Lecture 2

Now since it is clear from which parts the city is constituted, it is necessary to speak first about economy, for every city is composed of households.

Now the parts of the household are drawn from those out of which the household is instituted, and a completed household [is instituted] from slaves and the free. Now since we ought to seek what is first in each thing in what is smallest, and the smallest parts of the household are master and slave, husband and wife, and father and son, we will need to consider, regarding these three parts, both what each of them is and how each of them must be. And these three are the despotic, the nuptial (for the conjunction of man and woman itself is unnamed), and third, the teknofactive, for this also is not named with a proper name. So there will be these three for us to discuss.

And there is a another part which certainly seems to some to be economy itself, and to others, the greatest part of it, and we shall have to consider how it is disposed. And I am speaking about what is called the "crematistic" [art].

Now first, let us speak of despot and slave, so that we may see what is opportune by necessity, and also so that we may know if we are able to grasp anything better about them than is now opined.

For it seems to some that despotism is some science, and that economy and despotism and politics and kingship are all the same, as we said when we began. But others think that despotism exceeds nature--for indeed, the law says that this one is a slave, but that this other one is free--and that by nature there is no difference. Because of this, [they think that] it is not just, for it is violent.

Since, therefore, property is a part of the household, the [art of] property is a part of economy*.* For without necessary things it is impossible even to live. Now just as, for each of the determinate arts it will assuredly be necessary that there exist fitting instruments if their works are to be perfected, so also with the economic art.

Now among tools, some are soulless, and others are ensouled, as for the pilot of a ship, the rudder is a soulless tool, but the prowsman is ensouled; for a servant is a kind of tool for the arts. So also a piece of property is a tool for life, and property [as a whole] a multitude of tools, and a slave is an ensouled piece of property; and likewise, a servant is a tool before all other tools. For if it were possible for each tool, both when commanded and anticipating, to complete its own work, just as they say the things of Daedalus did, or the tripods of Vulcan, which the poet says *spontaneously undertook the contest of the gods--*if thus looms were to weave by themselves and the plectrum play the lyre--there would assuredly be no work from the architect for his servants nor from the master for his slaves.

Now among those things named tools, some are "making tools," but a piece of property is for action; for from the loom comes something other, beyond its own use, whereas from clothing or a bed, only the use.

Further, as making and acting differ in kind, and both require tools, it is necessary for these, likewise, to be different. Now life is acting and not making; because of this, the slave is a servant of those things which are for acting.

Again, a piece of property is also spoken of as a part; for a part is not only a part of another, but is "of another" simply speaking. Likewise also for a piece of property; and because of this, the despot over a slave is only a despot and is not "of the slave," but the slave is not only "the slave of the master," but is "of him" wholly.

So therefore, from these things it is clear what is the nature of a slave and what his virtue. For he who is by nature not his own, but "of another human being", such a one is by nature a slave; and whichever human being is "of another" is a piece of property, or a slave; and a piece of property is a tool, for action, and separate.

Quoniam autem manifestum ex quibus partibus, etc. Having set out an introduction in which he describes the condition of the city and of its parts, he here starts to develop political science.

And first, after the designated method, he determines what belongs to the first parts of the city.

Second, he determines what belongs to the city itself, in the second book, which begins at quia considerare volumus de communione, etc.

About the first he does two things.

First, he says what his intention is.

Second, he carries out what he proposed, at hiis quidem enim, etc.

About the first, he does two things.

First, he says what things he intends to determine.

Second, in what order, at primum autem de despota, etc.

About the first he does two things.

First, he says that the things that belong to the household need to be determined.

Second, he enumerates the things that belong to the household, at domus autem partes, etc.

First, therefore, he says that it is clear, from the preceding, out of what parts the city is constituted: and because to know a whole, one must first know the parts, as was grasped above, it is necessary that we first speak about economy, which manages or governs the things of the household, because every city is composed from households as from parts.

Then, where he says domus autem partes, etc., he enumerates what belongs to the household.

And first, what belongs to it as parts.

Second, what belongs as necessities for the parts, at est autem quaedam pars, etc.

