Lecture 17 — Injustice to Oneself

Whether or not it is possible to do injustice to oneself is clear from what has been discussed. [1091]

There are certain just acts arising from every virtue that are ordained by law. Hence, for example, the law never commands a man to kill himself. But what it does not command it forbids. [1092]

Again, however, when someone inflicts damage contrary to the law (it being not against one resisting injury from another), he voluntarily does injustice. By “voluntary” is meant that the agent knows both the nature of what he does and the circumstances. But the man who voluntarily kills himself in anger does an act contrary to a just law by willing what the law does not permit. Therefore he does an injustice. [1093]

But to whom? Does he not injure the state rather than himself? [1094]

He voluntarily suffers what is unjust, but no one voluntarily suffers injustice. [1095]

For this reason the state imposes punishment and a certain disgrace on the person who commits suicide as on one who does an injustice to the state. [1096]

Besides, inasmuch as a man is called unjust not as being entirely evil but only as performing a particular injustice, he does not do injustice to himself. This is different from the other kind of injustice, because a person unjust in a limited way—like the coward is evil—does not possess total perversity. Hence he does not do injustice to himself according to this injustice. [1097]

Indeed, something will be given to and taken from one and the same person at the same time. This is impossible, for it is necessary that justice and injustice be found in different persons. [1098]

Again, doing injustice is voluntary and with choice and happens previous to suffering injustice. A man who first suffers injustice and resists it does not seem to do an injustice. But the person receiving injustice from himself suffers and does the same injustice at the same time. [1099]

Moreover, he will be voluntarily suffering injustice. [1100]

Besides, no one does injustice to himself in regard to particular injustice. No one, for example, commits adultery with his own wife, breaks into his own home, or steals his own goods. [1101]

This question of doing injustice to oneself is completely solved according to the definition that suffering injustice is contrary to the will. [1102]

Obviously both are evil—that is, suffering injustice and doing injustice—for the former is to have less than the mean and the latter to have more (this corresponds to what produces health in medicine and good condition in physical training). [1103]

However, to do injustice is worse, because it is blameworthy and wicked either completely and absolutely, or for the most part (not every voluntary injury takes place with injustice). But a man suffers injustice without being guilty of wickedness or injustice. Therefore, in itself, suffering injustice is a lesser evil, although nothing hinders it from being by chance a greater evil. But art does not care about what is by chance; for example, medicine considers pleurisy a worse ailment than an injured foot, even if it should happen that the latter may be worse. An example of this would be the case when the one so injured falls and so is captured and put to death by enemies. [1104–5]

By metaphor and likeness, there is justice not of a man toward himself, but among the parts of man toward one another. However, not every kind of justice is found here, but the justice of master or administrator. According to these concepts, one part of the soul has been divided as against the irrational part (irascible and concupiscible). Looking at these, some people think that injustice to oneself is present because, in them, it is possible to suffer something contrary to one’s own desire. Here a kind of injustice is found as between master and slave. We have, then, finished the treatise on justice and the other moral virtues according to the preceding plan. [1106]

1091. Whether or not it is possible to do injustice. After the Philosopher has finished the treatise on justice in the proper sense, he now intends to treat justice in the metaphorical sense.

Because justice of this kind exists in things that relate to oneself, therefore, he first shows that no one, properly speaking, can do himself an injustice.

Second, at by metaphor (1138b5; [1106]), he shows how this takes place in a metaphorical sense.

He develops this point in a twofold manner.

First, he shows that no one can do himself an injustice or suffer an injustice from himself.

Second, at obviously both are evil (1138a28; [1103]), he shows whether it is worse to do an injustice or suffer an injustice.

He considers the first under three aspects.

First, he suggests that a question of this kind can be settled from what has been said before.

Second, at there are certain just acts (1138a5; [1092]), he proposes certain grounds on which it seems that a person can do himself an injustice.

Third, at but to whom (1138a11; [1094]), he determines the truth.

He says first that, from the premises, it can be made clear whether a man may do an injustice to himself. He raised this question before [1059–64]. But here he follows it up because of the connection it has with an understanding of justice taken in a metaphorical sense.

