Lecture 4 — Distributive and Commutative Justice

One species of particular justice and of the just thing corresponding to it consists in the distribution of honor, money, and other common goods that are to be apportioned to people sharing in social community, for in these matters one man as compared with another may have an equal or unequal share. [927]

Another species gives directions for use in private transactions. [928]

There are two parts of this species, as some types of transaction are voluntary and others involuntary. Examples of the voluntary are selling, buying, bail, loan, deposit, and rent. They are called voluntary because the origin of these exchanges is voluntary. [929]

Some kinds of involuntary transaction are hidden, like theft, adultery, poisoning, procuring, enticement of a slave, assassination, and false testimony. Others are one done with manifest violence, such as beating, imprisonment, murder, robbery, despoiling parents of children, reproach, and outrage. [930]

Since the unjust person is unfair and the unjust thing is unequal, it is clear that there is a mean corresponding to what is unjust. This is the equal, for in operations of this kind, where there is more or less, there is also an equal. Therefore, if the unjust thing is the unequal and the just thing the equal—and this is evident in all situations without need of proof—then the just thing will be the mean, since the equal is the mean. [932]

However, the equal implies at least two things. Therefore, since the just thing is both a mean and an equal, it necessarily is related to another and pertains to certain matters of equality. As a mean, it will be between two things that are more and less. As it is an equal, it will be between two things. As it is a just thing, it will concern matters in relation to other persons, for justice regards another. Therefore, the just necessarily involves at least four objects: two persons by whom justice is observed and two things about which justice is done. There will be the same equality between persons and between things in such a way that, as things are related to one another, so are persons. If they are not equal, they will not have equal shares, and from this source, quarrels and complaints will arise when either persons who are equal do not receive equal shares in distribution or persons who are not equal do receive equal shares. [934]

Moreover, this is clear from the fact that bestowal should be made according to merit, for the just thing in distribution has to be done according to a certain merit. But all do not agree that merit consists in the same thing. People of a democracy place it in a condition of freedom, people of an oligarchy in one’s riches or nobility of birth, and people of an aristocracy in a state of virtue. [936]

927. One species of particular justice. After the Philosopher has differentiated particular justice from legal justice, he now begins to investigate particular justice without treating legal justice.

He divides the investigation into two parts.

In the first part, he considers particular justice in a general way by comparison with its proper object;

in the second part, at since someone (1134a17; [1000]), he considers it in its application to the subject.

In regard to the first part, he does two things.

First, he makes a division of particular justice.

Second, at since the unjust person (1131a10; [932]), he explains how a mean may be taken in this virtue.

He discusses the initial point from three aspects.

First, he indicates a species of particular justice. He says that one species—and the same holds for the unjust thing corresponding to it—consists in the distribution of certain common goods (either honor or money or any other thing belonging to external goods or even to external evils, like labor, expenses, and so on) that are to be apportioned among people who share in social community. He proves that this should belong to particular justice because, in matters of this kind, equality and inequality—which belong to particular justice and injustice, as was stated before [922]—of one person to another are taken into consideration.

928. Second, at another species (1130b33), he gives a second kind of particular justice. He says that another species establishes a measure of justice in transactions, by which a thing is transferred from one person to another—in the first species, the transfer of a thing from the community to the individual was considered.

929. Third, at there are two parts (1131a1), he subdivides commutative justice according to the different kinds of transactions.

He makes a twofold division.

He says first that there are two parts of commutative justice because there are two kinds of transactions. Some are voluntary, others involuntary. The voluntary are called such because the principle of transaction is voluntary in both parties, as is evident in selling and buying, by which one man transfers the dominion over his own property to another as compensation for a price received; in barter, by which someone gives what is his to another for something of equal value; in bail, by which a person voluntarily appoints himself a debtor for another; in a loan, by which a man grants the use of his property to another without recompense but reserves ownership of the thing to himself; in a deposit, by which one commits something of his to the custody of another; and in rent, by which a person accepts the use of something belonging to another for a price.

930. Then, at some kinds of involuntary (1131a5), he subdivides the other division of transactions, saying that some involuntary transactions are secret, such as theft, by which one takes a thing belonging to another who is unwilling; moechia, or adultery, by which a man secretly approaches the wife of another for sexual intercourse; and poisoning, when a person poisons another with intent either to kill or to injure in some way. Also, they are especially called poisoners who, by some sorcery, bring about murder or harm. Paragogia is a derivation or a leading away, such as the secret diversion of a stream belonging to one person to the property of another; the enticement of a slave, when someone induces another’s slave to flee from his master; assassination, that slaying that happens from wounds inflicted by trickery; and false testimony, in which a person conceals the truth by lying. Other transactions are involuntary and done by manifest violence. Thus, a man may use violence either upon a person, by beating, fettering, or murdering, or upon things, by robbing another of his goods or by despoiling parents of their children through murder. Likewise, a man may use violence through infamy by using reproachful words, or through injury by inflicting outrage.

