Lecture 4

But it is not difficult to see that those who assert the contrary also speak rightly, in a certain manner. For [the terms] "to serve" and "slave" are used in two different ways. For there is the one who is a slave and enslaved by law: for there is a certain promulgated law in which they say that those overcome in war belong to those who prevail.

But many of those who write about law, as did a certain rhetorician, declare it to be iniquitous and hard if, because someone suffered violence, he will become a slave and a subject of one with power to inflict force who is only better according to his power. And it seems thus to some, but to others the other way, even among the wise.

The cause of this difficulty, and what makes explanations to vary, is that virtue, in a certain mode, things falling out successfully, is most of all able to endure violence; and it is always from an excess of some good that one overcomes another, so that it seems violence is not without virtue.

But the difficulty seems to be solely about justice: for to some, benevolence itself seems to be what is just, but to others, that it is just for those who are better to govern, since if these reasons are set out separately, the former reasons--that it would not be necessary for those who are better according to virtue to govern and have mastery--have neither strength nor probability.

Now comprehensively, some attending, as is possible, to a certain just thing, for law is a certain just thing, posit the slavery according to war as just, though not in every way.

For it happens that the beginning of a war is unjust; and certainly one can by no means say that anyone ought to be a slave who is unworthy to serve. Moreover, if this were not the case, it would happen that those who appear to be the best family of men would be slaves, and [born] of slaves, if it happened that those captured were sold.

Because of this, they do not wish to call themselves slaves, but only barbarians.

And indeed, when they speak this way, they are inquiring about nothing other than the natural slave, which, indeed, we spoke about at the beginning. For it is necessary to say that some, indeed, are slaves from the beginning, but others not at all.

In the same way, also, regarding nobility. For some, indeed, are not only like this among themselves, but are also deemed such everywhere; but the barbarians [are thought noble] only at home; as though something is noble and free simply speaking, but something else not simply, just as Theodectes quoted in his elegies: would anyone presume to call me a slave who am sprung from divine roots on both sides?

Now when they speak this way, they mean nothing other than that virtue and wickedness determine the slaves and the free, the nobles and the ignoble. For just as they judge the human comes from the human, and from beasts come to be beasts, so also the good from the good. And indeed, nature desires to make things usually this way, although it is not able [to accomplish it].

It is evident, therefore, that the difficulty [above] has some reason to it, and that it is not that these are indeed by nature slaves, but those by nature free. And that in some situations, it is determinate who are such, and advantageous for some to serve, for some to have mastery--and also just. And it must be that the one obeys and the other governs by the government of those born to govern. This is why despotism is evil and disadvantageous to both parties. For the same thing is advantageous to the part and the whole, to the body and the soul. Now the slave is a certain part of the master, but as though a living thing of his body. But he is separated on the part of the body, and because of this there is something advantageous [for them], and master and slave have friendship for each other--for those whom nature has made of such dignity. But for those who are not [master and slave] in this way, but according to law, and who suffer violence, the contrary occurs.

After the philosopher shows that natural slaves are those for whom it is expedient and just to slave, he here shows that the contrary opinion is also true in a certain mode. And about this he does two things.

First, he presents the mode of slavery that makes some people deny that slavery is natural and just.

Second, he raises doubt about this, and resolves it.

Therefore, he says first that it is not difficult to see that those who speak contrary to what has been determined, and who assert that no slavery is natural and just, speak correctly according to some mode. For there are two ways to speak of a slave or slavery. One way is according to a natural aptitude, as was said above, but someone is also a slave or in slavery after a law posited between men. For there is a certain promulgation of law that those who are conquered in war are said to be the slaves of those that have prevailed against them: and as though all nations [gentes] use this right [ius], it is named “the right of nations.”

Then, he raises a doubt about such legal slavery. And he does three things in this regard.

First, he lays out diverse opinions.

Second, he indicates the reasons for this diversity.

Third, he resolves the doubt.

Therefore, he says first that those who have engaged in writing about these laws have written that the right of the aforementioned law is numbered among those that are iniquitous. And he introduces someone who was called “the Rhetorician” to whom it seemed hard if someone who suffered violence should be a slave and subject to him who had the power to inflict the violence and who is not better except because he is more powerful. So to some, it seemed that it is iniquitous. However, to others it seemed the other way: and this diversity [of opinion] is not only among the many, but also among the wise.

Then he indicated the cause of this diversity [of opinion].

