Lecture 13 — Actions That Make a Man Just or Unjust

Since just and unjust acts are such as have been described, a man acts unjustly or justly when he acts voluntarily. But when he acts involuntarily, he works neither injustice nor justice except incidentally, for it is incidental that the actions are just or unjust. An act of justice and a just action are indicated by reason of a voluntary thing and an involuntary one. When a voluntary thing is done and a person is blamed, then there is at the same time an unjust action. Therefore, something unjust may be present, but an unjust action never exists if there is no voluntary action. [1035]

As has been pointed out previously, I call voluntary any of the actions within a man’s power that he does knowingly and without ignorance of the what, how, and why; for example, “whom he struck,” “with what instrument,” and “with what intention”—none of these being unintentional. Also, the act must be done without violence; thus, when one takes a person’s hand and strikes another, that person does not act voluntarily, because it was not in his power to hinder this. It can happen that the one struck is the man’s father but the striker, while knowing the person is a human being or someone present, does not recognize him as his father. Likewise, the same should be determined in what concerns the intention and the whole operation. Certainly the act done without knowledge, or knowingly and not being in our power, is like an involuntary action. We knowingly do and experience many natural things that are neither voluntary nor involuntary, such as growing old and dying. [1037]

The same is true even when the act is just or unjust incidentally, for if someone restores a deposit unwillingly and on account of fear his act is not said to be just, nor is it an act of justice except incidentally. In a similar way, a person forced against his will not to restore a deposit is said to do an unjust thing or an act incidentally unjust. [1039]

We perform some voluntary actions by choice and others without deliberation. When we make a choice of anything, we first deliberate, but things we do without choice are without previous deliberation. [1040]

Injury may occur in dealings among men in three ways. Through ignorance, sins are committed in which neither the person against whom, nor the what, nor the how, nor the end are known, and they take place for an end not considered (for example, a man intends not to wound but to tap, not this person or not in this way). When, therefore, injury is inflicted unintentionally, we have an unfortunate accident, but when the injury is not unintentional although without evil intent, we have a sin certainly, since the principle of the cause is in the agent. But what happens incidentally has an external cause. [1041]

However, when injury is inflicted knowingly but without deliberation, we have unjust action, such as whatever is done through anger or other passions that are necessary or natural to man. Under these circumstances, persons sinning and injuring others act unjustly and their actions are unjust, but they are not unjust or evil on account of this, for they do not inflict injury from wickedness. [1044]

But, when injury is inflicted by choice, the perpetrator is unjust and evil. [1045]

Therefore, it is in their favor that the things done out of anger are judged not to arise from premeditation, for the man who gave the provocation is he who began it, not he who acted in sudden anger. [1046]

Besides, it is not a question of whether the act is done, but whether it is done justly, for anger indicates some injustice that is obvious. The case is different when the fact is questioned, as in transactions where the alternative is necessarily evil if the action is not done through forgetfulness. But angry people, acknowledging the fact, are uncertain in what way there is injustice. However, those who act deviously are not ignorant on this point. Therefore, the cunning, but not the angry, know that the injured party suffered unjustly. [1047]

If a man inflicts injury by deliberate choice, he acts unjustly and he is now called unjust because of those unjust acts, since they are contrary to the proportional or the equal. In a similar way, a person is called just when he acts justly by deliberate choice, but he is said to be a doer of a just act only if he acts voluntarily. [1048]

Some involuntary acts deserve pardon, while others do not. Whatever sins men commit not only in ignorance but also because of ignorance are excusable. However, the sins they commit not by reason of ignorance, but in ignorance because of passion, which is neither natural nor human, are inexcusable. [1049]

1035. Since just and unjust acts are such as have been described. After the Philosopher has shown what justice in itself is and what just action and unjust action are, he now answers a question that he previously asked, namely, by what just or unjust actions a man may become just or unjust. He treats this point in a twofold manner.

First, he explains his plan.

Second, at some involuntary acts (1136a5; [1049]), he introduces a division to explain things mentioned previously.

He discusses the first point from two aspects.

First, he shows when a just or unjust thing may exist without a just or unjust action.

Second, at we perform some voluntary (1135b8; [1040]), he shows that there is just or unjust action without the agent being just or unjust.

He discusses the first point under two headings.

First, he explains his intention.

Second, at as has been pointed out (1135a23; [1037]), he clarifies what he said.

