Lecture 1 — Censurable Moral Dispositions and Their Opposites

Now, making a new start, we must indicate that there are three kinds of dispositions in moral practice to be avoided: vice, incontinence, and brutishness. [1292]

And the contraries of two of them are obvious, for the one we call virtue and the other continence. [1297]

The contrary of brutishness very properly is said to be above us and is called a heroic and divine virtue. [1298]

In this manner, Homer (Iliad 24.258.) presents Priam as boasting that his son Hector was so exceedingly virtuous that he did not seem to be an offspring of mortal man, but of God. If, then, as it is said, men become divine, it will be because of the excellence of virtue of this kind, a habit opposed to brutishness. [1300]

In fact, neither vice nor virtue is attributed to either dumb animals or God. Rather, the one (divine virtue) is more honorable than virtue while the other (brutishness) is a kind of vice. [1301]

Just as it is rare for men to be godlike—when the Spartans greatly admired someone, they used to exclaim, “this man is divine”—so also is it rare for men to be brutish; it is especially among the barbarians that brutishness is found. Men become brutish on account of both sickness and loss of loved ones, and on account of the prevalence of vice among them (for this reason, they receive a bad name). [1302]

But we will have to review this habit later (vice in general was discussed previously). Now we must investigate incontinence together with effeminacy and voluptuousness. Likewise, it will be necessary to treat continence and perseverance, for these habits must not be understood as identical with virtue and vice, nor as different in kind. [1304]

Here, however, we must proceed as in other subjects, stating what appears probable and then presenting the difficulties. In this way, we will show everything that is most probable about these movements of the soul—but if not everything, at least many of the principal things. Indeed, a sufficient exposition will be given when the difficulties are solved and the probabilities remain. [1305]

It surely seems that continence and perseverance are good and laudable, and that incontinence and effeminacy are evil and censurable. The continent man seems to be identified with one who abides by reason, but the incontinent man with one who disregards reason. Knowing that certain of his actions are evil, the incontinent man nevertheless does them because of passion. On the other hand, the continent man, knowing that his desires are evil, refuses to follow them because of the judgment of reason. [1306]

Likewise, the temperate man seems to be continent and persevering, and according to some philosophers, every continent man is temperate, but according to others he is not. Some even maintain that all intemperate men are incontinent and all incontinent men intemperate, without distinction; others distinguish them. Sometimes they say that the prudent man cannot be incontinent; sometimes that certain prudent and godlike men are incontinent. [1307]

Besides, men are said to be incontinent in regard to anger, honor, and gain. Such, then, are the statements made about these subjects. [1309]

1292. Now, making a new start, we must indicate. After the Philosopher has defined the moral and intellectual virtues, he now begins to consider certain things that follow from them.

First, he treats continence, which is something imperfect in the genus of virtue.

Second, at after the previous discussions (1155a3; [1538]), he treats friendship, which is a particular effect of virtue.

Third, at after these matters (1172a19; [1953]), he treats the end of virtue.

On the first point, he does two things.

First, he discusses continence and its contrary.

Second, at the investigation of pleasure (1152b1; [1469]), he discusses pleasure and pain, which are their matter.

He treats the first point from two aspects.

First, he distinguishes continence from other things belonging to the same genus.

Second, at it surely seems (1145b8; [1306]), he investigates them.

On the first point, he does two things.

First, he distinguishes continence and its contrary from other things belonging to the same genus.

Second, at but we will have (1145a33; [1304]), he shows which of these have been discussed and which remain to be discussed.

He handles the first point in a twofold manner.

First, he enumerates the censurable habits or dispositions in moral matters.

Second, at and the contraries (1145a17; [1297]), he gives their contraries.

1293. He says first that, after the treatment of the moral and intellectual virtues [245–1291]—so that nothing in moral may be passed over—we must make another start, stating that there are three kinds of states to be avoided in moral practice: vice, incontinence, and brutishness.

