Lecture 8

And indeed, there is no end of the wealth that is from this moneymaking [art]. For as in the medical [art] the pursuit of health is endless, and as the end of any of the arts is endless, for that is what they most of all will to do (but those things that are for the sake of an end are not endless, since the end is a limit in all things), so also in this moneymaking [art], the end is not a limit. For property is the end of such kinds of wealth and money. But in economics, the limit is not the moneymaking art: for this is not the work of economy.

Because of this, it seems indeed that there is necessarily a limit to all wealth. But in the things we see happen, the contrary occurs: for all those who have coin endlessly increase it for the sake of useful things.

But the cause is that they are closely related: for both kinds of moneymaking vary in their use of the same existing thing. For both, the use is acquisition, but not according to the same thing; but for one, [the acquisition] is of another end, but for the other, it is mere increase. This is why it seems to some that the second one is the work of economics, and they persevere in judging that they must either preserve or increase the substance of their coin endlessly.

The origin of this disposition in men is that they are intent upon living only, and not upon living well; and, as their desires are unlimited they also desire that the means of gratifying them should be without limit. Those who do aim at a good life seek the means of obtaining bodily pleasures; and, since the enjoyment of these appears to depend on property, they are absorbed in getting wealth.

And so there arises the second species of wealth-getting. For, as their enjoyment is in excess, they seek an art which produces the excess of enjoyment.

And, if they are not able to supply their pleasures by the art of getting wealth, they try other arts, using in turn every faculty in a manner contrary to nature. The quality of courage, for example, is not intended to make wealth, but to inspire confidence; neither is this the aim of the general's or of the physician's art; but the one aims at victory and the other at health. Nevertheless, some men turn every quality or art into a means of getting wealth; this they conceive to be the end, and to the promotion of the end they think all things must contribute. Thus, then, we have considered the art of wealth-getting which is unnecessary, and why men want it; and also the necessary art of wealth-getting, which we have seen to be different from the other, and to be a natural part of the art of managing a household, concerned with the provision of food, not, however, like the former kind, unlimited, but having a limit.

But what we doubted at the beginning is now clear: whether moneymaking belongs to the economic or political [art] or not, or whether they [already] need it to exist. For just as politics does not make human beings, but takes them up from nature for its use, so also nature must give over food for them, from the earth or the sea, or some other thing. And from this, it belongs to the economic [art] to dispose of such things as is fitting. For it is not for the weaver to make wool, but to use it, and to know what sort is useful and apt, or is mishapen and unuseable.

For someone may indeed doubt why moneymaking is, indeed, part of economics, but the medical art is not a part, even though the one who lives in the household must be healthy; and so too with any other of the necessities. But it is, indeed, for the economist and governor to see to health, but not as the doctor does, and so also about money, it is indeed for the economist, but in a way it is not, but for a subservient art.

But what was said previously is chiefly the case, that this must exist from nature. For it is the work of nature to bring forth food to what is born; and for all things that come to be, they have food from what is left-over; because of this, according to nature, there is a moneymaking art for all human beings from fruits and animals.

As we have said, two kinds [of moneymaking] exist: one is profit-turning, and the other is economics; and this latter is necessary and praiseworthy, but the former has justly carried blame with it. For it is not according to nature, but [a way for men to acquire] from each other. The most hated sort, and with the greatest reason, is obolostatics, which is acquisition from coin itself, and not from that for the sake of which we have acquired it. For money was made for the sake of transferral. And tokos makes money itself greater, for which reason it has taken on such a name. For offspring are like what generated them, and tokos makes coin come from coin. For this reason, such acquisition of money is most of all contrary to nature.

Et infinitae utique divitiae et cetera. After the philosopher shows how the moneymaking trade is brought in by law, he here shows how such an acquisition of money is without an end [infinitus]: and about this he does two things.

First, he shows what has been proposed.

Second, he indicates the cause of what has been put forward, ibi, causa autem huius dispositionis et cetera.

About the first he does two things.

First, he shows what has been proposed.

Second, from this he resolves a certain doubt, ibi, propter quod sic quidem et cetera.

Therefore, he first says that the wealth that is acquired “from this moneymaking [art],” namely, profit-turning, is without an end, and he proves it through this reason. In each art, the desire for the end [finis] is without an end [in infinitum]; but the desire of what is towards the end is not without an end, but has a limit following the rule and measure of the end: just as the art of medicine intends to heal without an end, since it brings about health to whatever degree it can; but it does not give medicine to whatever degree it can, but after the measure of what is useful for healing. And so it is in the other arts. And the reason for this is because the end is appetable in and of itself [secundum se]; but what is such in and of itself, if it were greater, would be more greatly such—just as if white dazzles vision, what is greatly white will greatly dazzle. But money is related to monetary profit-turning as an end: for this [art] intends to acquire money. But it is not related to economy as an end, but as something ordered toward an end, which is the governing of the household. Therefore, moneymaking seeks money without a limit, but economy [seeks money] with a limit.

