Lecture 3

But after this, we must consider whether anyone is of such a nature or not, and whether there is anyone for whom it is more worthy and just to serve than not, or if all slavery exceeds nature.

But it is not difficult either to contemplate this through reason or to discover this from the things that happen.

For to govern and to be subject is not only necessary, but also expedient, and immediately, from birth, some are separated, these to be subject, and these others to govern; but there are many ways both of being subject and of governing, and always, the better government is over the better subjects (for instance, over a human being rather than a beast). For what is effected by better things is a better work. And where one thing governs and another is subject, there is some work of theirs.

For among things which are constituted out of many, and which come to be some single common thing, either through conjunction or division, in every case there seems to be a governor and a subject.

And this, from the whole of nature, is innate in ensouled things--and indeed, there is a certain government in things that do not participate in life, such as harmony. But certainly, this may be rather extrinsic to our inquiry.

Now an animal is built first from soul and body, of which the former is by nature the governor, the latter the subject. But we must intend [to derive] what is more natural from what a thing has according to nature than from what occurs among corrupted things; because of this, we must also consider the human being with the best disposition of both body and soul, in which this is evident; for the body very frequently seems to govern the soul among those who are diseased or wickedly disposed, because they are wicked and disposed to exceed nature. And it is absolutely the case, as we say, that among ensouled beings we first contemplate both despotic and political government: for indeed, the soul has mastery over the body with despotic government, and the intellect is over the appetite with political and kingly government. In these things it is clear that, according to nature, it is expedient both for the body to be ruled by the soul and for the passible parts by the intellect, and the part that has reason. From the contrary, or from evenness, would come harm to all.

It is like this, again, among human beings and among the other animals. For indeed, tame animals are more worthy than wild ones according to nature, and for all of the foermer ones, it is better to be ruled by a human being: for thus they obtain health.

Yet again for the masculine toward the feminine, for indeed, the nature of the one is better and of the other is inferior, and it is the case that the one governs and the other is governed.

It is necessary that things also be the same way among human beings.

Therefore, whoever stands so far apart from another as the soul from the body and the human from the beast--things are disposed in this way for those whose work is the use of the body, when this is the best thing that can come from them. Such men, indeed, are by nature slaves, for whom it is better to be ruled by this government, if indeed what has been said is to be believed; for he is by nature a slave who is able to be of another because of which he also actually is of another.

And he shares in reason only so far as to receive it through sense, but not so far as to possess it. For the other animals serve, not through rational perception, but through the passions. But the advantage is only a little varied: for from both comes bodily help with necessities, whether from slaves or from domesticated animals.

Indeed, nature also wants to make a difference in the bodies of the free and of slaves, the latter strong for necessary employment, but the former upright and unuseful for such works, but useful for civic life. Such men, moreover, would become separated off for what is beneficial for war and peace. However, the contrary also frequently happens, such that some have the bodies of the free, and the others the souls.

Because of this, it is also clear that if some come to be different from the others in body only, like the images of the gods, then worse and worse will everyone declare that those who are worthy must serve the others.

Now if this is true in the body, it is much more just to define it of the soul. But it is not likewise so easy to see the beauty of the soul as of the body. Certainly, therefore, it is clear what such a nature is, who are the free, and who the slaves, and for whom to serve is advantageous and just.

Utrum autem est (aliquis) natura talis etc. After the philosopher shows the rationale for and the virtue of the slave, he here proceeds to investigate the opinions put forward above.

And first he inquires whether slavery is natural [I.3-4].

Second, whether mastery is the same as politics, at manifestum autem et ex his etc [I.5].

About the first he does three things.

First, he raises a difficulty [I.3.a].

Second, he determines it by approving one part, at non difficile autem etc [I.3.b].

Third, he shows how even the other part of the difficulty has a certain [aliqualiter] virtue, at quod autem et qui contraria dicunt, etc [I.4].

Therefore, he says first that after the aforementioned things, it must be considered whether anyone is naturally a slave or not: and therefore, whether for some it is more worthy and just that they serve than that they not serve, or alternatively not, but that all slavery exceeds nature. Which, indeed, goes back to two previous questions. For if all slavery exceeds nature, then a) nobody is naturally a slave, and therefore b) it will be neither just nor worthy that anyone serves: for what exceeds nature is neither worthy nor just.

