome in themselves. However, because a lesser evil apparently is in some way a good, and covetousness is concerned with a good, therefore it seems that this type of man is covetous. But he is unfair—a term that contains both and is common. [898]

Besides, the unjust man is law-breaking, but this lawlessness or inequality contains all injustice and is common in respect of all kinds of injustice. [899]

885. We must give our attention to justice. After the Philosopher has finished the consideration of the moral virtues dealing with the passions, he now begins to consider the virtue of justice dealing with actions.

He divides the inquiry into two parts:

in the first, he examines justice in the proper sense;

in the second, at whether or not it is possible (1138a4; [1091]), in the metaphorical sense.

He discusses the first point under two headings.

First, he investigates the virtue of justice;

second, at next we will treat equity (1137a31; [1078]), a certain virtue—namely, equity—that gives direction to ordinary justice.

He handles the initial point in a twofold manner.

First, he indicates what he intends to treat;

second, at we see everyone wants to call justice (1129a6; [888]), he carries out his intention.

He considers the first under two aspects.

First, he shows what subject he intends to consider, namely, justice and injustice.

Concerning justice, he proposes for consideration three differences existing between justice and the previously mentioned virtues.

886. The first difference is touched upon when he says that we must aim at such operations as are done by justice and injustice. The virtues and vices discussed before [649–884] are concerned with the passions, for there, we consider in what way a man may be internally influenced by reason of the passions; but we do not consider what is externally done except as something secondary, inasmuch as external operations originate from internal passions. However, in treating justice and injustice, we direct our principal attention to what a man does externally; how he is influenced internally we consider only as a by-product, namely, according as he is helped or hindered in the operation.

The second difference is touched upon when he says what is the mean of justice and the just action (1129a4), that is, the object of justice. In the virtues previously treated, we took the mean of reason and not of the thing. But in justice, the mean of the thing is used, as will be determined later [932–77].

The third difference is touched upon when he says and between what extremes the just action is the mean (1129a5). Each of the aforementioned virtues is a mean between two vices, but justice is not a mean between two vices, as will be clear afterwards [993–4].

887. Second, at it is our intention (1129a5), he shows by what method we are to examine the differences just mentioned. He says that we intend to investigate justice in the same way as we investigated the virtues just discussed, that is, according to type and so on.

888. Next, at we see that everyone (1129a6), he begins the investigation of justice.

First, he distinguishes particular from legal justice.

Second, at one species of particular, (1130b30 (lec. 4).) he considers particular justice, his principal concern.

He discusses the first point in a threefold manner.

First, he divides justice into legal and particular.

Second, at since it was said that (1129b11; [900]), he shows what the nature of legal justice is.

Third, at we are now investigating (1130a14; [913]), he explains that, besides legal justice, there is a particular justice.

He treats the initial point in a twofold manner.

First, he shows what the names “justice” and “injustice” signify;

second, at it follows in most instances (1129a23; [893]), he distinguishes the two concepts.

He develops the first under three headings.

First, he explains justice and injustice.

Second, at likewise, the same (1129a11; [890]), he shows that the explanation is reasonable.

Third, at oftentimes then (1129a17; [892]), he infers a corollary from the premises.

He says in the beginning that all seem to contend that justice is the sort of habit that brings about three effects in man.

The first is an inclination to a work of justice in accord with which a man is said to be disposed to just works.

The second is a just action.

The third is that a man wants to perform just operations.

We must say the same about injustice: it is a habit by which men are disposed to unjust deeds and by which they do and will unjust actions. For that reason, we must presuppose these things about justice as apparently typical in such matters.

889. Likewise, we must take into consideration that he properly explained justice after the manner of a will, which does not have passions but nevertheless is the principle of external actions. Consequently, the will is a proper subject of justice, which is not concerned with the passions.

890. At likewise, the same (1129a11), he shows that the preceding explanations are reasonable in this respect, namely, that justice is explained by the fact that its purpose is to will and perform just actions, and injustice to will and perform unjust actions. What is true of sciences and potencies is not true of habits, for contraries belong to the same potency (for example, white and black to sight) and to the same science (for instance, health and sickness to medicine). But in regard to habits, contrary things are not referred to them.

891. He takes an example from habits of the body. Not the things that are contrary to health proceed from health, but only those in keeping with health. In this way, we say that a man walks with a vigorous step who is vigorous in health. Hence, science itself, as it is a kind of knowledge, refers to contraries, inasmuch as one of two contraries is the reason for knowing the other; nevertheless, inasmuch as science is a certain habit, it is attributed to one act only (which is knowing the truth), and not to the contrary error. So, then, it was properly said that we do just actions by justice; by injustice, unjust actions.