Then, when he says propter quod sic quidem etc., from what has been advanced he resolves a certain doubt. And about this he does two things.

First, he raises it.

Second, he resolves it, ibi, causa autem etc.

Therefore, he first says that because of the aforementioned reasoning, it seems that it is necessary that there be a certain limit of wealth in economy: but if anyone studies those things that happen, the contrary seems to be. For every economy increases currency without an end, desiring to have currency for those things that are for the use of life.

Then, when he says causa autem etc., he resolves the previously advanced doubt; and he says that the cause of the aforementioned diversity seems to be the proximity of both [kinds] of moneymaking—of that which is at the service of economy, which seeks money for the trade of necessary things, and profit-turning, which pursues currency for its own sake: for the act of both [kinds] of moneymaking is the same, namely, the acquisition of money, but not in the same manner. But in economic moneymaking, this is ordered to another end: the governing of the household; but in moneymaking—profit-turning—the very increase of money is the end; and therefore, because of the proximity of profit-turning to economy, it seems to some economists that it is their office to do what belongs to profit-turners: that they delve into preserving and multiplying currency endlessly.

Then, when he says causa autem etc. he indicates the cause of what had been said, that the managers of households sometimes persevere in increasing money endlessly.

And because of this cause, which he indicates, there follow certain misuses. Therefore, this part is divided into three after the three abuses which he lays out.

The second part initiates here: et altera species etc.

The third here: et si pro non per pecuniativam etc.

Therefore, he first says that the cause of this organization—that managers of households seek to increase money without an end—is because men are zealous for living howsoever, but not for living well, which is to live after virtue. For if they were to intend to live after virtue, they would be content with those things that are sufficient for the sustenance of nature. But because this zeal is permitted, each one is zealous for living after his own will, and therefore each one intends to acquire those things through which he can fulfill his own will: and because the concupiscence of men intends what is without an end, they therefore desire without an end those things which can make their concupiscence content. There are also some who have a zeal for living well; but to that which constitutes “living well,” they add what belongs to bodily delight, for they say that there is no good life unless man lives with such delights, and therefore they seek those things through which they can fill up bodily delight: and because this seems to men to come forth from great wealth, therefore their every care seems to be for acquiring much money. And it must be considered that he indicates the cause of these things, which belong to the manager of the household, from the intention of human life, because the manager of the household has for his end the good life of those who are in the household. This, therefore, is the first misuse: that men, because they do not have a correct zeal for the good life intend to acquire money without an end.

Then, when he says et altera species, etc., he lays out the second misuse. For because the managers of households are zealous for the acquisition of money, on account of this they bring into the care of the household another kind of moneymaking—profit-turning--beyond what is proper for economy, that is, the acquisition of things necessary for life. But because they intend to enjoy [frui] the delights of the body in excess, because of this they seek those things that can make an excess of this sort: a multitude of wealth. And this is the second misuse: that the moneymaking that is not natural or necessary is taken up into economy.

Third, he lays out a third misuse here: et si non per pecuniativam etc. And he says that because sometimes, through the art of moneymaking, men cannot acquire those things sufficiently through which they make the excess of bodily delights content, they attempt to acquire money by other causes; and they misuse any power—that is, virtue, or art, or office—not after its own nature. Just as fortitude is a certain virtue, and its proper work is not not to gather [congregare] money, but to make men bold [audacem] for undertaking or enduring; and so if someone uses fortitude for gathering wealth, he does not use it after its nature. Likewise also the military art is for victory, and the medicinal for health, but neither is for money: but some turn both the military art and the medicinal toward acquiring money, and so they make both to be moneymaking [arts], that is, acquisitive of money, ordering arts of this sort toward money as toward the end to which all other things must be ordered; and therefore it is said in Ecclesiastes: all things are obedient to money.

Therefore, from what has been advanced, he concludes in an epilogue that it has been said about the non-necessary moneymaking—that acquires money without an end as if this were the end—what it is in itself, and for what reason men need [indigent] it—because of unending concupiscence. Necessary moneymaking has also been discussed—the one that is other than the previous one. For it acquires money up to some limit because of some other end, namely, to have the necessities of life. But properly, economy is about those things that are according to nature, such as those that belong to acquiring food: and this not without an end, as was the first moneymaking, but it has some limit. Or it can be understood that the moneymaking itself that is necessary is other than the unnecessary, but is economic, and other things are not traded.