He says first, therefore, that the parts of the household are the things from which the household is constituted. Now every household--that is, the domestic family—if it is complete, is constituted from slaves and the free. Now he says “complete” because in the household of the poor there is an ox for a servant, as was said above. And since each thing that can be observed in many things must first be sought in fewer and simpler things, so that doctrine may be easier, therefore it must be said that the first and smallest parts of the household are these three combinations: of master and slave, husband and wife, father and son--the third of which arises from the second, and so he omits it above. And so what each of these three are must be considered.

And consequently, he posits the names of these combinations; and he says that the combination of master and slave is called “despotic,” that is, “mastery.” Now the combination of man and woman was not named in his time, but he himself called “nuptial” what we call “matrimony.” Likewise also, the third combination of father and son did not have a proper name, but he himself calls it teknofactive, that is, factive of sons.

Then, where he says est autem quaedam pars, etc., he posits a fourth thing that belongs to the necessities of the household: and he says that there is a certain other economic part, which is called “crematistic,” that is, pecuniary, which seems to some people to be the whole of economy, but to some people, the greatest part of it; for the management of the household most of all consists in the acquisition and conservation of money. And we must consider how this part, too, should be disposed.

Then, where he says primum autem de despota, etc., he says in what order he ought to do these things. And he says that first he ought to speak about master and slave: and this consideration will be useful for two things.

First, indeed, so that we may be able to know those things that are opportune in such affairs; namely, for the practice of mastery over slaves.

Second, it will be helpful for science, since through this [consideration] we can attain to something better than what the ancients opined about mastery and slavery.

Then, where he says hiis quidem enim videtur, etc., he determines what he proposed: and he divides it into two parts.

In the first, he determines the combination of master and slave.

In the second, the other two combinations, at quoniam autem tres partes yconomicae, etc.

The first is divided into two parts.

In the first, he determines the combination of master and slave.

And because a slave is a sort of property, therefore in the second part he determines about the other part of economy, which is pecuniary, or about property, at totaliter autem de omni possessione, etc.

About the first he does two things.

First, he reports the opinions of certain people about mastery and slavery.

Second, he determines the truth of them, at quoniam igitur possessio, etc.

About the first he presents two opinions.

The first is that despotism, that is, mastery, is a certain science by which someone has scientific knowledge about how to have mastery over a slave; and that this is the same as economy, by which someone has scientific knowledge about the government of a household, and as political and ruling [science], by which someone has scientific knowledge about the government of a city, as was said in the preface.

The other opinion is that to have a slave exceeds nature, and that only by law is it ordered that some men are slaves and some are free, and that there is no difference between them according to nature. Whence, they further advanced that it is unjust that some are slaves, for it is out of violence that someone subjects others to himself as slaves.

Then, where he says quoniam igitur possessio, etc., he determines the truth about mastery and slavery.

And first he determines the meaning of slavery.

Second, he goes into the premising opinions, at utrum autem est aliquis natura talis, etc.

About the first, he does two things.

First, he premises certain things as necessary for knowing the meaning of slavery.

Second, from the premises, he concludes with a definition of a slave, at quae quidem igitur natura servi, etc.

About the first, he posits four things:

the first is that property is some part of the household, and that the art of property is some part of economy. And this is because it is impossible to live in a household without things necessary for life, which are had through property: and he proves this through a likeness to the arts. For we see that it is necessary for each art to have fitting instruments if it is going to complete its own work; as it is necessary for a smith to have a hammer if he is going to make a knife. And in this manner, for the governor [gubernator] of a household it is necessary to have property as an instrument for his own work.

