Lecture 10

Of household management we have seen that there are three parts—one is the rule of a master over slaves, which has been discussed already, another of a father, and the third of a husband. A husband and father, we saw, rules over wife and children, both free, but the rule differs, the rule over his children being a royal, over his wife a constitutional rule. For although there may be exceptions to the order of nature, the male is by nature fitter for command than the female, just as the elder and full-grown is superior to the younger and more immature.

But in most constitutional states the citizens rule and are ruled by turns, for the idea of a constitutional state implies that the natures of the citizens are equal, and do not differ at all. Nevertheless, when one rules and the other is ruled we endeavor to create a difference of outward forms and names and titles of respect, which may be illustrated by the saying of Amasis about his foot-pan. The relation of the male to the female is of this kind, but there the inequality is permanent.

The rule of a father over his children is royal, for he rules by virtue both of love and of the respect due to age, exercising a kind of royal power. And therefore Homer has appropriately called Zeus father of gods and men, (Homer, Iliad, bk. 1, ln. 544.) because he is the king of them all. For a king is the natural superior of his subjects, but he should be of the same kin or kind with them, and such is the relation of elder and younger, of father and son.

Thus it is clear that household management attends more to men than to the acquisition of inanimate things, and to human excellence more than to the excellence of property which we call wealth, and to the virtue of freemen more than to the virtue of slaves.

A question may indeed be raised, whether there is any excellence at all in a slave beyond and higher than merely instrumental and ministerial qualities—whether he can have the virtues of temperance, courage, justice, and the like; or whether slaves possess only bodily and ministerial qualities. And, whichever way we answer the question, a difficulty arises; for, if they have virtue, in what will they differ from freemen? On the other hand, since they are men and share in rational principle, it seems absurd to say that they have no virtue.

A similar question may be raised about women and children, whether they too have virtues: ought a woman to be temperate and brave and just, and is a child to be called temperate, and intemperate, or not. So in general we may ask about the natural ruler, and the natural subject, whether they have the same or different virtues. For if a noble nature is equally required in both, why should one of them always rule, and the other always be ruled? Nor can we say that this is a question of degree, for the difference between ruler and subject is a difference of kind, which the difference of more and less never is. Yet how strange is the supposition that the one ought, and that the other ought not, to have virtue! For if the ruler is intemperate and unjust, how can he rule well? If the subject, how can he obey well? If he be licentious and cowardly, he will certainly not do his duty.

It is evident, therefore, that both of them must have a share of virtue, but varying as natural subjects also vary among themselves. Here the very constitution of the soul has shown us the way; in it one part naturally rules, and the other is subject, and the virtue of the ruler we in maintain to be different from that of the subject; the one being the virtue of the rational, and the other of the irrational part. Now, it is obvious that the same principle applies generally, and therefore almost all things rule and are ruled according to nature. But the kind of rule differs; the freeman rules over the slave after another manner from that in which the male rules over the female, or the man over the child; although the parts of the soul are present in an of them, they are present in different degrees. For the slave has no deliberative faculty at all; the woman has, but it is without strength, and the child has, but it is immature. So it must necessarily be supposed to be with the moral virtues also; all should partake of them, but only in such manner and degree as is required by each for the fulfillment of his duty. Hence the ruler ought to have moral virtue in perfection, for his function, taken absolutely, demands a master artificer, and rational principle is such an artificer; the subjects, oil the other hand, require only that measure of virtue which is proper to each of them. Clearly, then, moral virtue belongs to all of them; but the temperance of a man and of a woman, or the courage and justice of a man and of a woman, are not, as Socrates maintained, the same; the courage of a man is shown in commanding, of a woman in obeying. And this holds of all other virtues.

This will be more clearly seen if we look at them in detail, for those who say generally that virtue consists in a good disposition of the soul, or in doing rightly, or the like, only deceive themselves. Far better than such definitions is their mode of speaking, who, like Gorgias, enumerate the virtues. All classes must be deemed to have their special attributes; as the poet says of women, Silence is a woman's glory, (Sophocles, Ajax, ln. 293) but this is not equally the glory of man. The child is imperfect, and therefore obviously his virtue is not relative to himself alone, but to the perfect man and to his teacher, and in like manner the virtue of the slave is relative to a master. Now we determined that a slave is useful for the wants of life, and therefore he will obviously require only so much virtue as will prevent him from failing in his duty through cowardice or lack of self-control.