Palam autem et quod dubitabant etc. He had raised a question further up: whether moneymaking is a part or is subservient to the economic [art]: and he distinguished moneymaking from the other [forms of] possessing. Now he resolves the previously raised question. And about this he does two things.

First, he shows that moneymaking is subservient to the economic [art].

Second, he shows how some moneymaking is praiseworthy, and some is blameworthy, at: duplici autem existente, etc.

About the first he does three things.

First, he resolves the question that was raised earlier.

Second, he raises another doubt here: etenim dubitabit etc.

Third, he clarifies something that he had said here: maxime autem etc.

Therefore, he first says that what was sought from the beginning can now be clarified from what has been advanced: whether moneymaking belongs to economics and politics, or does not, but is utterly foreign. And the truth is that moneymaking is not the same as economics, as was said above, but nevertheless is subservient to it: because money must exist for this, that the household may be governed. And he proves this through this: that in the household and the city there must be both men and those things that are necessary for men. But politics does not make men, but receives them, generated by nature, and so uses them. Likewise, therefore, politics or economics does not make food, but nature hands it down to them, either from the earth, as with produce, or from the sea, as with fish, or from some other thing. Therefore, to make or to acquire food of this sort is not the proper and unmediated work of politics or economics; but its proper work is to manage these things in the household, as it must. Just as we see that it is not for the weaver to make wool, but to use it, and to know [cognoscere] which wool is apt for his work, and which is misshapen or unusable. So thus, at the service of economics are both nature, which generates men and food, and consequently, moneymaking, which acquires things, just as at the service of the weaver's art are both nature, which produces wool, and the merchant's [art], which acquires it.

Then, when he says etenim dubitabit, etc., he raises a certain question, and it is this question: since those who are in the household require health, just as they require those things that are necessary for life, like food and clothing, why is the medical art not a part of economy, just like moneymaking is? And he responds that it belongs to the manager of the household and to the governor of the city to consider health in some manner—through using the counsel of the doctor about the health of his subjects. But in another manner it does not belong to them, but to doctors—for considering from what things health will be preserved or restored. Likewise also, it belongs to the manager of the household to consider money—for using it once it has been acquired, and using also the service of those who acquire it: but to consider from what things money can be acquired and how—this does not belong to economics, but to a subservient art: moneymaking.

Then when he says maxime autem etc., he clarifies what he had said above—that nature hands down those things that are necessary: and he says that as was said earlier, those things that economics or politics use must most of all pre-exist from nature, from which also the subservient arts receive them. And he proves this through this: that the work of nature is to give food to what is generated following nature. For we see that the thing from which something comes to be, to the degree that it is the surplus of generation, is the food of the thing generated, just as it is evident that an animal is generated from menstrual blood, and what is the surplus from this material nature converts into milk and prepares food for the generated thing. And therefore, because man is constituted from things that are according to nature, other things that are according to nature are food for him. And so for all men there is a natural moneymaking, that is, the one acquisitive of food or of currency for food, from natural things—from produce and animals. But that someone acquires money from from natural things, but from currency itself, this is not following nature.

Then, when he says duplici autem existente, etc., when he had laid out the two kinds of moneymaking, he shows which of them is praiseworthy, and which is blameworthy. And he says that there are two [kinds] of moneymaking, the first of which is called profit-turning, which acquires money from money and because of money, but the other kind of moneymaking is economic, which acquires money from natural things—such as from produce and animals, as was said. And this second one is necessary for the life of men, and so it is praiseworthy: but the other—profit-turning—is transferred from what is necessary for nature to what is required by concupiscence, as was said above, and therefore it is justly blameworthy: for this moneymaking is not following nature, because it is neither from natural things, nor is it ordered toward fulfilling the necessity of nature, but it is from the transferal of currency for currency, inasmuch as men gain currency through currency. And since this moneymaking, which is profit-turning, is justly blamed, there is a certain other [art] acquisitive of money that is most rationally blamed, and held in hatred, which is called obolostatics—that is, money-lending [statuitiva denariorum], as with those who gain through deviantly [excessu] loaning money [excessu denariis instituendis]. For such acquisition comes to be from the currency itself, and not after the first manner that was fashioned for acquiring currency; for currency was made for the sake of transferal—that is, trading—as was said above. But there is a certain other [art] acquisitive of money that in Greek is called tokos, that is, usury, through which currency increases itself, and so it is called this among the Greeks. For tokos is the same as “born” and we see that the things generated following nature are the same as the generators; and so it comes to be that there is a certain birth where currency grows from currency. And so also such an acquisition of money is most of all beyond nature, because following nature, currency is acquired from natural things, and not from currency. So therefore, one moneymaking is praiseworthy, and three are blameworthy, as was said.