Lecture 6

Let us now contemplate all of property and moneymaking generally, according to the previously induced method, since indeed a slave was a certain part of property.

First, therefore, anyone will have difficulty about whether moneymaking is economics, or a certain part of it, or subservient; and if it is subservient, whether it is so as the art of making combs is for weaving, or as bronzing for statuary. For they do not serve [another art] in the same way, but the one, indeed, shows the tools, the other the material--and I call "material" what lies beneath, out of which any work is perfected, as with weaving, wool, or with statuary, bronze.

Now indeed, it is therefore obvious that economics is not the same as moneymaking: for it is for the one to acquire, but the other to use. For which art will it be which uses those things that are for the household other than economics?

But there is a difficulty about whether some other kind of art is [also] a part of economics.

For if it will be for moneymaking to see where money comes from and how it is acquired, but property contains many parts and kinds of wealth, then first we will have to consider whether agriculture is a certain part of moneymaking, or of another kind of art, and generally, whether all things concerned with the acquisition and care of food.

Again, there are many kinds of food, and because of this, there are many kinds of lives both of animals and human beings. For it is not possible to live without food. For this reason, differences in food has made different lives for animals. For of beasts, some are gregarious, others have been dispersed; in both ways it is advantageous for the food of each; this, indeed, is why some are carniverous but athers are herbiverous or omniverous. Therefore, nature has determined the lives of each according to their idleness and choice. Now since the same thing is not pleasurable for each according to nature, but another thing is for another animal, it is also the case that the lives of carnivores and herbivores differ from each other.

Likewise also for human beings: for their lives differ in many ways. For indeed, the most leisurely are shepherds, for their food comes to be from domestic animals, without labor, from wandering about. Now since it will have been necessary for flocks to migrate, because of pasture, and the shepherds are compelled to follow them, as though cultivating a sort of living farm. But others live off plunder, and plunder is different for different people, as some, indeed, live from banditry, others from fishing--whoever dwells near ponds, marshes, rivers, and the sea; and others from the birds and the beasts of the woods. But more kinds of human beings live from the earth and cultivated fruits. Therefore, there are about as many ways of life. For some have what is spontaneously born for noursihment, without labor, or engaging in trade or business: the shepherd, the raider, the fisherman, the hunter. And for others, by mixing these live more delightfully, suplementing the deficiencies of one life with what it lacks in order to be self-sufficient, such as those who are shepherds and at the same time, raiders, or those who are farmers and hunters. Likewise also regarding the others, in whatever way opportunity compells them, in this way they spend their time.

And indeed, therefore, this kind of aquisition seems to be given by nature to all, both immediately from their first generation, until they are perfected. For according to that kind of generation which is from the beginning, these animals supply enough nourishment along with their offspring as will be sufficient until they are able to acquire for themselves what was generated, as with vermiparous or oviparous animals. And those animals who reproduce through birth have food in themselves for a time by nature, called milk. In like manner we may infer that, after the birth of animals, plants exist for their sake, and that the other animals exist for the sake of man, the tame for use and food, the wild, if not all at least the greater part of them, for food, and for the sake of other aids, as food and other tools come to be from them. Now if nature makes nothing imperfect, and nothing in vain, it is necessary that she has made all animals for the sake of man, for which reason also the art of war will be a natural art of acquisition, in a certain respect. For hunting is a part of it, an art which we ought to practice against wild beasts, and against men who, though intended by nature to obey, do not wish to; for this first hunting-war is naturally just.

Of the art of [acquiring] property then there is one kind which by nature is a part of economics, inasmuch as it must either exist, or be acquired in order to exist, and that is a treasury of things necessary for life or usefiul for the communion of the city or the household.

And true riches seem to be from these things; for the amount of property which is self sufficient for a good life is not infinite, although Solon in one of his poems says that no bound to riches has been fixed for man. But it is established, just as in the other arts. For no tool of any art is ever infinite, either in multitude or magnitude. And riches are a multitude of economic or political tools. And so it is evident that there is a natural art of property for economics and politics, and what is the cause of this.

Totaliter autem de omni possessione, [I.6.a] etc. After the philosopher determined about masters and slaves, which are a kind of property, he here determines what is common to all property. And it is divided into two parts.

In the first he determines about property with regard to its science.

In the second, with regard to its use, at quoniam autem que ad scientiam, [I.9.a] etc.

About the first he does two things.

First, he states his intention.

Second, he raises difficulties, at primum quidem igitur, [I.6.b] etc.

Therefore, he first says that because it has been said about a slave that a slave is a kind of property, we must consider, in the manner in which we treated of the slave, about all property universally speaking, and about the art that pertains to money.

Then, where he says primum quidem igitur, [I.6.b] etc., he raises certain difficulties.

First he raises them.

Second, he begins to resolve them, at quod quidem igitur, [I.6.c] etc.

The first difficulty is divided into two parts.

