Lecture 5

So it is clear from all this that the despotic and the political are not the same, nor doe all have the same government toward each other, as some assert, for there are some who by nature are of the free, but others who are of the slaves.

And indeed, economics is monarchic; for all in the household are led by one; but politics is government of those free and equal.

Now indeed, a despot is not so named after some science, but because he is such. Likewise also the slave and the free.

Now certainly, there will be both a despotic science and a servile science. The servile, indeed, will be of the sort that the man of Syracuse cultivated. For there, for a fee, he taught the boys the services of handmaids. Now certainly, there will be both more of these discplines, such as cooking, and also other such general services. And for others there are others, those more honorable works, but these are more necessary, and according to the proverb: slave before slave, master before master. Therefore, all such things are, indeed, servile sciences.

Now the despotic science is what is about the use of slaves. For [one is] a despot not in possessing slaves, but in using slaves.

But this science has nothing great about it, nor is it to be venerated. For what the slave must know to do, this the master must know to direct; because of this, for anyone who has the power that they do not themselves have to endure this evil, a manager takes up this honor. But they themselves live for civic life or philosophy.

But what is acquisitive of another is from both of these, such as when a certain just war exists, or through hunting. Therefore, what concerns the slave and the master has been thus determined in this way.

Manifestum autem et ex hiis etc. After the philosopher sought after the truth of the opinions of those who posit that slavery is not natural, he here proceeds to inquire about another posited opinion: that despotism is both the same as politics, and that it is a certain science.

And first he excludes the first mode;

second, the second, at despotes quidem igitur, etc.

About the first he does two things.

First, he shows that despotic [government]—that is, mastery—is not the same as political [government].

Second, that economic [government] is not the same as political, at et oeconomica quidem, etc.

Therefore, he says first that from what has been said, it can be clear that they have a false opinion who say that despotic [government], that is, mastery, and political [government], and any kind of government are one and the same. For political is the government over those who are free after nature, but despotic is government over slaves. For it was said above that, with a diversity of subjects and governors there follows a diversity in government so that with better subjects, there is a better government. For despotic and political government are not the same, but the political is more preeminent.

Then, where he says et oeconomica quidem, etc., he shows the difference of political [government] with regard to economic[government]—under which the despotic is contained, since the despotic is the government over slaves, but economic[government] is over all who inhabit the household, of which some are slaves, and some free. Therefore, economic [government] differs from political [government] in this, that economic government is a sort of monarchy, that is, the government of one; for every household is ruled by one who is the paterfamilias; but political is the government of those who are free and equal, and so persons exchange governing and being subjects because of equality, and many governments are constituted, either in one or in diverse offices. But it seems that these differences are not fitting.

First, indeed, because not every economic [government] seems to be a monarchy, but only when the father of the household rules; but when both man and wife have mastery, it is an aristocracy; and when brothers rule, it is a timocracy, or political, as is said in Ethics VIII.

Secondly, because monarchy is one of the regimes [politiarum], as will be said in Bk. III.

So regarding the first point, it should be said that the philosopher is speaking here about the government of the household after its best state, which is able to persevere: and that brothers should govern in the household—this is not permanent, but only for however long it takes them to divide their inheritance, and then each one rules his own household. And the government of the wife in the household is not government simply speaking [simpliciter], but in a certain respect [secundum quid], since she herself is subject to her husband, and if it happens otherwise, it is a corrupted household, and without order.

Regarding the second point, it should be said that he is speaking here about the government of the political [community], according to which political government is distinguished from kingly, as was grasped above.

Then, where he says despotes quidem igitur, etc., he disproves the aforementioned opinion with reference to its claim that despotism is a science.

And he shows first that it is not a science.

Second, that it has a certain adjunct science, at scientia autem utique erit.

Therefore, he first says that a despot is not so named after a science—because he has the science of mastery—but because things are so arranged [dispositus] either according to nature or law that he has mastery; and it ought to be said likewise about a slave or someone free. But despotism is that by which someone is denominated a despot: therefore despotism is not a science.

Then, where he says scientia autem, etc., he shows that despotism has an adjunct science. And about this he does two things.

First, he lays out his intention, saying that there is a certain despotic science, that is, the masterful, and a certain servile one.

Second, at servilis quidem, etc., he clarifies both,

and first the servile;

second the despotic, at despotica autem, etc.

Therefore, he first says that the servile science is the sort that someone in the city of the Syracusans taught, who received fees, and taught boys certain maid-services [ministeria], that is, taught them to do certain services that maids had been enjoined to do, or other slaves. And this science extends itself to more than just preparing appetizers, and other services of this sort that must be performed. For a difference attends these services in two regards: in worthiness and necessity. For some of them are more honorable, though less necessary, such the service of preparing fine food; but some are services more necessary but less honorable, such as the service of making bread. And so the proverb became ingrained that not all slaves are equal, but one slave is preferred to another, just as master is to master. Therefore, because such services are for slaves, it is clear that all such sciences are servile sciences: hence, to bring out the difference from these, some arts are called “liberal arts,” which designates them for the acts of the free.

Then, where he says despotica autem, etc., he clarifies what is the despotic science. And about this he does three things.

First, he clarifies what was proposed.

Second, he shows the construction of the despotic science, at est autem haec scientia, etc.

Third, he treats of a certain adjacent science, at acquisitiva autem, etc.

Therefore, he calls a “despotic science” that through which someone knows [scit] how to use slaves well, not that through which someone acquires slaves. And he proves this through this: that someone is called a “despot”, that is, a master, not in possessing, that is, in acquiring slaves, but moreso in using them.

Then, where he says est autem haec scientia, etc., he shows the condition of this science, and he says that this science is not of great valuation or veneration.

And he proves this first through reason: because the masterful science consists in this: that man knows how to use slaves by directing [praecipendo] them. And this is not great, for the things that the slave must know for doing and that the master must know for directing are the same: whence it is clear that this science is of no great importance.

Second, he clarifies the same thing through human custom: for since this science is not reputed of any importance, anyone who can detach themselves so that they do not have to suffer this evil, that is, so that they are not weighed down by the care of slaves, do detach themselves and free themselves up so that they can attend to the political life, or the civil life, or to the philosophic life, and the care of slaves they entrust to some manager.

Then, where he says acquisitiva autem, etc., because he had said that the despotic science does not consist in acquiring slaves, he adds that there is some other science for acquiring slaves which differs both from the servile and the despotic sciences: and this is of many kinds. He gives two examples: through one of them, a man acquires other men as slaves, and this is the science of accomplishing a just war in which those who are justly captured are made into slaves (though if the war is unjust, it would not be a just acquisition of slaves, and so it would not be done after a science); the other science, however, is that through which a man acquires beasts as slaves, and this is the science of hunting.

Lastly, he concludes in an epilogue that master and slave have been determined up to this point.