After the philosopher had determined about the partnership of master and slave, having also added a universal treatise about ownership, he here determines the two other household partnerships which he had posited previously: namely, that of a man toward his wife, and a father toward his son; and it is divided into two parts.

In the first, he determines something about partnerships of this mode.

In the second, he excuses himself from a more diligent study of these things, at de mulieris autem et viri, [I.11.5] etc.

About the first of these he does two things.

First, he determines the aforementioned partnerships, comparing them to other governments.

Second, he raises a certain common question about them all, at primo igitur quidem de servis, [I.10.6] etc.

About the first he does three things.

First, he posits the comparison of the aforementioned associations with other modes of government.

Second, he clarifies the comparison, at in politicis quidem, [I.10.3] etc.

Third, he shows that the concern of the economy is most of all turned toward these sorts of associations, at manifestum igitur, [I.10.5] .

Therefore, he says first that there are three parts of economy, that is, of the government of the household, that follow the three aforementioned associations.

The first of them has already been spoken about, namely, the despotic, which belongs to master and slave;

therefore, it remains to speak about the second, which is the fatherly, pertaining to father and son,

and the third, which is the marital, pertaining to man and wife.

About these he says three things.

First, that in both of these associations there is a certain preferment, or government. For the man governs the woman, and the father the son, though not as slaves, but as the free--in which these two governments differ from a despotic government.

The second point is that these two governments are not of one kind; but a man governs a woman with a political government, that is, he is foremost like someone who is chosen by the city as a ruler. But a father governs his sons with a kingly government; and this is because a father has the fullness of power over his sons, as does a king in a kingdom: but a man does not have the fullness of power over his wife in all things, but according to what the law of matrimony demands, just as the ruler of a city has power over citizens following established rules [statuta].

Third, however, he clarifies that these two governments exist according to nature. Because always, what is more governing in nature governs, as was grasped above. But the male is naturally more governing than the female, except when something happens beyond nature, as with effeminate men. And similarly, the father is naturally more governing than the son, as is the older than the younger, and the perfect than the imperfect. Therefore, the male is naturally governor over the female, and the father over the son.

Then, where he says in politicis quidem igitur, etc., he clarifies the aforementioned comparisons:

first, the marital government to the political;

second, the fatherly to the kingly, at puerorum autem principatus, [I.10.4] etc.

Therefore, he shows the first comparison with regard to their difference. Because in political governments, the persons of the governor and the subject are changed over: for those who are in the office of the governor for one year are subordinates in the others; and this happens because this sort of government is agreeable only among those who are equal following nature, and in no way differ naturally, but nevertheless, [differ] for a time in which one governs, and the others are subjects. Human industry invented a certain difference, both with regard to figure, which consists in external badges, and also in conversation, because they are named otherwise than before, and men address them differently; and likewise with respect to honors, because citizens display a certain reverence for those who are in a government which they did not display before. Just as the poet Amasis said about a foot washer. For he who is a foot washer, if badges of this kind were placed around him and the two other gifts were displayed, would not seem to differ from a governor of the city. Thus, therefore, it is clear that the political government is transferred from person to person. But this does not happen in the government of the husband toward the woman: for he who is a husband does not afterward become a woman, or the converse; but he always stays in the same mode.

Then, where he says puerorum autem principatus, etc., he compares the paternal government with the kingly following a likeness; and he says that the government of the father with respect to children—that is, sons—is kingly. For in this government, two things are attended to: namely, that the father, who generates, governs according to love, for he naturally loves his sons; and moreover, he governs according to old age, as if he has a certain natural prerogative of age over his sons; and in this regard, it is a species, that is, a likeness, of a kingly government. And so it is that “Homer called Jove,” that is, the highest God, “the father of men and gods,” that is, the king of all, both of men, and of higher substances, which they used to call gods. For it must be that the king, who perpetually governs and has the fullness of power in all things, differs from subordinates according to nature in a certain magnitude of goodness; and that he is nevertheless the same genus as them, at least regarding the human species. But it will be better if he is also from the same union of people. And this is also the comparison of older toward the younger, and of generator to generated, namely, that they have a natural prerogative of perfection. Therefore, it is must be that the king naturally differs from the others: for if he were not naturally better in a certain goodness, it would not be just for him to always have mastery with a fullness of power over his equals, as will be said below in the third part. Thus, therefore, a difference of nature separates the kingly government from the political: but love separates the kingly government from the tyrannical, which does not rule on account of the love that it has for its subordinates, but for its own gain.