He affirms first that, since just and unjust acts are such as have been described before [1000–1001], then a man acts unjustly or justly in this way: there is an act of injustice or a just action when he voluntarily does these very things, namely, what is just and unjust. But when a man does them involuntarily, he does not act justly or unjustly except perhaps incidentally; it happens contrary to his intention that the acts he does are just or unjust.

1036. Those things that we intend to do are said to be done in themselves and not incidentally. However, nothing is specified by what is incidental, but only by what is in itself. Therefore, the act of justice and the dicaeopragma, or the just operation, and likewise the act of injustice, are indicated by a voluntary or involuntary action, in such a way that, when something is voluntary, a person is praised or blamed. Hence, obviously, on the part of the thing done, there will be something unjust, but there will not be an unjust action as regards the species of the operation if there is not a voluntary action on the part of the agent. The same holds for just action.

1037. Then, at as has been pointed out (1135a23), he clarifies some things that have been said about what a voluntary and an involuntary action are.

He handles this point in a twofold fashion.

First, he indicates his intention.

Second, at the same is true (1135b2; [1039]), he shows that the previous explanation is applicable to both just and unjust acts.

He says first that a voluntary action, as has been pointed out in book 3 [382, 391, 427, 435–36], is said to be present when a person knowingly does a thing that is in his power and is not ignorant either of what is done, or by what means, or for what end he does this. For example, he knows whom he struck, how he delivered the blow—as by an instrument—and the purpose of it; so too he knows each of these in themselves and not incidentally. In order that there be a voluntary action, it is necessary that the thing not happen by violence—for instance, if one takes a person’s hand by force and strikes another, he whose hand it is does not do this voluntarily, because it is not in his power to avoid being forced.

1038. After this, he explains how a thing may be known incidentally. It is possible that the man struck is his father. He who delivers the blow knows that a human being or someone present was struck but not that his father was; thus, he knows incidentally that this was his father, inasmuch as he knows that the person to whom this happened was his father. As we have discussed the man who delivers the blow, we must similarly investigate the purpose of the whole operation, that is, all the circumstances of the operation. From the statement of what the voluntary is, we can know what the involuntary is. The reason is that, if something is done through ignorance, or is not in the power of the agent (after ignorance has ceased), or still more is done through violence, it will be an involuntary action. On this account it was added, by violence, because many things that are in us are not involuntary, for there are many natural things we knowingly do and experience, such as growing old and dying. Nevertheless, none of these is voluntary or involuntary, because each one of them concerns the things that are in us by nature. But if it happens through violence that one of them is not in us, then it is called an involuntary action.

1039. Next, at the same is true (1135b2), he explains what was said about just and unjust acts. He says that what is done by him who does not act voluntarily is accidental and happens similarly with regard to both just and unjust actions. In regard to just acts, such as if a man hands over a deposit to its owner not willingly but on account of fear, we do not say there is just action in this case except incidentally. Likewise, if a person forced against his will abstains from restoring a deposit, we say he does an unjust thing or acts unjustly by accident.

1040. At we perform some voluntary actions (1135b8), he shows when there is just or unjust action and yet the agent himself is not just or unjust.

About this, he does three things.

First, he premises a division necessary to explain the statement.

Second, at injury may occur (1135b11; [1041]), he explains the statement.

Third, at therefore, it is (1135b25; [1046]), he clarifies some things that have been said.

He states first that we do some voluntary actions by deliberate choice and others without deliberate choice. Whatever we do by deliberate choice we do with preceding counsel or deliberation; but whatever is not subject to choice, or is performed without choice, we do without previous counsel or deliberation.

1041. Next, at injury may occur (1135b11), he explains the statement.

First, he repeats when there may be an unjust thing without an unjust action.

Second, at however, when (1135b19; [1044]), he restates when there is unjust action without the agent being unjust.

Third, at but, when injury (1135b25; [1045]), he shows when one is unjust by the injustice and wickedness of the agent.

He says first, as appears from what has been stated previously [1037–38], that injury may occur in dealings among men in three ways:

in one way, by ignorance and involuntarily;

in another way, voluntarily but without choice;

and in a third way, voluntarily and with choice.

1042. Those sins are committed through ignorance that are done by a man who knows not what he is doing, nor against whom he acts, nor with what means, nor for what end, even if he was aware of performing an act. Thus, a man thought that he landed a blow not with this instrument, such as a piked lance, but with a rounded one; or he thought that he struck not this man, such as not his father, but an enemy; or he did not think he was about to strike for this objective, but an objective was achieved he did not think of, such as intending not to wound but to tap. The case is similar when ignorance exists in regard to the way a man landed a blow, mightily or lightly.

