Chapter 5 — Arguments that would seem to prove that evil is not beside the intention

There are, however, some objections that would seem to run counter to this conclusion.

For that which occurs beside the intention of the agent is said to happen fortuitously, casually, and seldom. (Ch. 3.) But evil is not said to happen fortuitously and casually, nor does it occur seldom, but always or frequently. For in the physical order generation is always accompanied by corruption. And in voluntary agents sin is of frequent occurrence, since it is as difficult to behave virtuously as to find the center of a circle, as Aristotle states. (Nicomachean Ethics 2.9.) Therefore, it would seem that evil is not an unintentional occurrence.

Again. Aristotle says expressly that vice is voluntary. (Nicomachean Ethics 3.5.) He proves this from the fact that a man does an injustice voluntarily, and it is absurd to suppose that the man who does unjust actions voluntarily does not wish to be unjust, and that he who rapes voluntarily does not wish to be incontinent; and again from the fact that legislators punish evil-doers as doing evil voluntarily. Therefore, evil would seem not to be unintentional or involuntary.

Further. Every natural movement has an end intended by nature. Now corruption is a natural movement, even as generation. Therefore, its end, which is privation having the aspect of evil, is intended by nature, even as the form and the good, which are the end of generation.