Then, where he says manfiestum igitur, etc., he concludes that the governing intention of an economist is more chiefly about these latter two associations than about the others. For he more intends things that concern human beings than that concern the possession of unensouled things, like wheat, and wine, and other things like this. And he ought more to intend the virtue through which men live well than the virtue of ownership, through which a possession is acquired and multiplied, which is signified by the name “wealth”: and likewise, he ought more to have zeal for the virtue of free men than of slaves. And the reason for this can be assigned, because the governing intention of each thing concerns its end. But unensouled objects are pursued on account of men, as an end, and slaves on account of the free, so that they may assist them.

Then, where he says primo quidem igitur, etc., because he had made mention about the virtue of the free and of slaves, he raises a question about this: and he does three things in this regard.

First, he raises it.

Second, he resolves it, at manifestum quia necesse, [I.10.8] etc.

Third, out of this solution, he raises again another question, at dubitabit autem utique aliquis, [I.11.1] etc.

About the first, he does two things.

First, he raises a question about master and slave.

Second, about the other governments, at fere autem idem est quod quaeritur, [I.10.7] etc.

Therefore, he says first that there can be a certain doubt about slaves. For it is clear that a slave ought to have a certain instrumental [organicum] and assistant virtue, through which he may know scientifically [sciat] and may be able to carry out the mandates of the master and to serve him, just as it was said above that there are certain servile sciences. But the doubt is about whether beyond the virtues of this sort there is some other more worthy virtue fitting for a slave, such as the moral virtues, like temperance, fortitude, justice, and others of this sort; or if there are no virtues fitting for a slave except those that belong to bodily service. And he says that on either side there seems to be a difficulty: because if it is fitting for slaves to have virtues of this sort, just as the free do, they will not seem to differ from the free in anything; on the other hand, it seems unfitting if they do not have the virtues through which men live according to reason, since they are men who share in reason.

Then, where he says fere autem idem, etc., he raises a certain question about the other governments, and he says that the same thing that is asked about the slave can also be asked about women and children: whether it is necessary for the woman to be temperate, and brave, and just, and likewise the child, or not. And this question can also be raised universally about every government: whether there is the same virtue for governor and for subject, or not. And he objects to each side. Because if both the governor and the subject must participate in calocagatia, that is, the goodness of virtue—for calos means “good”, and likewise, cagaton—then there will be no reason that the one ought to be permanently subordinate, and the other to rule—that is, for his whole life. It would be different if they were successively subjects and then governed, as happens in the political government. Nor can it be said that the virtue of governing and being subject differ according to greater and less, for greater and less do not alter the kind. But to govern and to be subject differ in kind; so it does not seem to be sufficient for the difference between governing and being subject that one has more virtue than the other. And on the other side, if it were said that it is necessary for one to have virtue, but not the other, something unfitting would also follow. Because if he who governs will not be sober and just, he will not be able to govern well. But if the subject does not have these virtues, he will not be able to be subjected well, because he will frequently fail to do those things that he must do on account of intemperance or fear, and thus he will not be a good subject.

Then, where he says manifestum igitur quia necesse, etc., he resolves the proposed difficulty,

and he first proposes a solution in general;

second, specifically, at palam autem hoc, [I.10.11] etc.

Therefore, he first concludes from the reasons brought forward [inductis] for one side that it is necessary for both the governor and the subject to participate in virtue; for otherwise, neither will the one govern well, nor will the other be subject well. But there is a certain difference of virtue for both, and this is clear from those who are naturally subject to others. He posits an example in the parts of the soul, one part of which is naturally subject, namely, the irrational part, such as the irascible and concupiscent [faculties]. Now we posit that there is a certain virtue for both parts, but different. For the virtue of the rational part is prudence, but the virtue of the irrational part is temperance and fortitude and other virtues of this sort. So it is clear that with the same mode, things are also so disposed [se habet] in other affairs which both govern and are subjected according to nature. And because nature is diverse in diverse things, therefore, following nature, there are diverse things that govern and that are subjected. For in a different manner, a free man governs his slave, and the male the female, and a man a child, as was also grasped previously. But the parts of the soul which were mentioned are innate in all of these, and so their virtues are innate in all the aforementioned, but differently.