And first, he puts forward something that is clear.

Second, indicates the source of the doubt.

Therefore, he says first that the cause of the previously advanced doubt, from which the explantions of the wise are at odds, is this: virtue, which exists in some [particular] mode—either as wisdom, or firmness, or as bodily fortitude, or in any other mode—if things should fall out successfully (that is, if the contrary should not come forth through misfortune) is most of all able to inflict violence. And so it is clear that he who overcomes always has an excess of some good, unless things happen otherwise through misfortune: from this it seems that force never occurs without any virtue whatsoever in him who inflicts the force. And this is clear through itself.

Then he shows what remains under doubt; and he says that this only remains in doubt: whether it is just that because of any excellence of virtue whatsoever, certain people who overcome ought to govern. And there are diverse opinions about this. For some say that this aforementioned justice of law is through benevolence—that is, introduced in favor of the victors—so that through this men would be incited to fight more bravely. To others, however, it seems that this law has a certain account of justice, insofar as he who appears better in that which he conquers should govern, as Solomon says in Proverbs: “Let the stronger hand have mastery; let him who is slack serve as tribute.” And they say this because if the reasons for such works were removed from the [middle term in the argument], from the perspective of what is first it would appear that those reasons indicating that he must not govern and have mastery who is better in that virtue that exists in the victors do not have anything that is effective for moving the reason, nor do they even have probability, according to those things that commonly appear [probable] to men.

Then he resolves the aforementioned doubt.

And first, he shows in what manner it is just to be a slave.

Second, how it is advantageous.

About the first he does two things.

First, he lays out a solution.

Second, he clarifies it.

Therefore, he says first that in order to comprehensively and fully determine the truth of this doubt, it must be said that some people, attending to some just thing—that is, to something just that is able to be among human affairs in a certain respect [secundum quid]—that law hands down some just thing, posit that the slavery which comes forth from war is just: but they do not say that this is just in every way—that is, simply speaking. Therefore, he approves of a second opinion, but explains it, showing that he was not speaking about what is just, simply speaking [simpliciter], but about what is just in a certain respect [secundum quid], how it is just for human law. For that is called just simply speaking which is just according to its own nature: but just in a certain respect [secundum quid] which is brought back to human advantage--which law intends, because it is on account of what is useful for man that all laws are set up. So because it is not just by nature that simply anyone conquered by enemies should be a slave—since usually it happens that the wise are overcome by fools—he says that this is not simply just; it is, however, advantageous for human life. For this is useful for those who are conquered, because on account of this, they are preserved from the victors, such that they can at least live as subjects, and so they are called slaves from their slavery; and also for those who conquer, because through this, men are incited to fight more bravely—and it is advantageous for human associations that there should be some brave fighters to prevent the wickedness of many.

If, however, human law were able to effectively determine who were the better in mind, then following nature, it would without doubt set them in order as masters. But because this could not come to be, the law accepted another sign of preeminence, namely, the victory that comes forth from some excellence of virtue; and therefore, it established that victors are masters of those whom they conquer. And thus this is called just in a certain respect [secundum quid], as what was possible to be set up as law; but it is not simply just. And so slavery is also for men who are virtuous of mind, because since the common good is better than the private good [bonum proprium] of one, what is fitting for the public good should not be damaged, even if it is not fitting for some private person.

Then he clarifies the solution to what was previously advanced.

And first through reasons.

Second, through those things that are commonly said.

Regarding the first, he puts forward two reasons.

What comes forth from an unjust beginning is not just simply speaking: but the beginning of a war can happen to be wrong, such as when someone does not have a just cause for engaging in war. Therefore, the slavery that follows from such a war is not just simply speaking.

He puts forward a second reason which is of this sort. It happens through war that someone is overcome for whom slavery is unworthy. But nobody can say that he for whom slavery is unworthy can justly be a slave: therefore, it cannot be said that the slavery that is from war is just simply speaking. He proves his minor premise: because if someone were to justly say that he is a slave for whom slavery is unworthy, it would happen that those who are from the noblest families would be slaves if they were captured in war; and if it happened that they were sold, it would further follow that their sons would be slaves that were born from slaves, which seems to be unfitting.

Then he proves what was proposed through those things that are commonly said.

And first, through those things that are commonly said about slavery.

Second, through those things that are commonly said about freedom.

About the first, he does two things.

First, he puts forward common sayings.