The first is: whether the moneymaking art, that is, the art of acquiring money, is utterly the same as that of economy, or rather, a certain of its parts, or if it is not the same, nor a part, but is rather subservient to it. For it is clear that moneymaking belongs in some way to economy: and so it must be that in one of these ways it belongs to it. But it is not the same thing for some art to be a part of another and for it to be subservient to it. For an art is said to be part of another art which studies a part of what the other art studies; just as the art which makes knives is the art of the blacksmith since a knife is a certain kind of those works that are made from iron. But an art is called subservient which makes something in the service of the other art, just as the art of mining iron is subservient to the art of the blacksmith. And because money is in the service of the household, it therefore seems to be more subservient than a part.

And then he raises a second difficulty. For it is found that one art serves another in two ways. In one, by preparing for it the tool with which it works, just as the art which makes the combs for weaving serves the art of weaving with its proper instruments. In another manner, [one art serves another] because it presents it with the material on which it works, just as the art which prepares bronze is at the service of the art that makes bronze statues, and that which prepares wool is at the service of the weaver. Therefore, there is a difficulty about whether the art of acquiring money is in the service of economy as one that prepares the material, or as one that prepares the instrument.

Then, where he says quod quidem igitur, [I.6.c] etc., he begins to resolve the aforementioned difficulty.

And first he shows that moneymaking is not the same as economy.

Second, he inquires whether it is one of its parts, or subservient to it, or rather if it is something foreign to it, at utrum autem pars ipsius est, [I.6.d] etc.

First, therefore, he resolves the first doubt, showing that moneymaking is not utterly the same as economy, because it belongs to moneymaking to acquire money, but to economy belongs its use. For to no other art does the use of what is useful for the household belong than the art of economy. But it is also clear in other things that the art which uses is different than the art by which things are made or acquired, just as the art of piloting a ship is other than the art of shipmaking. Therefore, economy is other than moneymaking. From this it is also clear that moneymaking is much more subservient than it is a part, for the art of making is always at the service of the art of using, like him who makes bridles for the military. From this it also becomes clear that moneymaking is subservient more in the mode of preparing instruments than in the mode of preparing material. For money, and all wealth, is a certain instrument of economy, as will be said later.

Then, where he says utrum autem pars (ipsius) est, [I.6.d] etc., he inquires whether moneymaking is a part of economy or is something foreign to it. And this is divided into two parts.

In the first, he raises a difficulty.

In the second, he pursues it, at si enim est pecuniativae, [I.6.e] etc.

Therefore, he first says that since moneymaking is not the same as economy, which universally uses wealth and property, it can be doubted whether moneymaking is a certain part of economy itself, or is a different kind [species] of thing than economy.

Then, where he says si enim est pecuniativae, [I.6.e] he pursues the aforementioned difficulty.

And first he shows what is different about moneymaking from other [arts of property].

Second, he determines the proposed question, at palam autem et quod dubitabant, [I.8.9].

About the first he does three things.

First, he raises a difficulty about what is different about moneymaking with respect to other [arts of property] [I.6.e].

Second, he determines about other [arts of property], at insuper species multae ciborum, [I.6.f].

Third, he determines about moneymaking, at est autem genus aliud, [I.7.a] etc.

Therefore, he first says that since it belongs to moneymaking to study how to acquire money; but many other things are [held as property] beyond money, such as everything grown from the earth, and other things of this sort: the question is about agriculture, through which some wealth is acquired, whether it is a certain part of moneymaking, or is another genus of art. And because agriculture is ordered toward acquiring food, the same question can be raised about the art that is ordered toward acquiring food, universally speaking.

Then, where he says insuper species multae, [I.6.f] etc., he resolves the proposed question.

And first he divides the acquisition of food into many parts [I.6.f-g].

Second, he shows of what sort it is, at talis quidem igitur acquisitio, [I.6.h] etc.

About the first he does two things.

First, he shows the diversity of food among animals [I.6.f].

Second, among men, at similiter autem et hominum, [I.6.g] etc.

Therefore, he first says that there are many kinds of food, and from this, the modes of living are diversified, as among the animals, so also among men. For since it is not possible to live without food, it is necessary that according to the difference of foods, the mode of living differs among the animals: for we see that some of the animals live flocked together in a multitude, and some lived dispersed and separated according to what is expedient for the food of each. For some of them are *animalifaga—*that is, “animal-eaters,” for phagi in Greek is the same as “to eat”. But some of them eat fruit, and some eat everything indifferently. By this nature has distinguished their ways of life, after the foods that they naturally choose, and after whether they live in idleness or in fighting. For those that eat other animals must be quarrelsome, and live scattered, for otherwise they would not be able to find food; but animals that eat food that is easily able to be found live together. And because diverse animals take delight in any of the diverse genera [of food] mentioned—for not all meat-eating animals take delight in the same meats, and likewise, not all animals that eat fruit delight in the same fruits—it therefore happens that for animals that eat meat, there are diverse manners of living, and likewise for those that eat fruit.

