Lecture 3 — Particular Justice

We are now investigating that justice that is a part of the general virtue. As we have remarked, there is such a virtue. We also intend to speak in a similar way about particular injustice. [913]

The proof for the existence of a particular justice is that a man who practices other vices, acting unjustly, nevertheless does not act covetously, for example, one who throws away his shield out of cowardice, or who speaks ill of another out of anger, or who refuses financial help because of stinginess. On the other hand, a person often sins by covetousness, although not by one or all of the other vices, but he does sin by this particular vice, for we reproach him for being unjust. There is, then, another kind of injustice, a part of injustice in general. Likewise, there is a certain unjust thing that is a part of that which is legally unjust. [914]

Moreover, if one man commits adultery for the sake of gain and makes money by this act while another commits adultery for the sake of concupiscence and pays (thus sustaining a loss), the second man seems to be more lustful than the first, who is unjust rather than lustful, for obviously he acted for gain. [916]

Yet, in all other kinds of injustice, there is always a reference to some particular vice; for instance, if a man commits adultery, it is ascribed to lust. If a soldier deserts his leader, it is referred to cowardice. If anyone strikes another, it is attributed to anger. But if a person makes an exorbitant profit, it is not reduced to any other vice, but only to injustice. Hence, it is clear that, over and above general justice, there is a particular justice. [917]

This justice has the same name because defined under the same genus, since both agree in a relation to another. [918]

But particular justice is concerned with honor, money, security, and all other things of this kind whatever name they may have, and also with the pleasure that follows upon possession. But general justice touches upon everything by reason of which a man can be called virtuous. [919]

Obviously, then, there is more than one justice; there is another justice besides the general virtue. What this other justice is and its characteristics will be considered now. [920]

We have determined that the unjust thing is both the illegally unjust and the unjust simply, but the just thing is both the just corresponding to the law and the just that is equal or fair. [921]

Therefore, in accord with the illegally unjust thing, there is an injustice that we previously discussed. Now, the unjust thing that consists in a desire for inequality is not the same, but is related to the other as a part to the whole, for every unjust thing consisting in a desire for inequality is an illegally unjust thing but not the reverse. Besides, the excessive is unequal but not the reverse. Because one unjust thing is not the same as another, so also one injustice is not the same as another, but different from it as a part from the whole. The same comparison holds for one injustice with the other. [922]

We must, then, discuss particular justice and injustice, and also the just and the unjust thing taken in the same sense. [923]

Justice that corresponds to all of virtue and injustice that corresponds to all of vice, as their exercise pertains to our neighbor, are both to be passed over for the present. It is evident in these cases how the just thing must be determined. Nearly all legal enactments are prescribed by the general virtue, for the law commands us to live according to every virtue and forbids us to live according to any vice. [924]

However, positive laws are productive of virtue in general in regard to instruction that pertains to the common good. But that instruction according to which a man is good simply, whether it belongs to political science or some other science, must be determined afterward. Perhaps to be a good man and to be a good citizen are not the same thing in any state. [925]

913. We are now investigating that justice. After the Philosopher has shown what is the nature of legal justice, which is general virtue, now he shows that, besides this, there is a particular justice.

He treats this point under three headings.

First, he indicates his proposition;

second, at the proof for (1130a16; [914]), he explains it;

third, at obviously, then (1130b6; [920]), he sums up what has already been said and shows what remains to be discussed.

He says first that, while legal justice is a general virtue, we are not principally investigating this at present, but that which, as a part of the general virtue, is a particular virtue. As is commonly held, there is such a virtue. Also, we intend to speak about particular injustice in a similar manner.

914. Then, at the proof for (1130a16), he explains the proposition.

He discusses this point from two aspects.

First, he shows that, besides legal justice, which is a general virtue, there is a justice that is a particular virtue.

Second, at this justice (1130a33; [918]), he assigns the reason why it has a name in common with legal justice.

On this question, we must consider that, to prove there is a justice that is a particular virtue, he takes for granted that there is an injustice that is a particular vice, for we said above [892] that habits are made known by their contraries.

He proposes three arguments for this.

The first argument is taken according to the real distinction of injustice from other vices, inasmuch as injustice is found without the others, and conversely. From this, it is evident that injustice is a particular vice distinct from other vices.

915. He says that we have this proof that there is a particular justice and injustice: a man who practices other particular vices acting unjustly according to legal injustice nevertheless does not act covetously in taking something from his neighbor, such as when a soldier throws away his shield because of cowardice, or a man casts opprobrium on someone because of anger, or a person refuses financial help to a friend because of the vice of stinginess. So other vices can exist without covetousness, which is a special kind of injustice. Sometimes, on the contrary, it happens that a person sins by covetousness in taking another’s goods; although he does not sin by some one or all of the other vices, he does sin by a particular vice. This is clear because he is reproached as unjust for that reason. Hence, obviously there is another justice—a part of the virtue—that is a special virtue. So, evidently, there exists also a certain unjust thing that is a part of what is legally unjust—the legally unjust being the unjust thing in general.

916. At moreover, if one man (1130a24), he gives the second argument, which is taken from the order to the end. Clearly, if a vicious or evil act is ordered to another unbecoming end, it will obtain a new species of vice from this fact. This is so when a man commits adultery for the sake of gain, such as to rob a woman or to take from her in any way whatsoever. Also, it happens sometimes that a man commits adultery entirely because of concupiscence, such that he not only does not gain but rather gives something of his own and suffers a loss of his goods. A man of this sort seems to be lustful, essentially speaking, since the vice of lust is strictly ordered to the satisfaction of concupiscence. But the man who commits adultery to take a woman’s goods does not seem to be lustful, absolutely speaking, because he does not intend lust as his end. He seems rather to be unjust, since he sins against justice for the sake of gain. So it is clear, then, that injustice is a special vice.

