Lecture 15 — Injustice in Distributions

There are still two questions we wish to discuss: Who does an injustice, he who distributes more than one’s share or he who receives it? And does a person do injustice to himself? [1065]

If the first proposal is true, namely, he who distributes commits injustice, but not he who receives, then, when a person knowingly and willingly gives more to another than to himself, he does injustice to himself, as moderate men seem to do, for the person who keeps within measure takes what is of less value for himself. [1066]

But it does not seem entirely true, for in this case, he abounds in another good, namely, glory or moral good. [1067]

Again, we can answer in accord with the definition of doing injustice, for the distributor suffers nothing contrary to his will. Therefore, he does not suffer injustice by reason of this, but only damage. [1068]

However, it is obvious that he who distributes too much does an injustice, but not always he who receives it. [1069]

Not the man in whom the unjust thing exists does injustice, but the man who wills to do it. He is the one who is the principle of action. This is in the distributor, not in the recipient. [1070]

Action is said to occur in various ways: in one way, as inanimate things or the hand or servant of the owner are said to take life. These do not act unjustly but do unjust things. [1071]

Moreover, he who has formed a judgment through ignorance of what is legally just does not do an injustice, nor is his judgment unjust, but it resembles injustice, for legal justice differs from primary justice. But, if a person knowingly forms an unjust judgment, he acts covetously to obtain favor or avoid punishment. Hence—just as if he shares in the injustice—the man who judges unjustly for that purpose has more than his due; for in such cases, the man who awards a field does not receive a field, but silver. [1072]

Men are of the opinion that they are unjust when they do what is unjust, and for this reason, they think it easy to become unjust. But this is not true. It is easy and within their power to have carnal intercourse with a neighbor’s wife, to strike another, and to hand over silver, but doing these things as a habit is not (immediately) in their power. [1074]

Similarly, some people think that no wisdom is needed to know what things are just and unjust, because it is not difficult to understand what the law says. However, these things are only incidentally just but become truly just when done and distributed in a particular way. Now, to know this way is a more difficult task than to know the things that are healthful, because there it is easy to know the virtue of honey, wine, and hellebore and to know the effect of cautery and surgery, but how they ought to be prescribed for health, for what patient, and when is as great an accomplishment as that of being a doctor. [1075]

For this very reason, it is thought also that the just man is not less able to do injustice, but rather can do any unjust thing: he can have carnal intercourse or strike a blow, and a brave man can throw away his shield, turn, and run away. However, perpetration of a cowardly action or of something unjust is doing these things only incidentally, but the doing is absolute for one having the permanent facility, just as healing and restoring to health do not consist in cutting or not cutting, in giving medicine or not giving it, but in prescribing these things as they should be. [1076]

Just acts are found among people who participate in things good in themselves but have both defect and excess of them. For some persons, there is no excess in regard to such goods (possibly so with the gods). For others, the hopelessly evil, no particle of these goods is useful, but every one of them is harmful. In still others, the goods become harmful at a determined point, and this is human. [1077]

1065. There are still two questions. After the Philosopher has solved one doubt, now he comes to another.

First, he proposes it;

second, he follows it up at if the first proposal (1136b17; [1066]).

He says first that, in the matter of justice and injustice, two questions still remain that he wishes to treat in preference to others.

The first of these is: which of the two persons does an injustice in regard to distribution—he who gives to someone without regard to worth, or he who accepts?

The second—whether a person can do injustice to himself—is a question he asked before [1059] and resolves later [1091–1108].

1066. Then, at if the first proposal (1136b17), he follows up the question previously asked.

First, he objects to the false part.

Second, at but it does not seem (1136b21; [1067]), he solves it.

Third, at however, it is (1136b25; [1069]), he determines the truth.

He says first that, if what was just said [1065] is true—namely, that the dishonest distributor does injustice and not he who receives too much—something inappropriate seems to follow. It can happen that a person knowingly and willingly gives more to another than to himself, and so it seems that he may do injustice to himself, a thing that is inappropriate. The reason is that moderate men apparently do this, as they retain things of less value for themselves. It is characteristic of the virtuous man that he belittles himself, that is, accepts things of less value for himself.

1067. Next, at but it does not seem (1136b21), he solves this by two reasons.

The first is that sometimes it is not entirely true that the distributor retains things of less value for himself. Although he keeps the less valuable external goods for himself, he nevertheless has an abundant share of another good—namely, glory—and of moral or honorable good.

1068. At again, we can answer (1136b23), he gives the second reason proceeding from the definition of doing justice given before [1061]. To this, an addition was made indicating that it is contrary to the will of him who suffers. But the distributor suffers nothing contrary to his will. Consequently, he does not suffer injustice, but only undergoes some damage.

1069. Then, at however, it is obvious (1136b25), he determines the truth. He says that obviously the man who distributes more than one’s share does an injustice, yet this is not always true of him who accepts too much, but only when he works to bring about this object.