931. We must consider that the voluntary and involuntary in transactions make a difference in the species of justice. Voluntary transactions cause the subtraction of only a thing that must be repaid according to the equality of justice, but involuntary transactions cause a certain injury. Hence, the robber is forced not only to return the thing plundered, but to undergo punishment because of the affront inflicted. Since the involuntary is twofold, namely, arising from force and from ignorance, he divides involuntary transactions into those which are hidden, as it were, through ignorance, and those that are done openly through violence.

932. Next, at since the unjust person (1131a10), he shows how a mean is understood in these matters.

He discusses this point from two aspects.

First, he explains how the just thing is a mean;

second, at from these discussions (1133b30; [992]), how justice is a mean.

He treats the first point in a twofold manner.

First, he shows in what way the just thing consisting in a mean according to either justice may be determined.

Second, at some philosophers seem to think (1132b21; [965]), he rejects an error.

He further discusses the first point in two stages.

First, he explains how the just thing may be taken as a mean according to distributive justice;

second, at there remains another (1131b25; [947]), according to commutative justice.

He considers the first point in two ways.

First, he proves that the mean of distributive justice should be taken according to a certain relationship of proportions.

Second, at therefore the just thing (1131a29; [938]), he shows what the nature of that relationship of proportions is.

On the initial point, he does two things.

First, he proves the proposition from the very concept of justice;

second, at moreover, this is clear (1131a24; [936]), from the concept of merit.

He treats the first point under two headings.

First, he shows from the very notion of justice that the just thing is a certain mean.

Second, at however, the equal (1131a15; [934]), he explains that the mean is according to a certain relationship of proportions.

933. He says first that, as was said previously [898, 921], the unjust man is one who desires an inequality of good and evil, and the unjust thing is that which consists in an inequality and concerns both too much and too little. But, wherever there is more and less, there the equal must be found, for the equal is the mean between the greater and the less. Hence, wherever we find equality, there we find a mean. It is clear, then, that the unjust thing is a kind of unequal thing. That the just thing is a kind of equal thing is obvious to everyone without any proof. Therefore, since the equal is a mean between more and less, as has been shown [310, 896, 898], it follows that the just thing is a kind of mean.

934. At however, the equal (1131a15), he explains that the just thing is a mean according to a certain relationship of proportions. To prove this, he takes for granted that the equal consists in at least two things between which an equality is considered. Therefore, since the just thing is both a mean and an equal, inasmuch as it is just, it is necessarily a relation to something, that is, with respect to another, as is evident from what has been indicated [922]. But, inasmuch as it is an equal, it pertains to certain matters in which equality between two persons is taken into account. Thus, it is evident that, if we consider the just thing precisely as a mean, it will then be a mean between two things that are more and less. But precisely as the just thing is an equal, it must be between two things (as a just thing, of course, it must concern some matters in relation to other persons, because justice regards another person). However, insofar as justice is a mean, an extrinsic thing, it considers more or less; but as something intrinsic, it considers two things and two persons in which justice is established. So it is clear that what is just necessarily consists in at least four objects: two persons by whom justice is observed and two things about which justice is done.

935. In the concept of justice, there must be the same equality between persons who practice justice and between things about which justice is done, such that, as the things are related to one another, so are the persons. Otherwise, they will not have shares proportional to themselves. But, by reason of this, quarrels and complaints arise, as if justice had been neglected because persons who are equal either do not receive equal shares—for example, if laborers are paid equal wages for doing an unequal amount of work—or are paid unequal wages for doing an equal amount of work. So, then, it is evident that the mean of distributive justice is taken according to a certain relationship of proportions.

936. Then, at moreover, this is (1131a24), he shows that it is obvious also by reason of merit that the just thing consists in a certain proportionality. In this way, a thing is said to be just in distributions inasmuch as allotment is made according to merit, as each is worthy to receive. A certain relationship of proportions is designated by this—that, as one person is deserving of one thing, so another is deserving of another thing.

937. However, all do not judge merit in distribution in agreement with the same norm. In a democratic state, where everyone governs, they judge merit according to a condition of freedom. Because the common people are the equal of others in freedom, they therefore think it proper that equal distribution be made to them. In an oligarchy, where some few rule, they measure merit according to a man’s riches or according to nobility of birth, such that men who are more eminent by birth or riches should have more of the common goods. In an aristocracy, where certain men govern because of their virtue, they measure merit according to a state of virtue, such that a man should have more who practices virtue more perfectly. Thus, it is clear that the mean of distributive justice is understood according to a relationship of proportions.