Lecture 14 — Suffering Injustice, an Involuntary Action

Someone may raise a doubt whether suffering and doing injustice have been treated sufficiently. Does Euripides speak the truth when he unseemingly says: I killed my mother: briefly, willingly or unwillingly I killed her who was willing to be put to death? [1050]

Is it true or not that a person willingly suffers injustice? Or is this an involuntary action, as every doing of injustice is a voluntary action? [1051]

Is suffering injustice always voluntary or always involuntary, or is it sometimes voluntary and sometimes involuntary? The same question can be asked about the reception of justice. [1052]

Every doing of justice is a voluntary action. Therefore, it is reasonable that suffering injustice and the reception of justice, in a similar way, are opposed according to both, namely, the voluntary and the involuntary (so that all of the one are voluntary and all the other are involuntary). [1053]

It seems unreasonable that every suffering of injustice is voluntary, for some people unwillingly suffer injustice. [1054]

Therefore, doubt can arise whether a person who has undergone damage suffers injustice. [1055]

In regard to what is incidental, the same holds for receiving as for doing, since clearly we take one for the other in matters concerning justice and injustice alike. Acting unjustly is not the same as doing something unjust, nor is suffering unjustly the same as suffering something unjust. Likewise, doing an unjust thing and suffering an unjust thing are not the same. It is impossible to suffer unjustly without someone doing what is unjust or to receive justice without someone doing what is just. [1056]

Doing an injustice in itself is present when a man voluntarily inflicts injury, that is, knowing who is injured, by what means, and in what manner. [1057]

The incontinent person who voluntarily injures himself also voluntarily suffers an injustice and does an injustice to himself. [1058]

But this is one of the doubtful points, whether it is possible for a man to do an injustice to himself. [1059]

Moreover, it happens by reason of incontinence that a man is voluntarily injured by another acting voluntarily. Hence someone willingly suffers an injustice. [1060]

Perhaps the definition is not correct, and we should add a furhter clarification to the words “knowing who is injured, by what means, and in what manner”—that is, “contrary to the will of the injured person.” Anyone, then, can have an unjust thing done to him voluntarily, but no one can suffer injustice voluntarily. [1061]

No one wants to suffer injustice, not even the incontinent person, unless he acts contrary to his will. No one wishes what he does not think is good. But the incontinent person performs actions he thinks he ought not to perform. [1062]

Anyone who gives what is his, as Glaucus gave Diomede golden armor for brass armor and a hundred oxen for nine oxen (according to Homer’s story), (Iliad 6.236.) suffers no injustice. It is in this man’s power to give, but not in his power to suffer injustice—there must be someone who inflicts the injustice. Therefore, it is obvious that suffering injustice is not voluntary. [1063]

1050. Someone may raise a doubt. After the Philosopher has shown by what just actions a person may be called just or unjust, now he raises some doubts about the questions just discussed. He treats this point from two aspects.

First, he raises the doubts and solves them.

Second, at men are of the opinion (1137a4; [1074]), he refutes the errors of some philosophers about these subjects.

The first part is divided into two according to the two questions he answers.

The second part begins at there are still (1136b15; [1065]).

He handles the first part under two headings.

First, he proposes the question.

Second, at every doing of justice (1136a19; [1053]), he follows up the question.

He discusses the first point in a twofold manner.

First, he proposes the matter of the question.

Second, at is it true or not (1136a15; [1051]), he puts the questioning into form.

In the first place, the matter of the question is taken from material that was settled earlier [1035–40]. Hence, he says that someone can raise a doubt whether the suffering and doing of injustice have been sufficiently discussed by reason of what has been said already. It was stated [1035] that doing justice is voluntary. So it can be questioned whether this must be referred to suffering injustice.

In the second place, the matter of the doubt is taken from the words of the poet Euripides, who somewhat unbecomingly introduced a character saying: “I killed my mother—to make the story short, either I voluntarily killed her who wished to be put to death or else I killed her involuntarily.” In either case, we understand that the mother had expressed a wish to be killed.

1051. Then, at is it true or not (1136a15), he puts the questioning into form.

He considers this in two ways.

First, he proposes one question, namely, whether it is really proper to say that a man voluntarily suffers injustice, or whether this is untrue, but that every suffering of injustice is involuntary, as every doing of injustice is voluntary.

1052. Second, at is suffering injustice (1136a16), he proposes another question. The question is whether every suffering of injustice is constituted in this way or in such a way that every suffering of injustice is either voluntary or involuntary. As this question can be asked about doing injustice—whether every such action is voluntary or whether some are voluntary and others involuntary—so in a similar way, the same question can be asked about the reception of justice.

1053. Next, at every doing of justice (1136a19), he follows up the question previously asked.

He develops this in a threefold fashion.

First, he argues that every reception of justice is voluntary or every reception is involuntary.

Second, at it seems unreasonable (1136a21; [1054]), he argues that not every suffering of injustice is voluntary.

Third, at doing an injustice (1136a31; [1057]), he argues that not every suffering of injustice is involuntary.