1070. Second, at not the man in whom (1136b26), he proves the proposition by three reasons.

The first is that the man in whom the unjust thing exists is not said to do injustice, because, in this way, the one who is injured would do injustice; but he does injustice who wills to do it—he is the principle of action. This is the case of the person who distributes, but not so with the recipient. Therefore, the distributor does injustice and not the receiver.

1071. Aristotle gives the second reason at action is said (1136b29), affirming that a man is said to act in various ways.

In one way, he acts as a principal agent;

in another, he acts as instruments act.

In the latter way, it can be said that inanimate things like stones, swords, or arrows, cause death and that the hand or the servant of the one who commands brings about death. None of these, absolutely speaking, does injustice, although they are the means by which unjust actions are done. The reason is that doing injustice, since it is voluntary, is attributable to the agent in whom the principle of action lies, as has been pointed out [1063]). But it is clear that, in distribution, the distributor holds the place of the principal agent, while the recipient holds the place of an instrument, after the manner of one obeying. Hence, it remains that the distributor does the injustice.

1072. At moreover, he has formed (1136b32), he gives the third reason. He says that, if a person judges wrongly by reason of ignorance of legal justice, he does not do injustice, absolutely speaking, nor is the judgment by which his action is done unjust in itself; but it is unjust in a way, because the thing judged is unjust. Therefore, we spoke of legal justice because one kind of justice is legal, which can be unknown, and another is natural, which cannot be unknown, since it is impressed by nature on the human mind. But if someone knowing legal justice judges unjustly, then he acts greedily, that is, unjustly, either for the sake of acquiring the favor of another or to avoid a penalty.

1073. If a man wishes to share injustice in unfair portions, he who judges unjustly to curry someone’s favor has more good than belongs to him. So he acts greedily, although he may not have more of that good in which he injured another. The reason is that, in such affairs, a man who unjustly awarded a field to someone obviously for profit did not get the field, but money. And so a distributor is situated in distribution as a judge in exchanges. Therefore, as a judge wrongly judging with full knowledge does an injustice, so too does he who distributes unjustly.

1074. Then, at men are of the opinion (1137a4), he refutes some errors.

Regarding this he does two things.

First, he refutes some false opinions concerned with one doing justice or injustice.

Second, at just acts are found (1137a26; [1077]), he shows in whom just and unjust acts exist.

In regard to the first point, he refutes three false opinions.

The first of these concerns the facility in becoming unjust. He says that many people are of the opinion that they are ready to do even injustice immediately. Hence they think that it is easy to be habitually unjust. Certainly it is easy, and immediately in a man’s power, to do unjust things: to have sexual intercourse with his neighbor’s wife, to strike his neighbor, to take money from the hand of another, or to hand over money to have murder or some crime done. But that men should do actions of this kind in such a way that they act promptly and with pleasure is neither easily nor immediately in a man’s power, but they come to this point through persistent habit.

1075. Second, at similarly, some people (1137a9), he refutes a false opinion about the knowledge of just and unjust things. He says some people think great wisdom is not needed for a man to discern just and unjust acts because it is not difficult to understand the decrees of the law determining legally just acts. However, such people are self-deceived, because these acts simply considered are just only accidentally, inasmuch as it is an accident that such things are just. But they become genuinely just when, in some way, they are performed and distributed (that is, attributed) in some way to affairs and persons. But proper adaptation to affairs and people is more laborious and difficult than knowing remedies, in which the whole art of medicine consists. There is a greater diversity among the voluntary acts about which justice is concerned than among the humors about which health is concerned. Also, it is easy to know the virtue of honey, wine, and hellebore, and the effect of cautery and surgery, but to prescribe these things for the restoration of health in the right way, for the right person, and at the right time is as great an accomplishment as being a doctor, for one who has this knowledge is a doctor.

1076. Third, at for this very reason (1137a17), he refutes a false opinion concerning facility in doing justice and unjust things. He affirms that, on account of what has been said, people also are of the opinion that the just man can do injustice as readily as any one else, because, from the fact that he is just, he knows not less, but more, and can do any one of the things called unjust, like having sexual intercourse with another’s wife, striking another, or throwing away his shield in battle; and a man can attack anyone he pleases. But they deceive themselves, for the perpetration of cowardly actions and the doing of what is unjust is doing these things only incidentally inasmuch as it happens that the acts are unjust, but to do what is simply unjust is for someone to do these things in such a way that he is willing and prompt at it. So it is in medicine: healing and restoring to health do not consist in operating or not operating, in prescribing or not prescribing a drug, such as a laxative, but in a person prescribing them as he ought.

1077. Then, at just acts are found (1137a26), he shows to whom they are attributable. We say that just acts are attributable to the people among whom are found things simply and in themselves desirable, like riches and so on, although these persons (as is common among men) have excess and defect in this matter. For some, there is no excess in such things that are used most laudably, as becomes men perfect in virtue and perhaps the gods (according to the error of people who hold that gods use things of this nature). For others—namely, the very wicked and the incurably evil—no particle of these goods is useful, but everything is harmful. For still others, not everything is harmful but it becomes so at a certain fixed point. Hence it is evident that justice is a human good, since it regards the general condition of man.