Chapter 20 — How things imitate the divine goodness

From what has been said it is clear that the last end of all things is to become like God. Now that which has properly the aspect of an end is the good. (Ch. 16.) Therefore, properly speaking, things tend to become like to God insofar as he is good.

Now, creatures do not acquire goodness in the way in which it is in God, although each thing imitates the divine goodness according to its mode. For the divine goodness is simple, being all in one, as it were. For the divine being contains the whole fullness of perfection, as we proved in the first book. (Ch. 28.) Therefore, since a thing is good so far as it is perfect, God’s being is his perfect goodness: in God, to be, to live, to be wise, to be happy, and whatever else is seen to pertain to perfection and goodness, are one and the same, as though the total of his goodness were God’s very being. Again, God’s being is the substance of the existing God. (Bk. 1, ch. 21.) But this cannot be so in other things. For it was proved in the second book (Ch. 15.) that no created substance is its own being. Therefore, if a thing is good so far as it is, and nothing is its own being, then nothing its own goodness, and each one is good by having a share of good, even as by having a share of being it is a being.

Also. All creatures are not placed on the same level of goodness. For in some the substance is both form and act, namely, such as are competent to be actually and to be good by the mere fact that they exist. But in others, the substance is composed of matter and form; such are competent to be actually and to be good, but by some part of their being (namely, their form). Accordingly, God’s substance is his goodness, but a simple substance participates in goodness by the very fact that it exists, and a composite substance by some part of itself.

In this third degree of substances, diversity is to be found again in respect of being. For in some composed of matter and form, the form fills the entire potency of matter so that the matter retains no potency to another form. Consequently, neither is there in any other matter a potency to this same form. Such are the heavenly bodies, which consist of their entire matter. In others the form does not fill the whole potency of matter, so that the matter retains a potency to another form, and in another part of matter there remains potency to this form: for instance, in the elements and their compounds. Since, then, privation is the absence in substance of what can be in substance, it is clear that together with this form which does not fill the whole potency of matter, there is associated the privation of a form, which privation cannot be associated with a substance whose form fills the whole potency of matter, nor with that which is a form essentially, and much less with that one whose essence is its very being. And seeing that it is clear that there can be no movement where there is no potency to something else, for movement is the act of that which is in potency, (Physics 3.1.) it is clear that in this last order of substances, good is changeable and has an admixture of the opposite evil, since evil is the privation of good. This cannot occur in the higher orders of substances. Therefore, the substance answering to this last description stands lowest both in being and in goodness.

We find degrees of goodness also among the parts of this substance composed of matter and form. For, since matter considered in itself is being in potency, and since form is its act, and again, since a composite substance derives actual existence from its form, it follows that the form is good in itself; the composite substance is good as having its form actually; and the matter is good as being in potency to the form. And although a thing is good insofar as it is a being, it does not follow that matter, which is only being potentially, is only a potential good. For being is predicated absolutely, while good is founded on order: for a thing is said to be good not merely because it is an end, or possesses the end, but it is said to be good as long as it is directed to the end (even if it has not attained the end).

Accordingly, matter cannot be called a being absolutely, because it is a potential being, by which it is shown to have an order towards being; yet this suffices for it to be called a good absolutely on account of this very order. This shows that the good extends further than being in a sense, for which reason Dionysius says that the good includes both existing and nonexisting things. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names,* ch. 4.)* For even nonexistent things (namely, matter considered as subject to privation) seek a good (namely, to exist). Hence it follows that matter also is good, for nothing but the good seeks the good.

In yet another way the creature’s goodness falls short from God’s. For, as we have stated, God has supreme perfection of goodness in his very being. But the creature has its perfection not in one thing but in many, because what is united in the highest is manifold in the lowest. Hence virtue, wisdom, and operation are predicated of God in respect of one and the same thing, but of creatures in respect of different things; the further a creature is from the highest goodness, the more does the perfection of its goodness require to be manifold. And if it be unable to attain to perfect goodness, it will reach to imperfect goodness in a few respects. Hence it is that although the first and highest good is utterly simple, and the substances nearest to it in goodness approach to it likewise in simplicity, yet the lowest substances are found to be more simple than some that are higher (for instance, elements than animals and men), because they are unable to reach the perfection of knowledge and understanding, to which animals and men attain.

From what has been said, it is evident that although God possesses his perfect and entire goodness in respect of his simple being, creatures nevertheless do not attain to the perfection of their goodness through their being alone, but through many things. Therefore, although each one is good inasmuch as it exists, it cannot be called good absolutely if it lack other things that are required for its goodness. Thus a man who, being despoiled of virtue, is addicted to vice, is said indeed to be good in a restricted sense (namely, as a being and as a man), but not absolutely; in fact, he should rather be called evil. Accordingly, ‘to be’ and ‘to be good’ are not the same in every creature, although each one is good insofar as it exists. But in God, ‘to be’ and ‘to be good’ are simply one and the same.

If, then, each thing tends to a likeness to God’s goodness as its end; and a thing is like God’s goodness in respect of whatever belongs to its goodness; and the goodness of a thing consists not merely in its being, but in whatever is required for its perfection, as we have proved, it is clear that things are directed to God as their end not only in respect of their substantial being, but also in respect of such things as are accidental to them and belong to their perfection, as well as in respect of their proper operation, which also belongs to a thing’s perfection. (Cf. ch. 27.)