Then, where he says non difficile autem etc. [I.3.b], he makes a determination about the proposed question, showing two things: namely, that some human being is naturally a slave, and that for some, it is worthy and expedient to serve. And about this he does two things.

For he first proposes the method by which these things ought to be shown, saying that it is not difficult for anyone to contemplate the truth and reason of the aforementioned questions, and that he can even further discover the truth from those things that happen in human affairs [rebus].

Second, at principari enim et subici etc., he shows the two methods that have been advanced for what has been proposed.

And first, from those things that happen.

Second, from reason, at quaecumque enim ex pluribus constituta sunt, etc [I.3.c].

About the first he puts forward four things,

the first of which is that to govern and to be subject are not only counted among those things that come out of necessity or violence, but also among those that are expedient for the well-being of human beings: and this pertains to the second question. For what is expedient for someone seems to be worthy and just for him.

The second is that in human beings, from their very birth, we see that there is a certain distinction: that some of them are apt to be subject, but some of them to govern--and this relates to the first question. For what is immediately innate to something from birth seems to exist naturally.

The third is that there are many kinds of those things that are subject and of those that govern: for in one way, a man governs a woman, in another, a master governs a slave, and another, a king governs a kingdom. And this also pertains to the same question: for those things that are naturally innate to things are differentiated according to their difference.

And the fourth is that the better government is always over the better subjects: just as that government is better by which someone governs a human being than by which someone governs a beast. And he proves this through the following line of reasoning. All government and subjection is ordered toward a certain work, for he obeys who is subjected to one who governs in a certain work. But a work which comes to be from something better is better: therefore also the government is better. And this fourth thing also pertains to the first question, for what is naturally innate, by however much it is better, by so much is it of a better thing.

Then, where he says quaecumque enim ex pluribus, etc. [I.3.c], he shows what was proposed through reason.

And he presents a reason showing that those people are naturally slaves for whom it is expedient to serve.

Second, he shows who these are, at quicumque quidem igitur, etc. [I.3.j].

About the first, he presents this reasoning. In whatever things are constituted out of many things, there is naturally some governor and some subject, and this is expedient. But a multitude of human beings is constituted out of many things: therefore it is naturally expedient both that one govern and another be subject. The minor premise of this reasoning is clear from what was previously said, where it was shown that human beings are naturally political animals, and hence it is natural that from many human beings, one multitude should be constituted.

Hence, with those things previously advanced, he proves the major premise: and so in this [line of] reasoning he does three things.

First, he posits the major premise.

Second, he proves it, at et hoc ex omni natura, etc.

Third, he infers the conclusion at eodem autem modo, etc.

Therefore, he says first that for whatever is constituted out of many things so that from them comes to be one common thing, whether those many things are conjoined, as the members of a body are joined together for the constitution of the whole, or whether they are divided as when from many soldiers a single army is constituted, nevertheless in all these there will be found a governor and a subject: and this is natural and expedient, as will be apparent through individual examples.

Then, where he says et hoc ex omni natura, etc., he proves the proposition in four ways.

First, indeed, in unensouled objects.

Second, in the parts of the human being, at animal autem primum constat, etc.

Third, in the genus of animals, at iterum in homine etc.

Fourth, in the differences of the sexes, at adhuc autem masculinum, etc.

He first says, therefore, that the truth of the previously advanced propositions will be found in ensouled objects, not as if it were proper to them, but from that which is common to the whole of nature. Because even in those things that do not participate in life there is a certain government, for instance, of harmony. This can be understood in two modes. In one mode, regarding the harmony of sounds; because in consonant voices, there is always a certain voice that has chief mastery [praedominatur], according to which the whole harmony is discerned. It can also be understood regarding the harmony of the elements in a mixed body, in which there is always one of the elements that has chief mastery. But he moves on from things of this sort, because they are extrinsic to this consideration.

