Chapter 28 — That happiness does not consist in honors

From the foregoing it is also clear that neither does man’s supreme good or happiness consist in honors.

For man’s ultimate end and happiness is his most perfect operation, as we have shown above. (Ch. 25.) But man’s honor does not consist in something done by him, but in something done to him by another who shows him honor. Therefore, man’s happiness must not be placed in honors.

Again. That which is on account of another good and desirable thing is not the last end. Now such is honor: for a man is not rightly honored except on account of some other good in him. For this reason do men seek to be honored, as though wishing to have a voucher for some good that is in them; hence they rejoice more in being honored by the great and the wise. (Nicomachean Ethics 1.5.) Therefore, we must not assign man’s happiness to honors.

Besides. Happiness is obtained through virtue. Now virtuous deeds are voluntary, else they were not praiseworthy. Therefore, happiness must be a good obtainable by man through his will. But it is not in a man’s power to secure honor; rather is it in the power of the man who pays honor. (Nicomachean Ethics 1.5.) Therefore, happiness is not to be assigned to honors.

Moreover. Only the good can be worthy of honor. Yet it is possible even for the wicked to be honored. Therefore, it is better to become worthy of honor than to be honored. Therefore, honor is not man’s supreme good.

Furthermore. The supreme good is the perfect good. Now the perfect good is incompatible with any evil. But that which has no evil in it cannot possibly be evil. Therefore, that which is in possession of the supreme good cannot be evil. Yet it is possible for an evil person to receive honor. Therefore, honor is not man’s supreme good.