917. At yet, in all (1130a28), he assigns the third argument, which is taken by comparison with legal justice. As nothing is contained in a genus that is not contained in some species, so anything that is done according to legal injustice is reduced to a particular vice. If a man acts contrary to legal justice by committing adultery, this will be referred to the vice of lust. If a soldier deserts his general in battle, this will be attributed to the vice of cowardice. If anyone immoderately strikes his neighbor, this will be ascribed to the vice of a anger. But, if a person inordinately enriches himself by pilfering another’s goods, this will not be ascribed to any other vice except injustice. Hence, it remains that there is a particular injustice over and above the other injustice that is a general vice. For a like reason, there is another particular justice besides the legal justice that is a general virtue.

918. Then, at this justice has (1130a33), he shows why a particular virtue of this kind is also named justice.

About this he does two things.

First, he assigns the reason for this from the agreement of particular justice with legal justice.

Second, at but particular justice (1130b2; [919]), he explains the difference between them.

He says first that particular justice is univocal, that it has a common name with legal justice. The reason is that they agree in definition according to the same genus, inasmuch as both are concerned about what relates to another. However, legal justice is taken into account in relation to what is the common good, while particular justice is ordered to another as pertaining to a private person.

919. Next, at but particular justice (1130b2), he explains the difference between justice and injustice on part of the matter. He says that particular justice regards those things that take into account social intercourse, like honor, money, whatever pertains to the safety or harm to the body, and so on. Likewise, particular justice is concerned not only with external things but also with pleasure consequent on the profit by which a man takes his neighbor’s goods beyond what he ought. But legal justice and injustice treat all moral matters in general in whatsoever way a man may be said to be good or virtuous about a thing.

920. At obviously, then (1130b6), he summarizes what has been said and shows what remains to be discussed.

First, he sets this forth in a general way;

second, at we have determined (1130b8; [921]), he takes it up in a specific way.

He says first that it is clear from the premises [913–19] that there is more than one justice—namely, legal justice and justice aiming at equality—and that, over and above legal justice, as a general virtue, there is a particular justice. But we must determine later on [927–1077] the nature and characteristics of particular justice.

921. Then, at we have determined (1130b8), he shows in detail what has been treated and what remains to be discussed.

First, he resumes what was said about the distinction between justice and injustice. He affirms that we have determined that the unjust thing is called illegal and unequal either by excess or by defect. On the contrary, the just thing is called legal and equal.

922. Second, at therefore, in accord with (1130b9), he resumes what he has said: as there is a twofold just thing, so there is a twofold justice. He affirms that, in accord with the illegally unjust thing, there is a certain injustice, previously discussed [911, 919], which is a general vice. Likewise, in accord with the just corresponding to the law, there is a certain justice that is a general virtue. Now, the unjust thing consisting in a desire for inequality is not altogether the same thing as the illegally unjust thing, but one is related to the other as a part to the whole, such that every unjust thing consisting in a desire for inequality is an illegally unjust thing, but not the reverse. Again, every thing that is excessive is unequal, but not the reverse, since there is a certain illegal injustice in having too few burdens. Because (I say) one unjust thing is a part of the other unjust thing, and they are not entirely the same; in a similar way, therefore, the injustice called inequality is not entirely the same as illegal injustice, but is compared to it as a part to the whole. Also, the justice aiming at equality is compared to legal justice in a similar manner.

923. Third, at we must, then (1130b16), he shows which of these things we must discuss.

On this point, he does three things.

First, he says that we must treat particular justice after this [927–1077], and similarly the just and the unjust thing particularly so called.

924. Second, at justice that corresponds (1130b18), he explains that here we are not going to treat legal justice. He affirms that legal justice—which conforms to all of virtue, inasmuch as the use of the whole of virtue referring to our neighbor pertains to it—is to be passed over for the present. Likewise, the opposite injustice (inasmuch as the use of the whole of vice pertains to it) is to be passed over. It is clear how what is just and unjust ought to be determined according to justice and injustice of this kind, because they are the precepts as laid down by the law. The greater part of legal prescriptions are enjoined in agreement with the whole of virtue, inasmuch as the law commands us to live according to every virtue and forbids us to live according to any vice. However, there are certain determinations of the law that do not belong directly to the exercise of any virtue, but to some disposition of external goods.

925. Third, at however, positive laws (1130b25), he raises a doubt. It is evident that positive laws are productive of virtue in general by the instruction given a man in reference to the common good. But there is another kind of instruction by which a man is trained in virtuous actions as applicable to him individually—that is, to his proper good, inasmuch as, in this way, a man becomes virtuous in himself. Therefore, there can be a doubt whether instruction of this kind should belong to political science or to some other science.

926. He says that this question must be settled afterward in the work on Politics. It is proved in the third book of the Politics (Politics 3.4.1276b16–1277b33; see Aquinas, In III pol., lec. 3, nn. 365–77.) that to be a good man simply and to be a good citizen are not the same in every state. There are some states not worthy of honor in which a person can be a good citizen yet not be a good man. But, in the most worthy state, no one is a good citizen who is not a good man.