Then, where he says animal autem primum, etc., he shows the proposition in the parts of the human being, and says that the composite of an animal is from the soul and body. And this composite is called first, not according to the order of generation, but according to government, because it is from the most governing parts. But of these parts, one is naturally governor, namely, the soul; and the other is subject, namely, the body. Now it would be possible for someone to say that this is not natural, since it is not found in all; and therefore, in order to exclude this [objection], he adds that in order to judge what is natural, it is necessary to consider those things which are disposed [se habent] according to nature, and not those things which have been corrupted, because things of this manner fall short from nature. And therefore, in order to judge what part in the human being naturally governs, one must consider a human being who is well-disposed both of soul and of body, in which it is clear that the soul has mastery over the body. But in diseased human beings and those who are evilly disposed [se habent], the body frequently governs the soul, because they prefer the advantage of the body before the advantage of the soul; and this happens because they are evilly disposed, and exceed nature.

And he consequently shows that the government that is in the parts of an animal has a certain likeness to external government. For we are able to consider, in the animal that is human, a twofold government regarding his parts: namely, the despotic, by which a master governs a slave, and the political, by which a ruler of a city governs the free. For it is found among the parts of the human being that the soul masters the body, but this is with a despotic government, in which the slave is in no way able to resist the master, because to be a slave, simply speaking, is to be “of a master” as was said above. And we see this in the members of the body, such as the hands and the feet: that they immediately apply themselves to a work at the command of the soul. We also find that the intellect, or reason, has mastery over the appetite, but with political and kingly [government], which is over the free; hence they are able to contradict in some things. And likewise, the appetite sometimes does not follow the reason. And the reason for this difference is, because the body is not able to be moved except by the soul, and therefore it is wholly subjected to it; but the appetite is able to be moved not only by reason, but also by the senses, and therefore it is not wholly subjected to reason. Under both regimes, however, it is clear that subjection is according to nature and expedient. For it is natural and expedient to the body that it be ruled by the soul: and similarly, it is natural and expedient for the feeling part, that is, for the appetite which is subjected to the passions, that it be ruled by the understanding, or reason. And for both it would be harmful if what ought to be subject were disposed toward equality, or on the contrary, what ought to govern: for the body would be corrupted if it weren’t subject to the soul, and the appetite would be inordinate if it weren’t subject to reason.

Then, where he says iterum in homine, etc., he proves the same thing in the genus of animals, saying that it is similarly disposed [se habet] among human beings and among the other animals, that it is natural and expedient for the human being to be a master over the others. For we see that tame animals, over whom man is master, are more worthy according to nature than the wild ones inasmuch as they participate in some way in the regime of reason; but also for all animals (it is better) that they be ruled by human beings, because thus in many cases they obtain greater bodily health than they would have been able to achieve through themselves; as it is clear, since for them more abundant food and the remedies of health are furnished by human beings.

Then, where he says adhuc autem masculinum, etc., he proves the same thing in the differences of the sexes. And he says that in the same way, also, the masculine is disposed toward the feminine, that naturally the masculine is better, and the feminine is inferior; and the male governs, but the female is subject. It ought to be noticed that the first two examples are about an integral whole, the other two are about a universal whole, which is a genus or species: and thus it is clear that the aforementioned proposition has a place in both.

Then, where he says eodem autem modo, etc., he concludes what was proposed, namely, that things are arranged in the same way among human beings as with the things previously discussed: that it is natural and expedient that one governs, and another be subject.

Then, where he says quicumque quidem igitur, etc., he shows who those are who naturally govern and are subject.

And first, what kind they are according to the soul;

second, what kind according to the body, at vult quidem igitur natura, etc.

About the first he does two things.

First, he shows what kind they are, according to the soul, who naturally govern or are subject.

Second, he draws a comparison between human beings who are naturally slaves, and brute animals, which also naturally serve, at communicant ratione, etc.

Therefore, he says first that, since the soul naturally is master over the body, and human beings over the beasts, then whoever stands so far apart from the others as the soul from the body and human beings from the beasts, because of the eminence of reason in some, and its deficiency in others, such human beings are naturally masters of the others, according to which Solomon also said that “the fool will serve the wise.” They are disposed in this manner: that some are disposed toward them as the human being is toward the beasts or the soul toward the body--those whose governing work is the use of the body; and that this is best, that they are able to be possessed by them. For they are robust for executing bodily works, but impotent for the works of reason: and such human beings are naturally slaves, for whom it would be better that they be ruled by the wise “if this may be believed from what was said,” because in this, they are alloted to the regime of reason. And that such human beings would naturally be slaves is clear through this, because he is naturally a slave who has a natural aptness to be another’s, inasmuch as he is not able to be ruled by his own reason, by which a human being is master of himself, but only by the reason of another, because of which he is naturally another’s, as if a slave.