1294. So it is necessary to understand the difference between these things. As a good action is not without practical reason and right desire—we pointed this out in book 6 [1269]—a perversion of these two faculties can bring about an act to be avoided in moral matters. If, then, perversity occurs on the part of the appetitive faculty such that the practical reason remains right, there will be incontinence, a condition that is present when a man has correct evaluation of what he ought to do or avoid but draws away to the contrary by reason of the passion of desire. But if the perversity of the appetitive faculty becomes so strong that it dominates reason, reason follows that to which the perverted desire inclines, as a kind of principle, considering it to be the ultimate end. Hence, a man will perform evil actions by choice, and for this reason he is called bad, as was noted in book 5 [1058]. Therefore, a disposition of this kind is given the name of vice.

1295. But we must consider that the perversion of a thing happens from the fact that the natural disposition of that thing is destroyed. Thus, physical sickness occurs in man because the proportion of humors belonging to this man is destroyed. In a similar way, perversion of the appetite, which sometimes perverts the reason, consists in the destruction of the commensuration of man’s desires. But a destruction of this kind does not consist in a thing that cannot be added to or taken from another, but it has a certain latitude, as is evident in the natural disposition of humors in the human body, for human nature can be kept in good health with more or less warmth. Likewise, a correct relation in human living is preserved by various degrees of desire.

1296. In one way, an upset in harmony of this kind can arise without exceeding the limits of a human mode of living. Then it will simply be called incontinence or human vice, like sickness of the human body in which human nature is preserved.

In another way, the correct relation in human desires can be so corrupted that it exceeds the limits of a human mode of living, like the inclinations of a dumb animal, a lion, or a pig. This is what is called brutishness. It is just as if the temperament of a man’s body had been changed into the temperament of a lion or a pig.

1297. Next, at and the contraries (1145a17), he gives the dispositions contrary to the qualities just mentioned.

First, he points out two dispositions about which there is no question, noting that the contraries of two of these are obvious, since virtue is opposed to vice and continence to incontinence.

1298. Second, at the contrary (1145a18), he shows what is opposed to the third, namely, brutishness.

First, he sets forth his proposition.

Second, at in this manner (1145a20; [1300]), he explains it.

He says first that a virtue that exceeds the usual human mode and can be called heroic or divine is appropriately said to be opposed to brutishness. Indeed, the pagans gave the name “hero” to the souls of their illustrious dead who, to their way of thinking, were even deified.

1299. To understand this, we must remember that the human soul is the middle substance between the higher or divine substances, with which it shares intelligence, and dumb animals, with which it shares sensitive powers. Consequently, the affections of the sensitive part are sometimes perverted in man almost like dumb animals (and this is called “brutishness,” exceeding human vice and incontinence); likewise, sometimes the rational part in man is perfected and formed beyond the usual mode of human perfection after a likeness to separated substances (and this is called a divine virtue exceeding ordinary human virtue). Indeed, the order of things is so arranged that the mean between different parts touches the two extremes. Likewise, then, in human nature there is something that comes into contact with what is above and something that comes into contact with what is below; yes, and something that occupies the middle.

1300. Then, at in this manner (1145a20), he clarifies his statement.

First, he explains that there is a kind of heroic or divine virtue in man.

Second, at in fact, neither vice (1145a25; [1301]), he shows that this virtue is the opposite of brutishness.

He illustrates his first point with two examples.

The first example is taken from Homer, who presents Priam as claiming his son Hector was so exceedingly virtuous that he seemed rather a child of God than of man—beyond the ordinary ways of man, something divine appeared in him.

His second example illustrates the same point by a pagan proverb believing in the deification of heroes. This is not to be understood, Aristotle says, in the sense that human nature is changed into divine nature, but in the sense that the excellence of virtue exceeds the usual human mode. Obviously, then, there is in some men a kind of divine virtue, and he draws the conclusion that this virtue is the opposite of brutishness.

1301. Next, at in fact, neither vice (1145a25), he proves his proposition by two arguments.

The first is that vice and virtue are said to be proper to man. Hence, neither is vice attributed to a dumb animal, who is inferior to man, nor virtue attributed to God, who is superior to man. But divine virtue is more noble than human virtue, which for us is called virtue in the fullest sense. On the other hand, brutish perversity is a kind of vice different from human vice, which is vice in the unqualified sense.