And this is clear first of all with reference to the rational part, to which it belongs to take counsel. For a slave, insofar as he is a slave, does not have counsel in his actions. The reason for this is, because we take counsel about those things that are in our power, but a slave does not have his acts in his power, but his acts are in the power of the master. So the slave does not have a free power of taking counsel. However, a woman, since she is free, has a power of counsel, but her counsel is not forceful. The reason for this is because, on account of the pliability of her nature, her reason does not firmly adhere to counsels, but is swiftly distanced from them on account of certain feelings, such as that of concupiscence, or anger, or fear, or something of this sort. Children, moreover, have counsel, but imperfectly. The reason for this is, because they do not have the perfect use of reason, such that they are not able to discuss particular things that ought to be attended to in counsels. Thus they [are all] disposed in diverse manners toward that which is of reason.

Likewise, the moral virtues must also be considered: for all participate in them, but not in the same manner. But each one participates in them insofar as it is necessary for his own work. Whence he who governs either the city, or slaves, or women, or children, must have perfect moral virtue, because his work is the work of the architect, simply speaking, that is, of the governing artisan. For just as the governing artisan guides and commands the assistants of his art who are at work by hand, so also the governor directs his subjects: and therefore, he holds the office of reason, which is disposed similarly to a governing artisan over the inferior parts of the soul. And so it must be that he who governs should have perfect reason: but each of the others who are subjected only have as much reason and virtue as he who governs puts into them—that is, they only must have what is sufficient to follow the guidance of the governor, for fulfilling his mandates. And so it is obvious that in all of the aforementioned things, there is some moral virtue, namely, temperance, fortitude, and justice. There is not, however, the same virtue for men and for women and for other subjects, as Socrates thought: but the fortitude of men is for governing, so that they will not hold back on account of fear from ordering what ought to be done. But in women, and in any subordinate, there must be an assisting fortitude, so that they will not hold back from giving their own assistance on account of fear. So also, fortitude differs in the leader of an army and in the soldiers. And just as was said about fortitude, so it ought to be said about all the other virtues: those that are in a governor, indeed, have governing qualities, but those in subordinates are assistive. And through this it is clear that the virtues of these do not differ only according to greater and less, but otherwise, according to their rationales.

Then, where he says palam autem hoc, etc., he more fully clarifies what had been said in the particular: and he says that that which was said will be more fully clarified for those who wish to study more in the particular. Because those who wish to speak about human actions only universally deceive themselves, because they cannot fully arrive at the truth; just as if someone where content to understand what that virtue is through which the soul is well disposed, or through which man is at work justly, or something else like this, and desired to understand nothing more about virtue: he would deceive himself, and have an imperfect and non-advantageous understanding of virtue. For those who calculate the virtues specifically, as Gorgias did, speak much better than him who speaks only in general about what the reason for this thing is, because acts are about particulars. Whence, also, those things that belong to acts must be studied as particulars. And therefore, just as a certain poet said a certain particular thing about women, pertaining to their virtue, so also it must be evaluated in all things. For it belongs to the elegance and dignity of a woman that she be silent: and this comes forth from the modesty that is owed to women. But this does not belong to the elegance of a man, but moreso that he should speak as it is seemly. Whence also the apostle warns that women should be silent in churches, and if they want to say something, they should interrogate their husbands about it at home. And because a child is imperfect, his virtue is not toward himself, that is, so that he should be ruled following his own perception, but so that [his life] may be organized following that which is fitting for the end he ought [to pursue], and toward obeying his leader, that is, his educator. So also, in Ecclesiasticus, the wise man says: neither give power to your son in his youth, nor regard to his thoughts. Likewise, also, the virtue of a slave is in the ordering toward his master. For it was said above that the slave is useful for the necessities of life: whence he does require virtue, but little; and only so much that he not fail in those works he ought to do, on account of the intemperance of concupiscence, or because of timidity.