Lecture 10 — Just Action as a Mean

From these discussions it is clear that a just action is a mean between doing what is unjust and suffering what is unjust. To be unjust is to have too much, to be injured is to have too little. [992]

But justice is a mean not in the same way as the preceding virtues, but in the sense that it produces a mean. However, injustice pertains to extremes. [993]

Justice is also a habit by which the just man is said to operate by choosing what is just and is said to distribute both to himself in relation to his neighbor and to one man in relation to another. [994]

He does not act in such a way that he bestows more desirable things on himself and less desirable things on his neighbor or less hurtful things on himself than on his neighbor, but he distributes equally according to proportion. Likewise, he observes a rule regarding one man in relation to another. On the other hand, injustice is a habit operative of what is unjust. This takes place by excess and defect of useful or hurtful things contrary to what is proportional. Hence, injustice is called excess and defect because it brings about excess and defect, the unjust man assigning himself an excess of what is simply useful and a deficiency of what is harmful. In a similar way, he attributes both an excess and a deficiency to others. But this too is contrary to what is proportional in whatever way it takes place. [996]

One injustice, which is to have too little, is to suffer what is unjust. Another injustice, which is to have too much, is to do what is unjust. [997]

We have then discussed justice and injustice, and the nature of both. Likewise, we have treated in a general way what is just and unjust. [999]

992. After the Philosopher has shown how the just thing is a mean, he now shows how justice is a mean.

On this point, he does three things.

First, he states his intention.

Second, at justice is also (1134a1; [994]), he proves his statement.

Third, at we have then discussed (1134a14; [999]), he recapitulates what has been said.

Since habits are known by acts, he treats two aspects of the initial point.

First, he proposes that the operation of justice is a mean;

second, at but justice (1133b32; [993]), how justice itself is a mean.

He says first that, from previous considerations [978–91], it is evident that a just operation—that is, an operation of justice—is a mean between doing what is unjust and suffering what is unjust. The first is to have more than is due to oneself, to do an unjust action; but the other, to suffer an unjust thing, is to have too little by reason of the fact that a person has been deprived of what is due him. The act of justice is to do what is equal, the mean between too much and too little. Obviously then, it follows from the premises that a just action is a mean between doing what is unjust and suffering what is unjust.

993. Then, at but justice (1133b32), he explains how justice is a mean, saying that justice is not a mean in the same way as the other moral virtues. Their mean lies between two vices; liberality is a mean between parsimony and extravagance. But justice is not a mean between two vices. However, it can be called a mean by reason of its effect, inasmuch as it constitutes a mean, since its act is a just operation that is a mean between doing what is unjust and bearing the unjust. The first of these, active injustice, pertains to a vice of injustice that is a habit of extremes, since it takes for itself too many goods and too few evils. But the other—that is, the toleration of the injustice—is not a vice, but a suffering.

994. Next, at justice is also (1134a1), he proves what was said, that justice is not a middle course between two vices, as is the case with other moral virtues.

He treats this point in a twofold manner.

First, he takes up the nature of justice;

second, at one injustice (1134a12; [997]), he adds some remarks to bring his subject to a conclusion.

He discusses the first point from two aspects.

First, he states what justice is;

second, at he does not act (1134a4; [996]), what in justice is.

He says first that justice is a habit by which the just man does the just thing—and this by deliberate choice, because a moral virtue is a habit of correct choice, as was previously pointed out in book 2 [305, 308, 382]. Doing the just thing can be referred to justice directing exchanges, in which the nature of justice is more apparent by reason of the equality of the thing. Hence, he adds and to distribute in order to include also distributive justice, which consists in the equality of proportion.

995. A man can do the just thing by choice, both in exchanges and in distributions, in two ways.

In one way, he does this between himself and another, and touching this point, Aristotle says, both to himself in relation to his neighbor.

In the second way, a man does this between two others—this pertains to a judge or an arbiter—and so the Philosopher adds, and to one man in relation to another.

He explains, by exclusion of the contrary, how the just man does a just deed. He adds that the just man does not so act that, in regard to desirable things (for example, riches and honors), he bestows more on himself and less on his neighbor and, in regard to harmful things (that is, burdensome and painful), more on his neighbor than himself; but he makes an equal distribution according to proportion—a thing he observes not only between himself and another, but also between two others.

996. At he does not act (1134a4), he presents the nature of injustice. He affirms that, on the contrary, injustice is a habit that does by choice what is unjust. This happens by excess or defect of useful or harmful things that the just man accepts according to due proportion. Hence, as justice is called a mean because it produces a mean, so also injustice is called excess and defect because it produces excess and defect in such a way that the unjust man bestows on himself an excess of things that are simply useful but a deficiency of things that are harmful. In a similar way, he attributes to others both excess and defect, however not of the same things, but a defect of the useful and an excess of the harmful. Nevertheless, it has not been determined in what way injustice may depart from the proper proportion, that is, how much more or how much less it may accept than is due. But injustice does this, howsoever it may happen.

997. Next, at one injustice (1134a12), he adds some remarks required to conclude the subject. He says there is a twofold injustice. One consists in a lack of beneficial things and indicates an excess of onerous things—which amounts to the same—and this is to suffer what is unjust. The other injustice is to have an excess of beneficial things and a lack of onerous things—and this is to do an injustice.

998. From what has been said, we can come to three conclusions. To do an unjust act pertains to injustice. However, to have a lack of benefits or an excess of burdens is not to do what is unjust but, to suffer what is unjust. Therefore, this does not pertain to the vice of injustice. But justice is a mean between having too much and having too little, as was pointed out before [992–93]. Consequently, injustice is not a mean between two vices.

999. Then, at we have then discussed (1134a14), he concludes by recapitulating what has been said. He affirms that we have discussed justice and injustice and the nature of both. Likewise, we have treated what is just and what is unjust in a general way, for he will determine afterwards [1000–1008] certain particular modes of what is just and unjust.