Lecture 11 — The Unjust Man

Since someone doing an unjust act may not be unjust himself, we will investigate the nature of the unjust actions that show the doer—for example, a thief or an adulterer or a robber—already unjust according to the injustice proper to each case. Or does not this make any difference? If a man having sexual intercourse with a woman knows with whom he sins and acts not by choice but by passion, he does an unjust act but is not unjust. So neither is a man a thief although he steals, nor an adulterer although he commits adultery. The same is true in other cases. [1000]

We have previously discussed how reciprocation is related to what is just. [1002]

We must not forget that we seek what is just in the absolute sense and political justice. [1003]

The latter consists in a community of life for the purpose of having a self-sufficiency among free men equal according to proportionality or arithmetical equality. [1004]

Therefore, among those persons in whom this does not exist, we find not political justice, but a special kind of metaphorical justice. [1006]

For justice exists between those very persons whose relations are governed by law. But the law is enacted for those among whom injustice is found, because punishment is a judgment of what is just and what is unjust. Among these there is unjust action, but injustice does not exist in everyone who does an unjust action, which is to attribute to oneself too many of the things good in themselves and too few of the things onerous in themselves. [1007]

For this reason, we do not permit the rule of man, but of reason, for a man rules for himself and becomes a tyrant. But a prince is the guardian of justice and of equality. [1009]

Since a prince, if he is just, attributes nothing excessive to himself, it follows that he does not give himself more of what is simply good, except according to proper proportion, and on this account, he works for others. Therefore, it is said that justice is the good of another, as was previously pointed out. [1010]

Consequently, a reward should be allotted to him, namely, honor and glory. Rulers who are not satisfied with these are tyrants. [1011]

However, the justice of a master and of a father are not the same as those we have examined, but similar to them. [1012]

Toward one’s own things, injustice does not exist in an unqualified manner. But chattel and a son, until he is a certain age and acts in his own right, are a part of a man, as it were. Now no one chooses to injure himself. Therefore, there is no injustice done to oneself, and consequently no injustice simply speaking. [1013]

Nor is political justice observed here, which is according to the law and found in men naturally bound by the law. Such are the persons who have equality in regard to ruling and being ruled. [1014]

Hence, justice concerns rather a wife than children and chattels. In the first, there is domestic justice, and this is also different from political justice. [1015]

1000. After the Philosopher has treated justice and the unjust thing in themselves together with their opposites, now he treats them in comparison with their subject, showing how a man in doing an unjust action becomes unjust.

He handles this point under two headings.

First, he determines the truth.

Second, at someone may raise (1136a10; [1050]), he raises some doubts about matters previously settled.

He discusses the initial point from three aspects.

First, he asks a question.

Second, at we must not forget (1134a24; [1003]), he interposes some subjects necessary for a solution of the question.

Third, at since just and unjust (1135a15; [1035]), he answers the question.

He treats the first point in a twofold manner.

First, he presents the question.

Second, at we have previously (1134a23; [1002]), he shows that another question was settled previously.

He says first that a person who does an unjust action still may not be unjust. Therefore, we must inquire into the* *nature of the unjust actions; that is, the actions of unjust men must be of such a type that the man who does unjust deeds is already unjust in that particular species of injustice, such as theft or adultery or robbery. Or, passing over the cases just mentioned, can it be said that, for a man to be unjust, it makes no difference in what actions he may act unjustly?

1001. For this reason, we ask with what kind of injustice it occurs, because the doing of an unjust action takes place in many ways. A man may have sexual intercourse with a woman, the wife of another, and not be ignorant who the person is (ignorance could cause an involuntary act), but know with whom he is having intercourse, and still not perform the act by deliberate choice, but by passion. Such a man does an unjust act although he does not seem to be unjust, since he does not act by deliberate choice. So also we can say in a particular case that a man is not a thief even though he has stolen, since he did not commit theft by deliberate choice. In a similar way, a man is not an adulterer even though he has committed adultery. The same idea is found in other matters.

1002. Then, at we have previously (1134a23), he shows that a particular doubt has already been solved, meaning in what way reciprocation is related to justice—a point we discussed previously [971–72].

1003. Next, at we must not forget (1134a24), he interposes some subjects that are necessary for the solution of the proposed question:

first, what justice is in the absolute sense;

second, at there is a difference (1135a8; [1032]), what unjust action is.

He handles the initial point in a twofold fashion.

First, he states his intention.

Second, at the latter consists (1134a26; [1004]), he carries out his intention.

He says first that, for a clear understanding of the question (in which we seek by what actions a man who does a just or an unjust act is said to be just or unjust), we must not forget the fact that the justice sought is justice in the absolute sense, which is political justice.

1004. Then, at the latter consists (1134a26), he carries out his intention.

First, he shows what political justice is.

Second, at one kind of political justice (1134b18; [1016]), he divides it.

He treats the initial point under two aspects.

First, he proposes what he intends, which is what political justice is.

Second, at for justice exists (1134a30; [1007]), he explains his intention.

He discusses the first point under two headings.

First, he shows what political justice is.

Second, at therefore, among those persons (1134a28; [1006]), he concludes that there are other kinds of justice differing from this.

He says first that political justice consists in a community of life that is ordered to a self-sufficiency of the things pertaining to human living. And the state-community should be such that everything sufficient for the needs of human life is found in it. This justice is found in free men, not slaves, because masters exercise toward slaves not political justice, but the justice of dominion, on which more will be said presently [1006–12]. However, political justice is encountered with persons who are equal, that is, one of whom is not subject to the other in the natural or political order, as a son to a father, between whom there is no question of political justice, but of paternal right.