He argues in this way for the first point. Every doing of justice is voluntary, as is clear from what has been pointed out [1035]. But doing justice is the opposite of receiving justice. Therefore, it seems reasonable that receiving justice or injustice should be opposed similarly according to both, that is, voluntary and involuntary, so that all of the one is voluntary and all of the other involuntary.

1054. At it seems unreasonable (1136a21), he argues that not every suffering of injustice is voluntary.

He treats this point from three aspects.

First, he argues for the proposition, saying it seems unreasonable to hold that every suffering of injustice is voluntary. Obviously, some people unwillingly suffer injustice, like those who are flogged or whose possessions are taken by others.

1055. Second, at therefore, doubt can arise (1136a23), he asks a question on this point: whether everyone who suffers injustice materially and incidentally can be said to suffer injustice formally and in itself. Thus someone may readily object that the man who unwillingly suffers robberies or blows suffers injustice incidentally, nevertheless he is not, so to speak, simply a victim of injustice.

1056. Third, at in regard to what is incidental (1136a25), he answers the objection. He says that the same holds for doing as for receiving. The reason is that, in both cases, it is possible to take one for the other, to understand what is incidental about justice in a similar way to what is incidental about injustice. He gives this explanation: performing acts incidentally unjust is not the same as doing an act unjust in itself. It was pointed out [1035–36] that, sometimes. a person in ignorance does by chance what is unjust, but absolutely speaking, he nevertheless does not act unjustly. Similarly, undergoing things that are incidentally unjust is not the same as undergoing what is simply unjust. Likewise, it is impossible that these things are the same in the doing of justice and in receiving justice, or that the same reason holds for the doing and receiving both in regard to just things and unjust things. He explains this afterward by the fact that it is not possible to suffer something just or unjust simply speaking, because passion is an effect of action. If, then, a man does what is unjust incidentally and does not become unjust simply, it follows that neither does he suffer injustice simply who suffers an unjust thing. The same argument holds for justice.

1057. Then, at doing an injustice (1136a31), he argues against the idea that suffering injustice is involuntary.

First, he argues for the proposition.

Second, at perhaps the definition (1136b3; [1061]), he solves the proposition.

Concerning the first point, he offers two reasons.

In regard to the first of these, he presents three considerations.

First, he gives a definition of doing injustice, which was defined previously [1035, 1045]: doing injustice simply and in itself is simply the voluntary inflicting of injury. By voluntary is meant that one knows who is injured, what inflicts the injury, and how—that is, in what manner—together with other circumstances of this kind.

1058. Second, at the incontinent person (1136a32), he argues from the definition given. It is obvious that the incontinent person voluntarily injures himself, inasmuch as he does voluntarily what he knows is harmful to him. If, then, suffering injustice resembles doing injustice, it follows that the person acting voluntarily himself may suffer injustice from himself, and so it is possible for someone to do injustice to himself. Thus it follows that not every suffering of injustice is involuntary.

1059. Third, at but this is one (1136a34), he asks an incidental question, whether in fact someone can do an injustice to himself. But he takes up this question later [1091–1108].

1060. At moreover, it happens (1136b1), he gives the second reason. If it happens that anyone, by reason of incontinence, is knowingly and willingly injured by another (for example, a man ensnared by love of a prostitute allows himself to be robbed), then it is possible that a person may willingly suffer injustice. Thus, not every suffering of injustice is involuntary.

1061. Then, at perhaps the definition (1136b3), he gives the solution.

He discusses this point from three aspects.

First, he corrects the definition of doing injustice given above [1057], and from it he infers the truth of the question. He says that the definition of doing injustice, stated without qualification, is not correct. But the statement should be added that doing injustice is present when someone with a knowledge of the circumstances inflicts injury on another against his will. From this, it follows that, although a person voluntarily may be injured and suffer incidentally what is unjust, nevertheless, no one voluntarily suffers injustice, absolutely speaking, for in itself, doing injustice is to inflict harm on another against his will.

1062. Next, at no one wants (1136b6), he answers the first reason. No one wishes with a complete will to suffer injustice, not even the incontinent person, although he does things harmful to himself against his will. Essentially he wills good, but by concupiscence he is drawn to evil. Aristotle proves this statement from the fact that, since the will desires what appears good, no one wills what he does not think is good. But the incontinent person in a passionless moment does not think what he does is good, and therefore he does not will it absolutely; nevertheless, he does what he thinks he ought not to do, on account of concupiscence, which is in the sensitive appetite, the will being in the reason.

1063. Third, at anyone who gives (1136b9), he answers the second reason concerning the person who is willingly injured by another. He says that, absolutely speaking, a man does not suffer injustice who voluntarily gives what is his own, as Homer narrates (Iliad 6.236.) about an individual named Glaucus who he gave Diomedes golden armor for brass armor and a hundred oxen for nine oxen. Therefore, this type does not suffer injustice because it is in the man’s power to give what belongs to him. However, suffering injustice is not in the power of him who suffers injustice, but there must be someone who does the injustice. Consequently suffering injustice is involuntary, and doing injustice is voluntary, because the principle of action is in the agent—this belongs to the nature of a voluntary action. However, the source of suffering is not in the patient, but in another—and this belongs to the nature of an involuntary action.

1064. He concludes by way of summary that suffering injustice obviously is involuntary.