1302. He gives his second argument at just as it is rare (1145a27), by asserting that people rarely have such great virtue, and those who do seem to be divine. Hence, when the Spartans—citizens of a particular section of Greece—marvelled at the virtue of someone, they exclaimed, “this man is divine.” Likewise, in regard to vice, brutishness is rarely found among men.

1303. He presents three ways by which men become brutish.

The first is from a pagan manner of life: some of the barbarians, who are not accustomed to reasonable laws, fall into the vice of brutishness because of general vicious habits.

The second way is from sickness and privations, that is, loss of loved ones, which makes them lose their minds and become animals.

The third way is from an excessive growth in vice, which shamefully stigmatizes them with the name of beast.

Since this is true—as divine virtue is rarely found among the good, so brutishness is rarely found among the vicious—it seems that the two things correspond by opposition to one another.

1304. Then, at but we will have (1145a33), he shows what kind of matters has been discussed and what yet remains.

First, he connects the preceding with what follows.

Second, at here, however, we must (1145b2; [1305]), he explains his method of procedure.

He says first that, later in this book [1401–3], he will review this habit of brutishness. Previously in the treatment of the moral virtues [528–1108], he discussed vice, the opposite of virtue. But now [1306–1468], he must investigate incontinence, which is censured when concerned with pleasures, and effeminacy and voluptuousness, which are censured when concerned with pain. Likewise, he must investigate continence, which is commendable when concerned with pleasure, and perseverance, which is commendable when concerned with pain—in such a way, however, that we do not consider these to be habits either identified with virtue and vice or different in kind.

1305. At here, however, we must (1145b2), he explains his method of procedure. Here we must proceed in the usual way—namely, after stating what seems probable in the preceding discussions, the difficulties should be presented. In this way, everything that is most probable in the matters discussed will be explained—or if not everything (since no human mind is capable of this), at least many of the principal things. The reason is that, when difficulties are resolved in any question and probabilities appear as true, a sufficient study has been made.

1306. Next, at it surely seems (1145b8), he investigates continence and incontinence, perseverance, and effeminacy.

First, he proposes what is probable, according to his plan.

Second, at someone can raise a doubt (1145b21; [1310]), he brings forward the difficulties.

Third, at first then we must try (1146b8; [1328]), he solves the difficulties.

On the first point, he does three things.

First, he proposes what is probable concerning continence and incontinence themselves.

Second, at likewise the temperate man (1145b11; [1307]), he proposes what is probable from a comparison of them with other dispositions.

Third, at besides, men are (1145b19; [1309]), he proposes what is probable about this matter.

On the first point, he makes three probable statements.

The first pertains to the goodness and the badness of these dispositions. He says it is probable that continence and perseverance are good and laudable, while incontinence and effeminacy are evil and censurable.

The second statement pertains to the definitions of the things themselves. He says that the continent man seems to be identical with the reasonable person, who judges what ought to be done reasonably; but the incontinent man seems to depart from reasonable judgment.

The third pertains to the operations of these dispositions; he says that the incontinent man knows these particular actions are evil, but nevertheless does them out of passion. On the other hand, the continent man experiences desires that he knows are evil but does not pursue them because of the judgment of reason. These two remarks are to be extended also to perseverance and effeminacy in connection with pains.

1307. Then, at likewise, the temperate (1145b11), he makes two probable statements from a comparison of these with other dispositions.

The first is taken from a comparison of continence with temperance. He says that the temperate man seems to be continent and persevering. Some philosophers even hold that every continent and persevering man is temperate, but others hold that he is not. Regarding the opposites of these, some were of the opinion that all intemperate men are incontinent, conversely, in a confused way, that is, without any distinction; but others, that these differ one from another.

1308. The second statement is taken from a comparison with prudence. He says that sometimes it is maintained that the prudent man cannot be incontinent; sometimes, that certain prudent and godlike (that is, gifted) men are incontinent.

1309. Last, at besides, men (1145b19), he states what is probable about their matter, remarking that, at times, some are called incontinent not only for their concupiscence but also in connection with anger, honor, and gain. These, then, are the six statements that are usually made about continence, incontinence, perseverance, and effeminacy.