1092. Then, at there are certain just acts (1138a5), he gives two reasons from which it seems that someone can do himself an injustice.

The first is this. Obviously, from what has been said before, the things that are just according to any virtue are ordered by law. Hence what is not ordered at all by law does not seem to be just in terms of any virtue, and hence is unjust. In no case does the law command a man to take his own life. But those acts that the law does not command as just, it forbids as unjust. This is not to be understood as if no mean exists between the command and the prohibition of the law, since there are many acts that are neither commanded nor forbidden by the law but are left to man’s will, such as buying or not buying a particular thing. But this is to be understood in the sense that it is only those things that are forbidden as unjust in themselves that the law in no case commands. So it seems that to take one’s own life is of itself unjust, since the law never commands it.

1093. At again, however (1138a7), he gives the second reason, saying that one who injures another contrary to the precept of the law (as when the law commands that an action be punished provided it is not against a person defending himself, that is, resisting injury inflicted on oneself by another), such a one, I say, willingly does injustice. When I say “willingly,” it is understood that the person should know what he does, in what manner, and the other circumstances. But he who takes his own life because of anger acts contrary to a good law in willing something the law does not permit. Therefore, he does injustice. Consequently it seems that a man can do himself an injustice.

1094. At but to whom (1138a11), he solves the previously mentioned doubt.

First, he presents and confirms the solution.

Second, at this question (1138a26; [1102]), he gives the root of the solution.

He treats the first point in two ways.

First, he solves the doubt raised before, regarding legal justice.

Second, at besides, inasmuch (1138a14; [1097]), he solves the doubt regarding particular justice.

On the first point, he does two things.

First, he proposes the solution, saying that the man who commits suicide does some injustice. But we must consider against whom he acts unjustly. Certainly, he does an injustice to the state, which he deprives of a citizen, even if he does no injustice to himself.

1095. Second, at he voluntarily suffers (1138a12), he confirms the solution given.

He does so first in regard to the fact that one does not do himself an injustice. He may willingly endure the slaying, but no one willingly suffers injustice, as was said before [1094]. Therefore this person does not suffer an injustice and does not do himself an injustice.

1096. Second, at for this reason (1138a12), he confirms the solution in regard to the injustice to the state—this by a certain sign. We see that the state imposes what punishment is possible, dishonor or censure on the suicide; it has his body dragged or left unburied. In this way, we are given to understand that this man committed injustice against the state.

1097. At besides, inasmuch (1138a14), he shows that no one does himself an injustice according to particular justice.

First, he proposes what he intends. He says that, inasmuch as a person is called unjust not as being completely perverse in evil, but only as doing particular injustice, according to this injustice, it is not possible for a person to do injustice to himself. This particular injustice, which we discussed before [913–26], is different from legal injustice. A man may be called unjust in some measure not as being completely evil, but as being partially evil; for example, someone is called cowardly according to a particular evil. Hence, neither can anyone do injustice to himself according to particular injustice.

1098. Second, at indeed, something (1138a18), he proves the proposition by four reasons.

The first is that one who does injustice according to particular injustice has more than is due him, and he who suffers injustice has less. If, then, someone could do injustice to himself, it would follow that something could be taken from him and added to him at one and the same time—things that are opposites. Therefore, it is impossible for the same person to be the one doing injustice and suffering injustice from himself. But justice and injustice necessarily implies more than one person.

1099. At again, doing injustice (1138a20), he gives the second reason, saying that doing injustice must be voluntary and with choice, and must be previous to suffering injustice. That man who first has suffered injustice and reacts against it according as the law allows does not seem to do injustice, for example, if he repossesses a thing taken from him. But if a person injures himself, he suffers and inflicts the same act at the same time. Therefore, he does not seem to do injustice to himself.

1100. Then, at moreover, he will (1138a23), he offers the third reason. Certainly a person voluntarily does harm to himself. If, then, such a one suffers injustice from himself, it follows that suffering injustice is a voluntary action. This we disproved before [1094–96].