Second, at organorum autem quidem, etc., he posits a division of instruments, saying that some instruments are ensouled, and others are soulless. Just as a rudder [gubernaculum] is a soulless instrument of a pilot [gubernator], but the prowsman--that is, he who guards the front part of the ship, which is called the prow--is his ensouled instrument, and obeys the pilot. For a servant in the arts has the rationale of an instrument because just as an instrument is moved by the artisan, so also a servant moves at the command of one who governs him. And just as in the works of an art there are these two sorts of instruments, so also in the household there is a soulless instrument, the possession itself, such as a bed or a garment, which is a certain instrument in the service of human life. And the multitude of such instruments is the whole that is possessed by the household. But since a slave is a possessed, ensouled object, it follows that he is a certain ensouled tool in the service of household life. Now there is an ensouled tool of this sort in the arts; and in the household, the slave is an instrument above other instruments because he himself uses other instruments, and moves them; and for this we are in need of servants and slaves. For governing artisans, who are called "architects," would not be in need of servants, nor would a master of a household be in need of slaves if each soulless instrument, discerning the master, could complete its own work at his command--as if looms were to weave by themselves, or a plectrum [i.e. a pick] were to play the lyre by itself, as it is said of the statues that Daedalus made that through an inborn quality of the quicksilver, they used to move of themselves. And likewise, a certain poet says that in a certain temple of Vulcan, who was called the god of fire, certain tripods were so prepared, either through human artifice or black magic, that of themselves -- as if spontaneously -- they seemed to undertake a divine contest, as if fighting to serve in the service of the temple.

Third, at quae quidem dicuntur organa, etc., he posits a second division of tools. Now tools of the arts are called “making tools”; but a piece of property, which is the tool of the household, is an “acting tool”. Now he proves this division through two reasonings.

First, indeed, because tools are called “making” when from the instruments, something comes to be beyond the use of the instrument itself. And we see this in the instruments of the arts; as from a loom, which weavers use, something comes to be beyond the use of the loom itself, namely, cloth. But from property, which is the instrument of the household, there is not something other that comes to be beyond the use of the thing itself; as from clothing and a bed, nothing comes to be except their use. Therefore, such things are not “making things” like the tools of the arts.

He posits a second reason, at adhuc quoniam differunt, etc., which goes like this. Diverse instruments are for diverse things. But acting and making [actio et factio] are different in kind: for making is a work through which something comes to be in external materials, as with cutting and burning: but acting is a work that stays in the worker, and belongs to the life of the worker himself, as is said in Metaphysics IX. But both these works need instruments. Therefore, their instruments are different in kind. But life, that is, household association, is not a making but an acting: therefore, the slave is a servant and a tool of those things that belong to acting, but not of those things that belong to making.

Fourth, at res possessa autem, etc., he shows how the slave is disposed with regard to his master: and says that the comparison of the piece of property to the owner and of the part toward the whole is the same, inasmuch as a part is not said to be only a part of the whole, but is also said to belong to the whole simply speaking, as we say “man’s hand” and not only that it is a part of the man: and similarly, a piece of property, such as clothing, is not only said to be the property of the man, but that it is this man’s simply speaking. So since a slave is property, a slave is not only the slave of the master, but is his simply speaking. But he who is a master is not “of the slave,” simply speaking, but is only a master with regard to slave.

Then, where he says quae quidem igitur natura, etc., he draws a conclusion from the premises with a definition of a slave: and he says that from what has been said, the nature of the slave is clear, and also his virtue—which is his duty. For virtue refers to acting, but a duty is the suitable act of someone. For since a slave is a thing that in itself belongs to another, as was said, any human being that is not naturally his own, but another's, is naturally a slave. But that human being is not naturally his own, but belongs to another, who is not able to be ruled except by another. Moreover, this is convertible, namely, that anyone that is the property or slave of another is the human being of another. For it is from the rationale [ratio] of property that he is an “active and separate tool.” Whence, it is possible to conclude with this definition of a slave: a slave is a tool; ensouled, active, separate, human, belonging to another’s existence. In this definition, “tool” is posited as the genus, and five differences are added. Through what is called “ensouled,” he is distinguished from soulless instruments; and through what which is called “active,” he is distinguished from an artisan's servant, who is an ensouled instrument that makes; and through what is called “belonging to another’s existence,” he is distinguished from the free, who always serves in the household not as property, but of his own accord, or hired for pay; and through what is called “separate,” he is distinguished from a part, which belongs to another but is not separate, like a hand. Through what is called “human existence” he is distinguished from the brute animals, which are separate pieces of property.