Lecture 7

There is another kind of the [art of] property than that which is mostly called this, and that is rightly called "moneymaking." Because of [this art], there appears to be no limit to wealth and property, and on account of their proximity, many impute that they should be called one and the same. But though they are not far distant from each other, neither should they be called the same. For indeed, one is by nature, but the other is not itself by nature but rather comes to be through some experience and through art.

Let us begin regarding these things with this principle: for each thing there is a twofold use, both are according to the thing itself, but not similarly according to the thing; but one is proper to the thing, and the other is not proper to the thing. For example, a shoe is for shoeing [feet] and for trade. Both are uses of the shoe: for in trading with one who requires a shoe, in exchange for money or for food, the shoe is used insofar as it is a shoe, bu not according to its proper use. For it is not made for the sake of trade. The same may be said of all other things held as property.

For there is [an art of] exchange for all things which begins, first, from what is according to nature, because some have too much, others too less than what is sufficient. From this it is clear that profit-turning [campsoria] is not a moneymaking art according to nature. For trade came to be from what was necessary for them to be sufficient.

In the first community, indeed, which is the household, it is clear that its work [needs nothing of the art], but when existing in a broader community, some share in all things, but others are divided, and exchange with each other many necessities required for life. This a kind of trade which is still practiced among barbarous nations. For each trades what is advantageous for each, but nothing more, as for example giving and receiving wine for wheat, and other such things.

This sort of trade is not beyond nature, nor is it a kind of moneymaking. For it was for the satisfaction of what is self sufficient according to nature.

However, from this was made [the other kind of trade] according to reason: from greater travel, a help was developed for pursuing what was required and exchanging what was abundant, from which the necessity the acquisition of coin came into use. For the various things necessary according to nature are not easily carried about; because of this, for the sake of such trades, men agreed to give and receive to each other something intrinsically useful, a thing useful and very advantageous for life, such as iron and silver, and other such things. First, this was simply determined by size and weight, but later, a character was imprinted, to absolve people from measuring. For the character is posited as a sign of quantity.

When coin had been made for the trade of necessities, another kind of moneymaking was made, profit-turning [campsoria]. First, it was perhaps done simply, but then through experience it became artful from where and how to make profit through many exchanges.

Because of this, it seems that moneymaking is chiefly about coin, and that its work is to be able to study where much money will come from, and to be [the art] that makes wealth and money.

Indeed, wealth is thought by many to be much coin, and because of this, that it is about moneymaking and profit-turning.

But then again, sometimes coin seems deranged and utterly [a thing of] the law, with nothing of nature; since if those using it replace it [i.e. with something else], it has no worth, nor is it useful for anything necessary. And those rich in coin can often lack necessary food. But it is unfitting that such people should be wealthy who perish from hunger, as they say of Midas, in the fable, whose insatiable desire turned everything set before him into gold.

Because of this, those who seek a different kind of wealth and moneymaking seek rightly; for there is another kind of moneymaking and wealth that is according to nature, and this indeed is economics. But profit-turning makes money not in every way, but through the exchange of money. And this seems to be about coin, for coin is the element and end of such trade.

Est autem genus aliud, etc. After the philosopher determined about one part of property, which is the acquisition of food and of other necessities of life, he here determines about the other part of property, namely, moneymaking. And about this he does two things.

First, he discusses its establishment [I.7.a].

Second, he determines it, at sumamus autem de ipsa, [I.7.b] etc.

Concerning the first he determines three things about this second part of property.

For he first determines its name, saying that it is called moneymaking because it pursues the acquisition of money.

Second, he says that the acquisition of money is without an end, since this part of property seems to men to have no limit of wealth and property: for many repute that this part of property is one and the same with the one previously advanced because of the proximity that it has with it.

Third, he lays out a comparison of this property with the previously advanced one, and he says that it is neither the same with the one mentioned, nor is it far distant from it. That it is not the same he clarifies through this: that the aforementioned part of property, which is acquisitive of food and of other necessities of life, is natural, but the one that is acquisitive of money is not natural. For currency was not invented by nature, but it was introduced through a certain experience and art. But therefore, he said that [the two kinds of property] are not far apart, because the necessities of life can be owned for the sake of currency, and also the converse.