Then, where he says et communicant ratione, etc., he compares the human being who is naturally a slave to the brute animal, with regard to what is fitting and what is different. And he says that he who is naturally a slave shares in reason only to this degree: that he receives the perception of reason [sensum rationis] when he is taught by another, but not to the degree that he has the perception of reason of himself. But other animals serve human beings not as if receiving a certain perception of reason from man, but inasmuch as their memories, which receive impressions [passa] either well or badly from man, are incited to serving either through fear or through love. And in this degree, the mode of serving is different inasmuch as the natural slave serves by reason, but the dull animal by passion. But the advantage, that is, the usefulness that comes forth from the slavery of both, is only a little varied: for help is proffered to us from the same things, both from slaves and from domesticated animals: namely, for the necessities of the body. For the natural slave, since his reason is deficient, is not able to be helpful for counsel, or for some work of reason. However, the slave is able to serve in more bodily modes than the dull animal, because of reason.

Then, where he says vult quidem igitur natura, etc., he shows what sort would be slaves following the body.

And he first proposes his intention.

Second, he proves what was proposed, at quoniam et hoc manifestum, etc.

Therefore, he says first that nature desires, that is, has a certain impulse [impetus] or inclination [inclinationem] to this: in order to make a difference between the bodies of the free and of the slaves: namely, so that the bodies of slaves should be stronger, for exercising [exercendum] necessary employment, which is fit for them: namely, for digging in the fields, and other similar exercising services [ministeria exercenda]. But the bodies of the free ought to be upright, that is, well-disposed by nature, and unuseful for such servile works [operationes serviles], which drive out a delightful constitution; but nevertheless, they ought to be useful for the civic life, in which free men keep company [conversantur]. Such men who have limbs useful for the civic life have a disposition divided between a suitability for war and for peace, so that in times of war they have limbs knit for fighting, and for other military works; but in times of peace, for exercising other civic works. And however much nature may have an inclination toward causing the aforementioned difference of bodies, nevertheless, whenever it is deficient in this, just as in all other things which are generated and corrupted, nature achieves its effect as in most cases, but falls short in a few. When, therefore, nature is deficient in this, the contrary to this frequently happens, as was said, so that those who have the souls of the free have the bodies of slaves, and the converse.

Now we must consider that the philosopher here deduces a conclusion from premises, in which he dealt with the disposition of the soul; because, since the body exists naturally for the sake of the soul, nature intends to form the body such that it may be fitted for the soul; and therefore, it intends to give those who have the souls of the free the bodies of the free, and similarly regarding slaves. And this, indeed, so that the interior dispositions always harmonize [consonat]: for it cannot be that someone should have a soul well disposed if the tools of the imagination and of the other sensitive forces are badly disposed: but in shape, and exterior quantity, and the other exterior arrangements, dissonance can be found, as is said here.

Then, where he says quoniam et hoc manifestum, etc., he proves what he had said.

And first, with reference to the body;

second, with reference to the soul, at si autem in corpore, etc.

Therefore, he says first that it is clear that nature is inclined toward this--that it makes diverse bodies of slaves and of the free--from this: because if among some there is found such a great difference merely on the part of the body that they seem to surpass others as if they were images of the gods; just as we are commonly accustomed to say, when we see someone of elegant form, that they seem to be like the angels: then all say that those who are deficient in such elegance of bodily form are worthy [digni] to serve those who are abundantly surpassing, following this: “the appearance of Priam is worthy to command.” And since this is clear in the greatest difference, the same is also perceived to be the intention of nature, even if there were not such a great difference.

Then, where he says se autem in corpore, etc., he proves the same thing from on the part of the soul: and he says that if this is true on the part of the body, that those who are deficient are worthy to serve the more excellent, it is much more just to determine this from the part of the soul, inasmuch as the soul is more noble than the body. But however excellent the beauty of the soul, it cannot be so easily known as the beauty of the body: and therefore, it is more vulgarly judged that someone is worthy to have mastery on behalf of the body than on behalf of the soul.

And lastly, in an epilogue he concludes two serious conclusions in this chapter: namely, that some men are naturally slaves, and some are naturally free: and that for those who are naturally slaves it is advantageous to serve, and it is just that they should serve.