1043. But on this point we must consider that, when injury is inflicted unintentionally—that is, contrary to plan or intention—then an altogether unfortunate accident happens. For instance, a man means to brandish a spear, but instead throws it. But when someone inflicts injury not unintentionally—that is, not without the intention of injuring, but without malice in the sense that he does not mean to injure much or injure such a person—then there is some sin, although not so great a one. A man sins when the principle of an inordinate act is in his power in that he intends to perform the act. But when the principle of operation is entirely external, such that it works contrary to the intention, then an unfortunate accident occurs, since fortune is an intellectual cause acting outside of reason, as is explained in Physics 2. (Physics 2.5.196b10–197a8; see Aquinas, In II phys., lec. 8, nn. 207–16.)

1044. Then, at however, when (1135b19), he shows when there may be unjust action without wickedness or injustice of the agent. He says that, when a man inflicts injury knowingly but not with previous counsel—that is, without deliberation—then there is a kind of injustice, as there is in any action that a person commits through anger and other passions (provided these passions are not natural and necessary to men, like desire for food and drink in extreme necessity, which excuses the taking of what belongs to another). Therefore, those who injure others because of these passions sin and do an unjust thing and their acts are unjust actions. Nevertheless, by reason of this, they are not unjust and evil, because they do not inflict injury from wickedness, but from passion. Such people are said to sin from weakness.

1045. At but when injury (1135b25), he shows when there may be unjust action with injustice on the part of the agent. He says that, when a man by deliberate choice causes injury to another, he is unjust and evil. Such a one is said to sin out of sheer wickedness.

1046. Next, at therefore, it is (1135b25), he clarifies what has been said. Because the first of the three things mentioned previously (which treats of what is done from ignorance) was commented on before [1042–43], in the beginning he explains the second, which deals with what is done from weakness or passion.

Second, at if a man inflicts injury by choice (1136a1; [1048]), he explains the third, which treats of what is done by deliberate choice.

He says first that, when people sin from anger, they are not evil or unjust because of this. Therefore, we are well able to judge from this proof of previous statements that what is done from anger is not considered to be done with premeditation. He proves this afterwards, at for the man who gave (1135b25), by two reasons.

The first is that it is not the man himself who does something in anger who begins the process of injuring, but the person who provoked him. So it does not seem that the injury arose with premeditation.

1047. Then, at besides, it is not (1135b27), he gives the second reason. He says that, when a man inflicts injury in anger, there is no question whether he does the act or not, but whether he does it justly, for by anger some injustice is obvious, that is, operates openly. And the angry man wishes the punishment to be obvious, but it seems to him that he is justly provoked. It is not the same thing with unjust dealings, like theft and so forth, in which there is doubt whether the act should have been done. One of the things must be evil, such as giving or not giving; for we sin sometimes by omission but other times by transgression, unless we are excused by reason of forgetfulness, as when a person forgets to pay a debt to a creditor at an agreed time. But people acting in anger admit the thing, or the fact, but doubt whether what they did is unjust. This does not happen to those who act deviously by choice and are not ignorant that they act unjustly. Therefore, the insidious person judges that the man he injured suffers unjustly; but the angry person does not think this. So it is evident that he who does an unjust thing in anger does not act with premeditation.

1048. At if a man inflicts injury (1136a1), he explains the third reason concerned with acts done by deliberate choice. He says that, if a man inflicts injury by deliberate choice, it is obvious that absolutely speaking he acts unjustly, because he operates voluntarily. He who acts according to an injustice of this kind is called unjust because this action is contrary to the proportional, against distributive justice, or contrary to the equal, against commutative justice. In a similar way, a man is called just when he acts justly by deliberate choice. However, if he should act voluntarily and not by choice, he will be called the worker or doer of what is just.

1049. Then, at some involuntary things (1136a5), he gives a division to explain things mentioned previously. He says that some involuntary acts are venial, deserving of pardon, and others are not. Those sins deserve pardon that men commit not only in ignorance—that is, when they have concomitant ignorance—but on account of ignorance, namely, when ignorance is the cause, so to speak. This happens to those who are sorry when they become aware. But those sins do not deserve pardon that men commit not on account of causative ignorance, but in ignorance because of passion, which is neither natural, nor human, nor according to right reason. In actions of this kind, passion is the cause of ignorance and sin; these have been more fully treated in the book 3 [406–24].