Then, where he says sumamus autem, etc., he begins to determine the nature of moneymaking. And because money was invented for the sake of making trades, he therefore does three things about it.

First he shows how trade is related to the things traded [I.7.b].

Second, he determines about natural trading, at est enim permutativa omnium, [I.7.c] etc.

Third, he determines about monetary trading, at ex hac tamen facta est illa, [I.7.f] etc.

Therefore, he says first that in order to study moneymaking, we ought to take up this beginning: there is a twofold use for each thing. And they are fit for this, since either [use] is according to the thing itself [secundum se] and not accidental to it [per accidens]. But they differ in this: that one of them is the proper use of the thing, and the other is not proper, but common. Just as there is a twofold use for shoes. One, indeed, is its proper use: to shoe feet, and for this use the shoe is made; but the other is not its proper use, namely, trade, for it was not for this purpose that a shoe was made—so that man could trade it—but certainly man can use shoes to trade them, whether for bread or for food. And although trading is not the proper use for shoes, it is a use of them according to themselves, and not accidentally, because he who trades it uses it according to its value. And what has been said about shoes can be understood about all other things that can be possessed by man.

Then, where he says est enim permutativa, etc., he determines about natural trading; and he does three things in this regard.

First, he shows what this trading is of [I.7.c].

Second, how it is introduced.

Third, how it relates [se habet] to nature.

Therefore, he says first that exchange can happen with all things. And first, trading begins from things that nature serves for the necessities of human life, of which some men have more, and some less, just as some have more wine, but others more bread: whence they needed to trade. And trading came to be until each one had self-sufficiency. From this it is clear that since currency is not from nature, as was said, profit-turning, which is currency exchange, is not from nature.

Then, where he says in prima quidem igitur, etc., he shows how such exchange was introduced: and he says that in the first community, which is the community of one household, there was not any work such as trading, since all the necessities of life were those of the father of the family, who provided all things. But when the broader community had been made, namely, a village and a city, because of this—that some men held all things in common, among whom trade could not come to be, while others who were separated also [held many other things in common]—it therefore it was necessary for there to become trades of their things, which were divided, so that as one received from the other what the other had, the latter in turn gave what he had back to the former. And this practice still serves among many barbarian nations, among whom there is no use of currency, and who trade nothing more than those things which are opportune for life, by giving and receiving things like wine and wheat and other things of this sort.

Then, where he says talis quidem igitur, etc., he concludes from what has been advanced that such trade is not beyond nature, because it concerns things that nature serves, nor is it a kind of moneymaking because it does not come to be through currency. And that it is not beyond nature he proves through this: that it is for supplying self-sufficiency, that is, so that man, through trade of this sort should have those things that are necessary for sufficiently supporting human life.

Then, where he says ex hac tamen, etc., he determines about monetary [trading], and he does two things in this regard.

First, he shows how this trading was invented through reason, although it is not from nature.

Second, he shows that it is without an end, at et infinitae utique divitiae [I.8.a], etc.

About the first he does two things.

First he determines about the first invention of monetary trading.

Second, about a certain monetary trading that overtook [the first], at facto igitur iam numismate [I.7.g], etc..

Third, he determines about the moneymaking that concerns trades of this sort, at propter quod videtur pecuniativa [I.7.h], etc.

Therefore, he first says that from the first trade, which was of the necessary things themselves for each other, there proceeded a certain other trade according to what reason had invented. For since mutual human help, through trade, had produced more traveling, because men began to make use of trade not only with their neighbors, but also with remote [peoples], by bringing to themselves what they lacked, and sending the things in which they themselves abounded to others; because of such necessity the use of currency was discovered, since those things that are necessary by nature cannot be easily carried to remote lands—like wine and wheat and other things of this sort. And therefore, in order to make trades of things of this sort in remote lands, they had so ordered it that they could give and receive something to each other that was able to be carried easily and expediently, and yet that had some usefulness about it: and metals are things of this sort, like bronze, iron, silver, and others: for these are useful in themselves, inasmuch as from them come vases, and other instruments, and nevertheless they can be easily carried to remote lands because a small amount of such things, because of their scarcity, is worth much with reference to other things; and so it is the way of men who are required to take a long journey to carry for their expenses, in place of the currency of the area, silver or gold. But because of the aforementioned necessity of trade with remote places, metal was at first determined only by weight and magnitude, just as among certain peoples they use forms of unminted silver; but afterward, so that men might be freed from the necessity of measuring and weighing, they impressed some character that was imposed as a symbol that the metal was of such a quantity. Just as in some places they impose a certain public symbol as a measure of wine or grain. So therefore it is evident that the first currency was discovered for the trade of necessary things.