Second, he shows in what way they can be understood [intelligatur].

Therefore, he says first that in order to shun the unfitting things mentioned, men do not want to say that noble men, when they are captured in war, become slaves; but only barbarians become slaves when they are captured.

Then, he shows how this can be understood. And he says that those who say these things seem to speak only about the natural slavery that is among barbarians because of their incomplete [defectum] minds, but is not among noble men captured in war: because, as was said above, it is necessary from the very beginning [principio] of birth that there are some who are naturally slaves and some who are not.

Then he lays out what men say about freedom.

And first he lays out what is said.

Second, he shows how it may be understood.

Therefore, he says first that men speak in the same manner about good birth [ingenuitate], that is, about freedom: for he is well born who is neither a slave nor a liberated man. For they say that noble men are well born not only when they are “among their own,” that is, when they are in their own household and place of power, but also wherever they are on earth: but barbarians who are naturally slaves because of incomplete reason are only free in their own households because of an incomplete mastering: and if some were simply free or well-born, namely, because they are well-organized in mind, others are [free] only in a certain respect, like barbarians. And to confirm these words, he invokes the poet Theodectes, who said in his elegies (that is, his writings on pity): “who will repute it worthy that he is surrendered into slavery who on both sides,” that is, the father's side and the mother's, “has came forth as offspring from the noblest and most divine [parents]?” (He was speaking after the error of the gentiles, who called great princes gods).

Then he shows how what was said may be understood. And he says that those who say these things seem to say nothing other than that freedom and slavery, nobility and ignobility, are determined by virtue of mind: and so those who are virtuous of mind are free and noble, while those who are vicious are slaves and ignoble, as the Lord says in Kings: “Those who disdain me will be ignoble.” And he says this because men repute it as worthy that as man is generated from man, and beasts from beasts, so also the good man is generated from a good man. And from this proceeds the honor of nobility, when sons of the good are honored as though alike to their fathers in goodness.

And it is true that nature has an inclination to make things this way: for it arises that from a body that is good in composition and nature that some are more or less inclined to the works of virtue or vice, just as some naturally are irascible, and some are mild-tempered: and this, that is, the nature of the body, is distributed from the father to his descendents—at least for the most part—just as other bodily dispositions, such as beauty, fortitude, and others of this sort. But because of some impediment, it sometimes fails. So from good parents, good children are often born. But because of some impediment, nature is not always able to make things this way, and so sometimes, from parents that are well-disposed toward virtue there will arise evilly-disposed sons, just as ugly children can come from beautiful parents, and small ones from large parents.

It also happens that children are diversified from their parents in goodness and wickedness not only according to the natural organization of the body, but also on account of reason, which does not follow of necessity from natural inclination. So it happens that men who are like their parents in natural organization, because of different instruction and custom are also unlike their parents in morals. So if the children of good parents are good, they will be noble both after opinion and truth: but if they are evil, they will be noble after opinion, but ignoble after the truth of the thing [rei veritatem]. And the contrary is true about the sons of the wicked.

Then he shows how to be a slave is advantageous for some, or not, and concludes with an epilogue from what has been put forward. For the doubt which was raised above has a certain reason to it, such that a certain distinction between freedom and slavery is not after nature, but after law, but in some, it is distinguished by nature, and among such people, slavery is advantageous for them and for those that have mastery, and this is also just. And he proves this: because it is opportune that each one should be subject or govern because he has a natural aptitude: and so also for those who have a natural aptitude for this, it is advantageous that they have mastery over slaves. But if they exercise mastery badly and against a natural aptitude, it is useless for both. He proves it through this: because we see that the same thing is advantageous for the part and for the whole, namely, that the part be contained within the whole, and likewise, for the body and the soul, that the body be ruled by the soul. Now the slave is compared to the master as the body to the soul, as was said above; but he is also compared to the master as a certain of his parts, as if it were a certain ensouled tool that is some part that is separated from the body: for this distinguishes a slave from a part, as was said above. And therefore it is clear from what has been advanced that for the slave and the master who are worthy to be such after nature, it is advantageous for each the one should be the master and the other a slave; and therefore there can be friendship among them, because a union of two in what is advantageous for both is the rationale of friendship. But for those who are not thus disposed toward each other after nature, but only after law and force, they are disposed in a contrary manner, because they do not have friendship toward each other, nor is it advantageous for them that one is master and the other is a slave.