1101. Next, at besides, no one (1138a24), he gives the fourth reason. If we look at particular injustice, that is, the species of particular injustice, it is apparent that no one does himself an injustice. One particular species of injustice is fornication, that is, adultery. But no man fornicates or commits adultery with his own wife. No one is called a burglar—burglary belongs to another species of injustice—because he breaks into his own home, nor a thief if he secretly takes his own goods. Obviously, then, it is not possible to do oneself injustice.

1102. At this question (1138a26), he gives the principal root of the previously mentioned solution. He says that this question about doing injustice to oneself is completely solved in accord with what was determined before [1063, 1071, 1099] on the point that it is impossible to suffer any injustice voluntarily. From this, it clearly follows that no one unwillingly does injustice, since doing injustice is a voluntary action, as was pointed out previously [1063, 1071, 1099].

1103. Then, at obviously both (1138a28), he compares these two things with one another.

In regard to the comparison, he takes up three points.

First, he shows that both of them are evil.

Second, at however, to do injustice (1138a31; [1104]), he shows that, in itself, it is worse to do injustice.

Third, at although nothing hinders (1138a31; [1105]), he shows that, by chance, the contrary can be true.

He says first that both doing injustice and suffering injustice are evil. He proves the statement from the fact that to suffer injustice is to have less than the mean of justice requires. But the first, to do injustice, is to have more than the measure of justice. Now, the mean of justice, called the just thing, is related to exchanges and distributions as the healthful is to medicine and the well-conditioned to gymnastics. Consequently, just as in medicine and gymnastics what is too much or too little is evil, so also in regard to justice.

1104. Next, at however, to do injustice (1138a31), he shows that it is worse to do injustice than to suffer injustice. This he proves from the fact that to do injustice is blameworthy and evil—a thing that is to be understood either as complete and absolute evil (for instance, when someone does injustice not only voluntarily, but by choice) or coming close to complete evil (evident in the person who acts unjustly not by choice but by anger or some other passion). It has been explained before [1041] that not every voluntary act accompanies injustice, because sometimes a man does an unjust act and nevertheless is not unjust, although he is blameworthy. But a person’s suffering injustice is entirely without evil and injustice, for he who suffers injustice can in no way be considered unjust or evil. But, obviously, that by which a man is called evil is worse than that by which he is not called evil; an actual whiteness by which a person is called white is whiteness in a greater degree than a potential whiteness by which a person is not called white. It follows, then, that suffering injustice is in itself less evil than doing injustice.

1105. At although nothing hinders (1138a31), he shows that the contrary can be true by chance. He says nothing prevents suffering injustice from being more evil by chance than doing injustice, as when a man is provoked to do greater injustice by the fact that he suffers unjustly. But this is by chance, and art does not care about what is by chance, but judges only according to what is essential. Thus, the art of medicine calls pleurisy a dangerous and deadly abscess under the ribs, a worse ailment than a sore foot, but the latter nevertheless can be worse by chance—for instance, when a man falls because of an injured foot and so, by accident, is captured and slain by an enemy.

1106. Next, at by metaphor and likeness (1138b5), he shows of what nature metaphorical justice is. He says that, by a kind of metaphor and likeness, it is possible to have not justice or injustice of the whole man toward himself, but a certain species of justice among the parts of man. However, this is not justice in the full sense, but only the justice of a master or an administrator (namely, the head of a household), for corresponding to these reasons of dominion and administration, the rational part of the soul seems to be distinguished from the irrational part, which is divided into irascible and concupiscible. The reason is master of the irascible and concupiscible parts and governs them.

1107. In view of such consideration, some people think that a man’s justice extends to himself because, by reason of these parts, he can suffer from his own desires, such as when he acts against reason out of anger or concupiscence. Hence, among the parts, a kind of justice and injustice is found, as between one who commands and one who obeys. However, it is not genuine justice, since it is not between two, but it has a resemblance to justice inasmuch as the diversity in the soul is like the diversity between persons.

1108. Finally, as a summary, he concludes that we have finished the treatise on justice and the other moral virtues according to the preceding plan. With this, the teaching of the fifth book is completed.