Then, where he says facto igitur, etc., he determines the other trading that overtook [the original]; and he says that after currency had been made for the aforementioned trading, which was made by necessity of having necessary things from remote places, a kind of monetary trading was brought in underneath [subintroducta] in which currency was traded for currency. And this is called profit-turning, which is what those who turn profits from money do. And this was first done simply and as though by chance, for instance, as though some people, in transporting currency from one land into another, paid out less than they were going to receive. And so afterward, through experience, it was done through artifice, so that man would consider from what place the money was transferred, and how it would be possible to make the greatest gain; and this belongs to the art of turning a profit.

Then, where he says propter quod videtur, etc., he determines about moneymaking, and he says two things about it.

First, he concludes from what has been advanced what is the material and activity of this art [I.7.h].

Second, he determines a certain doubt, at etenim divitias [I.7.i], etc.

Therefore, he concludes from what has been advanced that the art which concerns currency is called moneymaking from that which initiated the trade of currency for currency for the sake of gain through a certain artificial manner. And its act is that it can consider from whence men can acquire much money. For it is ordered toward this as toward its end, so that it can make much money and wealth.

Then, where he says etenim divitias, etc., he determines a certain doubt about what has been advanced. For because he had said that moneymaking is what makes wealth and money, someone could doubt whether it is utterly the same as money and wealth. About this he does three things.

First, he lays out the opinion of certain people [I.7.i].

Second, he introduces reasons to the contrary, at aliquando autem rursus [I.7.j], etc.

Third, he concludes with a determination of the truth, at propter quod quaerunt [I.7.k], etc.

Therefore, he first says that most men have the opinion that wealth is nothing other than much money, and from this, that moneymaking and profit-turning, whose end is to multiply wealth, is wholly built around money, as though around its proper material.

Then, where he says aliquando autem, etc., he lays out a contrary opinion, saying that it sometimes seems folly for some people to say that none of those things that are natural are wealth, such as grain, and wine, and other things of this sort, and that the whole of wealth is money, which was introduced by law. And for this he brings in two reasons.

The first is: because those things are not true wealth that, if the disposition of men is varied, have no worth or usefulness for the necessities of life. But were the disposition of men who use currency for wealth altered, [currency] would have no value, nor would it contribute anything to the necessities of life—for instance, if it pleased a king or a community that [currency] should have no worth. Therefore, it is stupid to say that wealth is absolutely nothing except a multitude of money.

He lays out a second reason, at et numismate dives [I.7.j], etc.,which is this. It is unfitting to say that he who is wealthy could lack food or perish through hunger: but it can often happen that a man abounding in currency goes without food and dies of hunger, as is said in the fable about the man named Midas, who, because he had an insatiable desire for money, asked God and obtained it so that everything offered to him would become gold; and so he died of hunger, having a multitude of gold, since all food set before him was turned into gold. Therefore, currency is not true wealth.

Then, where he says propter quod quaerunt, etc., he concludes by a determination of the truth. And he says that those who discern correctly, for the aforementioned reasons, say that wealth is other than either money or moneymaking: for there is a certain wealth according to nature, namely, of those things necessary for life, as was said above. And the acquisition of such wealth properly belongs to economy. But the moneymaking which is profit-turning multiplies money not in every manner, but only through currency exchange: whence it is constructed entirely around currency, because currency is the beginning and end of such trading, so long as currency is given for currency. Therefore, it is evident according to this that, to speak truly, they are wealthier who abound in those things necessary for life than are those who abound in currency.