Then, where he says similiter autem et hominum, [I.6.h] he shows the diversity of foods among men, and he says that it is also after the diversity of foods that the lives of men differ in many ways. For someone acquires nutrition in three ways. For some acquire food and neither labor nor plunder, and such men are the most leisurely—such as shepherds, because the food that comes to be from domestic animals, like sheep, comes without labor to men living in leisure; but they have only this labor, that when it becomes necessary because of pastureland to move the livestock from one place to another, then they are compelled to follow, as if they were cultivating a sort of field that lived and moved. Others, however, seize nutrition from plunder, which they either acquire from other men, like bandits; or which they acquire from the water of ponds, marshes, rivers, or other things of this sort, like fishermen; or from fields and woods, like the hunters of birds and beasts. The third genus of living is what is fit for most men that live off of those things that are grown from the earth, and off of domestic produce: and such men have the food brought forth through labor. These, therefore, are the lives of most men: for beyond those who have food through labor and who live by their business--who will be treated of later—there are four simple lives: the pastoral life, raiding, fishing, and hunting, as is clear from what has been said. But since the life of man is most deficient inasmuch as it lacks many things, some people, in order to be self-sufficient by themselves in all things, mix the aforementioned lives: and so they live delightfully, supplying for themselves what they lack from one with the other, just as some practice at once the pastoral and raiding lives, some the lives of agriculture and hunting, and likewise the other lives, after what is opportune for each one.

Then, where he says talis quidem igitur, [I.6.i] etc., he shows of what sort is the aforementioned [mode of having property], which is for acquiring food.

And first he shows that it is natural [I.6.i].

Second, that it is a part of economy, at una quidem igitur species, [I.6.j] etc.

Third, that it is not without an end, at et videntur verae divitiae, [I.6.k] etc.

About the first he lays out this reason: just as nature provides for animals instantly at the beginning of their generation, so does it also after their generation becomes perfected. But it provides nutrition for them at the beginning of their generation: and this is evident in diverse animals, for there are some animals that are not generated as perfect animals, but they make eggs, like birds, or varieties of worms in the place of eggs, as is evident with ants and bees and others of this sort: and animals of this sort *coekpariunt—*that is, they at once produce [pariunt] along with their young only so much nutrition as is able to be sufficient until the generated animal arrives at perfection. Just as it is clear with eggs, whose yolk results in nutrition for the chicks that are generated from the egg white, which lasts as long as the chick is within the shell, so likewise is it with worms. But there are some animals that are generated as perfect animals, like the horse and others of this sort, and among animals that are produced in this way, for some time they have food for themselves from the nutrition of the generator, which food is called “milk”. And so it is clear that nature provides food for animals from the first moment of generation. And so it is clear that after animals are already perfected, nature provides food for them, such that plants are for the sake of animals, so that they may receive nutrition from them; but animals are for the sake of man: domestic animals both for food and for other uses; wild animals, though not all, yet most of them serve as [cedunt] food for man, or in some other mode for his help, inasmuch as man acquires clothing from them—that is, from their skins; or also other instruments, such as from their horns, their bones, or their teeth. And so it is clear that man requires for his life both animals and plants.

But nature neither leaves anything imperfect, nor makes anything in vain, and so it is clear that nature makes animals and plants for the sustenance of men. But when anyone acquires what nature made for him, it is a natural acquisition: and so [the art of property] by which things of this sort are acquired, which belong to the necessities of life, is natural, and part of this is plundering, which must be employed toward the beasts, who are naturally the subjects of man, and toward barbarian men who are naturally slaves, as was said above, as if this were the first just war according to nature. Moreover, he said that plundering is a part of this [art of property], because the other part is agriculture, which acquires nutrition from plants.

Then he concludes from what has been advanced that a certain natural kind of property of which we have now spoken is a certain part of economy, in the sense that [secundum quod] the part is said to be subservient: for it subserves not only economy, but also the political community. And this follows because it is necessary for the acts of political and economic [governors] that both those things which are treasured up for the necessity of life and what is useful for the community, either exist or are acquired; as in the household so also in the city, because neither the household nor the city can be governed without what is necessary for life.

Then, where he says et videntur verae divitiae, [I.6.k] etc., he shows that the aforementioned [art of property] is not without an end. And he says that true wealth is of those sorts of things through which the necessity of nature is relieved. But therefore, such things are true wealth because they can take away need and make sufficient those who have them, so that man may be self-sufficient for living well. But there is other wealth the possession of which is without end, as will be discussed below, about which Solon—who was one of seven wise men—said in his poetry that no limit of wealth can set up an end for men: and so such things are not true wealth, because they do not fill up the appetite of man.

But that the wealth which consists in things necessary for life has an end he proves through this reasoning: the act of no instrument is without an end, neither in multitude nor magnitude. For the art of the smithy does not have unending hammers, nor even one unending hammer. But the aforementioned wealth is a certain tool of economic and political [governors], because they use it for governing the household or the city, as was said. Therefore, wealth of this sort is not without end, but it has some limit.

And he finally concludes in an epilogue that there is a certain natural property that is necessary both for economic and political [governors]; and the cause of this is clear from what has been said.