Lecture 11

Some one will ask whether, if what we are saying is true, virtue will not be required also in the artisans, for they often fail in their work through the lack of self control?

But is there not a great difference in the two cases? For the slave shares in his master's life; the artisan is less closely connected with him, and only attains excellence in proportion as he becomes a slave. The meaner sort of mechanic has a special and separate slavery; and whereas the slave exists by nature, not so the shoemaker or other artisan.

It is manifest, then, that the master ought to be the source of such excellence in the slave, and not a mere possessor of the art of mastership which trains the slave in his duties. Wherefore they are mistaken who forbid us to converse with slaves and say that we should employ command only, for slaves stand even more in need of admonition than children.

So much for this subject; the relations of husband and wife, parent and child, their several virtues, what in their intercourse with one another is good, and what is evil, and how we may pursue the good and good and escape the evil, will have to be discussed when we speak of the different forms of government.

For, inasmuch as every family is a part of a state, and these relationships are the parts of a family, and the virtue of the part must have regard to the virtue of the whole, women and children must be trained by education with an eye to the constitution, if the virtues of either of them are supposed to make any difference in the virtues of the state. And they must make a difference: for the children grow up to be citizens, and half the free persons in a state are women.

Of these matters, enough has been said; of what remains, let us speak at another time. Regarding, then, our present inquiry as complete, we will make a new beginning. And, first, let us examine the various theories of a perfect state.

Dubitabit autem (utique) aliquis, etc. After he solved the preceding difficulty, he here raises a certain other difficulty that arises from the previously advanced solution. And about this he does three things.

First, he raises the difficulty.

Second, he solves it, at aut differt ab his, [I.11.2] etc.

Third, he deduces a certain corollary from the posited solution, at manifestum igitur, [I.11.4] etc.

There is, therefore, a difficulty about what was mentioned above. For if it is true that a slave must have a certain virtue so that he does not fail in his work out of intemperance or fear, through the same reasoning it will seem that artisans, in order to be good artisans, must have some virtue, since it frequently happens that because of intemperance, or some other vice, they make a defect in their works, as when they neglectfully wander away while attending to other things.

Then, where he says aut differt ab his plurimum, etc., he resolves the proposed difficulty. He says that there is a great difference between a slave and an artisan, and he proves this through two rationales.

The first is: because there is something in which a slave is a participant in life—that is, of human association—insofar as he is a slave. For it was said above that the slave is an instrument in those things which belong to action, that is, to the association of men. And therefore, since the moral virtues perfect man in human association, the slave must participate in something of moral virtue so that he may be good. But the artisan's disposition is further removed from human association: for the work of the artisan, insofar as he is of this sort, is not about the doings of human association, but about artifacts, which is what things that are made are called. So someone is called a good artisan, for instance, a good blacksmith, from this, that he understands and is able to make good knives, even if he employs his art evilly or negligently. Certainly, insofar as he displays service for human association, to that degree does he put virtue into his work, just as we see that certain artisans, like banausi—that is, wage-earners, such as cooks—have a certain determinate service when they are employed for a certain specific assistance, and they serve: and following on this, they require moral virtue so that they may be good in assisting.

He posits a second rationale, at et servus quidem, etc., because a slave is one of those things that are from nature. For it was proved above that some are naturally slaves, but nobody is a tanner by nature, or an artisan of any other art, but all arts are invented by reason. But virtue pertains to those things that are in us by nature. For we have a certain natural inclination toward virtue, as was said in Ethics II, and so it is obvious that for someone to be a good slave, he requires moral virtue, but not in order to be a good artisan.

Then, where he says manifestum igitur, etc., he deduces a certain corollary from what has been said. For it was said why a slave requires virtue: but man, who has an inclination toward virtue, must follow after virtue through the study of some governor; just as citizens ought to become virtuous through a legislator, as is said in Ethics II. So it is clear that the master ought to be the cause of the virtue that the slave ought to have in order to be good, instructing him how he ought to act, both by punishing him if he does badly, and rewarding him if he does well. But it should not be said that it belongs to a master to have despotic, that is, a certain mastering science that teaches slavish works to the slave himself, thinking that he ought to teach [the slave] to cook, or to do other things of this sort; but he ought to teach the slave how to be temperate, and humble, and patient, and other things of this sort. So they do not speak well who say that reason should not be used with slaves, but only precepts, for we more ought to admonish slaves toward virtue than sons, because children are not yet capable of admonition. And let these things now be determined.

Then, where he says de mulieris autem et viri, etc., he excuses himself from a more diligent determination about the two associations. He does three things about this.

First, he lays out his excuse.

Second, he indicates the reason for what was said, at quoniam enim domus quidem, [I.11.6] etc.

Third, he extends what has already been said into what must be said, at quare, quoniam de his, [I.11.7] etc..

Therefore, he says first that in the things that must be said about regimes—that is, about cities—it is necessary to draw out further the virtue of woman and man, father and sons, and about their homily—that is, about their conference or intercourse with each other—what is done well and not-well in this, and how that which is good may be cared for, and that which is evil may be shunned. And so at present, before we speak about regimes, we are not able to determine this.

Then, where he says quoniam enim domus (quidem) omnis, etc., he indicates two reasons why it is necessary to determine the aforementioned things with reference to the regimes.

The first reason is because the disposition of the part must be studied in comparison with the whole, like the disposition of a foundation in comparison with the house. But the household, to which the two associations of father and son, husband and wife first belong, is part of the city. So we must consider how children and wives are to be refined [erudiendi] following upon the comparison with the regime.

He posits a second rationale, at si quidem aliquid differt, etc.: for those things whose disposition makes a difference for the goodness of the city must be studied within regimes. But the instruction of women and children is something of this sort, and how they are both good, because women are a half part of the free human beings who are in the city; and from the children grow the men, who are the managers of the city. Therefore, it is in regimes that the instruction of wives and children must be determined.

Then, where he says quare, quoniam, etc., he extends the things that have been said into the things that must be said, and he says that because the previously advanced things have been determined, and what remains must be discussed in other places, that is, in what follows, which belongs to regimes, we ought at present to dismiss such conversations as belong to the management of the household, as though we now had a completion. And we will make another beginning, by considering those things that have been said about the best regime. And so the first book comes to an end.