1005. This political justice is either according to proportionality—that is, proportional equality pertaining to distributive justice—or numerical equality, the equality of numerical quantity pertaining to commutative justice.

1006. Next, at therefore, among those persons (1134a28), he concludes that there are other kinds of justice differing from that just mentioned. He states that, since political justice exists among the free and equal, it is not political justice—unqualified justice—that is found in people who are not free and equal, but a peculiar justice, such as that of a master or father, which is a qualified justice inasmuch as it has some likeness to political justice.

1007. At for justice exists (1134a30), he clarifies his statement:

first, in regard to political justice, which is unqualified justice;

second, in regard to the justice of a master or a father, which is qualified justice, at however, the justice of a master (1134b8; [1012]).

About the first he does two things.

First, he clarifies his statement that political justice is in free and equal persons.

Second, at for this reason, we do not (1134a35; [1009]), he draws some corollaries from the premises.

He says first that—as has been pointed out [1004]—political justice is in the free and equal because, being determined by law, it necessarily is found in those for whom the law is enacted. But law is enacted principally not for slaves, who are restrained by masters, nor for children who are restrained by fathers, but for the free and equal. That political justice exists in men of this kind, for whom law is enacted, is obvious from this, that justice and injustice exist in them. Now, law extends to persons in whom there can be injustice. This is clear from the fact that punishment, which is fixed by law, is nothing other than a judgment about what is just and unjust.

1008. From this statement—the law exists for those between whom justice exists—it follows that it is for those between whom there is unjust action and for those between whom there is just action. The reason is that, in whomsoever there is injustice, in these the performance of an unjust act is found, but not the reverse. It was pointed out in book 2 [252–53] that the doing of a virtuous action may take place without virtue, and likewise the doing of vicious actions without the habit of vice. An unjust act arises from the fact that a person should attribute to himself too many of those things that are absolutely and of themselves good, like riches, and too few of those things that are simply and of themselves evil, as the opposite of these.

1009. Next, at for this reason we do not permit (1134a35), he draws three corollaries from the premises.

First, he says that, because injustice consists in this, that a man attributes to himself too many of the benefits and too few of the burdens, it follows that, in good government of the multitude, we do not permit that men should rule—that is, according to whim and human passion—but that the law, which is a dictate of reason, should rule man, or that the man who acts according to reason should rule. The explanation is that, if a prince follows human passions, he will do this for himself; he will take more of the good things and less of the burdensome and so become a tyrant, although this is contrary to the concept of a prince. A prince was given the office to observe justice, and consequently equality, which he passes over when he usurps for himself too many beneficial and too few onerous things.

1010. He gives the second corollary at since a prince (1134b2). He affirms that, since a just prince attributes no more of the good things to himself than to others (unless perhaps according to a proper ratio of distributive justice), it follows that he does not labor for the advantage of himself, but of others. Because of this, it was said before [909] that legal justice, by which the prince rules the multitude of the people, is the good of another.

1011. He presents the third corollary at consequently, a reward (1134b6). It is clear that everyone should reward the man who labors for him. Therefore, since the prince labors for the multitude, a reward should be given by the multitude, namely, honor and glory, which are the greatest goods that can be offered by men. But if there are some princes who are not satisfied with these for a reward but seek wealth, they are unjust and tyrannical. Over and above this reward proffered by man, good princes look for a reward from God.

1012. Then, at however, the justice of a master (1134b8), he explains what was indicated previously about the fact that this is not justice in the absolute sense but by similitude:

first, in regard to the justice of a master and that of a father;

second, at hence justice concerns (1134b15; [1015]), in regard to the justice that belongs to a husband in relation to a wife.

On the prior point he does three things.

First, he proposes what he intends, saying that the justice of a master or lord over a slave and the paternal justice of a father over a son are not the same as political justice, but they have some likeness to it according as it has a relation to another in a way.

1013. Second, at toward one’s own things (1134b9), he explains what was pointed out regarding this, that the justice of a master or of a father is not justice without qualification. It is evident that injustice cannot exist in an unqualified way for a man in regard to the things belonging to him, and neither can justice, because both have a relation to another. But the slave belongs to the master as chattel, and a son is—so to speak—a part of the father until he is a certain age or mature and separated from the father by emancipation. That there is no injustice toward oneself is clear from the fact that no one chooses to injure himself. Hence, it is obvious that, absolutely speaking, there is no justice or injustice toward a son or a slave.

1014. Third, at nor is political justice (1134b13), he explains that, even if the justice of a master and of a father would be justice without qualification, it would not be political justice, because political justice is according to the law and in those for whom the law is designed by its nature. Such are those persons who have equality in regard to ruling and being ruled, but of these, one is subject to another, such as a slave to a master and a son to a father. Hence, political justice does not exist in these matters.

1015. Then, at hence, justice concerns (1134b15), he treats justice pertaining to a wife. He says that, because a wife is less subject to a husband than a slave to a master or a son to a father, the relation of a husband to a wife has more of the nature of justice than the relation of a father to his children or of a master to his chattels or slaves. The justice that belongs to a husband in regard to a wife is domestic, because the husband is the head of the home, as the prince of the state. However, domestic justice is different from political, as the home is different from the state.