892. Then, at oftentimes, then (1129a17), he infers a corollary from the premises. Since contrary habits belong to contraries and one act belongs to one object in a fixed manner, it follows that frequently one contrary habit is known by another, and oftentimes by its object, which is, as it were, matter subject to the operation of the habit. He illustrates this by an example. If “euechia,” or a healthy condition, is known, “cathechia,” or an unhealthy condition, is also known. In this way, a habit is known by its contrary. Likewise, it is known from its object, for from the things that make a man healthy, a healthy condition becomes known. This is further illustrated in a more particular way. If the fact that a man has very firm flesh is a characteristic of a healthy condition, then the fact that he has flabby flesh—loosely compressed, as it were, by reason of disordered humors—is necessarily characteristic of an unhealthy condition. Again, that which makes a man healthy is necessarily a condition making him have firm flesh.

893. Next, at it follows in most instances (1129a23), he distinguishes justice and injustice.

First, he gives the division;

second, at since the unjust man (1129b1; [897]), the parts of the division.

He treats the first point in three ways.

First, he shows that various meanings of injustice indicate various meanings of justice. The reason is that it follows in most instances that, if one of opposites may be spoken of in diverse ways, then the other can be. This is the case, too, with what is just and unjust.

894. Second, at justice and injustice (1129a26), he explains the nature of their various meanings. He says that both justice and injustice can be spoken of in diverse ways, but their many meanings lie concealed because the things making for equivocation are close to one another in their agreement among themselves. But, in widely separated things, equivocation is evident if the same name be given them, because their great difference in concept—that is, in the essential element of the proper species—is immediately apparent. In this way, the name “key” is used equivocally of an instrument that locks doors and of the clavicle, (From clavicula, meaning “little key.”) which covers the artery in the shoulder of animals.

895. Third, at the unjust man (1129a31), he explains in how many ways the previously mentioned habits may be signified.

First, we must consider the unjust man in as many ways as he is designated.

He is spoken of in three ways:

in one way, as the law-breaking man, that is, one who acts contrary to the law;

in another way, as the covetous man, who wants too much prosperity;

in the last way, as the unfair man, who determines to have too few burdens.

896. It is obvious, then, that the just man is taken in two ways:

in one way, as a law-abiding person, that is, as one who observes the law;

in the other way, as the fair person who is willing to have the smiles and frowns of fortune in equal measure.

The equal is opposed to both, namely, to what is excessive and to what is deficient. From this he draws a further conclusion: what is just is said to be according to the law and fair; and what is unjust, contrary to the law and unfair, inasmuch as objects are made known by habits, as was said before [892].

897. At since the unjust man (1129b1), he makes clear the parts of the division just given.

First, he shows in what way the covetous man is said to be unjust. He affirms that, since the covetous person who wants to have too much is unjust, it follows that he will be concerned about an abundance of goods that men desire. However, he will not be solicitous about all goods, but only those pertaining to fortune and adversity. Goods of this kind are beneficial if we do not make qualification; that is, they are good considered independently and in themselves. But they are not always beneficial for an individual because they are not always proportionate to him, nor always expedient for him. However, men seek these goods from God and pray for and desire them as if such things were always beneficial. By reason of this, they become covetous and unjust. It should not be this way, but a man ought to pray that those things that are in themselves good be made good for him, so that each may choose what is good for him, that is, the proper exercise of virtue.

898. Second, at but the unjust man (1129b6), he shows how the unjust person is said to be unfair, stating that a man is not always called unjust because he chooses too much, but also because he chooses too little of the things that simply and considered in themselves are burdensome—like labors, lack of necessities, and other such things. However, since lesser evil apparently is in some way a good precisely as it is eligible—covetousness regards a good as was just said [897]—it seems for this reason that a person who desires too little of what is arduous is in some way covetous. But it is nearer the truth to say that he is unfair—a term that contains both and is common to excess and defect.

899. Third, at besides, the unjust (1129b10), he explains how the unjust man is said to be law-breaking, affirming that he who is unlawful is also called unjust. A person is designated a lawbreaker by reason of unlawfulness, which is also an inequality inasmuch as a man is not equal to the norm of the law. This unlawfulness contains, in general, all injustice and something common in respect of every kind of injustice, as will be made clear later [911, 919, 922].